Transcript Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?

Shall the Religious Inherit
the Earth?:
Demography, Religion and
Radicalization
Eric Kaufmann, School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College,
University of London, [email protected]
Religiosity
Religious Fertility vs. Religious
Decline
"One of the most central injunctions of virtually
all traditional religions is to strengthen the family,
to encourage people to have children, to
encourage women to stay home and raise
children, and to forbid abortion, divorce, or
anything that interferes with high rates of
reproduction. As a result of these two
interlocking trends, rich nations are becoming
more secular, but the world as a whole is
becoming more religious." (Norris and
Inglehart 2004: 22-23, emphasis added)
Religiosity and Fertility Among European Jews, by Age,
1981-1997
Children per Woman
3.5
3
2.5
2
over 45
1.5
18 to 44
1
0.5
0
Religious
Not Religious
Religiosity
Atheist
Hypothesis: a combination of higher
religious fertility and immigration will lead
to a growth in the religious population
(defined in terms of belief) that exceeds
the net loss of communicants through
religious apostasy.
Results: Proportion Without Religion
Percent
Assuming:
35
30
High secularization trend
25
20
Constant secularization trend
15
10
5
20
01
20
06
20
11
20
16
20
21
20
26
20
31
20
36
20
41
20
46
20
51
0
Low secularization trend
Austria,
TFR 2001
Roman Catholics
1.32
Protestants
1.21
Muslims
2.34
Others
1.44
Without
0.86
Total
1.33
Projected Religious Population, 6 Early
Secularising Societies, 2004-2104
100%
Proportion Religious
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2004
2014
2024
2034
2044
2054
2064
2074
2084
2094
2104
Attendance at Religious Services, by Faith and Age,
2004 ESS
Weekly Attendance
RC
Prot
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Eastern
Muslims
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
'A Religious Person'
Religious or Not, by Age Category, Muslims in Islamic
Countries, 2000 WVS
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
15-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
Source WVS 1999-2000. N=15197 cases. Question asked in Algeria, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Egypt, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Iran, Morocco,
Turkey, Uganda and Tanzania.
65-98
Religious Retention by Faith and Birthplace, UK, 2001-3
(Excludes nonidentifiers. 'Practice' is self-description)
UK BP Muslims
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Foreign BP Muslims
UK Afro Christians
Foreign Afro Christians
UK White Christians
Foreign White Christians
2001
Attend Worship*
2003
Retain Religious Practice*
N.B. 'BP' refers to Bangladeshi and Pakistani; 'UK' refers to British-born
and 'Foreign' to foreign-born
Age Structure of Major Religious Groups in UK, 2001
Census
0 - 15
16 - 34
45
40
% in Age Band
35
30
25
39
37
34
41
35 - 64
65 and over
32
25
25
20
22
19
18
15
10
5
4
4
0
Muslim
No religion
Christian
Canadian Religion in Decline
• Canada 2004: 66% attend less than
monthly, 19% no religion, up from 12% in
1985.
• Europe 2004: 72% attend less than
monthly. 39% no religion.
• US 2004: 51% attend less than monthly.
14% no religion.
• 40% of Canadians have a low degree of
religiosity, 31% are moderately religious
and 29% are highly religious.'
(Schellenberg & Clark 2006)
Future Religious Return?
• Immigrants more religious than nativeborn, and show no similar inclination to
secularism
• Canadians with 'no religion' declined from
20% in 2000 to 19% in 2004. First decline
since 1985. Could immigration and higher
immigrant fertility be a possible factor?
• Would suggest demographically-driven
religious revival in Canada, as in Europe
and USA
9.0%
8.0%
7.0%
6.0%
5.0%
4.0%
3.0%
2.0%
1.0%
0.0%
USA
Canada
Europe
England &
Wales
Holland
France
Muslim Fertility Rate, Selected Countries
3
2.5
2
TFR
Proportion of Total
Muslim Population, Selected Countries, 2001-2
1.5
1
0.5
0
UK 2001
Austria 2001
Canada 2001
Switzerland
2000
USA 19992006
Source: Belanger 2006
Source: Belanger 2006
Canadian Immigration
2004
China and Hong Kong
38,608
India
28,183
Philippines
13,900
Pakistan
13,011
Iran
6,491
United States
6,470
Romania
5,816
Great Britain
5,353
South Korea
5,351
Colombia
4,600
• Currently and
Historically 60% Asian,
dominated by nonMuslims (Chinese,
Indians, Philippinos)
• Demographic Transition
and development may
shift sources to Middle
East and Africa in the
future
Canadian Muslim Demography
• Moderate Sized Religious Group
• Fast-growing, perhaps at same rate or
slightly slower than in W. Europe
• Falling fertility, modest level of immigration
• Urban concentration, as in Europe
• More middle-class character, as in USA
• I am unclear about 'demographic
polarization' trends between moderates
and fundamentalists
Demographic Radicalization
Source: ‘The
Moment of Truth’,
Ha’aretz,
8 February 2007
Decline of Liberal Protestants
USA: Denominational
Projections to 2050
35%
30%
Protestants Fund.
