Transcript Mine Health and Safety Act - Supplemental Teaching Resources

Mine Disasters and Lessons
©Mar. 21, 2006 Dr. B. C. Paul
Easy to Forget How Common it Used to be for
Mines to Blow Up
140
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80
60
2000s
1990s
1980s
1970s
1960s
1950s
1940s
1930s
1920s
1910s
1900s
1890s
1880s
1870s
1860s
1850s
1840s
1830s
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
Decade
40
20
0
# of Explosions and
Fires
# Killed
Frequency of Mine Explosions and Fires
# Killed
# Mines
Recent Disasters (since 1969)
#1
#2
#3
#4
#5
#6
#6
#7
#8
#9
#9
#9
#10
#10
#11
#11
#11
#12
#12
#12
#12
#12
2/26/1972
12/30/1970
12/19/1984
3/9+11/1976
4/15/1981
9/23/2001
12/8/1981
1/2/2006
9/13/1989
8/6 + 8/16
2007
7/22/1972
3/1/1977
12/7/1992
12/7/1981
6/21/1983
1/20/1982
7/23/1966
2/6/1986
12/16/1972
4/4/1978
11/7/1980
May-06
Buffalo Mining Co.
Finley Coal No. 15 & 16
Emory Mining Co. Wilberg Mine
Scotia
Mid-Continent Resources Dutch Creek #1
Jim Walter Resources, Inc. #5
Grundy Mining #21
Sago Mine
Pyro Mining Co. No. 9 Slope Wm. Station
Genwal Mine
Worst Since 1969
Saunders, WV
Hyden, KY
Orangeville, UT
Whitesburg, Ky
Redstone, CO
Brookwood, AL
Whitewell, Tn
WV
Sullivan, KY
Utah
Blacksville #1
Porter Tunnel
Southmountain Coal Mine #3
Adkins Coal Mine #11
Clinchfield Coal McClure #1
#1
Siltex Mine
Loveridge No. 22
Itmann No. 3
Moss No. 3
Farrel 17
Darby
Blacksville, WV
Tower City, PA
Norton, VA
Kite, KY
McClure, VA
Caynor, Ky
Mt. Hope, WV
Fairview, WV
Itmann, WV
Duty, VA
Uneed WV
Kentucky
125 Coal
38 Coal
27 Coal
26 Coal
15 Coal
13 Coal
13 Coal
12 Coal
10 Coal
9 Coal
9 Coal
9 Coal
8 Coal
8 Coal
7 Coal
7 Coal
7 Coal
5 Coal
5 Coal
5 Coal
5 Coal
5 Coal
Dam failure
Explosion
Fire
Explosion
Explosion
Explosion
Explosion
Explosion
Explosion
Chain Pillar Collapse
Explosion
Inundation
Explosion
Explosion
Explosion
Explosion
Explosion
Collapsed coal pile caused suffocation
Explosion
Inundation
Explosion
Explosion
Buffalo Creek
• Not really a mining accident per say
• Rains weakened and overtopped a tailings
pond dam
• The dam collapsed sending water down
narrow canyons
– In WV people live mostly in the river bottoms
– Canyon structure acted as a shot gun barrel
wiping out towns and the people in them.
Findley Disaster of 1970 #2
• Dec 30 1970 Explosion killed 38
– 1969 law was new and being transitioned in.
– Mine had a proven history of allowing coal dust to
accumulate, doing poor rock dusting, and blasting
anyway they felt like.
– They loaded up over 100 holes into the roof – loaded
with cartridge explosives that were not permissible –
stemmed the holes with curtain scraps (unconfined
shot) and fired them all at once (instead of 20 at a time)
– Shot stirred up and ignited dust sending a powerful coal
dust explosion through the mine
• 31 killed instantly rest within a short time from CO
#3 Wilberg Disaster of 1984
• Dec 19, 1984 a defective compressor that
had its safeties bypassed caught fire.
– Two miners working on the beltline discovered
the fire and attempted to extinguish it
unsuccessfully
– Fire spread to the belt line and the fire
suppressant foam nozzle and extinguishing
system failed to go off properly
– Miners evacuated and spread the alarm.
