Transcript Preventing School Violence - Office of the Dean of Students

Preventing School Violence
Identifying, Assessing, and Managing Potential
Incidents of School Violence
Presented by:
Frederick S. Calhoun and Richard M. Wilson
CONCERNS:
What do
our communities
fear?
Slide 2
© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Virginia Tech: April 16, 2007
 32 victims dead
 27 victims wounded or
physically injured
 Perpetrator suicide
 ~ 100 witnesses or directly
impacted individuals
 ~ 33,000 persons
impacted on the
Blacksburg campus
Slide 3
© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Northern Illinois University
DEKALB, IL: FEBRUARY 14, 2008
Slide 4
© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
CONTEXT:
What do we face?
OVERVIEW OF
VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS
Slide 5
© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
On-Campus Violence
Type of Violence
2004
2005
2006
2007
16
11
8
46
Sexual Assault
2689
2722
2717
2704
Robbery
2077
2055
1981
1962
Aggravated Assault
2995
2906
3022
2834
Arson
1072
1024
975
790
30
32
51
31
1377
1450
1412
1446
Murder
Injurious Hate Crimes
Illegal Weapon Arrests
Source: US Dept. of Education Office of Post-Secondary Education
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© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Beyond The Tip of the Iceberg
Beyond Mass Shootings:
•A broad range of issues impact
the safety & well-being of
campuses.
– Harassment & Bullying
– Bias-related incidents
– Stalking
– Domestic abuse
– Sexual assault
– Substance abuse
– Mental illness
– Suicide
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© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Mental Health on Campus
Centers Dealing With:
Obsessive Pursuit Cases *
Hospitalization of Student
Student Suicide
Client Suicide
Percent
38
87
26
22
* 271 cases of obsessive pursuit were reported:
 80 students were injured
 9 students were killed by their pursuer.
Source: 2007 National Survey of University Counseling Center Directors
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© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Mental Health on Campus
Counseling Center Clients Reporting:
Non-suicidal self-injury
Seriously considered suicide
Prior suicide attempt
Seriously considered harming others
Afraid of losing control & acting violently
Intentionally harmed another person
Percent*
21
25
8
8
7
5
*Note: Includes prior to and after starting college.
Source: Center for the Study of Collegiate Mental Health (CSCMH):
2009 Pilot Study
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© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Mental Health on Campus
College Students Reporting:
Percent*
Felt so depressed, difficult to function
43
Diagnosed with depression
5
Seriously considered suicide
9
Attempted suicide**
1
*Note: Includes 1 or more times in the last school year.
** Approximately 1100 college students suicides each year.
Source: American College Health Association National College Health Assessment (Spring 2008; N=80,121)
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© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Mental Health on Campus
Counseling Center Clients:
Percent
Clients with severe mental health issues
49
 Impaired ability to maintain enrollment
 Severely distressed but treatable
8
41
Source: 2007 National Survey of University Counseling Center Directors
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© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
CONTEXT:
•What do we know?
•THE NATURE & PROCESS
•OF TARGETED VIOLENCE
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© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Targeted Violence On Campus
Joint Project of the:
US Secret Service
US Department of Education
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attacks: 1900 – Present
272 incidents
Source: U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dept. of Education, &
Federal Bureau of Investigation (2010). Campus
Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of
Higher Education.
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© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Targeted Violence On Campus
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
92
79
40
1
0
1900s 10s
3
8
20s
30s
13
19
50s
60s
25
1
40s
70s
80s
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Enrollment in Millions
Number of Incidents
INCIDENTS: 1909-2009* (N = 281)
90s 2000s
*Data collected through 2008, projected for 2009 based on average per year for decade.
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© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Targeted Violence On Campus
About the Incidents
 Occur on and off-campus
• 80% on-campus (residence, grounds, class/admin)
• 20% off-campus (residence, public area)
 Precipitating events present: 83%
 Targeted one or more specific persons: 73%
 Pre-incident threat/aggression to target: 29%
 Pre-incident concerns reported by others: 31%
Source: U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dept. of Education, & Federal Bureau of Investigation
(2010). Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education.
