Transcript Slide 1

SCIENCE ADMINISTRATION
LECTURE 17
RADICAL TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION
IN INDUSTRY (CONTINUED)
ILLUSTRATION: DUPONT’S INNOVATION OF NYLON
FREDERICK BETZ
PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY
Carothers's illness and the staff needs of nylon development gave Bolton
additional opportunity to bring Stine's fundamental research division
back into the fold of standard industrial research. Soon it was "reported,
reviewed, supervised, and administered in much the same manner as
other lines of work."
Stine's now virtually defunct program had 'succeeded" in producing
neoprene and nylon -- because the company had hired Carothers and
Stine had encouraged him to work on polymers.
But then Bolton had arrived at the proper moment to reorient the work
toward an important technical objective.
Had Carothers been left entirely on his own, as Stine had envisioned,
nylon would probably not have been discovered and developed.
Clearly tension existed between the pure-science idealist Carothers and
the pragmatic Bolton, but nylon emerged from this tension.
Neoprene and nylon were first-rate achievements because the new
substances were the first ones to have properties that excelled their
natural analogues to any significant extent.
Neoprene resisted degradation by oxygen, oil, and gasoline, and nylon
was stronger and more abrasion-resistant than silk. The Du Pont
Chemical Department's management believed neoprene and nylon had
the potential to become outstanding products.
However, the tasks of development and commercialization were
formidable. From the preparation of the intermediate chemicals to the
processing of the polymer into useful products, Du Pont had very few
technological precedents to follow.
TYPES OF RESEARCH INQUIRIES
SCIENCE
Discovery
Theory
TECHNOLOGY
Bottleneck
Invention
ENGINEERING
Systems
Design
COMMERCIALIZATION
Standards
Processes
At the heart of both production processes would be the reaction of the
intermediates to form the solid polymers.
In the mid-1930s there were no commercially produced synthetics that
required the extent of control over the polymerization reaction that
neoprene and nylon demanded. Therefore, Du Pont had to develop most
of this technology itself, drawing upon all its deep and broad
technological skills to achieve success.
At the same time that Du Pont's researchers were developing processes
to make these new products, others were investigating strategies for
commercializing them.
Both neoprene and nylon had to fit into existing fabrication networks. The
former was sold unprocessed to rubber fabricators, and the latter in the
form of filaments to textile companies.
Du Pont had to do the spinning step with nylon because the silk throwers
were incapable of adapting to the new technology. Both neoprene and
nylon were exceptional discoveries, and their development and
commercialization were equally exceptional.
A crash program brought nylon out of the laboratory and into the
marketplace in less than five years. There are two principal reasons
why it was developed so effectively.
One was the early decision that full-fashioned silk hosiery would be the
first large market for the new material. Du Pont's management
exercised considerable restraint by not yielding to the enthusiasm of
researchers who saw nylon replacing, among other things, cellophane,
photographic film, leather, and wool.
Each year about seventy million dollars' worth of silk went into stockings,
which were knitted into eight pairs per American woman per year. By
focusing directly on this one market, Du Pont avoided having
conflicting demands made on the research personnel:
(1) who were trying to develop a production process and
(2) on the sales development people who were working with textile
manufacturers to evaluate nylon's performance.
INNOVATION PROCESS
TRANSFORMING KNOWLEDGE TO VALUE
NATIONAL KNOWLEDGE INFRASTRUCURE
NATUR
UNIVERSITY E
RESEARCH
INDUSTRIAL
VALUE-ADDING
STRUCTURES
GOVERNMENT
RESEARCH
INDUSTRIAL
RESEARCH &
DEVELOPMENT
TRANSFORMING
RESEARCH TO UTILITY
BUSINESS
MARKET
PRODUCTION ADMINISTRATION
MARKETING
FINANCE
ENGINEERING INFORMATION
RESEARCH
PRODUCT
CUSTOMER
TASK
APPLICATION
SYSTEM
LESSONS FOR SCIENCE ADMINISTRATION
In technological innovation the leap from the idea of technical feasibility
to the idea of a product for a market application is the entrepreneurial
creativity for commercial success.