Meanwhile Back at the Longwall
• Longwall was about to complete a worlds
production record
– Several company officials were on hand.
– Warning was phoned to the section of an out of
control belt fire
• People apparently ignored the warning and did not
attempt to put on their filter self rescuers (a filter
self rescuer is carried on miners belt and catalyzes
conversion of CO to CO2)
Back on the Belt Line
• Fire spread out of control burning through
the stoppings into the escapeway
– The mine had been allowed to operate with a
fall in the returns so it could not be used as an
alternate escape.
• Toxic atmosphere now flooded down the
airsupply into the longwall area.
At the Longwall
• Miners became confused as smoke and toxic
gasses flooded in
– 13 of 27 people on section scrambled for self rescuers
• Rest were cut down by CO before they could figure out what
to do (remember fire or explosion often brings black out
conditions with toxic air and moves in as a wave)
– Weakness of Filter Self Rescuer is it provides no self
contained atmosphere.
• SCSRs are like bulky back packs since 1980 had to be stored
near section
The Survivors Try To Escape
• 3 of the Survivors tried to exit using their filter
self rescuers but were cut down before they could
get to SCSRs
– May have waited to late to put them on or breathed
around FSR
• Mouth piece becomes hot enough in CO to blister your mouth
– but if you twinge or open your mouth your dead
• 4 more were confused and walked past the SCSRs
– As they advanced toward the fire area the oxygen was
depleted by the fire and they suffocated.
6 Survivors Get to the SCSRs
• 4 of the men tried to change from FSR to SCSRs but they
didn’t get them on before they tried to breath – the CO cut
them down
• 1 changed to an SCSR and tried to escape but ran out of air
or mistakenly inhaled
– SCSR’s have a reputation for being very hard to breath through –
especially under exertion or stress.
• One grabbed three rescuers and changing them as he went
– He cleared the fire and got to safety (well sort of)
• He took his SCSR off when he was sure it was safe – it wasn’t
• 27 people died – the entire longwall section and visitors
including first women killed in a coal mine disaster.
Wilberg Summary
• Wilberg is most serious mine disaster of recent
time stemming from
– Pure Stupidity
– Intentional violation of the regulations
– Poor training in the handling of rescuers
• Criticism of MSHA for issuing a variance
allowing mine to operate with secondary
escapeway through the returns blocked.
– Only one person made it far enough for blockage to
have been an issue and he got through
Scotia #4 – 26 killed
• SE mains had poor ventilation. Methane feeders
developed. Mine did not send Fire Boss into the entries to
inspect before the shift, but did send and electric loco in
that had been modified so that wiring exposed an ignition
source
– MESA believed the loco that reached the area as it exploded set off
the blast
– Mine prefers the story that a rock outburst dropped rock and
created a spark as the train went by
• The blast on March 9, 1976 killed 9 people. Six more fled
back into a mined panel and tried to barricade. The
barricade leaked and the miners died
• Rescuers got all the bodies out in 18 hours
Recovery of the Scotia Mine
• MESA inspectors began working down SE entries
to restore ventilation and investigate
• They had a major roof fall, sent in a tracked bolter
to work on things and clean them up
– Didn’t check for methane build up
– When they powered on the section and the bolter the
mine blew up again – Mar. 11, 1976
– Killed 11 more people
– Mine was sealed for a year because of more explosion
fears.
Highlighted Lessons
• Rescuers go into an un-stabilized environment and
are at risk from 2ndary explosions
• Mine explosions damage ventilation networks
• Miners trying to set up quick barricades often have
problems with barricades leaking CO
• People who don’t check their mine atmospheres
can get blown up – even when their badge says
MSHA
Dutch Creek #1, April 15, 1981 #5
• 15 Dead
• This was a deep mine at 2700 ft using longwall
– The mine was prone to rock bursts and release of
accompanying methane pockets
– Defense against explosions
• Methane detectors de-energized circuits quickly
• Enclosed “intrinsically safe” permitted circuits
• Rock dusting and dust clean-up to prevent explosions from
propagating
• Self rescuers for miners to protect themselves from carbon
monoxide.