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© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Targeted Violence on Campus
About the Perpetrators:
Age: 16 – 64
Gender: Male (80%); Female (20%)
Status:
•
•
•
•
Current / Former Student: 60%
Current / Former Employee: 11%
Indirectly Affiliated: 20%
No known Affiliation: 9%
Source: U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dept. of Education, & Federal Bureau of Investigation
(2010). Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education.
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© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Facts About Campus Attacks
Perpetrators of serious campus violence
don’t “just snap.”
These incidents are not impulsive or random.
 Most (over 75%) consider, plan, and prepare before
engaging in violent behavior;
 Most (over 75%) discuss their plans with others
before the attack.
Source: U.S. Secret Service & U.S. Dept. of Education (2002).
Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative.
Slide 17
© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Facts About Targeted Attacks
We cannot know whether to be concerned
based on a subject’s appearance –
but we can tell by their behavior.
 No unique profile of the campus attacker.
 Most have concerned several others with troubling
behavior before their attacks.
 Most are suicidal or at a point of desperation prior to
their attacks.
Source: U.S. Secret Service & U.S. Department of Education, (2002)
Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative.
Slide 18
© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
A Perpetrator’s Poem
• Sinking into bed
• Homicidal thoughts filling my head
• Suicidal thoughts not gone, but fleeing
• Because it’s other people’s death I’m seeing
• Suicide or homicide
• Homicide and suicide
• Into sleep I’m sinking
• Why me I’m thinking?
• Homicidal and suicidal thoughts intermixing
• I know my life’s not worth fixing
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© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Implications for Prevention
 Many targeted attacks can be prevented.
 Information about a subject’s ideas and plans for
violence can be observed or discovered before harm
can occur.
 Information available is likely to be scattered and
fragmented.
 Key is to act quickly upon an initial report of concern,
see who else has a piece of the puzzle, then pull all
the information together to see what picture
emerges.
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© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Implications for Prevention
– Assessment involves asking: Is this person on a
pathway toward violence?
– Using a team can be particularly effective for
gathering and evaluating information, and
intervening if necessary.
– Threat assessment and case management is not
an adversarial process. Engagement with a person
of concern can be critical to preventing violence or
harm.
Slide 21
© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
• Assessment Approaches
Slide 22
© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Current Prevention Approaches
– Mental health violence risk assessment
– Automated decision-making
– Profiling
– Threat assessment
Slide 23
© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Mental Health Risk Assessment
– Also known as a clinical assessment of
dangerousness
– Evaluates a person’s risk for more
general/prevalent types of affective violence
– Not intended (nor effective) for evaluating risk of a
targeted attack
– May supplement threat assessment process but is
not a replacement
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© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Automated Decision-Making
• Two Areas of Concern:
– The statistical or mathematical process for making
the evaluation is unknown
– No correlation between satisfaction with using the
automated tool and the accuracy of the decision
made
Slide 25
© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
“Profiling”
– Most commonly used as an investigative tool to
describe the person or type of person who
committed a particular crime
– It is retrospective in that it uses clues from a crime
that has already occurred to narrow down
possible suspects
– When used with respect to evaluating risk of
violence, profiling is prospective, not retrospective
Slide 26
© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Prospective Profiling
Gather data on offense characteristics
Identify common characteristics to generate composite
Compare the person in question with the composite
Closer the match, the greater the cause for concern
Slide 27
© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Profiling – Two Major Failings
– It identifies far more people that match a profile
but do not pose a threat
– It fails to identify a person whose behavior
suggests real concern but whose traits or
characteristics do not match the profile
Slide 28
© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Preventing School Violence
• Preventing school violence depends on
everyone:
– Controlling their own behavior and
– Reporting inappropriate behavior they may
witness.
