Determinants of TOEFL Score: A Comparison of Linguistic

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Transcript Determinants of TOEFL Score: A Comparison of Linguistic

“The Global Economy” conference (University of Tokyo, 15-16 March 2013).

The Financial role of East Asian Countries in Global Imbalances: An Econometric Assessment of Developments after the Global Financial Crisis June 2013

Hyun-Hoon Lee Kangwon National University, Korea Donghyun Park Asia Development Bank, Philippines 1

1. Introduction

 In the wake of the global financial crisis, the phenomenon of global imbalances has been at the center stage in the debates about the causes of the global financial crisis and reform of the international financial architecture.

 Global imbalances are characterized by large US current account deficits funded primarily by East Asian countries and oil producing countries.

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Since the late 1990s, the US current account deficits grew until 2006 when it reached over 1.5% of world GDP.  China’s current account surplus increased remarkably fast until 2008.  Japan’s surplus also continues to be large and the current account surplus of other East Asian countries are not negligible.

 Since the late 1990s the US current account deficit grew continuously to exceed 5% of US GDP in 2003. It peaked in 2006 at over 6%.  The counterparts to the US current account deficits were the large surpluses of China, Japan and OPEC member countries.  The current account deficit of the US relative to its GDP has fallen since the global crisis, suggesting a decline in global imbalances.

40 20 0 -20 120 100 80 60

Country Share of U.S. Current Account Deficit (%) 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Others OPEC EU Japan China  China’s relative contribution to US current account deficits grew remarkably rapidly, even after the global crisis.

 Japan’s share also increased after the crisis.

 Thus, East Asia’s share of the US’s total current account deficit has increased.

1. Introduction

 Understanding the factors behind the the future. global imbalances matters for assessing how global imbalances may evolve in  It also matters for assessing the potential threat the imbalances pose to future global financial and economic stability, along with the measures that policy makers must take to “rebalance” the global economy. 6

1. Introduction

(1) (2)

Two conflicting views on the roots and sustainability of global imbalances

Global imbalances are an unsustainable phenomenon, whose impending correction must entail US current account adjustment and a sharp depreciation of the US dollar coupled with a sudden stop of capital flows into the US (See, e.g., Roubini 2008; Roubini and Mihm, 2010). - Focus on current account imbalances.

Global imbalances represent an equilibrium situation that, absent changes in its underlying determinants, can be self sustaining. - In other words, global imbalances are the result of fundamentals and/or policies adopted by other countries that have led to a steady accumulation of US assets by the rest of the world. -Thus, without changes in such fundamentals and policy choices, global imbalances could persist.

- Focus on capital account imbalances.

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1. Introduction

Main Objectives

 We aim to assess whether global imbalances have undergone any fundamental structural changes since the global financial crisis of 2008.  In particular, we aim to assess whether the investment positions of China and other East Asian countries in the US financial market changed in such a way to alleviate the global imbalances. 8

1. Introduction

Contents of this paper

1. Introduction 2. Trend of East Asian Holdings of US Financial Assets 3. Empirical Specifications 4. Empirical Results 5. Concluding Observations 9

2. Descriptive Analysis

Data

 US Treasury Department, Treasury International Capital (TIC)  TIC system provides data on cross-border portfolio investment positions between US residents and foreign residents.  It also provides monthly and quarterly position data on bank claims and liabilities by country.

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 Global imbalances of the last decade have been accompanied by massive capital flows from East Asian countries to the US.  Even after the global crisis, East Asian countries’ investment in the US continued to grow.

 China is the biggest investor in the US, followed by Japan.

 This pattern is especially visible in long-term bond investment.

 Magnitude of Asia’s equity investment and bank lending are relatively small.

Trend of Net Portfolio Investment Positions of East Asian Countries in the U.S. (US$ Million)  China has increased its portfolio investment very rapidly.

 East Asian countries’ investment in the US continued to grow.

