Understanding

Our Saving Capacity, Competitive Positions of Exports in Dynamic Asia, Welfare Impacts of Asia’s FTAs & FDIs, and Shifts in Development Paradigm (for Informal ODA Discussion Meetings in Jakarta, Indonesia)

Prof. Shigeru T. OTSUBO

Advisor Extraordinary Tokyo Task-Force for Japan ’ s ODA Strategy toward Indonesia The Government of Japan Professor Graduate School of International Development Nagoya University

1

100 90 80 70 60 50 40

Is the Doomsday Imminent ?

Age Dependency Ratio (dependents to working-age population, %)

Higih Income Cos.

Low & Middle Income Cos.

Japan East Asia & Pacific LMICs

Determinants of the (private) saving ratio:

Income (level), rates of return, uncertainty, domestic/foreign borrowing constraints, financial depth, fiscal policy, pension system, income/wealth distribution, and

demographics

… 2

Is the Doomsday Imminent for Indonesia?

The pattern of Indonesia ’ s age dependency ratio lags behind that of East Asia (average) by as much as 10 years, but it will bottom out in 2015 and the rising trend will be visible by 2025 … . If Indonesia can mobilize her own savings … ..

Targeting the year 2025 for major development outcomes will be a right strategy.

Age Dependency Ratio (dependents to working-age population, %) 100 70 60 90 80 50 40 Higih Income Cos.

Japan Low & Middle Income Cos.

East Asia & Pacific LMICs Indonesia 3

90 80 70 60 50 40 30

Indonesia

’

s Demographic Trends

So far, Indonesia ’ s population share of ages 65+ has been only gradually rising, while that of young generation ages 0-14 has been declining rapidly … ..

Indonesia's Demographic Trends 5 5 4 1 0 2 1 3 2 4 3 Age dependency ratio Population ages 65 and above (% of total) Population ages 0-14 (% of total) Population growth (annual %) 4

Japan’s Current Account Balance

Japan’s CAB movements are still cyclical, but if 1) TB surplus is on a shrinking trend, and 2) Income Balance surplus continues to expand …..

5

Japan’s Trade Partners

In early 1990s, Asia replaced the US as Japan’s top export destination and as her top import origin …..

Exports Imports

6

Re-Importation by Japanese Firms Operating Overseas

1) 2) The share of re-imports by Japanese firms in total imports has reached 15% mark at the end of 1990s and it continues to increase.

More than 80% of those re-imports are from Asia.

7

Development Stages Theory of BOP

(cf. Crowther, 1957)

Indonesia

Malaysia Korea Singapore

Japan

Thailand Surplus Current Account Balance Trade Balance in Goods & Services Income Balance (returns on Investments) Deficit Surplus Deficit Surplus Deficit Surplus Net Foreign Assets Deficit Surplus Capital Account Balance Deficit Immature Debtor Country Matured Debtor Country Debt Repayment Country + Immature Creditor Country + + Matured Creditor Country +

-

+ + + +

-

+

-

+ +

-

+ + +

-

+

-

+

- -

F. Asset Take-down Country

-

+ + +

-

8

Export Product Share in 2000

Pulp Coal Vegetable oil Data processing mac. Furniture Petro Gas Wood Textile Radio Telecom Footwear Indonesia's Export Product Shares 12.00

10.00

8.00

6.00

4.00

2.00

0.00

SITC 3-digit Category

Export Potential Tables are provided at SITC 3-digit level in an Appendix.

9

Indonesia

’

s Shifting Comparative Advantage in Asia



Revealed Comparative Advantage RCAij = ( Xij / Xi ) / ( Xj / X ) RCA>1 or RCA<1

1) RCA indices are computed for East Asian economies using UN/COMTRADE (WB Version) SITC 3-digit level (269 lines) data, for 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000.

2) Then correlations among RCAs for Asian economies are computed.

10

Indonesia's Export P otentials 0 - Food and Live A nim als C hiefly for Food 1 - B everages and Tobacco 2 - C rude M aterials, Inedible, except Fuels 3 - M ineral Fuels, Lubricants and R elated M aterials 4 - A nim al and V egetable O ils, Fats and W axes 5 - M anufactureing G oods C lassified C hiefly by M aterial 6 - C hem icals and R elated P roducts, N .E.S .

7 - M achinery and Transport Equipm ent 8 - M iscellaneous M anufactured A rticles 9 - N ot C lassified Elsew here P ulp and w aste paper O res and concentrates of base m etal C oal,lignite and peat P etrol.oils,crude,& c.o.obtain.from

P etroleum products,refined G as,natural and m anufactured O ther fixed vegetable oils,fluid or W ood m anufactures,n.e.s.