The Event
• B shift started at 3:00 PM
– Mine blew up between 3:55 and 4:10 (hysteria prevents
knowing exactly)
– Personnel who could left the mine, and calls went out to
management, MSHA, and rescue teams
• Rescue efforts commenced to account for 19
missing people at 5:17
– Took just a little over an hour to get response going
– First trip got 4 people out by 6:39
Blast Damage – A Frequent Problem
• Teams generally work in pairs alternating advance into the
mine (still done today)
– Teams found stoppings blown out and had to repair roof and
ventilation structure to advance
– Need to establish fresh air as they advance
• If you don’t do this you run the risk of blowing the mine again with
your rescue teams inside.
– By time they reached the intake to the 102 section (a continuous
miner advance section) they were looking at a smashed up power
station
• Fairly sure by 10:30 that chances of finding remaining 15 alive were
slim. (a 15 psi over-pressure will smash a human body)
– As the teams advanced into the section they started pulling out
bodies
What Went Wrong
• Mother nature had another rock-burst that spread
broken coal all over and released a cloud of
methane
– Most of the equipment worked and miners and face
shut down
– Except the lights on miner
• Lights were an after market rig up
• It had been done in 1978 and never hooked up to the safety
system (which was why it didn’t go off)
• On April 6, 1980 a second jury rig put the switch in a box that
didn’t seal tight.
Saga of a Disaster
• One of the continuous miner operators went
and turned the non-cooperative circuit off
– The breaker arced and the box was not sealed
properly
– The spark ignited the methane pocket
– The rock burst had put fine coals dust all over
the face
• The methane explosion picket up the coal dust and
initiated a full fledged blast wave.
People Die
• Six miners were right on the face
– Three of the six were killed instantly from blast concussion
– Another was severely injured but died a short time later from CO
poisoning
– Two escaped the blast but did not get their rescuers on before the
CO got them
• Two miners were bringing a shuttle car away from the face
– The strengthening blast wave picked up coal dust from the shuttle
car and clobbered the two miners dead from the concusion
• Seven out-by support people and operators escaped the
concussion but died of CO poisoning.
Causes
• Natural mine dangers – rock bursts
• Jury-Rigged circuits
– Probably a lot of small fires associated with half cocked
jury-rig wire ups
– Jury rigged circuits don’t perform to spec when the
chips are down
– Had circuit been right the rock burst would have shut
the mine face down until the methane cleared
– Jury rigged circuits don’t kill people by the grace of
God
• If his grace is not on the job-site then somebody is going to get
dead.
Causes Cont.
• Coal Dust
– Coal dust adds to blast power but cannot ignite itself
– A methane ignition will set it off and give it the power
of a high explosive
– Reason keeping coal dust clean and faces dusted is sooo
important.
– In this case the rock burst put down the coal dust
blanket or there was some on top of the shuttle car or
feeder.
• Avoiding this dust by clean-up would have been hard
Lack of Fast Worker Response
• Only 5 of the 15 people were killed by the
blast even though they were in the middle
of it.
– One more was injured badly and could not have
been expected to get on a self rescuer
– Two more on the face didn’t have much time
– About 7 people would have had a little more
time after the swoosh of the blast wave
• Ability to get a rescuer on fast might have made a
big difference
Grundy #21 Tied for
th
6
Place
• Whitewell Tennessee Dec. 8 1981
– Grundy was a room a pillar mine.
• Methane ignition blast occurring at 12:00 noon
• Illustrates the issue of old mine workings
– Abandon workings cave and gob / can get methane
build ups
– One approach is to run-ventilation around edge of the
Gob to draw out and dilute methane.
• Alternative is to seal the area off all together to keep out
oxygen.