Trend of Net Equity Investment Positions of East Asian Countries in the U.S. (US$ Million) Trend of Net Long-term Bond Positions of East Asian Countries in the U.S. (US$ Million)

Trend of Net Bank Lending Positions of East Asian Countries in the U.S. (US$ Million)

3. Empirical Specification

Benchmark specification

(1)

Asset it

= α+β 1 ln

POP it

+β 2 ln

PCGDP itt

+β 3 ln

τ ijt

+ β 4

EASIAi

+

u i

+

u t

+

e it Asset it

= value of the holdings of US securities (equities, long- term bonds, or bank loans) held by the residents of economy i, ln

POP it

= natural logarithm of population of economy i, ln

PCGDP it

= natural logarithm of GDP per capita of economy i, ln

τ it

= natural logarithm of transaction costs between the US and economy i

= Dist i

· exp(δ 1

Finlib it

+ δ 2

OFC i

+ δ 3

Comlang i

+ δ 4

Contig i

+ δ 35

Colony i

)  As an alternative, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) suggest that the gravity model be estimated in its multiplicative form and use a Poisson pseudo- maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator that is usually used for count data.

3. Empirical Specification

Specification with year-specific effects

(2)

Asset it

= α+β 1 log

POP it

+β 2 log

PCGDP it

+β 3 log

τ it

+β 4

EASIA

_2005 + ........ + β 11

EASIA

_2012 +

u i

+

u t

+

e it

where

EASIA

_2005 = 1 if country

i

is an East Asian economy at year 2005 = 0 otherwise, (i.e., East Asia dummy * Year 2005 dummy) . .

EASIA

_2012 = 1 if country

j

is an East Asian economy at year 2012 = 0 otherwise, (i.e., East Asia dummy * Year 2012 dummy)  To ask whether the "excessive" holdings of US securities by East Asia has built up gradually before the crisis and then declined gradually after the crisis

3. Empirical Specification

Specification with country-specific effects

(3)

Asset it

= α+β 1 ln

POP it

+β 2 log

PCGDP itt

+β 3 log

τ ijt

+ β 4 CH + β 5 HK + β 6 ID + β 7 JP + β 8 KR + β 9 MY + β 11 PH + β 11 SG + β 12 TH + β 13 TW+β 14 VN +

u i

+

u t

+

e it

, where

EASIA

_2005 = 1 if country

i

is an East Asian economy at year 2005 = 0 otherwise, (i.e., East Asia dummy * Year 2005 dummy) . .

EASIA

_2012 = 1 if country

j

is an East Asian economy at year 2012 = 0 otherwise, (i.e., East Asia dummy * Year 2012 dummy)  To compare how different East Asian countries behave differently in holding US securities.

4. Results

     Table 5. Determinants of Foreigners’ Holdings of US Securities: PPML Model Table 6. Determinants of Foreigners’ Holdings of US Securities: Random Effects Model Table 7. Determinants of Foreigners’ Holdings of US Long-term Bonds: PPML Model Table 8. Year-specific East Asian Effects as Determinants of Foreigners’ Holdings of US Securities: PPML Model Table 9. Country-specific East Asian Effects as Determinants of Foreigners’ Holdings of US Securities: PPML Model

Determinants of Foreigners' Holdings of US. Long-term Bonds: PPML Model

2004 - 2008 2009 - 2012 log

POP

Treasury (1) 1.021*** (0.055) Agency (2) 0.997*** (0.078) Corporate (3) 0.453*** (0.069) Treasury (4) 1.004*** (0.069) Agency (5) 1.013*** (0.082) Corporate (6) 0.553*** (0.082) log log

PCGDP Dist

0.926*** (0.045) -0.718** (0.332) 0.794*** (0.076) -0.662

(0.505) 1.795*** (0.214) -2.268*** (0.534) 0.871*** (0.090) -0.714* (0.378) 0.934*** (0.109) -1.313*** (0.496) 1.943*** (0.200) -2.402*** (0.539)