The product for a market application sets the technical specifications that
the new technology must meet to be used in the product – engineering
specifications.
The engineering specifications provide the goals (research issues) for the
commercialization research.
The second way Du Pont kept the development of nylon moving was by
focusing on one process for each production step. The research
managers constantly put all their eggs in one basket.
Of course, this strategy can lead to disaster if a particular approach
proves unworkable. Fortunately for Du Pont, its managers exercised
skillful judgment and had enough perseverance that no major lines of
work had to be abandoned. Expediency ruled. Some of the initial
equipment, according to Crawford H. Greenewalt (who oversaw much of
the work) accomplished its tasks through "brute force and
awkwardness”. Still, the processes worked and produced nylon at a
cost less than that of silk.
This get-a-workable-process approach to development depended heavily
on Du Pont's impregnable patent position. Because nylon was
unquestionably a Du Pont invention, the company did not have to worry
about being undercut by competitors. To make money it was not
necessary to have the best possible process but just to have one that
worked. As long as nylon could be made at a reasonable cost,
improvements could wait.
LESSONS FOR SCIENCE ADMINISTRATION
Intellectual property in the form of a patent can be very valuable in the
early times of a new technology, allowing for an early market and profit
margins before competition can enter with look-alike products.
In the summer of 1934 the fiber project became the major focus of activity
in Carothers's group. Several of his assistants began preparing
polyamides from virtually every combination of di-basic acid and diamine
with between two- and ten-carbon-atom chains. Of the eighty-one possible
compounds, only five looked promising.
Eventually 6-6 (the numerical designation comes from the number of
carbon atoms in the diamine and the dibasic acid, respectively), first
prepared by Gerard J. Berchet on February 28,1935, became Du Pont's
nylon.
The early assessments of nylon showed that major problems would have
to be solved.
Only one of the two intermediate compounds, adipic acid, was produced
on a fairly large scale, and that was in Germany. The other one,
hexamethylenediamine, was a laboratory curiosity. Also, methods of
controlling the polymer chain growth had to be developed, and once a
satisfactory polymer had been made, it had to be converted into a fiber.
PRODUCT REALIZATION PROCESS
RESEARCH
UTILITY
SCIENCE
RESEARCH
ENGINEERING
RESEARCH
TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT
NEW KNOWLEDGE AS DISCOVERY
& UNDERSTANDING & MANIPULATION
OF NATURE
NEW KNWOWLEDGE AS
FUNCTIONAL MANIPULATION
OF NATURE IN RESPONSE
TO IDENTIFIED NEED
NEW KNOWLEDGE AS
IMPROVEMENT
OF CRITICAL PARAMETERS &
OPTIMIZATION OF
PERFORMANCE IN
FUNCTIONAL MANIPULATION
OF NATURE
COMMERCIALIZATION
NEW KNOWLEDGE AS PROPRIETARY
SKILL IN THE DESIGN & PRODUCTION
0F GOODS & SERVICES, UTILIZING
FUNCTIONAL MANIPULATIONS
OF NATURE
FUNCTIONAL
PROTOTYPE
AND DESIGN
STANDARDS
COST
SCIENTISTS
& MANAGERS
UNIVERSITY
LABORATORY
SCIENTISTS
& ENGINEERS
& MANAGERS
UNIVERITY
LABORATORY
SCIENTISTS
& ENGINEERS
& MARKETING
PERSONNEL
& MANAGERS
SCIENTISTS
& ENGINEERS
& MARKETING,
PRODUCTION,
FINANCE
PERSONNEL
& MANAGERS
& INDUSTRIAL
LABORATORY
INDUSTRIAL
LABORATORY
TIME
INDUSTRIAL
DIVISION
Du Pont's fiber-spinning technology had been developed for the manufacture of
rayon and acetate, which did not melt and had to be spun from solutions. The
Chemical Department decided to try a potentially simpler, faster, and cheaper
process: melt spinning. This entailed melting the solid polymer to a honey-like
liquid that would be driven under pressure through a spinneret, which consisted
of a number of very small holes in a metal plate. The extruded filaments would
form solid fibers upon cooling.
