Transcript NATO-Russia Theatre Missile Defence Command Post Exercise

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International BMD Conference
“Missile Defence Factor in Establishing a New Security
Environment”
“Russia’s Assessment of NATORussia Theatre Missile Defence
exercise”
Chairman of Military-scientific Committee of the Russian Federation
Armed Forces – Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian
Federation Armed Forces
General-Major
I. Sheremet
Moscow, 2012.
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NATO-Russia Theatre Missile Defence
Command Post Exercise Stages
Key Dates & Facts
From 2003 till 2008 4 stages of the exercise were conducted:
CPX-1. Stage 1 December 2003. NATO Consultation, Command and
Control Agency (NC3A) (the Hague, the Netherlands);
Stage 2 March 2004 Joint National Integration Center at AFB
Shriver (Colorado-Springs, USA).
CPX-2. March 2005. Royal Air Force Base (Venray, the Netherlands).
CPX-3. October 2006.
4th Central R&D Institute, MOD, the Russian
Federation (Moscow).
CPX-4. January 2008 Ottobrunn, Germany.
CPX AAR proved that the aim and objectives in planning and conducting
operations based on simulated models had been successfully fulfilled.
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Specific Features of NATO-Russia Theatre
BMD Command Post Exercise
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Exercise is not linked to any geography or specific
existing threats;
Exercise scenarios are not based on
cooperation of the parties;
possible actual
Complication was achieved by introducing more units
and increasing the scale of missile strikes;
Both Russian and NATO AD and BMD assets
performances were used as imaginary initial data
NATO-Russia Theatre BMD Computer-Assisted
Command Post Exercise 26 - 30 March 2012
(Ottobrunn, Germany)
Aim: development, research and efficiency assessment of various
ways to establish a BMD in Europe taking into account the results
of previous NATO-Russia Theatre BMD cooperation activities.
Objectives:
exploring options for early warning data exchange in the
framework of a Joint BMD Centre;
 Examining ways of coordination for intercepting ballistic missiles
by both Russian and NATO assets;
 looking into options for coordination and operation of Russia and
NATO BMD command and control forces;
 planning, implementing and assessing of
joint missile defense
options.
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Format and Framework for
Command Post Exercise
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Considering the European region as a platform for exploring various
ways to establish a joint BMD;
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Examining hypothetical missile threats not connected with political
views of Russia and NATO;
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Using closest to real BMD assets performances to obtain more
reliable simulation data;
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Studying various ways to build a missile defense and establish
cooperation of the parties that reflect NATO and Russia approaches
to BMD in Europe.
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Options for NATO and Russia Groups of
Forces Joint Operations
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Independent combat operations of Russian and NATO BMD
and AD groups (option 1);
Independent combat operations along with joint employment
of missile attack early warning systems’ data (option 2);
Independent but coordinated combat operations: decisions to
engage targets were made by Russia and NATO
independently, but either party could call for support if
needed (option 3);
Use of shared early warning data and conduct of combat
operations under single centralized command and control
from BMD Centre (option 4);
Best streamlined missile defense arrangement and single
command and control while jointly protecting hypothetical
areas (option 4А).
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Command and Control, Information Support 7
Framework with Single Centralized
Arrangement
NATO operational level
Command
Russian operational
level Command
Automated
data
integration
BMD Centre
NATO tactical level
Command
NATO tactical level
Command
Russian tactical
level Command
Russian tactical
level Command
Shooters
Shooters
Shooters
Shooters
BLUELAND
YELLOWLAND
ORANGELAND
Amount of engaged missiles depending on specific
episode and level of cooperation
22.55
21.6
Episode 1
1
2
3
4
4А
107.2
101.45
95.2
88.8
89
1
2
Episode 2
3
4А
4
123.4
120.8
114.95
112
108.45
Episode 3
1
2
3
4
4А
8
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Recommendations for Future Research
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Real geography;
Scaling of ballistic missiles strikes by intensity, direction and
trajectory types;
Playing with a broader range of ballistic missiles performances,
including missiles with over 3000 km range;
Scaling by composition of BMD group in terms of both
independent and joint combat operations;
Exploring various options of information support based on joint
information processing arrangements;
Adding episodes with complications – e.g. disablement of some
BMD assets;
Examining impacts of different killing techniques on the
effectiveness of joint groups operations;
Improving performance indicators and criteria of joint
operations effectiveness.