25%
Protestants Mod.
Catholics
20%
Hindus Buddhists
Jews
15%
Muslims
Other Religions
10%
None
5%
0%
2002
2012
2022
2032
2042
2052
Zero Immigration Scenario
35%
30%
Protestants Fund.
25%
Protestants Mod.
Catholics
20%
Hindus Buddhists
Jews
15%
Muslims
Other Religions
10%
None
5%
0%
2002
2012
2022
2032
2042
2052
TFR (non-Hispanic White, 2002)
Relationship between the non-Hispanic White Total Fertility Rate in 2002 and
the Percent Vote for Bush in 2004 (r = +.78)
UT
2.40
AK
ID
2.20
KS
SD
2.00
AR
NM
MD
1.80
NY
CT
1.60
MA
VT
NJ MN
MI
IL DE OR
WA PA
HI
ME
OH
NV
WI
AZ GA MS
OK
NE
IN TX
LA TN
VA
MT KY
CO
NC
WV SC
FL
WY
AL
ND
NH
RI
40.00
50.00
60.00
Percent Vote for Bush 2004
70.00
Muslim World
• The religious cleavage between Islamists and
Others (Secular Nationalists/Socialists/Liberals)
• Q: Will higher fertility endow Islamists with
political leverage into the future?
• Berman & Stepanyan (2003) find a significant
but modest link between Madrassa attendance
and fertility in four countries
• This study uses WVS 1999-2000 dataset on 715 countries (depends on question)
Agree with Shari'a Law, by Age, 2000 WVS, Muslims in
Islamic Countries
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
15-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 7436 respondents. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.
65-98
rs
U
ni
ve
er
s
e
U
ni
v
ity
ity
)
So
m
Se
c
on
da
ry
(U
ni
vp
pr
e
ni
v
(u
ar
y
nd
ec
o
>S
re
p
p)
.
Te
ch
da
ry
on
Se
c
>S
ec
o
nd
ar
y
Pr
im
Pr
im
>
ar
y
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
ar
y
% Agreeing
Agree with Shari'a Law, by Education, Islamic Countries,
WVS 2000, Muslims Only
Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 7412 respondents. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.
Islamist Religiosity
• Younger, Educated are less Islamist, but effect is
complex and there are exceptions (i.e. under
24s, university students)
• Urbanites more Islamist than rural population
• Higher education levels may modestly lower
Islamism, but urbanization may raise it.
Generational change will have little effect
• GDP per head unlikely to affect religiosity
• Nationalism and Islamism seem compatible
Fertility by Support for Shari'a Law, by Education,
1999-2000 WVS, Muslims in Islamic Countries
H. School+
4.5
Less than H.School
Children Ever Born
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
Str Agree
Agree
Neither
Disagree
Str. Disagree
Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 1649 respondents with High School or More, 3318
respondents with Less than High School. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia,
Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.
Attitudes to Shari'a and Fertility, Islamic Countries, by
Urban and Rural, 2000 WVS (Muslims Only)
3.5
Children Ever Born
3.3
3.1
city > 100k
2.9
town < 10k
2.7
2.5
2.3
2.1
1.9
1.7
1.5
Str. Agree
Agree
Neither
Disagree
Str. Disagree
Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 2796 respondents in towns under 10,000 and 1561
respondents in cities over 100,000. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia,
Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.
Islamist Fertility
• Islamists in Muslim countries are more
fertile; some evidence for sharpened
fertility effect in more 'modern' contexts,
i.e. cities, the educated
• But the growth of the Islamist population
through higher fertility is still a long-term
process, unlike Israel
Canada
• Will we see religious polarization ('demographic
radicalization') within the Jewish, Christian and
Muslim populations, as elsewhere?
• Anecdotal evidence of evangelical Protestant
and ultra Orthodox Jewish demographic vitality,
set against backdrop of secularization
• Canada generally reflects global fertility and
retention trends in Abrahamic faiths
• Demographic radicalization not an imminent
prospect in Canada, but cannot be ruled out for
the longer term (i.e. to 2050)
Conclusion
• Canadian Muslim population is in the medium
range for Western countries, with similar
demography to other western Muslim
populations
• Canada undergoing secularization process, but
immigration will probably lead to a reversal in
the future
• Global Evidence of higher fertility among
religious literalists/fundamentalists
• Effect strongest in Judaism, followed by
Christianity and Islam
• Canada will be affected by these developments