P aper and paperboard Textile yarn Fabrics,w oven,of m an-m ade fibres A utom atic data processing m achines P arts of and accessories suitable f R adio-broadcast receivers G ram ophones,dictating,sound recorde Telecom m unications equipm ent and pa Therm ionic,cold & photo-cathode val Electrical m achinery and apparatus, Furniture and parts thereof O uter garm ents,m en's,of textile fab O uter garm ents,w om en's,of textile f O uter garm ents and other articles,k Footw ear SITC C ode 251 287 322 333 334 341 424 635 641 651 653 752 759 762 763 764 776 778 821 842 843 845 851 M ITI designated sectors (2002.1) P rotection?

R C A Increases (2000/1990) 5.37

2.03

5.63

0.38

0.53

0.39

2.02

1.27

8.36

6.78

1.18

1787.96

747.24

9.02

197.63

6.14

6.35

2.93

1.90

1.12

1.23

1.10

1.73

2000 S hare in X (%) 1.15

3.13

2.05

9.80

2.63

10.66

2.65

1.51

3.29

2.14

1.80

3.25

1.61

0.98

1.33

2.82

1.19

1.07

2.46

1.61

2.14

1.44

2.58

11

Looking at the competitive structure in Asia from Indonesia

’

s point of view: 1) Indonesia

’

s export structure continues to be complementary to those of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.

2) Indonesia faces stiff competition with Malaysia in exports, and this competition has become stiffer.

3) Competition with Thailand and Philippines has been also keen, and that with Thailand has become keener.

4) Competition with Singapore has been decreasing due to

…

(forming a growth triangle?) 5) China (w/ or w/o Hong Kong) emerges as a competitor for Indonesia.

RCA Correlations vs. Indonesia 0.20

0.10

0.00

-0.10

-0.20

0.70

0.60

0.50

0.40

0.30

Japan Korea Hong Kong Singapore Taiwan Malaysia Thailand Philippines China 1985 1990 1995 2000 12

Looking at the competitive positions of economies in Asia vis-

à

-vis. China:

1) Korea started to position herself vs. China in early 1990s..

2) Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand started to position themselves vs. China in the latter half of 1990s.

3) Indonesia and Philippines are lagging behind in this game of

‘

coexisting with China

’

in her emergence in the global market. RCA Correlations vs. China 0.30

0.25

0.20

0.15

0.10

0.05

0.00

-0.05

-0.10

-0.15

Korea Hong Kong Singapore Taiwan Malaysia Thailand Philippines Indonesia Japan 1985 1990 1995 2000 13

D evelopm ents in FTA s and Econom ic P artnerships in A sia 1989 … 1993 1994 1995 … ASEAN-AFTA ASEAN6 CEPT (Common Effective Preferrential Tariff) Scheme + Vietnam 1997 + Myanmar, Laos Japan & Singapore … 1999 ASEAN10 + Cambodia … Japan & ASEAN China & ASEAN ASEAN plus 3 (Japan, China, Korea) Unofficial ASEAN 3 meeting (KL) APEC Formation at Canberra (Nov.) Bogor Declaration ASEAN-AFTA Japan & Singapore Japan & ASEAN China & ASEAN ASEAN plus 3 (Japan, China, Korea) APEC … 2001 2002 Economic Partnership (Jan.) 2003 Within-AFTA tariffs < 0-5% by 2003.1.1

… 2010 AFTA completion I (original 6) Closer Economic Partnership (CEP) (Jan. Bangkok -) Brunei meeting (Nov.) FTA within 10 years Framework for Economic Cooperation (Nov.) EAFTA vision (Brunei) EAFTA vision welcomed (Sept. Brunei) Negotiaion Starts CEP within 10 years Free trade and investment (Developed members) !

!!

… 2015 AFTA completion II (ASEAN10) … 2018 AFTA completion III (all items) … 2020 Free trade and investment (Developing members) 14

The GTAP Model

GTAP Web Site: www.agecon.purdue.edu.gtap

 The GTAP model is a multi-region multi-industry computable general equilibrium (CGE) model constructed over a database consisting of bilateral trade, transport, and protection data for economic linkages among countries/regions, and of input-output tables that represent intersectoral interactions within each country/region. Each industry is represented by a single homogeneous commodity. The model includes three factors of production: labor, capital, and land. Labor and capital are mobile across domestic sectors, while land is assumed to be used only in agricultural sectors. Capital is traded internationally like intermediate inputs, while labor and land are not mobile across borders.

