Transcript Political Organisation and Elite Bargains in Africa

Political Organisation and Elite
Bargains in Africa
James Putzel
Department of International Development
London School of Economics
29 March 2012
Addis Ababa
Some caveats at the outset
• There is a tendency in academic literature to pathologise
African politics and infantilise African states, which must be
rejected vigorously.
• The category of “(neo) patrimonial politics” has little
explanatory power, encompassing successful states like
South Korea and states like Somalia and the DRC.
• The analytical prisms with which we discuss African politics
should be the same as those used to discuss politics in any
region.
• The individuality of African states, like all other states,
makes generalisation about politics very risky.
• The big question is: What are the factors favouring and
hindering capitalist development in Africa?
• I am not an expert in African politics and came to it from
much longer study in Asia – I speak to collective research
results.
A general outline
• Why looking at “political settlements” may tell
us more than looking at “good governance”
• Why “Elite bargains” are central to politics in
general and developing countries’ politics in
particular
• Why political organisation plays a decisive role
in shaping a state
• Some implications for policy
Dominant view in the policy
community on the state and politics
“Good Governance”
can secure:
• peace and stability and
• growth and development
“Good Governance”
=
the adoption of institutions
promoting:
• Liberal democracy
+
• Free markets
• The right institutions
(rules and norms)
In the DRC after the peace
donors promoted:
• A democratic constitution
• Competitive elections
• Polices: anti-corruption,
transparency,
poverty reduction
BUT the DRC has achieved
neither peace nor the
beginnings of development
• 50th on Ibrahim’s Index
Incentives for good
behaviour
(high scores on
Mo Ibrahim’s Index)
Telegraph 28 Nov 2011,
Kinshasa elections
The same institutions lead to very
different outcomes
In Tanzania and Zambia
• Similar institutional reforms
promoting competitive
politics
- were adopted peacefully
- but with limited impact on
growth, poverty reduction
and development
In Rwanda
• Institutions limiting political
competition
- established peace
- and have had a significant
impact on growth and
modest poverty reduction
• 13th and 16th on Ibrahim’s
Index
• 25th on Ibrahim’s Index
Seeing the state as a
“political settlement”
Political Settlement embodies a
set of power relations
• Intra-elite
- economic vrs political elites
- landed and non-landed
- rural & urban
• Elites & non-elites
- rich & poor
- employers & workers
- landowners & tenants/
farmworkers
• Inter-group
- genders, regions, ethnicities
religious communities
• State & society as a whole
Emerge from conflict &
bargaining
Botswana public sector workers
forced to end strike 2011
Institutional reforms must take
account of the political settlement
When institutional reforms are
out of step with power relations
• At best they are ineffective
- SAPs that were not
implemented
• At worst they can provoke
violent conflict
Extreme example:
Rwanda:
The threat of democratic
reforms in early 1990s likely
contributed to the genocide
“Elite Bargains” are at the centre of
political settlements
Need to “buy in” elites to
manage conflict peacefully
• In most developing countries
bargains among elites remain
central to peace and
development prospects
• Elites play by state rules in
exchange for privileged access
to rents:
- Licences: mining, telecoms,
trucking, transport
- control of land
- access to tax holidays
Defining elites: Those who:
• possess valued assets in
agriculture, manufacturing,
services (main capitalists);
• wield substantial power of
adjudication over the
distribution and allocation of
property rights (traditional
chiefs, landlords, regional
political leaders);
• possess authority to bargain
on behalf of rural communities
or organized religious
communities (traditional
leaders, religious leaders);
• lead political organizations like
parties, clan networks,
populist coalitions
Characteristics of a state that can
make an “elite bargain” durable
Coercive power of the state must be
both strong enough and legitimate enough to
provide “credible commitment” and “credible threat”:
• Positive incentive to elites
• Those who control the state
- rents allocated and
must be legitimate
property rights granted can
- there is a basic acceptance
be protected & enforced
of their right to rule
- do not need to exercise
• Negative incentives to elites
coercive force against
- elites who choose to exit a
citizens in order to maintain
bargain & challenge the
power
state through violence can
be punished
Role of non-elites and
social movements
Two reasons why society and non-elites remain central:
• Elites need to main their
• Well organised social
authority among their social
movements
base regardless of regime
- can overturn an elite
type:
bargain (Tunisia)
- They need to ensure basic
- give rise to new elites
protection of communities
(Uganda)
- They need to ensure basic
- reconstitute old elites in a
livelihood possibilities
new elite bargain and
- They need to ensure their
constituents do not resort
political settlement
to violence against them!