Definition of
School Violence
Violent acts, including physical assaults,
threats of assault oral and/or written remarks
or gestures that communicate a direct or
indirect threat of physical harm which
otherwise frighten or cause a reasonable
individual concern for his or her personal
safety or the safety of others, when directed
towards persons at UT Facilities or
Operations, or while on or because of their
official duty.
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Spectrum of Inappropriate Behaviors
•
Verbal or written threats
•
Bullying
•
Verbal abuse
•
Suspicious activity
•
Inappropriate references
to weapons
•
Stalking
•
•
•
•
•
•
Inappropriate references
to death, suicide,
violence, assassinations,
or terrorism
Obsessive interest in
another employee
Claims of mental illness
prompting problematic
behavior
•
•
Violent or threatening
gestures
Research into the
personal life of
another employee
Frightening other
employees
Intimidating
behavior
Brandishing a
weapon, whether
its real, a toy, or
imaginary
•
Aggressive
emotions
•
Violence against
inanimate objects
•
Throwing things
randomly
•
Inappropriate
physical contact
with another
employee
•
Use of a firearm
•
Use of an edged weapon
•
Use of bombs or
incendiary devices
•
Physical assault
•
Damaging or
destroying
property
•
Use of weapon of
opportunity, such as loose
objects or equipment
•
Acting out anger
•
Throwing things at
another person
•
Use of fists, feet,
or body as a
weapon
Four Types of Aggressors
• Student
• Employee
• Domestic Partner
• Criminal
Understanding Four Types of
Aggressors
• Identifying the type of aggressor helps us
to:
– Understand the aggressor’s motive or
grievance
– Select appropriate threat management
strategy
Nature of Violence
• Violence is a process of incremental behaviors
• Specific actions assailant must perform
• Behaviors form basis for identifying problem
individuals and for assessing risk
• Focus on actions and behaviors -- process of
violence -- rather than words
Paths to Violence
Five Easy Pieces
Nature of Threats
• Those who pose threat may never make a threat
• Conversely, those who make threats may never
pose a threat
• Focus shift from what individuals say -- threats
they make -- to what individuals do
• Assess threateners and actors
Intimacy Effect
• Degree of intimacy within relationship affects
validity of threatening statements
• More intimate relationship, more likely threats will
be carried out
– Domestic violence, workplace and school
settings
• Threat value diminishes as intimacy recedes
– Public figures, presidents, celebrities, judges,
abortion providers
Intimacy Effect
Threat Less Likely Carried Out
Distant
Intimate
Threat More Likely Carried Out
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Contemporary Threat Management
Process
Phase 1
Report of Inappropriate Behavior
• Inappropriate Behaviors are noticed and reported by
targets, staff, colleagues or families
• All employee training provides employees with the
knowledge of what to report
• CTM depends on strong communications link between
employees, BAT, TAT, and Student Deans
Phase 1 - Ensure Target Safety
• Safety overriding goal of CTM
• First reaction always ensure employee’s
immediate safety
Phase 1 - Gather Initial Facts
• Facts feed assessments
• Gather initial facts, then set initial
protective response
• Avoid conjectures and exaggerated fears
Contemporary Threat Management
Process
Phase 2 - Initial Assessment
• Assess known facts and circumstances
• Prepare for on-going assessments
• Assessments guides protective response,
protective fact finding and threat
management
Phase 2 - Credible Threat
• Made by an individual who has the apparent
capability of inflicting harm
• Made in a manner that causes people to be
aware they are the target of the threat
• Place individuals in reasonable fear for their own
safety and/or the safety of others, including their
immediate family
Four Assessment Approaches
• What are the circumstances and context?
• Is the subject acting like a Hunter?
• Is the subject acting like a Howler?
• What is the subject’s justification, alternatives,
consequences and ability (JACA) ?
Measuring the Circumstances and Context
• The Circumstance and Context Factors
• Once you have your facts, you want to
examine them within the context and
circumstances in which they occur
because facts can be misinterpreted.
Assessing Individuals of
Violent Intent
• Circumstances looks at the inappropriate
behavior directly.
• Context looks at what else is going on
when that behavior occurs.
