Transcript Document

Overview of Sensor Network Security
Yang Liu
Graduate student, University of Tennessee
2003 spring group seminar
Motivation
• Hostile environments
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Battlefield sensing/actuation
• Safety-critical applications
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Sensors in reactor complex
• Privacy intrusions
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Employee tracking/monitoring
• Uncontrolled access
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Challenges
• Wireless Communication
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Bring eavesdropping, unauthorized access, spoofing,
replay and denial-of-service attacks;
• Resource-constrained sensor nodes
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Limit the degree of encryption, decryption, and
authorization on the individual sensor nodes;
• Compromised sensor nodes
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Denial-of-service attacks;
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Desired security properties
• Confidentiality
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only intended receivers can recover the meaning
• Authenticity
• Integrity
• Freshness
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a message is not a replay of a previous message
• Scalability and Availability
• Other Considerations
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Traffic analysis
Sensor data accuracy
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Security Attacks
Passive Attacks
Release of Message
contents
Traffic analysis
Attacks
Masquerade
Active Attacks
Replay
Denial of service
Modification of
messages
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Attack Threads
• Spoofed, altered, or replayed routing
information
• Selective forwarding
• Sinkhole attacks
• Sybil attacks
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A single nodes presents multiple identities
• Wormholes
• HELLO flood attacks
see illustration
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Attacks against routing protocols
Protocol
Relevant attacks
TinyOS beaconing
Bogus routing information, select
forwarding, sinkholes, Sybil, wormholes,
HELLO floods
Bogus routing information, select
forwarding, sinkholes, Sybil, wormholes,
HELLO floods
Bogus routing information, select
forwarding, Sybil
Bogus routing information, select
forwarding, sinkholes, wormholes, HELLO
floods
select forwarding, HELLO floods
Directed diffusion and its
multipath v ariant
Geographic routing(GPSR,
GEAR)
Minimum cost forwarding
Clustering based
protocols(LEACH,TEEN,PEGASIS)
Rumor routing
Bogus routing information, select
forwarding, sinkholes, Sybil, wormholes,
HELLO floods
Energy conserv ing topology
Bogus routing information, Sybil,HELLO
maintenace(SPAN,GAF,CEC,AF floods
ECA)
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Cryptography Review
• Symmetric ( secret key )
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Shared secret
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Confusion and diffusion
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E.g., RC5, DES, AES
• Asymmetric( public key )
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One-way functions
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E.g., RSA, ElGamal, Elliptic-Curve
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Cryptographic Mechanism
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Use of public key cryptography in a manner that takes
advantage of its asymmetric nature to minimize power
consumption
Use of secret key (symmetric) cryptography within
tamper-resistant sensors in a manner that efficiently
emulates public key functionality (i.e., key notarization
and symmetric-key certificates)
Efficient key management techniques, including
adaptive selection and use of group keying
Use of special-purpose hardware to accelerate selected
cryptographic operations
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Security Services
• Provide for essential authentication, integrity, and
confidentiality services
• Provide security support services, including efficient
sensor equivalent of a public key infrastructure (PKI)
Security
services
Security support
services
Efficient cryptographic mechanisms
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Related work
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Security Considerations
Energy-Efficiency
Key Algorithm
Secure Routing
Intrusion Detection and Tolerant
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Security Considerations
• NAI Lab
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“Constraints and Approaches for Distributed Sensor
Network Security”
• OSU
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“Security Considerations in Wireless Sensor Networks”
• Univ. of Virginia
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“Denial of Service in Sensor Networks”
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Review
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NAI Labs has developed novel key management protocols
specifically designed for the distributed sensor network
environment, including Identity-Based Symmetric Keying and
Rich Uncle. They have analyzed both existing and NAI Labsdeveloped keying protocols for their suitability at satisfying
identified requirements while overcoming battlefield energy
constraints. They also implemented a sensor network simulator.
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Secret-key-based protocols are generally energy-efficient
Public key algorithms consume a great deal of computational and
communications energy
group keying protocols can reduce key management and
communications energy consumption
a mix of public key-based protocols, including pairwise, group
keying, and distribution keying, provide an energy-efficiency
superior to using just a single protocol
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Review
• Denial of Service Attacks and Defenses
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Energy-Efficiency
• Univ. of Maryland
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“Design Space Exploration for Energy-Efficient Secure
Sensor Network”
• Univ. of Twente
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“Assessing Security-Critical Energy-Efficient Sensor
Networks”
• NAI LAB
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“Energy-Efficient and Low-latency Key Management
For Sensor Networks”
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Review
• UMD
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Two observations
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Propose dynamic voltage scaling(DVS) for energy-efficient
DSN.
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• EYES
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Unbalanced computation load for decryption and encryption
Large variety of data processing requirement( The forwarding
messages need not be processed)
DVS varies the supply voltage and clock frequency based on
the computation load to provide performance with minimal
amount of energy consumption
Propose a unified assessment framework based on system
profiles, system parameters:
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Data Confidentiality
Tamper Resistance
Public Key Cryptographic Capability
Rich Uncles
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Key Algorithm
• NCSU
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“Efficient Distribution of Key Chain Commitments for
Broadcast Authentication in Distributed Sensor
Networks”
• UMD
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“A key-management scheme for distributed sensor
networks”
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Review
• UMD
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Pre-key distribution ( chose n keys randomly from a large k pools at
for a node and save them )
Share-key discovery ( During DSN initialization, each node discover
the neighbor nodes which can share keys )
Path-key establishment ( If the node pair cannot share keys, but
they are connected with the links in which all nodes share key, they
can be assigned a key.