(Zambia)
Stable elite bargains and political
settlements must be inclusive
1. Inclusive of rival elites and
their constituents
• Elites anchored in diverse
territories, and religious,
ethnic or language groups
Uganda
- eluded state building
projects pre-1986
- achieved by Museveni
during first 2 decades;
- now threatens the future
as Buganda and other
communities are alienated
2. Inclusive in one overarching
bargain rather than loosely knit
exclusionary local bargains
• Single inclusive bargains in
Zambia and Tanzania
• Regionally and ethnically
based bargains in the DRC
- Cities can be the locus of
local bargains:
Lubumbashi inKatanga
• Clan based bargains in
Somalia
3. Inclusive in how elites
mobilise their social base
• Mobilisation on ethnic
grounds as in the DRC vrs
• Mobilisation around a
development programme as
in Rwanda
• Building an inclusive local
coalition around national
development objectives as
in Durban, South Africa
4. Inclusiveness observed
through outcomes more than
processes
• Distribution of rights &
entitlements among classes
and groups rather than
appointment of officials
• Imposed settlement as in
Rwanda may be more
inclusive than pluralist
bargaining as in Burundi
• Dominant party state as in
Tanzania - more inclusive
outcomes than Kenya
Political Organisation
Plays a Decisive Role
• Political organisations are groups whose actions
are directed to achieving positions within the
state and shaping its institutions (rules) and
policy directions (come in many forms)
• They determine the durability and outcomes of
political settlements and elite bargains
• They are decisive in determining the powers and
the limitations of power over the Executive
Authority of the state
Importance of Executive Authority
Executive authority
powerful but limited
•
• Executive authority needs
to be powerful enough to
impose positive and
•
negative incentives
• Executive authority needs
to be limited to ensure
•
against abuse by actors
- Checks within the state
- Checks independent of the •
state
•
Zambia
UNIP faced fractious
contending elites by
concentrating power in the
Presidency
Contending elites were
brought into the party and
state
Powerful non-executive
actors within the party &
state and not excluded
Respected independence of
Zambian trade unions
All had interest in effective
security forces
Uganda’s achievements
• NRM banned competitive
political parties and
concentrated power in the
executive
- crucial to development
achievements
• Initial achievements by
building alliance with
contentious elites:
especially the Baganda
But no checks on Executive
Authority
• Loose structure of NRM
provided no means to check
executive power
• Personalist patronage
networks within the armed
forces
• Powerful elites excluded
from the state: Kabaka
• Few independent
organisations capable of
limiting executive power
Political organisation and differential
performance of the state
Analysing political organisation
Aggregate Measures of
performance
• Political organisations and
patterns of action they
pursue can create executive
authority that is effective in
some functions and
ineffective in others
• Understanding this puts into
question efforts to come up
with aggregate measures of
state performance
• Word Bank’s seven key
indicators of good
governance
• Mo Ibrahim’s four overarching dimensions of
inclusive governance
- Both fail to analyse or explain
differential performance
within states
Contrasting Political Organisation in
Zambia and Botswana
Zambia
• UNIP under pressure from
elites took over direct
management of mines
despite lack of capacity
• Proceeds used in patronage
that maintained peace but
led to sharp decline in
mining production
(Di John, 2010)
Botswana
• BDP in Botswana forged an
elite bargain initially among
cattle ranchers that
promoted state economic
management capacity
• When diamond mining
began proceeds were
reinvested in infrastructure
(wider issue resource curse)
• Ineffective in fighting HIV
(Di John and Putzel, 2009)
Dominant Political Party
versus competitive party politics
When limited party competition
promotes long run democracy
• States damaged by civil war
or intense episodes of
violence often experience
- conflicts over who is a
citizen
- elites resorting to violence
to secure rents
• Checks on executive
authority must be built into
party organisation
Uganda/Rwanda vrs Zaire
• NRM and RPF in Uganda
and Rwanda could ensure
- political actors respect
rules of the state on
citizenship and rent
allocation
- securing state power did
not rely on ethnic
mobilisation
• Mobutu’s MPR was
declared overnight & had
no checks on executive
authority
Developmental reforms often only
happen under threats
• Elites enjoying privileged access to income
streams and political decision-making have
moved toward more risky patterns of investment
and economic transformation only when they
were confronted with threats;
• In Rwanda, the RPF faces a threat to its position
of power if it does not deliver developmental
progress, which acts as a strong incentive to both
state officials and private sector actors close to
the state to engage in more risky investments
External Actors influence elite bargains
and shape political settlements
• Life-lines to elites:
- access to developed countries markets for
investments and consumption
- foreign aid to relieve revenue gaps
• Imposition of reforms and conditionalities for
loans and grants
• Alliances with particular political actors and
organisations
• Threats of prosecution (ICC)
• Military interventions: asymmetric power
Implications for Politics and Reform
• Uniform opposition to rent seeking as corruption may provoke
violence while allocation of rents and privileges may be
central to peace and state-building
• If competitive politics will lead to exclusion of powerful elites
or important ethnic, linguistic or religious groups, powersharing may be the better option
• The promotion of democracy in a country needs to focus on
establishing mechanisms for checks and balances on
executive authority rather than the form of political party
competition
• Attention should be focused on why states perform well in
some areas and not in others, and the array of interests
behind these trends, rather than developing aggregate
measures of “good governance”;
• Specific capacities in the state are the result of political
decisions based on interests and never simply a technical
issue that can be resolved with technical assistance;
• Where the basic parameters of the state, like who is a citizen
and who is not, or the basic authority to allocate property
rights, remain contested, the establishment of multiple
political parties may allow rival elites and their social
constituents to challenge the existence of the state itself, thus
leading to violent conflict;
• The radical changes in elite bargains and political settlements
required to embark on more risky developmental investments
may be difficult in the absence of major threats.