Accepting Good News
• Assessments factor positive news
• Inhibitors, positive behavior changes, lifestyle changes, life improvements, refocus
Avoid the What If? Game
• Assess only facts
• Avoid conjectures
• At all costs, never engage in What If?
questions
Identifying Problem Individuals
• Two Types of Problem Individuals
– Hunters, who actually intend violence
– Howlers, who want to frighten or emotionally
connect
Hunters Hunt
• Most importantly, hunters are known by
their behaviors
• They follow the path to intended violence
Path to Intended Violence
Grievance
Expressed feelings of injury, injustice, anger, fear,
revenge, outrage, or ideology
Ideation
Delivered Inappropriate Behavior, discussed plans
for violence, identified with assassins, fixated on
violence, fascinated with weapons, interested in
specific anniversaries
Research &
Planning
Stalked, researched target, made suspicious
inquiries, gathered information on target’s personal
life
Preparations
Acquired weapon, assembled equipment, arranged
transportation, respected significant dates,
conducted final acts, costumed
Breach
Approached target with weapon
Attack
Assaulted target
Marks of a Howler
Inappropriate
Behavior
Subjects who write or telephone keep safe distance
Written or Over
Telephone
Veiled-Subject
Defer Harm
Conditional
Harm
Make Habitual
or Chronic
Threats
Subject saying someone else will cause the harm
Howlers like to postpone any harm
Howlers like to make if…then promises
Some subjects just like to threaten
General Rule
• Hunters hunt and rarely howl; howlers howl and
rarely hunt
Except
• In intimate or interpersonal relationships, howlers
continue to threaten as long as the threats obtain
the howler’s goal.
• As soon as the target challenges the threats, the
howler becomes increasingly likely to start
hunting.
Hunters Hunt
• Hunters engage in attack-related
behaviors.
• They do things in furtherance of their plan
to commit violence.
Howlers Howl
• Howlers draw attention to themselves by
making threats or other inappropriate
communications, but they do nothing else.
Rule of Threat Management
• Always keep in focus what the subject is
doing in order to identify a subject as a
hunter.
Howlers vs. Hunters
• Howlers use their communications to cause a reaction,
to frighten or enamor, to upset or provoke
• Communicating is action aplenty; it results in the end
they seek
• Hunters want a more tangible result
• They intend to take violent action to rectify their issues
• For them, justice is expressed in force, vengeance in
blood, affection in approaching
Contemporary Threat Management
Process
Phase 3
Appropriate Protective Response
• Devise appropriate protective response for
the target
• Always respond
Phase 3
Appropriate Protective Response
• Devise appropriate protective response for
the target
• Always respond
Phase 3
Conduct On-Going Assessments
• Factor new facts into on-going assessments
• Changes in circumstances prompt reassessments
Contemporary Threat Management
Process
Phase 4 - Select Threat Management
Strategy
• Gauge threat management strategy to
current assessment
• Maintain flexibility in applying strategies
70
Phase 4 - Manage Case
• Changes in strategy must be readily
available
• Strategies must be flexible, adaptable, and
abandon-able
Phase 4 - Develop Follow-Up
Strategy
• CTM cases can go on for months or years.
• Coordinator needs process for following
up on the subject
Defusing the Risk
• Consider all approaches
• Situation changes precisely because a strategy has
been employed
• Change requires re-evaluation of case, assessment,
and strategy
• May result in using another strategy or combination of
approaches
• Process not endless -- but often seems like it is
74
Legal Considerations and
Information-Sharing
Slide 75
© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
What Rules May Apply?
– Federal Americans with Disabilities Act and
Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act
– State public accommodations laws / disabilityrelated employment laws
– Federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act;
– Federal Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)
– State Patient-Health Care Professional Privileges
Slide 76
© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Information Sharing: FERPA
 FERPA is not an impediment to effective threat assessment
and case management.
 FERPA governs records only, not observations,
communications, etc.
 FERPA does not govern law enforcement records.
• If created and maintained by law enforcement, for law
enforcement purpose.