Until they had a better idea how the product was going to be used, the developers
did not give too much thought to the problems that would occur after the very fine
filaments had been twisted together (as is done with silk) in bundles of twenty or
thirty to make a textile fiber. Ultimately nylon had to be tested on standard textile
machinery and put through commercial finishing processes.
After the major process steps had been conceptualized, teams of chemists and
engineers could be assigned to work on each one. As new problems were
recognized, the work was further subdivided. In retrospect, the development of
nylon appears to be the solution of thousands of small problems, but this kind of
engineering could begin only after the big decisions were made about how nylon
was to be manufactured.
The development project can be split into three periods.
In the year following Bolton's decision in July 1935 to commercialize
nylon 6-6, work centered on determining whether it could feasibly become
a commercial success. In this feasibility stage of development, the most
immediate problem was to work out a scheme for making the intermediate
chemicals, especially hexamethylenediamine (HDA). HDA was very
difficult to manufacture, requiring a multi-step synthesis.
When Du Pont decided that nylon did show promise as a new kind of
textile fiber, the second phase of development began; it lasted roughly
from the summer of 1936 until the end of 1937. In this phase, nylon had to
be shown to be practicable, not just feasible. Also, the critically important
decision was made then to concentrate on producing high-quality yarn for
full-fashioned hosiery.
Finally, after learning that a satisfactory or maybe superior product could
be made, Du Pont turned its activities toward making yarn with uniform
properties on a larger scale. With bigger samples of yarn to knit, the
textile companies could run nylon under standard commercial conditions.
Once several-pound batches of intermediates became available,
experiments on polymerization started.
The major goal then became to find methods of producing polymer that
would make uniform fibers. This meant stopping the reaction at a precise
moment to control the polymer's molecular weight. After considerable
experimentation, Wesley K. Peterson discovered that the addition of small
amounts of acetic acid would regulate the extent of polymerization. This
was another 'simple' solution that required considerable time and effort to
be discovered.
Besides the HDA process and standardization of the polymer, the other
major problem Du Pont faced in the early part of the development was
that of spinning the polymer into fibers. At first, both melt and solution
spinnings were tried.
In the solution process the nylon polymer was dissolved in hot phenol
or formamide, and the hot, syrupy solution was pumped through a
spinneret. As the filaments emerged from the holes, the solvent
evaporated and solid fibers were formed. But this process looked
unpromising because of the hazards and expense of handling and
recovering the solvents.
Melt spinning had the appeal of simplicity, but it required developing a
new technology for precisely metering a molasses-like fluid to the
spinneret at a temperature of about 260 degrees centigrade. Also, at its
melting temperature some nylon polymer decomposed, and the
extruding filament broke whenever the resulting gas bubble went
through a spinneret hole. A practical continuous spinning process
required that filaments be spun in very great lengths without breaks. By
early 1936, even though melt spinning was still far from being a workable
process, work on solution spinning was discontinued.
By the summer of 1936 Du Pont was ready to move nylon into a bigger scale of
development.
The company's Rayon Department reported that it considered the new fiber "a
high quality yarn superior to natural silk" that would have a large market at
two dollars a pound, roughly the price of silk. Preliminary estimates showed
that nylon yarn could be produced for eighty cents a pound in a plant making
eight million pounds a year. Even a very small plant could make money. On the
basis of these optimistic forecasts, the research managers decided to expand
the company's nylon-manufacturing capacity from two to one hundred pounds
a day in order to improve the process and provide material for extensive
testing. Nylon had entered its second phase of development. It looked good;
now was the time to prove that it was so.