– Grudy used perimeter ventilation around the GOB
The Grundy Event
• Ventilation around GOB was not keeping
methane down in a GOB and it was leaking
into the Section #3 face area
– At 7:00 AM Section 3 had 5% methane in the
GOB and coming out
– Determined to try to drill holes ahead to flush
out the methane build up using ventilation air
Working with Geniuses
• Had a crew of 13 people on a mining face trying to drill
through to bleed away dangerous and explosive methane
concentrations
– Ventilation regs specify that can’t have but the last few cross cuts
open for fear of short circuiting ventilation air needed to keep
methane down.
• Lack of open cross cuts increases shuttle change out time and reduces
face productivity
• They had left extra cross cuts open and were shorting fresh air away
from the face where methane was building up
– Bozo Breath is up on the face fighting methane build up and pulls
out a cigarette and lights it up.
• CAPITAL LETTERS ON GIVE ME A LIGHT!
– He blew the whole crew up
What Went Wrong
• Mine had been short cutting on ventilation to the face area
– leaving opportunities for methane build up
• Mine had been sloppy in maintenance of perimeter
ventilation around GOB area
• Poor ventilation practices allowed methane build-up
• Mine was lax in smoking enforcement
– Had not had an inspection for two months even though mine policy
called for weekly
– Smoking was widespread and smoking materials were scattered all
over the mine
• Someone knew or should have known smoking policies and safety
was being neglected.
The Crown Jewel
• How could someone be so stupid that they
are on a face fighting methane – measuring
explosive concentrations coming out of a
GOB and then light up a cigarette with 12
of his buddies standing there?
What Did Not Go Wrong
• Face had just been rock dusted on the
previous shift and there was no coal dust
explosion wave to kill anyone else
Moral of this Story
• If you wonder why MSHA kicks individual “butt”
for smoking violations maybe carrying out 13
dead bodies will help illustrate.
• #2 Illinois Worst Mine Disaster of all time was the
Orient #2 blast just before Christmas in 1951
– 119 dead bodies spread out on the High School Gym
floor
– A Christmas thousands of widows, orphans, and close
relatives will never forget
– A family legacy in West Frankfort to this day
– Ignited by a miner lighting up a cigarette.
Cigarettes Still Kill
• South Mountain Virginia Dec. 7, 1992 (10th place)
– A poorly ventilated GOB began releasing very localized
methane pockets
– A miner with a butane lighter – lights up on a face
• (unlike Grundy he wouldn’t have known that methane was a
big hazard)
• He blows his whole crew of 8 to heck except the belt attendant
who made it out with his injuries
– Rock dusting on the maintenance shift just before the
production shift saved mine from a general explosion
that could have killed a mine full.
Jim Walter Resources #6 tie
• Sept 23, 2001 (right after 9/11)
– Crew of three was setting up cribs near a battery charging station
to respond to bad roof
– A fourth person was delivering supplies
– 32 people were in the mine
• The roof fell on the battery station
– Smashed up one battery and released a pocket of methane
– The battery arced and blew the methane at 5:20 pm
• 1 miner received near fatal injuries – others were very hurt
but managed to make their way out and to sound the alarm
The Rescue Begins
• The initial blast blew out the ventilation
controls in the area reversing flows and
cutting dilution of leaking methane gas
• Miners de-energized the electrical system to
cut spark ignition sources and then teams
from other areas of the mine moved in to
rescue the injured miner
Who Rescues the Rescuers?
• First team of 5 advanced through debries on the track haulage system
and found the air flows reversed
– Without any gas detection equipment they met 4 others and advanced into
the damaged area
• Team of 3 communicated to section foreman and went in to rescue the
miner
• They had remembered to turn off all the high voltage but forgot about
the traffic lights on the haulage system
– The methane build-up ignited at 6:20 pm this time picking up sloppy coal
dust accumulations and sending a firestorm wave through several sections
of the mine
• 11 of the advancing rescuers were blown to bits
– One was severely injured
– Regular rescue teams picked him up but he died the following day
A Lesson In Mine Rescue
• Teams are advancing into unstable
conditions
– Reason need to advance ventilation with them
– Charging in like a hero may not be heroic
Sago Mine Jan 2 2006
(7th Place)
• Setting the Stage
– Mine was working a panel but roof conditions
were bad – determined they would pull out of
the panel
• The mine pillared on retreat (the usual practice)
– Some sources criticize for aggressive pillaring which
made it unsafe to go in and measure but the panel was to
be sealed
• The panel was sealed off – supposedly tight and
work went on for several months
Opening the Mine
• After the holidays the mine was pre-shift inspected at 5:50 am on Jan
2, 2006.