 Microeconomics-oriented model with incentive structures of economic agents explicitly modeled.

   Global saving-investment identity is preserved.

WTO, WB, USDA, and EPA are among the active users.

For further details, refer to the papers, ｢経済分析｣ １５６ 号 , and the GTAP web site.

15

Cos. & Regions

[Static Impact Only] Welfare Implications of Asian FTAs ($US million) AFTA JAPAN & Singapore JAPAN plus AFTA China, Hong Kong plus AFTA AFTA plus 3 Japan Singapore Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Vietnam China Hong Kong S. Korea

Taiwan Australia New Zealand Russia USA Canada Mexico Chile Latin America Western Europe ROW

World

-2,131 3,309 860 1,083 -60 -888 729 -175 -158 -267 -212 -151 -57 11 -836 33 29 0 -101 -840 -284 -106 -41 -29 -48 -26 -33 -6 -14 -182 -8 -1 -3 -39 -141 -117 214 541 -22 -60 -12 -32 -13 -72 12,115 2,812 243 457 -1,061 -1,915 997 -1,171 -281 -1,195 -792 -485 -98 -251 -3,010 1 -2 -38 -474 -3,909 -1,175 768 -4,678 4,292 1,821 1,932 76 -159 886 -4,972 8,616 -961 -1,415 -203 -67 -107 -2,717 -100 77 -15 -482 -2,367 -405 -946 31,976 3,142 719 567 -881 -2,000 1,148 -8,247 4,945 9,537 -4,329 -807 -170 -1,003 -8,005 -366 -80 -118 -1,682 -10,244 -3,208 10,897 16

[Static Impact Only]

Cos. & Regions

Trade Balances (US$ million) AFTA JAPAN & Singapore

Japan Singapore Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Vietnam China Hong Kong S. Korea Taiwan Australia New Zealand Russia USA Canada Mexico Chile Latin America Western Europe ROW 1,549 -1,277 -177 -1,053 -1,301 -1,001 -830 69 53 101 22 196 19 84 1,050 70 34 7 204 1,644 537 -235 -261 4 4 13 -3 18 128 4 1 1 27 151 91 11 1 27 2 5 4 6

JAPAN plus AFTA

-1,892 -1,261 -530 -1,730 -2,244 -2,087 -1,042 77 215 325 26 513 33 162 3,007 110 54 20 582 4,143 1,518

China, Hong Kong plus AFTA

5,445 -1,545 -351 -1,131 -1,785 -1,312 -1,004 -5,163 -8,615 393 40 399 44 334 4,448 322 137 35 982 6,555 1,772

AFTA plus 3

-2,662 -1,362 -661 -1,852 -2,682 -2,107 -1,230 -10,831 -4,707 -3,497 -44 1,026 79 536 9,738 399 167 70 2,070 12,747 4,803 1995 TB 1995 G D P 75,707 5,137,382 13,033 83,677 -2,697 -3,495 -5,799 202,132 88,832 74,120 -11,299 -2,181 16,091 -6,053 -7,212 167,996 20,194 700,219 139,242 489,258 17

Intra-APEC FDI and Trade Flows

(average for 1992-94) 1,000,000 100,000 10,000 1,000 100 10 1 1 10 100 1,000 Inward FDI (log of US$ millions) 10,000 100,000

In the APEC region, FDI inflows had already started to create exports (more than imports) in early 1990s.

18

Index of Trade Complementarity

: (1)

CMP ij

 1    

k M k j M j



X i k X i

  / 2 (0 ≦

CMPij

≦ 1)

where i is an exporting region, j is an importing region, and k represents goods categories. This index takes the value of one when a composition of import needs in an importing country matches perfectly with the export bundle of an exporting country. At the other extreme, where an export bundle of an exporting country has no relevance to the import needs of an importing country, the index takes the value of zero.