 Guidance from ED encourages information sharing where
public safety is a concern.
 FERPA does not permit a private right of action.
Slide 77
© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Disability Law Considerations
– Ensuring due process
– Direct threat provisions
– Not assuming every threat assessment case
involves mental illness
Slide 78
© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Information Sharing: HIPAA
– Confidentiality is held by client, not mental health
provider.
– In cases where privacy laws apply, can try these
strategies:
• Ask subject for permission to disclose.
• No legal prohibition against providing information to
health professionals.
• Inquire about Tarasoff - type duty.
Slide 79
© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Case Management Resources
•
Case Management options can include any mix of the following:
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Outpatient counseling/mental health care.
Emergency psychiatric evaluation
Pastoral counseling
Mentoring relationship
Academic / work accommodations
Separation from the institution
Social skills training
Behavioral contract
Parental / family involvement
Law enforcement involvement
Diversion programs
Management by walking around/alliance
Others?
CASE STUDY
Slide 81
© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Concerned
Students
Residence
Life
Faculty
Health
Center
CARE
Team
Counseling
Center
The
Individual
Judicial
Affairs
VA Tech
Police
SOURCE: OIG Report #140-07: Investigation of the April 16, 2007 Critical Incident at Virginia Tech. Prepared by:
Office of the Inspector General for Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services –
Commonwealth of Virginia
Slide 82
© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Counseling Center Involvement
– Insure that the nature of psychological difficulties is
understood, i.e., individuals with a mental illness are
far more likely to be victims than perpetrators.
– Utilize knowledge about human behavior to inform
the TAT
– Make suggestions as to when mental health
evaluations would prove useful
– Interpret findings of mental health assessments
Slide 83
© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
Consultation with Administration
– Advocate for the TA process – including resources for
training
– Advocate for management decisions made by the TAT
– Maintain the confidentiality of clients
– Strongly suggest dual referral of individuals of
concern (counseling & administrative)
Slide 84
© G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.
De-Escalating
Volatile People/Situations
De-Escalating Situations
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Setting the Stage
Maintain personal space
Avoid excessive familiarity
Use caution in touching person
Minimize distractions
Maintain intermittent eye contact
Remain calm
Slow down the process
Continually assess for danger
De-Escalating Situations
Engaging the Person
Monitor own reactions & stress
Treat the person with respect
Listen carefully & express concern
Focus on problem-solving
Be aware of non-verbal messages
Understand but do not encourage disordered
thinking or venting
• Stay calm
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
De-Escalating Situations
• Assess Behavior and the Situation
• Observe behavior
• Elicit responses & listen:
– Attitude - subdued, combative, volatile;
– Awareness - time, date, place, identity;
– Speech pattern / content;
– Mood - content & appropriateness;
– Thoughts - content & clarity of expression;
– Internal reactions to person
• Gather data - staff, history, consultation.
De-Escalating Situations
• Recognize Barriers to Cooperation
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Poor Communication
Previous Interactions
Anger/Hurt
Stress
Fear of Outcome / Unknown
Not Understanding Value to Self
Low Self-Efficacy
Disability.
De-Escalating Situations
• Resolving the Situation
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Be consistent
Maintain reasonable limits
Respond to needs and feelings
Exercise creativity in problem solving
Give firm, clear directions
Use authority with firmness
Give limited choices
Be truthful
De-Escalating Situations
• Do:
• Stay calm
• Listen carefully & express concern
• Focus on problem-solving & alternatives
• Isolate the situation but not yourself
• Be aware of non-verbal messages
• Be consistent & enforce reasonable limits.
De-Escalating Situations
• Do NOT:
• Over-react
• Make accusations
• Be hostile or threatening
• Be defensive
• Reject all demands without consideration
• Get in a power struggle
Contact Information
Richard M. Wilson, MPA, CPP
Sigma Threat Management Associates
[email protected]
480-231-5759
Frederick S. Calhoun
Threat Management Consultant
[email protected]
703-328-9082