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Secure Protocols
• UC. Berkeley
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“SPINS: Security Protocols for Sensor Networks”
“Secure Routing in Wireless Sensor Network: Attacks
and Countermeasures”
• UMBC
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“Security For Sensor Network”
• UCLA
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“On communication Security in Wireless Ad-Hoc
Sensor Network”
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Review
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SPINS has two secure blocks: SNEP and µTESLA.
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SNEP includes: data confidentiality, two-party data authentication
and evidence of data freshness
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Semantic security, coding with randomized counter
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Data Authentication, MAC( message authentication code)
using shared secret key
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Replay authentication, MAC includes counter value
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Low communication overhead, 8 bit per messages
µTESLA provides authenticated broadcast
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One way function
UCLA communication Security Scheme
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Define three types of data in sensor network, which is mobile code,
location information and application specific information
For each of them apply for different security levels protection,
master key for mobile code, group key for location information and
low overhead key for application data.
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Intrusion Detection and Tolerant
• Univ. of Colorado, Boulder
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“INSENS: Intrusion-Tolerant Routing in Wireless Sensor
networks”
• Palo Alto Research Center
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Jessica Staddon, Dirk Balfanz and Glenn Durfee.
“Efficient tracing of failed nodes in sensor networks”
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Review
• Intrusion tolerance
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Constrain the type of commutations. Individual nodes are
not allowed to broadcast to the entire network
Prevent advertisement of false routing data. Control routing
information must be authenticated
Symmetric key is chosen
Redundant multipath routing is built into the system to
achieve secure routing
• Intrusion Detection ( tracing the false nodes)
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Base station need know near neighbors of each node
Establish network topology
Subdivision-Based tracing
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Research Fields
• Security under resource constraints, e.g., energy,
bandwidth, memory, and computation constraints;
• Key management;
• Authentication and access control;
• Intrusion detection and tolerance;
• Secure location services;
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Research Fields (Cont.)
• Trust establishment, negotiation, and
management;
• Privacy and anonymity;
• Secure routing;
• Secure MAC protocols;
• Denial of service;
• Prevention of traffic analysis;
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Future Topics
• Introduction to Cryptography
• Overview of Ad hoc Network Security
• Introduction to Intrusion Detection System
• Overview of routing protocols in Sensor Network
• Key Exchange, Distribution and management
• Security in Mobile Agent
• Sensor Network Simulation
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Reference
• [1] D. W. Carman, P. S. Kruus and B. J. Matt. “Constraints and Approaches for
Distributed Sensor Network Security”. dated September 1, 2000. NAI Labs Technical
Report #00-010
• [2] Adrian Perrig, Robert Szewczyk, Victor Wen, David Culler, J. D. Tygar. “SPINS:
Security Protocols for Sensor Networks”, in Wireless Networks Journal (WINE), September
2002
• [3] Prabal K. Dutta, “Security Considerations in Wireless Sensor Networks”, Sensors
Expo, San Jose, CA
• [4] Sasha Slijepcevic, Miodrag Potkonjak,Vlasios Tsiatsis, Scott Zimbeck, Mani B.
Srivastava. “On communication Security in Wireless Ad-Hoc Sensor Network” Eleventh
IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative
Enterprises (WETICE'02) June 10 - 12, 2002 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA
• [5] Chris Karlof and David Wagner, “Secure Routing in Wireless Sensor Networks:
Attacks and Countermeasures”, to appear First IEEE International Workshop on Sensor
Network Protocols and Applications, May 2003
• [6] Anthony D. Wood, John A. Stankovic. “Denial of Service in Sensor Networks”. IEEE
Computer, 35(10):54-62, 2002
• [7] Lin Yuan, Gang Qu. “Design Space Exploration for Energy-Efficient Secure Sensor
Network”. The IEEE International Conference on Application-Specific Systems,
Architectures, and Processors (ASAP'02) July 17 - 19, 2002 San Jose, California
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Reference(Cont.)
• [8] Jeffery Undercoffer, Sasikanth Avancha, Anupam Joshi, and John Pinkston,
“Security for Sensor Networks”2002 CADIP Research Symposium.
• [9] Donggang Liu and Peng Ning “Efficient Distribution of Key Chain Commitments for
Broadcast Authentication in Distributed Sensor Networks”, The 10th Annual Network and
Distributed System Security Symposium. San Diego, California. February 2003
• [10] Adrian Perrig, Robert Szewczyk, Victor Wen, David Culler, J. D. Tygar. “SPINS:
Security Protocols for Sensor Networks”. in Proceedings of Seventh Annual International
Conference on Mobile Computing and Networks MOBICOM 2001, July 2001
• [11] Adrian Perrig, Robert Szewczyk, Victor Wen, Alec Woo. “Security for SmartDust
Sensor Network”
• [12] Stavan Parikh, Tracy Barger, David Friedman “ Security in Sensor Network”, lecture
of CS 588 Cryptography, Dec. 2001
• [13] Jessica Staddon, Dirk Balfanz and Glenn Durfee. “ Efficient tracing of failed nodes
in sensor networks”. In Proceedings of the first ACM international workshop on Wireless
sensor networks and applications (WSNA), pages 122-130, ACM Press, 2002
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Illustration
Warmhole and sinkhole
HELLO flooding
Spoofing
Sybil
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