The Chemical Department constructed a glass melt-spinning assembly so that
direct observation of the melted polymer would be possible. Experiments with
the glass cell confirmed that decomposing polymer gave off gas bubbles that
broke the fiber upon passing through a spinneret hole. Two principal
researchers soon concluded that if the polymer were kept under pressure, the
bubbles would dissolve harmlessly into the molten mass. This idea worked
and removed the major obstacle to the commercialization of melt spinning. By
May 1937 continuous spinning times had been increased from ten to eightytwo hours.
PRODUCT REALIZATION PROCESS
RESEARCH
UTILITY
SCIENCE
RESEARCH
ENGINEERING
RESEARCH
TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT
NEW KNOWLEDGE AS DISCOVERY
& UNDERSTANDING & MANIPULATION
OF NATURE
NEW KNWOWLEDGE AS
FUNCTIONAL MANIPULATION
OF NATURE IN RESPONSE
TO IDENTIFIED NEED
NEW KNOWLEDGE AS
IMPROVEMENT
OF CRITICAL PARAMETERS &
OPTIMIZATION OF
PERFORMANCE IN
FUNCTIONAL MANIPULATION
OF NATURE
COMMERCIALIZATION
NEW KNOWLEDGE AS PROPRIETARY
SKILL IN THE DESIGN & PRODUCTION
0F GOODS & SERVICES, UTILIZING
FUNCTIONAL MANIPULATIONS
OF NATURE
FUNCTIONAL
PROTOTYPE
AND DESIGN
STANDARDS
COST
SCIENTISTS
& MANAGERS
UNIVERSITY
LABORATORY
SCIENTISTS
& ENGINEERS
& MANAGERS
UNIVERITY
LABORATORY
SCIENTISTS
& ENGINEERS
& MARKETING
PERSONNEL
& MANAGERS
SCIENTISTS
& ENGINEERS
& MARKETING,
PRODUCTION,
FINANCE
PERSONNEL
& MANAGERS
& INDUSTRIAL
LABORATORY
INDUSTRIAL
LABORATORY
TIME
INDUSTRIAL
DIVISION
Du Pont's development team had now made significant strides toward its
goal of producing a standard and uniform product, but no yarn had been
knitted into stockings.
The first test came in February 1937, when Everett Vernon Lewis, a
Rayon Department research chemist, took a few carefully measured
skeins of yarn for a knitting test to the Union Manufacturing Company in
Frederick, Maryland.
The Frederick hosiery manufacturer experienced difficulties with the new
fiber in nearly every production process. It did not come off the spools
properly; it snagged on the knitting machines; and after being dyed, it
looked like a wrinkled mess that had "a not too pleasant gray color
roughly approximating gun metal."
Undaunted, Lewis attributed these difficulties to inexperience with a new
material.
Du Pont soon learned that quality requirements were very high for
full-fashioned hosiery yarn.
Further testing was done at the Van Raalte mill in Boonton, New
Jersey, and the first experimental stockings were made in April.
By July 1937 Van Raalte had knitted enough material to give Du
Pont some definite feedback.
The yarn performed quite well. The outstanding defect was the
tendency of the stockings to wrinkle during dyeing and the other
finishing operations.
These wrinkles "completely destroyed the uniform appearance of
the stocking."
A few months later it was discovered that these wrinkles could be
eliminated by steam treating the stocking before dyeing.
SOURCES OF DELAYS IN THE PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
TECHNOLOGY
IMPLEMENTATON
NEED FOR PRODUCTION IMPROVEMENT
NEED FOR NEW PRODUCTS
DESIGN
PROBLEMS
RESEARCH
TECHNOLOGY
RISKS
PRODUCT
COST/QUALITY
PROBLEMS
PRODUCT
PLANNING
PRODUCTION
PROBLEMS
PRODUCT
DESIGN
UNCERTAINTY
ABOUT
CUSTOMER
REQUIRMENTS
PRODUCT
PRODUCTION
TRADEOFFS
BETWEEN
PERFORMANCE
AND
COST
VARIATION
IN
PRODUCTION
In 1937, the Van Raalte mills had started turning out "full-fashioned hosiery
excellent in appearance and free from defects." These stockings were virtually
indistinguishable from their silk counterparts.