19

Intra-APEC Trade Complementarities and Trade Flows (average for 1992-94)

1,000,000 100,000 10,000 1,000 100 10 1 0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

0.50

0.60

Complementarity Index 0.70

0.80

0.90

1.00

20

Gravity Model of Directions of Trade Flows

Trade ij = f [GDP i , pcGDP i , POP i , GDP j , pcGDP j , POP j , Distance ij , FDI ij (and/or FDI ji ) , CMP ij , RTAD ijk , Other Dummies], Trade ij --- trade flow from country i to country j, pcGDP --- GDP per capita, POP --- population, FDI --- foreign direct investment (either direction), CMP --- complementarity index, RTAD --- a set of dummy variables for a set of k different regional trade arrangements (=1 if both i and j are members of the particular RTA). A similarity index │ pcGDP i – pcGDP j │ that represents the Linder Hypothesis is not included in the current study so as to focus on trade complementarity given the flying geese pattern of Asian production and trade. 21

Results for APEC Trade Gravity Models with FDI

(Dependent variable is Export ij) 1 Year Constant Distance ij GNP i GNP j Per capita GNP i Per capita GNP j Border Dummy b Complementarity 1984 -8.44

(-4.65) a -1.19

(-7.84) 0.22

(4.01) 0.28

(4.76) 0.76

(8.20) 0.69

(7.09) 0.62

(1.71) 2 1993 -6.03

(-3.34) -1.03

(-8.98) 0.25

(5.11) 0.26

(5.23) 0.51

(7.25) 0.50

(6.87) 0.69

(2.02) 3 1993 -6.46

(-3.54) -1.03

(-8.92) 0.23

(4.84) 0.27

(5.48) 0.45

(5.85) 0.50

(6.84) 0.66

(1.93) 4 1993 -6.77

(-4.19) -0.87

(-7.50) 0.21

(4.61) 0.18

(4.20) 0.57

(8.71) 0.31

(4.26) 0.40

x (1.21) 5 1993 -7.11

(-4.32) -0.87

(-7.50) 0.19

(4.36) 0.19

(4.48) 0.52

(7.18) 0.31

(4.30) 0.39

x (1.14) FDI ij FDI ji 0.22

(2.03) 0.68

(7.02) 0.18

(1.70) 0.66

(6.98) FDI ij x FDI ji Sample size F-statistics SSE Adjusted R 2 238 41.07

642.08

240 43.33

460.19

240 38.05

453.30

240 46.19

406.80

240 41.01

402.33

0.504

0.515

0.520

0.570

0.573

Note: a. Numbers in the parentheses are t-statistics.

b. This dummy takes the value one when two countries share the border.

x = Insignificant at the 5% significance level (t-value<1.645) 0.40

(4.84) 240 44.41

416.11

0.600

6 1993 -7.25

(-4.27) -0.93

(-7.91) 0.19

(4.25) 0.23

(5.15) 0.44

(6.58) 0.39

(5.47) 0.47

x (1.37) 7 1993 -5.02

(-3.11) -0.92

(-7.55) 0.19

(4.67) 0.25

(4.97) 0.36

(4.51) 0.42

(6.09) 0.67

(2.31) 3.67

(4.41) 240 44.26

416.95

0.559

8 1993 -5.22

(-3.17) -0.93

(-7.55) 0.18

(4.58) 0.25

(5.07) 0.35

(4.18) 0.43

(6.05) 0.66

(2.26) 3.52

(4.09) 0.08

x (0.77) 240 38.70

416.05

0.558

9 1993 -5.81

(-4.03) -0.78

(-6.43) 0.16

(4.11) 0.18

(4.04) 0.43

(5.61) 0.26

(3.57) 0.40

x (1.41) 3.29

(4.13) 0.62

(7.00) 240 46.63

372.39

0.604

10 1993 -5.94

(-4.00) -0.78

(-6.42) 0.15

(4.05) 0.18

(4.12) 0.42

(5.33) 0.26

(3.57) 0.40

x (1.38) 3.20

(3.84) 0.06

x (0.54) 0.62

(7.03) 240 41.34

371.98

0.603

0.32

(3.99) 240 43.14

390.42

0.585

11 1993 -6.21

(-3.97) -0.86

(-7.05) 0.15

(3.92) 0.23

(4.95) 0.34

(4.38) 0.35

(5.05) 0.49

(1.65) 2.92

(3.51) 22

Analyzing Welfare Implications of Japan ’ s FDI Activities in Asia

Simulation Design Matrix

Transfer of Capital Stock Transfer of Capital Stock & Technology Cofinance — Joint Venture Perfect Competition Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 (on top of Simulation 2) Monopolistic Competition Simulation 4 Simulation 5 Simulation 6 (on top of Simulation 5) 23

Simulation 1:

Transfer of Capital Stock under the Assumption of Perfect Competition (CRTS) A transfer of capital stock from Japan to nine developing Asian economies/regions (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore) is emulated in order to assess the “ stock effects ” .