Finlib OFC

0.039

(0.043) 1.578*** (0.510) 0.026

(0.087) 2.240*** (0.573) 0.576*** (0.147) 0.631

(0.416) -0.027

(0.080) 1.575*** (0.504) 0.317*** (0.112) 2.710*** (0.395) 0.613*** (0.154) 0.902** (0.443)

Comlang Contig Colony

-0.281

(0.357) -0.934* (0.518) -0.732*** (0.222) -0.825* (0.440) -0.530

(0.677) -0.781** (0.330) -0.252

(0.233) -2.321*** (0.827) 0.189

(0.303) -0.057

(0.296) -1.366** (0.618) -0.629** (0.255) -0.912** (0.357) -0.449

(0.734) -0.802** (0.345) -0.019

(0.304) -2.684*** (0.903) 0.741** (0.323)

EASIA

Constant 1.788*** (0.247) -10.936*** (3.304) 1.552*** (0.319) -9.984** (4.836) 1.296*** (0.321) 0.101

(5.055) 1.354*** (0.263) -9.352** (3.659) 2.778*** (0.316) -9.427** (4.510) 1.168*** (0.392) -2.342

(5.097) # OBS Pseudo R 2 220 0.888

219 0.785

215 0.660

232 0.808

229 0.864

232 0.664

Notes: 1. Estimates are made with Poission psueudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator. 2. Year dummies are included but not shown here for brevity. 3. Shown in parentheses are robust standard errors. 4. ***, **, and * denote one, five, and ten percent level of significance, respectively.

Year-specific East Asian Effects as Determinants of Foreigners' Holdings of US. Securities: PPML Model

Equities Long-term debt Bank loan Treasury Agency Corporate

EASIA * 2005 EASIA * 2006 EASIA * 2007 EASIA * 2008 EASIA * 2009

(1) 0.615* (0.365) 0.803** (0.370) 0.843*** (0.327) 1.139*** (0.350) 1.346*** (2) 1.406*** (0.405) 1.559*** (0.393) 1.339*** (0.378) 1.496*** (0.372) 1.616*** (3) 0.888*** (0.241) 0.858*** (0.248) 0.977*** (0.268) 1.005*** (0.222) 0.946*** (4) 1.815*** (0.231) 1.813*** (0.254) 1.717*** (0.256) 1.618*** (0.303) 1.784*** (5) 1.469*** (0.408) 1.632*** (0.391) 1.681*** (0.406) 2.133*** (0.388) 2.482*** (6) 0.975** (0.406) 1.677*** (0.544) 1.166*** (0.438) 1.460*** (0.526) 1.585***

EASIA * 2010

(0.315) 1.169*** (0.341) 1.586*** (0.251) 1.138*** (0.255) 1.652*** (0.325) 2.527*** (0.486) 1.232***

EASIA * 2011

(0.325) 0.991*** (0.310) (0.349) 1.424*** (0.332) (0.226) 0.633** (0.264) (0.277) 1.390*** (0.276) (0.280) 2.362*** (0.332) (0.440) 1.111** (0.493)

EASIA * 2012

0.481

(0.620) 0.545

(0.554) 0.863*** (0.210) 0.718

(0.473) 1.708*** (0.533) 0.275

(0.648) Constant -12.053*** -4.474

2.427

-9.979*** -10.135*** -0.876

(3.256) (3.483) (1.810) (2.702) (3.517) (3.545) # OBS Pseudo R 2 454 0.772

455 0.663

423 0.809

452 0.847

448 0.814

447 0.657

Notes: 1. Estimates are made with Poission psueudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator. 2.

Control variables and year dummies are included but not shown here for brevity. 3. Shown in parentheses are robust standard errors. 4. ***, **, and * denote one, five, and ten percent level of significance, respectively.