And Du Pont management had in hand the results of a report on the reaction of
women to nylon. The experimental stockings were very durable, but they
wrinkled easily and were too lustrous and slippery.
By then Preston Hoff of the Rayon Department, an earlier skeptic, found that
"as the data accumulate, they continue to support our belief that in 'nylon‘. We
have a product that surpasses rather than approaches the natural one."
He thought that many of the production problems would be solved in six
months.
But before a commercial plant could be built, Du Pont's management
decided that a middle-size pilot plant was necessary.
The executive committee's authorization of a pilot plant, on January
12,1938, signaled the end of the second phase of development. Nylon had
been shown to be practicable.
Now it had to be proved on a commercial scale. Whereas earlier efforts
had centered on making one good stocking, the focus of attention moved
toward the production of millions of pairs. An experimental unit about a
tenth the size of the projected full-scale units was designed to produce
250 pounds of nylon yarn a day.
When the pilot plant was authorized, one problem began to look much
more formidable than before.
Silk filaments have a natural coating, sericin, that protects the fibers
during textile processing. After the knitting is finished, the coating,
known as size, is removed with boiling water.
Of course, nylon had no natural size. Du Pont needed to find a material
that would form a protective film, be removable in hot water, not discolor
the yarn, apply conveniently, and not accumulate on the knitting needles.
The size problem took many months of trial-and-error work to solve.
Working frantically, researchers in a number of departments contributed
to the formulation of a new four-component size for nylon. This type of
industrial research, though not glamorous in any way, proved absolutely
necessary for the successful development of nylon.
The elimination of the nagging size problem occurred just when Du
Pont's first full-scale nylon plant, in Seaford, Delaware, was beginning
production.
SOURCES OF DELAYS IN THE PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
TECHNOLOGY
IMPLEMENTATON
NEED FOR PRODUCTION IMPROVEMENT
NEED FOR NEW PRODUCTS
DESIGN
PROBLEMS
RESEARCH
TECHNOLOGY
RISKS
PRODUCT
COST/QUALITY
PROBLEMS
PRODUCT
PLANNING
PRODUCTION
PROBLEMS
PRODUCT
DESIGN
UNCERTAINTY
ABOUT
CUSTOMER
REQUIRMENTS
PRODUCT
PRODUCTION
TRADEOFFS
BETWEEN
PERFORMANCE
AND
COST
VARIATION
IN
PRODUCTION
Before it could introduce its new fiber, Du Pont had had to come up with
a name for it, and a committee was formed to do so.
The company's president, Lammot du Pont, liked Delowear or neosheen.
Another executive, Ernest Gladding, threw in Wacara, a play on
Carothers's name, and later norun, which would have caused problems
because nylon stockings did run. He then turned norun around to Duron but thought that sounded like a nerve tonic. So he changed the r to
an I, making it nulon. This apparently was very similar to an existing
trademark, and Cladding realized that advertisements would refer to
"new nulon," a redundant-sounding phrase. Next, he changed the u to
an i and got nilon, which unfortunately has three pronunciations: nil-lon,
nee-lon, or nigh-Ion. The last was chosen.
Instead of registering nylon as a trademark, Du Pont made it a generic
word that anyone would be free to use. The company's negative attitude
toward trademarks had been engendered by the loss of its trademark for
cellophane in 1937. The fact that hosiery became known as nylons
probably would have cost them this one anyway.
While work continued, sample stockings became available. As more and more
comments came in, the outstanding feature of nylons appeared to be their
durability. Plus they looked like silk. (Several hucksters even sold silk stockings
as nylon at this time.)
The fact that nylons felt cold and clammy did not dampen enthusiasm for them.