– First crew of 12 miners entered shortly there after
– A second man trip began around 6:00
• Shortly before 6:30 the mine exploded by 6:30 sensors were reporting
CO moving through the mine
– The stoppings on the recently sealed panel were blown to pieces by
pressures as high as 60 psi
• Pattern suggests a blast may have originated behind the seals
• One man walking the entries near by was apparently killed in the blast
– The first mantrip was past the explosion area probably at their working
face
– The second mantrip had not reached the seals and turned back
– Communication to the face where the first crew had gone was cut off by
blast damage to phone lines
• (one news column criticized the operator for not using cell phones but you
know they don’t work underground)
A Fiasco Begins
• Foreman on the second mantrip (his brother was trapped),
the Superintendent and 3 others made a rescue attempt
doing quick repairs to blown out ventilation stoppings
– Advancing 9,000 feet into the mains – CO readings were high and
the air shifted into the mine might set off a second explosion
• They pulled back
• At 7:40 the mine issued instructions to begin calling for
help
– At 8:04 the rescue team at another mine was called for help (you
can use rescue teams up to 2 hours away)
– At 8:10 calls reached MSHA but the contact people were still out
of the office on vacation
– At 8:30 someone at MSHA was called and official “immediate”
notification was given (the explosion had occurred by 6:30)
Help Arrives
• MSHA arrived at 10:30 and took control of the
rescue and all public relations (using two people
who had never experienced a mine disaster before)
• The Mine Rescue Team arrived at 10:40
– Rescue teams could not be released immediately
• Drill rigs arrived and began drilling holes into the
panel area where the first crew would have gone
to work
• By around 10:30 to 11:00 PM the rescue teams
were allowed to begin advancing into the mine
Bad News
• Robot sent ahead of the teams to probe got a flat tire and almost tipped
over about 2,500 ft in.
• By 3:40 am Jan 3, 2006 the advancing rescue teams had to be pulled
out
– Teams advance 500 feet at a time securing fresh air behind them – they
call in and the next team moves past and advances
• On a good day you can get 1,000 ft/hour
– Problem was they found air monitor network had been left on when the
mine powered down – this meant a potentially damaged ignition source
was still running
– The drill was near the 280 foot depth mark and would soon penetrate the
mine – if the bit sparked it could ignite an explosion
• The hole was punched through
– The air was 1300 ppm CO (400 maximum tolerable level)
– Borehole cameras saw nothing
• Mine Rescue teams could not be released again till 6:20 am
Looking for Hope
• In a toxic atmosphere from which no one had emerged hope was that
the miners had barricaded and saved enough air to wait for rescue
• Shortly before Midnight the advancing rescue teams found body of a
miner killed by the blast.
• Mine rescue teams communicated on an open channel and as teams
neared working face the press poised for news
• Around 1:00 am Jan 4 the rescue teams arrived at the face. They found
a barricade built of blocks and plastic and 12 men down but wearing
breathing apparatus
– “We found 12” said the rescue team
– “Are they alive”? Ask the coordinator
– “I think so” responded an optimistic team member who had not checked
any of the bodies
• The press had the story before the Mine Officials and broadcast the
news – ambulances raced to the site and Church Bells Rang
Hopes Fall
• By about 1:30 Hatfield CEO of International was told the
report was wrong
– Hatfield ask a State trooper to tell people celebrating at the Church
that there were now conflicting reports
• The communication never arrived
• At 4:00 word reached the celebrating crowd that all but 1
were dead
• The next day copies of last letters written by loved ones
trapped underground were released to the families
– Barricade had leaked CO and the air supplies the miners had were
not adequate for the 41 hours it took for the rescue teams to reach
them.