Country-specific Effects as Determinants of Foreigners' Holdings of US. Securities: PPML Model

China

Hong Kong

Indonesia

Japan

Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Taiwan Vietnam

Equities (1) 5.702*** (0.710) -0.408

(0.266) 2.631*** (0.594) 0.893*** (0.284) -0.624* (0.330) 0.995*** (0.383) 4.113*** (0.697) 1.389*** (0.220) 1.900*** (0.480) 0.716*** (0.177) 2.483*** (0.773) -28.774*** 2004 - 2008 Long-term debt (2) 4.147*** (0.529) -0.476

(0.354) 1.284** (0.520) 1.740*** (0.281) 1.128*** (0.258) 1.168*** (0.317) 1.706*** (0.509) 1.035*** (0.214) 1.288*** (0.398) 1.666*** (0.235) 2.454*** (0.543) -9.496** Bank loan (3) 1.108** (0.495) 0.263

(0.489) 1.564*** (0.559) 1.097*** (0.289) 0.682** (0.313) 0.508

(0.372) -0.579

(0.440) 1.182*** (0.323) 2.186*** (0.417) 1.382*** (0.253) Equities (4) 4.411*** (0.533) -0.638* (0.357) -0.228

(0.627) 1.132*** (0.417) 0.590*** (0.209) 1.206*** (0.390) 1.292** (0.572) 0.993*** (0.252) 1.522*** (0.443) 1.062*** (0.203) -0.629

(0.605) -18.273*** 2009 - 2012 Long-term debt (5) 3.333*** (0.435) -0.293

(0.394) 0.250

(0.368) 1.364*** (0.509) 0.827*** (0.218) 1.158*** (0.273) 1.652*** (0.479) 0.925*** (0.302) 0.818*** (0.299) 2.109*** (0.207) 1.485*** (0.488) -11.071** Constant 3.025

1.014

(4.548) (4.121) (2.727) (3.576) (4.448) (3.279) # OBS Pseudo R 2 222 0.869

222 0.801

207 0.827

232 0.836

233 0.763

216 0.832

Notes: 1. Control variables and year dummies are included but not shown here for brevity. 2. Shown in parentheses are robust standard errors. 3. ***, **, and * denote one, five, and ten percent level of significance, respectively.

Bank loan (6) 0.924** (0.465) 0.277

(0.445) 1.254*** (0.436) 1.322*** (0.254) 0.132

(0.221) 0.344

(0.395) -1.230*** (0.465) 0.843** (0.331) 2.264*** (0.345) 1.492*** (0.270)

Country-specific Effects as Determinants of Foreigners' Holdings of US. Long-term Bonds: PPML Model

2004 - 2008 2009 - 2012

China

Hong Kong

Indonesia

Japan

Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Taiwan Vietnam

Constant Treasury (1) 1.953*** (0.486) 0.275

(0.450) -0.192

(0.399) 1.833*** (0.270) 0.889*** (0.263) 0.480

(0.302) 1.685*** (0.377) 2.494*** (0.342) 0.762** (0.297) 1.682*** (0.248) 1.172*** (0.385) -18.016*** Agency (2) 3.206*** (0.649) -0.612* (0.335) -0.727

(0.797) 1.393*** (0.401) 1.390*** (0.308) 1.053** (0.425) -0.411

(0.697) 0.635* (0.360) -3.994*** (0.475) 1.927*** (0.259) -3.918*** (0.906) -19.587*** Corporate (3) 6.110*** (0.686) -0.402

(0.391) 2.482*** (0.759) 1.678*** (0.416) 1.134*** (0.292) 1.713*** (0.455) 3.191*** (0.653) 0.960*** (0.300) 1.750*** (0.590) 1.473*** (0.338) 2.885*** (1.027) -5.782

