Transcript AGRICULTURE, FOOD AND RESOURCE POLICY AGEC 430
Chapter 5 - Trade & Macro
5.1 Macroeconomic Factors
– exchange rates – interest rates – government fiscal balance
5.2 International Agricultural Trade
–Trade agreements
5.3 Trade Theory
–Gains from trade –Distortions (tariffs & subsidies) –Farm programs
1) Exchange Rates
Affects the competitiveness of agr. Products Early 1970’s – floating exchange rates Policy – over or under value exchange rate What is the impact of a ER distortion?
Example 1:
Argentina: Overvalued Exchange Rate (exporter) Shift of excess demand function Lower producer price Lower quantity exported Loss of producer surplus
Source: International Monetary Fund -IFS
P
Increase in Exchange Rate
ED S Q
Interest Rates:
Why interest rates are important:
1) Value of currency
– prices received and paid Most commodities are US$ denominated
2) Cost of borrowing:
Agriculture is capital intensive (borrowing) Inputs: seed, fertilizer, machinery 1980’s - high interest rates – low grain prices - debt crisis
Cost of borrowing
: How is it determined ?
Role of central bank (Bank of Canada) Role of the market Government intervention (interest subsidies)
20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1960 1965 1970
Canadian Prime Rate % (1960-2004)
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
100 Basis points = 1% Src. Globe & Mail - March 8, 2008
Government Fiscal Balance
Consequences for Agricultural Policy
1 – interest rate
- more borrowing = higher rates
"crowding out effect"
- higher cost for farm borrowing 2001 Average capital/farm = $800,000 Total farm capital = $ 200 Billion 1% change in interest rates => $ 2 Billion (1971 - 2002) - Net market income - 1.8 $B (2002) 3.3 $B (1975)
2 – capacity to fund interventions
- deficits = limited marge de manouvre - reduced scope for intervention
Debt/GDP Canada (61-2003)
80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1961-62 1969-70 1977-78 1985-86 1993-94 2001-02
-8 -10 -4 -6
Deficit/GDP Canada (1961-03)
4 2 -2 0 1961-62 1966-67 1971-72 1976-77 1981-82 1986-87 1991-92 1996-97 2001-02
Fiscal Deficit - Debt Service (1961-2003) ($Millions)
60000 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000 0 1961-62 -10000 -20000 -30000 -40000 1966-67 1971-72 1976-77 1981-82 1986-87 1991-92 1996-97 2001-02
5.2 International TRADE
Gains from trade:
•
> increase in output due to specialization
based on comparative advantage each country
– –
concentrates on producing goods and that it produces relatively efficiently trading to obtain goods that it does not
• • •
Trade Distortions many forms of distortion (welfare reducing) tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative measures non-tariff barriers (health, safety reg’s)
• •
Trade Agreements institutional arrangement – restraint on behaviour multi-lateral (regional), bilateral
•
Levels of cooperation
– – –
Range of goods (agr vs industrial) Scope of instruments included Customs union – full economic integration (EU)
Reasons for Protection
•
new industry (infant industry argument)
•
national health + phyto-sanitary
•
unfair foreign trade policy
•
Defend domestic programs
•
improve balance of payments
•
improve “Terms of Trade”
•
generate revenue
•
slow down painful economic adjustment
•
Political economy
benefits of additional trade are spread thinly among many individuals but the cost is high for only a few firms or groups
Trade Theory
• Why do nations trade? • What are the benefits?
• Implications of trade distortions
Theory
• comparative advantage (Ricardo) • absolute advantage
P P M A
US
• Ohlin (1933) • comparative advantage – due to resource endowments – Canada land rich, capital poor
P P M A
CA
– => export agr & import manufactures
Gains from trade
• Trade allows for specialization – increased welfare
.
Agr.
P 2 P 1
Gains from Trade
W 1 W 2 Manufactures
ES/ED Framework
• Excess Demand (ED) • Excess Supply (ES)
Gains from trade (versus no trade)
• depend on the impact of a country on world prices • Small country – no price impact • Large country – prices adjust, impacts smaller
2 Country Model – 1 good
• e.g. US/Canada cattle market • Assume: Canada - low cost producer • How are consumers and farmers affected by trade between the two countries?
• Winners and losers – distribution effects – US – consumers gains, farmers lose – CA – consumers lose, farmers gain
.
Canada
Gains from Trade
Trade Sector US ES P US W US P W P CA W CA ED Trade
Analysis: Trade Distortions
•
1 ) Import Tariff
Fixed-tariff rate vs ad valorem
• – – – –
Small country (fixed tariff)
domestic price increases Supply increases, demand decreases imports reduced Net dead weight loss • – – – – – – –
Large country
domestic price increases world price decreases Imports decrease; domestic output increases Consumers lose; producers gain Government gains tariff revenue Net welfare gain Potential to compensate consumers
Import Quota
•
Binding quota
–
if it restricts imports below free trade imports
•
Similar price effects to a tariff
– – – –
Imports lower Domestic price higher World price lower Rents to importers
•
Quota value: right to import
–
Based on difference between new world price and domestic price
P Q P w .
Large Country – Import Quota
Domestic Market D S World Market ES ED 0 P WQ Q I Q
Large Country - Tariff
.
P w Domestic Market D S ED 0 World Market ES TR ED 1
Import tariff – Small Country
S P T P w b G income a Government income – few transactions D
Export Subsidy
•
Used extensively
– Purpose: support domestic income (price) support – Subsidy to export the excess supply – US (EEP) starting in 1985 – EU (ERP) – export restitutions – 1970’s – not unique to agriculture – e.g. Bombardier •
price support program – increases ES
•
Subsidy Impacts
– world price falls (large country) – Domestic price falls – Exports expand – Government payments = (P s -P Ws )*exports •
value of exports increase relative to free trade
•
Deadweight loss
– Consumers gain – Producers gain – Foreign importers gain – Taxpayer loses
Export Subsidy – Large Country
S P s DWL P ws P w D T D d Exports Before Exports After Dd – domestic demand D T – total demand – including world demand
Export Tax
•
Tax exporters
•
Exporting government gain revenue from export taxes
•
Producers in exporting country lose
Export Cartel
Assumptions:
• 2 countries • Cartel: importer + domestic supplier • Suppliers maximize joint profits • Price according to joint supply function • MR = MC (joint MC)
Results:
• Domestic price increases • Imports and domestic production decrease • Foreign surplus increases • Deadweight loss
Export Cartel
.
P C P w S Exporter b a Q E Q d S d S T – domestic supply – domestic + foreign supply Exporter gain = (a-b) Deadweight loss = c c S d Importer S T MR D Q
Decoupled Subsidies
•
Programs that do not distort trade
–
within the green box category under GATT
•
policies that lead to a per-unit payment to producers are not decoupled
•
trade distorting => affects trade and prices
•
Is any farm program completely decoupled ?