Transcript Document

Trusted Computing
Yaron Sheffer
Manager, Standards and VPN Technologies
Check Point
Jan. 2008
©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
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Agenda
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A few words about Check Point
Why Trusted Computing
The Trusted Computing Architecture
Uses of Trusted Computing
Issues with Trusted Computing
Trusted Computing in practice
Details: 3rd party attestation
The TC ecosystem: related and competing work, NAC
puresecurity
©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
2
A Global Security Leader
Leader
800000
700000
• Global leader in firewall/VPN* and mobile
data encryption
• More than 100,000 protected businesses
• More than 60 million consumers
• 100%
of Fortune 100 as customers
Revenue
Net Profit
600000
500000
100%
security
400000
• 100% focus on information security
• >1,000 dedicated security experts
• Protecting networks and enterprise data
300000
200000
100000
Global
0
1994
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* Frost & Sullivan
• ~ 2,000 employees
• 69 offices, 28 countries
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2002
2003
2004
• 2,200
partners,
882001countries
• HQ in Israel and U.S.A.
2005
2006
©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
2007E
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Always Anticipating New Security Needs
SMART
Business drivers
Security Management Architecture
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Consistence and scalable security
Validate IT investments- lower TCO
Compliance
Improve operations efficiency
Firewall
VPN Client
VPN
Disk
Encryption
UTM
Security issues
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Enforce security policy
Incident response
Security audits
Update security posture, defenses
Personal
firewall
IPS
Media
Encryption
Management
Disk
Encryption
Technology
Check Pointenablers
solution
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•
•
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Unified security management
Real time event analysis
Reporting, policy optimization
One-click security updates
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Anti-Virus
Port control
Monitoring
Reporting
Data
leakage
Compliance
Unified Security Architecture
©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
4
Agenda








A few words about Check Point
Why Trusted Computing
The Trusted Computing Architecture
Uses of Trusted Computing
Issues with Trusted Computing
Trusted Computing in practice
Details: 3rd party attestation
The TC ecosystem: related and competing work, NAC
puresecurity
©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
5
Trusted Computing
 Trust (RFC 4949): A feeling of certainty (sometimes
based on inconclusive evidence) either (a) that the
system will not fail or (b) that the system meets its
specifications (i.e., the system does what it claims to do
and does not perform unwanted functions)
 When approaching a PC, do we have this feeling?
 Something is rotten in the state of Denmark
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©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
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Lack of Trust
 Mutability
–
–
–
–
–
Data
Applications and libraries
Device drivers
Kernel components
And… the BIOS
 “Least privilege” principle is ignored
– Administrator privileges
 Huge amounts of trusted code
 Secure development principles are not applied
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©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
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Trusted Computing Group
 [An] organization formed to develop, define, and promote
open standards for hardware-enabled trusted
computing and security technologies, including
hardware building blocks and software interfaces, across
multiple platforms, peripherals, and devices
 Implicitly: software alone will not do
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Established (as TCPA) 1999
TPM 1.0 published Feb. 2001
TNC work started 2004
Around 200 member companies
 www.trustedcomputing.org
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©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
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Agenda








A few words about Check Point
Why Trusted Computing
The Trusted Computing Architecture
Uses of Trusted Computing
Issues with Trusted Computing
Trusted Computing in practice
Details: 3rd party attestation
The TC ecosystem: related and competing work, NAC
puresecurity
©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
9
Trusted Computing Architecture
TPM (Trusted Platform Module): a tamper-resistant hardware module
mounted in a platform.
Responsible for: measurement, storage, reporting and policy enforcement
App1
App2
App3
Operating System
Protected
Code
TPM
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Boot Process
Encrypted
Files
©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
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Roots of Trust
 A Root of Trust is a component that must behave as
expected, because its misbehaviour cannot be detected
– A piece of code
 Root of Trust for Measurement: the component that
can be trusted to reliably measure and report to the Root
of Trust for Reporting what software executes at the start
of platform boot
 Root of Trust for Reporting: the component that can be
trusted to report reliable information about the platform
 Root of Trust for Storage: the component that can be
trusted to securely store any quantity of information
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©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
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A Chain of Trust
 The core idea of the Trusted Computing architecture
 Each stage measures and validates the next one
– Measurements go into Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs)
on the TPM
 The chain starts with the hardware TPM
 Then software:
– RTM, TPM Software Stack, BIOS, kernel
– Applications?
 At the end, the entire platform is verified to be in a
trusted state
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©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
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TC Cryptographic Capabilities
 SHA-1, HMAC
– Hashed message authentication code
 Physical random number generation
– An important feature in itself
 Asymmetric key generation
– 2048-bit RSA
 Asymmetric crypto encryption/decryption and signing
– RSA PKCS#1
 Bulk symmetric crypto is performed off-chip
– For example, disk encryption
 Reasons: price, export considerations
 This is no high performance crypto chip!
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©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
13
Agenda