Treasury (4) 1.812*** (0.373) 0.301

(0.428) -0.399

(0.386) 1.121*** (0.405) -0.057

(0.203) 0.320

(0.303) 1.834*** (0.475) 2.122*** (0.340) 0.186

(0.267) 2.142*** (0.234) 0.371

(0.407) -13.947*** Agency (5) 4.287*** (0.424) 1.478*** (0.392) 0.025

(0.717) 2.857*** (0.416) 3.155*** (0.211) 3.004*** (0.365) -1.271** (0.561) 0.880** (0.386) -2.436*** (0.467) 3.391*** (0.221) -17.516*** (1.126) -19.808*** (3.935) (4.857) (6.445) (4.034) (4.350) (5.788) # OBS Pseudo R 2 220 0.921

219 0.876

215 0.725

232 0.861

229 0.923

232 0.702

Notes: 1. Estimates are made with Poission psueudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator. 2.

Control variables and year dummies are included but not shown here for brevity. 3. Shown in parentheses are robust standard errors. 4. ***, **, and * denote one, five, and ten percent level of significance, respectively.

Corporate (6) 3.274*** (0.639) -1.478*** (0.517) -0.324

(0.734) 2.049*** (0.486) 0.913** (0.368) 1.574*** (0.452) 1.267** (0.563) 0.399

(0.314) 1.417*** (0.503) 2.112*** (0.350) 0.226

(0.915) -10.345*

Effects of Domestic Savings and Foreign Exchange Reserves on Foreigners' Holdings of US. Securities

2004 - 2012 log log log

POP PCGDP Dist Finlib OFC Comlang Contig Colony EASIA Savings-investment ratio

log

Reserves

Constant Equities (1) 0.543*** (2) 0.594*** (0.058) (0.073) 1.794*** (0.157) -0.791*** 1.766*** (0.154) -0.595* (0.272) 0.237*** (0.060) 0.467* (0.264) 0.461*** (0.342) 0.163*** (0.057) 0.331

(0.241) 0.423*** (0.176) -0.014

(0.513) 0.354* (0.191) 0.903*** (0.148) -11.845*** (0.163) 0.418

(0.547) 0.681*** (0.175) 0.394* (0.234) 1.039*** (0.184) 0.150** (0.068) -18.593*** Long-term debt (3) (4) 0.883*** (0.058) 0.933*** (0.070) 0.972*** (0.075) -1.144*** 0.974*** (0.058) -1.346*** (0.387) 0.185** (0.073) 1.636*** (0.440) -0.142

(0.330) -1.405** (0.654) -0.180

(0.225) 1.330*** (0.212) -4.532

(0.332) 0.132* (0.070) 1.461*** (0.323) -0.302

(0.294) -1.514*** (0.569) 0.239

(0.271) 1.327*** (0.176) 1.152*** (0.218) 0.087

(0.070) -7.162** Bank loan (5) 0.802*** (6) 0.690*** (0.043) (0.056) 0.909*** (0.049) -1.878*** 0.808*** (0.059) -1.899*** (0.222) 0.206*** (0.061) 0.755*** (0.207) 1.267*** (0.167) -2.704*** (0.439) 0.583*** (0.153) 0.913*** (0.137) 2.472

(0.232) 0.145** (0.057) 1.004*** (0.194) 1.192*** (0.174) -2.552*** (0.464) 1.048*** (0.186) 0.116

(0.208) 0.882*** (0.179) 0.290*** (0.064) -2.194

(3.195) (3.991) (3.532) (3.276) (1.821) (1.965) # OBS Pseudo R 2 454 0.757

387 0.815

455 0.658

387 0.749

423 0.810

360 0.836

Notes: 1. Estimates are made with Poission psueudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator. 2. Year dummies are included but not shown here for brevity. 3. Shown in parentheses are robust standard errors. 4. ***, **, and * denote one, five, and ten percent level of significance, respectively.