Why Did the Mine Explode?
• A Explosive Atmosphere developed behind a sealed panel
as methane built up and oxygen was not yet depleted
• Early reports blamed a lightning strike at the shaft (but
people were near the shaft and saw no such thing)
• Lighting detection network picked up two strikes above the
mine
– One at 6:26:36am a large 35Kamp strike occurred above the panel
that appears to have exploded (22 Kamps is a normal strike)
– Siesmographs picked up a small seismic event in the area of the
mine at 6:26:38am (possibly the explosion)
– By 6:30 the methane detection network at the mine was going off
extensively
How Could Lightning Blow An Underground
Panel?
• No conductors found to take the line
underground
• Electricity can produce a magnetic pulse
which can travel underground
• An old cable had been left running to an
abandoned pump
– Cable acted as an antenna
– The magnetic pulse generated the electricity
that arced from the pump
The Anti-Thesis of Jim Walters
• An issue constantly present in disasters
– Not killing the rescuers
– Previous disasters had killed rescue crews but Jim Walters was
recent.
• Rescue Crews get suckered at Sago
– Most mine explosions occur on the face or around active
equipment areas
• A few old ones around ventilated gobs and left open old workings but
Sago was sealed
– Severity of the damage was apparent long from the face
• It could only get worse going to the face
• There could be no survivors
• Went in cautiously to avoid getting people killed – played with their
little robot toy
But it Wasn’t True
• Damage was bad where the seal blew
• The face was undamaged and people were trapped
from exiting
• Rescue crews played it safe (and played in
general)
– People died of monoxide as their rescuers on the face
ran out of air
– Poor communications and some lack of grace by
rescuers made things look even worse
Sending People Reeling – Alma Mine
• Alma Mine #1, January 19, 2006
– 5:01 mine belt inspector finds haze and alignment
problems on a belt – he tries to correct it
– When he can’t he shuts down the belt and calls for
equipment to align
• He notices smoke forming and calls in a report and help is
dispatched.
– 5:14 beltway CO alarms go off – office determines not
to take action because they have people on the scene
already
Fire Fighting – Polish Style
• Help arrives and they discharge fire extinguishers at the
fire (which is now catching the rib) – fire bounces back
• They go hook up the fire hose
– No one paid attention to coupling compatibility
– Someone had shut off the water
• They went searching for more extinguishers and to find out where the
water was shut off
• They found the water shut-off and got water to the area but the fire
was now out of control
– Reported immediately to the surface where an evacuation order
was issued (28 minutes after the first alarms)
Evacuation
• Trouble getting section 2 crew alerted but
the foreman got them together and laid out
the plan
– They would go out the primary escapeway and
if that failed they would cross over into the
beltway (2ndary escape)
• He picked an area with a lot of cribs that would be
easy to find under adverse conditions
– Door was new, not marked, many were not familiar with it
You Can’t See in a Fire
• Mantrip went to where smoke was so dense they
could not see
– Stoppings to isolate the belt from the intakes had been
removed and smoke from the fire got into the intakes
• Inspectors had no equipment to check air flow directions and
had not found the problem
• Miners got off and began putting on SCSRs
– They said they put them on right away but cases
indicate many went quite away before trying to put
them on.
CO and Orientation
• Even lower CO concentrations can impair judgment before
killing you
– Miners were trying to put on equipment kneeling toward the floor
with about 1 foot of visibility
– They dropped goggles and could not find them, had trouble
activating rescuers
– They could not see each other to keep track and people were
dropping down to put on SCSRs at random
• They went through the door to mostly clear 2ndary
Escapeway and found 2 missing
– 3 went back to call and look in the smoke but found nothing
– They determined to get the rest out
– (2 missing men were later found dead)
Some Observations
• Catching dangerous situations before hand is important
– If inspectors had been equipped to check ventilation air they would have
found open stoppings that allowed smoke into the primary escapeway
– Coal dust accumulations on belt line and not staying on top of belt
maintenance contributed
• (although belt inspector did do some shoveling)
• Irregularities become MSHA vengeance points if something goes
wrong
– Mine was clobbered for 28 minute evacuation delay even though they had
a crew on scene at the fire and were in active communications
– Mine was clobbered over the escapeway door
• Foreman planned and clearly explained the evacuation
• He picked a coordinated point with maximum chance of finding the door to
switch to the 2ndary if needed even before knowing escapeway was in trouble
• The door was not marked (never mind that miners could not find their goggles
on the floor in front of them) – MSHA blamed heavily
• 1.5 million dollars in fines, including reckless disregard charges
More Observations
• Little day to day Polish things set up a killer
scenario
• Putting on a rescuer in smoke is very
different than a class room
– People are slow to put on rescuers (remember a
little monoxide will blow the edge off your
judgment)
– Staying together is important (should miners
tether-up to each other?)