A few words about Check Point
Why Trusted Computing
The Trusted Computing Architecture
Uses of Trusted Computing
Issues with Trusted Computing
Trusted Computing in practice
Details: 3rd party attestation
The TC ecosystem: related and competing work, NAC
puresecurity
©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
14
Uses of Trusted Computing
 Data protection: storage of secrets
– TPM unseals storage keys only if the platform is in a trusted state
 Detecting unwanted changes to a machine’s configuration
– Secure boot
 The next three require “3rd party attestation”
– Protocol described later
 Checking client integrity on a local network
– E.g. before the client is allowed into the network
– Or by each network server
 Verifying the trustworthiness of a “kiosk”
– By a remote server
– By a local smartcard
 Machine authentication for remote access
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©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
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Authentication and Privacy: A
Contradiction?
 When you digitally sign a measurement report, you potentially reveal
your identity!
 The architecture provides for the TPM to have control over “multiple
pseudonymous attestation identities” – next slide
 TPM attestation identities do not contain any owner/user related
information
– A platform identity attests to platform properties
 No single TPM “identity” is ever used to digitally sign data
– Privacy protection
 TPM Identity certification is required to attest to the fact that they
identify a genuine TC platform
 The TPM Identity creation protocol allows for choosing different
Certification Authorities (Privacy CA) to certify each TPM identity
– Prevent correlation
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©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
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Multiple Pseudonymous Attestation
Identities…
Identity CA
Trusts…
Certified by…
Name1
Verifier Host
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Name2
Host being verified
©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
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Issues with Trusted Computing
 TC is happening very slowly
– A mixture of technical, business and perceptual issues
 Can a large and not-so-well-designed OS ever become
trustworthy?
– Intel’s current direction might point to a solution
 The distinction between platform owner and data owner
– Can Sony prevent you from playing their songs? – DRM is evil!
– Can Sony prevent you from reading their confidential financial
data? – Enterprise DRM is ???
– But hey, we’ve had DRM long before TPM!
 Allowing an “open” software ecosystem
– For proprietary software
– For open source software
– For open source software that refuses to “play by the rules”
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©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
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Trusted Computing in Practice
 TPM exists on a very large percentage of desktops and
laptops
– On your computer, too
 But it is disabled by default
 So it is rarely used
– Even innocuous functionality like RNG is blocked!
 Microsoft was expected to enhance TC functionality in
Vista
– But only made a small step with BitLocker
 Apple used TPM once to ensure its new OS only runs on
its own “beta” machines
– But this is the wrong way around!
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©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
19
Agenda








A few words about Check Point
Why Trusted Computing
The Trusted Computing Architecture
Uses of Trusted Computing
Issues with Trusted Computing
Trusted Computing in practice
Details: 3rd party attestation
The TC ecosystem: related and competing work, NAC
puresecurity
©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
20
Remote Attestation
 Three phases
 Measurement: machine to be attested must measure its
properties locally
 Attestation: transfer measurements from machine being
attested to remote machine
 Verification: remote machine examines measurements
transferred during attestation and decides whether they
are valid and acceptable
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©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
21
Linux Integrity Measurement
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©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
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Linux Attestation
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©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
23
Linux Verification
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©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
24
Agenda








A few words about Check Point
Why Trusted Computing
The Trusted Computing Architecture
Uses of Trusted Computing
Issues with Trusted Computing
Trusted Computing in practice
Details: 3rd party attestation
The TC ecosystem: related and competing work, NAC
puresecurity
©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
25
Network Access Control (NAC)
 Two separate goals:
– Ensure computers are “clean”, and running an authorized
configuration
– Ensure only “good” computers connect to the LAN
 We could have done #1 with TC, but TC is not
happening
 So we just ask the computer nicely, and believe the
response…
 NAC is important in the marketplace
 Being standardized within TCG
– Under the name Trusted Network Connect, TNC
 It might converge with TC some day
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©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
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TC: Related and Competing Initiatives
 Microsoft Next Generation Secure Computing Base
(NGSCB), formerly Palladium
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–
Uses TPM to create a secure OS partition
Was expected to go into Vista
Apparently dead now
Microsoft’s Bitlocker disk encryption survived into Vista
 ARM TrustZone
 Intel Trusted Execution Technology
– Next slide
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©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
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Intel Trusted Execution Technology
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A recent initiative, an extension of the vPro architecture
Relies on TPM
Focused on virtualization: partitioning of virtual machines
Requires an “enabled” OS and applications
Provides:
– Protected (partitioned) execution – partitions are full virtual machines,
each running its own OS
– Sealed storage
– Protected input (e.g. from USB devices)
– Protected graphics
– Software measurement and protected launch of OS components
 Consists of:
– CPU extensions
– Chipset enhancements, e.g. to partition physical memory
– TPM
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©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
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Summary
 Trusted Computing tries to solve one of the top problems
in today’s computing
 It builds a complex and interesting architecture, using
innovative hardware components
 The in-built conflict between proven security and privacy
has not been resolved, and maybe cannot be
 TC is making small steps forward, will it ever see
widespread use?
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©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
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Further Reading
 https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/home
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_computing
 Pearson et al., Trusted Computing Platforms, Hewlett
Packard and Prentice Hall 2003
 David Grawrock, The Intel Safer Computing Initiative.
Intel Press 2006.
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©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
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Thank You!
[email protected]
©2003-2007 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved. Proprietary and confidential.
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