Practicality and good looks seem to have outweighed comfort.
Finally, nylons went on sale nationally in May 1940, and the demand was
overwhelming.
Convinced that nylon would prove superior to silk, Du Pont initially set its price 10
percent higher than that of silk.
In less than two years Du Pont captured more than 30 percent of the fullfashioned hosiery market. Then the United States' entry into World War II led to
the diversion of all nylon into military uses. During the war flu Pont increased its
nylon production threefold, to more than twenty-five million pounds a year; the
biggest uses were for parachutes, airplane tire cords, and glider tow ropes.
When the war ended and women began to demand nylons again, their demand
greatly exceeded supply for two years.
TYPES OF RESEARCH INQUIRIES
SCIENCE
Discovery
Theory
TECHNOLOGY
Bottleneck
Invention
ENGINEERING
Systems
Design
COMMERCIALIZATION
Standards
Processes
Nylon became far and away the biggest money-maker in the history of the
Du Pont company, and its success proved so powerful that it soon led the
company's executives to derive a new formula for growth.
By putting more money into fundamental research, Du Pont would
discover and develop "new nylons" -- that is, new proprietary products
sold to industrial customers and having the growth potential of nylon.
This faith seemed to be borne out in the late 1940s arid early 1950s with
the development of Orlon and Dacron and the continued spectacular
growth of nylon. Du Pont had effected a revolution in textile fibers, and the
revolution propelled earnings skyward.
In fact, Du Pont, which for its first hundred years had been an explosives
manufacturer. In the twentieth century, it became a diversified chemical
company. By the 1950s, Du Pont was principally a fibers company, that
had some other businesses on the side.
TASKS OF SCIENCE ADMINISTRATION IN INDUSTRY
1. OBTAINING AND ALLOCATING FUNDS FOR THE SUPPORT OF SCIENCE IN
THE CONTEXT OF INVENTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY.
2. HIRING UNIVERSITY-PRODUCED PH.D.s AND TRAINING THEM INTO
INDUSTRIAL SCIENTISTS.
3. SELECTING AND OVERSEEING RESEARCH CENTERS/PROJECTS FOR
SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AS TARGED BASIC RESEARCH.
4. INVENTING AND PATENTING NEW TECHNOLOGY.
5. COMMERCIALIZING THE NEW TECHNOLOGY INTO NEW PRODUCTS OR
PRODUCTION PROCESSES OR SERVICES.
BUSINESS CONCEPTS IN INNOVATION
STRATEGIC PLANNING
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
IMPROVE TECHNOLOGY IN
CURRENT PRODUCTS
DEVELOPMENT
INNOVATE NEXT GENERATION
TECHNOLOGY SYSTEM
GROWTH OF
EXISTING BUSINESS
NGT PRODUCT
PLATFORM
NEW PRODUCT LINE
GROWTH OF
NEW BUSINESSES
SUMMARY: LESSONS FOR SCIENCE ADMINISTRATION
Intellectual property in the form of a patent can be very valuable in the early times of a new technology, allowing for an
early market and profit margins before competition can enter with look-alike products.
In technological innovation the leap from the idea of technical feasibility to the idea of a product for a market application is
the entrepreneurial creativity for commercial success.
SCIENCE ADMINISTRATON IN INDUSTRY:
OBTAINING AND ALLOCATING FUNDS FOR THE SUPPORT OF SCIENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF INVENTION OF NEW
TECHNOLOGY.
HIRING UNIVERSITY-PRODUCED PhD's AND TRAINING THEM INTO INDUSTRIAL SCIENTISTS.
SELECTING AND OVERSEEING RESEARCH CENTERS/PROJECTS FOR SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AS TARGED BASIC
RESEARCH.
INVENTING AND PATENTING NEW TECHNOLOGY.
COMMERCIALIZING THE NEW TECHNOLOGY INTO NEW PRODUCTS OR PRODUCTION PROCESSES OR SERVICES.