2006 Triple Play – Darby – May 20, 2006
1:00 AM – The production shifts were out
And the maintenance shift was going into
Full swing (6 people were in the mine)
The Fatal Mistake – two of the workers
Went to fix the A left seals
Metal roof straps were left going through
The seals preventing flexible wood seal at
The top. Crew went to cut the straps
Cutting is done with torches but one must
Check the methane readings around the
Area before lighting up
Crew did not sample methane (relied on
The pre-shift) and had no way to know what
Was behind the seals
Blow Up
• The two started cutting by the seal with an
explosive mixture behind
– It ignited
• Production crew was no sooner out of the mine
than a swoosh of air followed by a burnt coal
smell came out
– MSHA was called by 1:05 (5 minutes)
– Mine pieced together a jury rigged team to go in with
some trained rescuers
Action Underground
• The explosion blew out the seals
– Force of the explosion killed two workers
– One body was found 240 ft away, the other 340 ft
away.
This is their personnel
Carrier wrapped around
Conveyor belt structure
4 Miners Felt the Blast and Determined to evacuate
• They hopped on a personnel carrier and
headed out
• Traveled only a short distance and
encountered thick vision obscuring smoke
– They put their SCSRs and drove on.
You Can’t See After A Blast
After just 300 ft the carrier
Ran aground on a blown
Out overcast
(it was 3800 feet to the
Surface)
They got out and tried to
Walk on through the
Darkness
They made it to a power
Center and pulled out
Their mouth pieces to talk
One thought he found a
Power cable to follow – the
Others went back – all
Became disoriented
The Fate of the Miners
• Two apparently took out their mouth pieces and collapsed
(they were found dead)
• Another found dead also
• One who followed the cable to the surface passed out – but
revived and tried to crawl to the surface
– The jury rig rescue party got to him in time
• Miners had not kept breathing through their SCSRs
–
–
–
–
Hard to breath and exerting
Pulled out to talk
Did not stay together
A little monoxide will fog your mind and judgment before killing
you (that’s all it takes to finish you)
Genwal, Aug 6, 16, 2007
Chain pillar failure closed all 4 entries for 2,000 feet and likely
Buried 6 miners on a working section
A Killer Rescue
Aug. 16, 2007 3 more die trying to mine through the collapse to rescue
The miners
What Went Wrong
• Official accident report is not out so things are speculative
• Genwal was trying to mine up through reserves between
pillared panels
– It is likely the mine plan considered average overburden and not
variations in overburden thickness
– It was a chain pillar collapse (only one in U.S. coal)
• MSHA is in a bad spot with vengeance investigation
– Mine plans were prepared by hired consultants and were approved
by MSHA
– Mine was following the plan
– Trying nit pick violations won’t help much – this was very fast and
the killer problem was a flawed plan
– How do you blame someone else when you signed off on the plan
and were in charge of the rescue that killed 3 more people?
Scrambling for Lessons
• How careful should you be on rescues?
– Jim Walters – the fatalities were mostly rescuers
– Genwal – 3 of the 9 fatalities were rescuers
– Sago – the people died because the teams did not
realize the blast was not from the face. Believing no
one could have survived they doddled and 11 people
died
– Darby – a rescue team without back-up and including
non-rescue personnel pulled the only survivor out
because they did not doddle