Effects of Domestic Savings and Foreign Exchange Reserves on Foreigners' Holdings of US. US. Long-term Bonds

2004 - 2012 log log log

POP PCGDP Dist Finlib OFC Comlang Contig Colony EASIA Savings-investment ratio

log

Reserves

Constant Treasury (1) 1.010*** (2) 0.848*** (0.048) (0.061) 0.902*** (0.055) -0.722*** 0.854*** (0.053) -0.913*** (0.275) -0.008

(0.048) 1.557*** (0.366) -0.120

(0.247) -0.005

(0.030) 1.573*** (0.293) -0.280

(0.231) -1.227*** (0.436) -0.686*** (0.178) 1.509*** (0.196) -9.898*** (0.227) -1.143*** (0.410) -0.047

(0.204) 0.844*** (0.167) 1.109*** (0.171) 0.418*** (0.066) -16.454*** Agency (3) 0.975*** (4) 0.979*** (0.053) (0.077) 0.809*** (0.062) -0.789** 0.834*** (0.067) -1.154*** (0.376) 0.109

(0.084) 2.506*** (0.364) -0.775*** (0.278) -0.346

(0.515) -0.787*** (0.246) 1.998*** (0.246) -10.422*** (0.378) 0.046

(0.071) 2.424*** (0.337) -0.782*** (0.254) -0.645

(0.475) -0.288

(0.299) 1.637*** (0.295) 1.210*** (0.193) 0.185** (0.088) -12.699*** Corporate (5) 0.497*** (6) 0.585*** (0.053) (0.069) 1.820*** (0.138) -2.247*** 1.714*** (0.145) -2.410*** (0.355) 0.547*** (0.101) 0.824*** (0.300) -0.121

(0.207) -2.413*** (0.600) 0.447* (0.232) 1.160*** (0.228) -0.901

(0.420) 0.533*** (0.126) 0.234

(0.361) -0.086

(0.222) -2.542*** (0.646) 0.506* (0.269) 1.591*** (0.379) 0.559** (0.235) -0.087

(0.088) 1.575

(2.735) (2.592) (3.588) (3.704) (3.507) (4.581) # OBS Pseudo R 2 452 0.837

385 0.921

448 0.806

381 0.853

447 0.652

380 0.665

Notes: 1. Estimates are made with Poission psueudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator. 2. Year dummies are included but not shown here for brevity. 3. Shown in parentheses are robust standard errors. 4. ***, **, and * denote one, five, and ten percent level of significance, respectively.

5. Concluding observations

Main findings

 Our regression results show that although the relative ‘excessive’ investment of most East Asian countries in the US, has declined somewhat since the global crisis, it still remains substantial.  This pattern is especially visible in long-term bond investment of China. 28

5. Concluding observations

Implications

 Our results support the view that the imbalances are an equilibrium state conditional on the various fundamentals underlying the capital markets and hence the present imbalances may persist unless the fundamentals are addressed.

 In particular, the increase in East Asia’s relative contribution to global imbalances indicate that the internal fundamentals of East Asian countries have not changed since the global crisis. 29

5. Concluding observations

Underlying forces of Trans-Pacific imbalances

 The underdevelopment of social safety nets , especially in China, combines with the underdevelopment of financial markets to drive enormous amounts of East Asian investment into financially developed advanced economies, especially the US.  Whether out of mercantilist, export-promoting purpose or precautionary self-insurance against financial shocks, the East Asian region is continuing to amass foreign exchange reserves in the form of safe bonds such as those of the US. This accumulation underlies the persistence of global imbalances.

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5. Concluding observations

Policy suggestions

 There is a need for China and other East Asian countries to strengthen their social safety nets so as to curtail excessive savings and thus nurture healthy consumption.  Furthermore, East Asia should strive to refrain from disproportionate foreign exchange rate accumulation and shift toward a growth paradigm in which domestic demand plays a larger role.  In the long run, the region should strive for broader, deeper, more liquid and more sophisticated financial markets. In this connection, it is necessary to further expand and strengthen the Chiang Mai Initiative, which emerged as a regional Asian response to the Asian crisis, and the Asian Bond Market Initiative.

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