A Filosofie II

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Transcript A Filosofie II

Quine and ontological relativity
Quine Willard van Orman (1908 – 2000)
American philosopher (Harvard)
Language cannot be divided to “atoms”, it works only in its
complexity (holism). E.g., to be …. is only a role in structured
wholeness (e.g., goalkeeper)
Difference between analytic and synthetic statements (logical
propositions) is not absolute and should be dropped
If a statement is analytic, then it is true by definition. (Bachelors
are unmarried. Daisies are flowers.) Because of this, analytic
statements are essentially uninformative tautologies.
If a statement is synthetic, its truth value can only be
determined by relying upon observation and experience. Its
truth value cannot be determined by relying solely upon
logic or examining the meaning of the words involved. (All
men are arrogant.) The information in the predicates
(arrogant) are not contained already in the subjects (all
men).
“All crows are black.”
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Ontological relativity
It has no sense to tell how are subject of some theory
absolutely, it is only possible to explain how one
theory of subjects is interpreted in another theory…
Any individual statement (proposition) can not be
confirmed or disconfirmed, in the play is the whole
theory (system, discourse)
Any statement can be keep true if we do enough
drastic changes in the system.
„To ask how is reality actually is selfcontradictionary. It
is the same like to ask how long is the river Nile,
without reference to specific affairs of miles and
metres.“
“Reglementation” (purification) of language
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Philosophy of mind – the key branch of
analytical philosophy
Can machines think?
A. Turing Computing Machinery and Inteligence (1950)
What it means „to think“?
Turing test (TT) – dialog between „machine“ and man, thinking –
ability to cheat (trick)
Cognitive science
Weisbaum “Elisa”
John Searle – “Chinese room” (1984)
biologism (thinking is something like digestion), machines can
have syntax, no semantics (meaning of symbols, no
representation)
Ned Block (1942) (article Psychologism and Behaviourism -1981)
It is important how is pass TT
Roger Penrose – from Gödel theorem (?), no algorithmic function
of brain (no determination?)
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Defence of TT:
We all ponder in this way!
Legitimate extrapolation of the concept of „thinking“
Daniel Denett (1996) – theory of stances, similar to “perspektivism”
(developed by Friedrich Nietzsche. All ideations take place from
particular perspectives. There are many possible conceptual
schemes, or perspectives in which judgment of truth or value can be
made. No way of seeing the world can be taken as definitively "true“.
(But does not necessarily entail that all perspectives are equally
valid.)
• Physical perspective
• Design perspective
• Intentional perspective (having wishes, intentions)
Important is consciousness
“God (spirit, ghost, soul) in us” (Anaxagoras, Augustine, … P. Russell)
Quantum phenomena(?) (indeterminism?, freedom?)
Controversy:
dualism (Pythagoras, …Descartes …) x monism (atomists, ..)
Division mental x neural (stance, languages)
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Funkcionalism
(driller x rod, book – calendar)
From functional viewpoint, mind is a black box with
some function
T. Nagel How is it to be a bat?
“Science of consciousness made from first person
perspective … has no methods, data … will still
remain fantasy.” David Chalmers (Australian
philosopher, b.1966)
Post analytical philosophy
Richard Rotry (1931-2007): …things are not
represented by language, but created…
Language is set of instruments for achievement of
something …
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Soul and Body
(and analytical philosophy)
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Dualism and monism
Body x mind → soul?
Formation of dualism
mythology – Amor and Psyché
Milesian philosophers – principle of motion
Pythagoreans – soul (PSYCHÉ) principle of individuality,
metempsychosis
Empedocles (5th cent. BC) (had been girl, bush…)
Plato (4th cent. BC) – live of soul (metempsychosis)
3 parts of soul (team of horses):
1 reason, 2 passions, 3 will
Aristotle (4th cent. BC) (principle of life) – 3 souls
nourishing, experiencing, rational
Nefesh → influence of Neo-Platonism → soul
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Living and non living bodies (distinguished in Czech)
Descartes (1596-1650)
Clear opposites, incommensurability, problem of interconnection
of soul (mind) and body:
----------------------------------------------------------------------a – the world of bodies is closed, nothing no corporal influences
it, explicable from itself
b – the world of mind (psychological, mental states, processes,
dispositions, attributes …) no corporeal, closed – independent
world of mind (illusion?)
c – stated and processes of mind – causes of some corporeal
states, processes, changes
-------------------------------------------------------------a- and b - is not possible to proof (and disproof), metaphysical
theses
Berkeley (1685-1753)
Nissargadatta (1897-1981): “all there is is consciousness”
c- empirical assertion (possible falsification)
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→ three concepts
Psychophysical materialism (a and c, non b) (mind has
corporeal nature – old atomists, mind is illusion)
1. Dualism – non a: body is mind, body is illusion
2. Epifenomenalism, psychophysical parallelism, non c.
(mind is caused by corporeal changes)
Epiphenomenon (epi-phainó, to appear on something) is
phenomenon that can have case, but do not cause
anything. Secondary phenomenon.
Paralelism: between mind and body is no causal
interconnection, in both proceed the same causal
processes,
Nicolas Malabranche (1638-1715)– no interaction – God
arranged that physical and mental processes proceed
simultaneously
Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), “occasionalism”, dualism of
qualities, “theory of double aspect”- some causes
have both physical and mental aspect
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“neutral monism” amended
E. Mach → B. Russell:
Mind and body – no independent
entities, but appropriate ways of
ordering events
Model:
wave - corpuscular dualism of quantum
mechanics
relation sense – reference in Frege´s
terminology
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Main theses:
mind = behaviour (behaviourism)
= part of brain (psychophysical
identity)
= program (functionalism)
= phenomenal quality fixed to brain
= illusion (eliminative materialism)
= quality of brain (naturalism)
= non-physical entity interacting with
brain (interactionism)
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Gilbert Ryle (1900 -1976), English philosopher,
(“tourist in Oxford”) → behaviourism
The concept of "mind" is "a philosophical
illusion hailing chiefly from Descartes and
sustained by logical errors and category
mistakes which have become habitual."
Belief that there is polar opposition between
mind and body is the belief that both terms
are of the same logical type.
Gilbert Ryle (The Concept of Mind 1949)
Ghost in the machine
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