Capital stock endowments of recipient Asian economies are augmented by 1 percent while Japan ’ s capital stock is reduced by the amount equivalent to a total increase in the recipients ’ capital stock. Without an accompanied technology transfer, there is no distinction between indirect investments and direct investments. International capital mobility is assumed. The savings rate is fixed.

Simulation 2:

Transfer of Capital Stock and Technology under the Assumption of Perfect Competition Production and managerial technologies accompany the transfer of capital stock. Assuming FDI flows to manufacturing sectors and there is resultant intra- and inter-industry technology spillover, the rate of technology growth is augmented in all seven manufacturing sectors (food & beverages, textiles, chemicals, metals, transport equipment, machinery, and other manufacturing) by 1 percent.

Simulation 3:

A Matching Increase in Capital Stock by Domestic Investment-Savings (Cofinance) Perceived higher rates of return in industrial activities with FDI inflows prompt domestic investors to mobilize domestic resources (savings) to cofinance the industrial projects.

Recipient countries ’ capital stock is further increased by an increment in domestic investment equivalent to the amount of the initial inflow of FDI. This simulation is conducted on top of Simulation 2 using the output file produced in Simulation 2. International capital flows are suppressed and the trade balance is fixed in order to force domestic savings to finance new domestic investment. The savings rate is thus endogenized on the marginal base.

Simulation 4:

Transfer of Capital Stock under the Assumption of Monopolistic Competition (IRTS) Transfer of capital stock (Simulation 1) is repeated, but this time, under an assumption of monopolistic competition with scale economies in all of the seven manufacturing sectors (food & beverages, textiles, chemicals, metals, transport equipment, machinery, and other manufacturing). International capital mobility is assumed. The savings rate is fixed.

Simulation 5:

Transfer of Capital Stock and Technology under the Assumption of Monopolistic Competition Transfer of capital stock and technology (Simulation 4) is repeated, except that monopolistic competition is assumed for the manufacturing sectors.

Simulation 6:

A Matching Increase in Capital Stock by Domestic Investment-Savings (Cofinance) Same as Simulation 3 except that the simulation is conducted under the assumption of scale economies and that the output file of Simulation 5 is used. International capital mobility is suppressed. The savings rate is endogenized.

24

World Aggregates

(percent change) Equivalent variation (U S$ m illion) G lobal net return on capital G lobal net investm ent W orld trade volum e W orld trade price Sim ulation 1 Sim ulation 2 Sim ulation 3 Sim ulation 4 Sim ulation 5 Sim ulation 6 2,220 0.01

0.03

0.07

-0.02

16,141 0.06 0.23

0.18

-0.06

5,347 0.00

0.10

-0.01

2,837 0.02

0.05

0.08

-0.01

16,665 0.04 0.29

0.21

0.00

6,315 0.00

0.08

-0.01

FDI is a positive-sum game, not a zero-sum game!

25

Simulation Results under Perfect Competition (CRTS) -- Economy-Wide Effects

(percent change) G D P quantity index Export V olum e Im port V olum e Export P rices Im port P rices Term s of Trade Trade Equivalent V ariation B alance (U S$ m illion) Total due to TO T changes (U S$ m illion) due to Technology changes Japan S im ulation 1: T ransfer of C apital S tock -0.11

-0.4

0.12

0.07

-0.02

0.09

-1,483 -1,811 936 0 Japan Japan S im ulation 2: T ransfer of C apital S tock & T echnology -0.11

-0.24

-0.11

-0.01

0.01

-0.02

S im ulation 3: C ofinance-Joint V enture (on top of S im ulation 2) 0 0.02

0.09

0.02

-0.01

0.03

-698 0 -3,042 310 -225 309 0 0

Simulation Results under Monopolistic Competition (IRTS) -- Economy-Wide Effects

(percent change) G D P quantity index Export V olum e Im port V olum e Export P rices Im port P rices Term s of Trade Trade B alance (U S$ m illion) Equivalent V ariation due to Total TO T changes (U S$ m illion) due to Technology changes Japan S im ulation 4: T ransfer of C apital S tock -0.13

-0.35

-0.02

0.04

0 0.04

-1,071 -2,970 456 -585 Japan Japan S im ulation 5: T ransfer of C apital S tock & T echnology -0.15

-0.28

-0.34

-0.06

0.05

-0.11

S im ulation 6: C ofinance-Joint V enture (on top of S im ulation 2) 0 0.01

0.04

0.02

0 0.02

-571 0 -5,279 220 -1,127 203 -848 -17 26

Major strategic implications of the study for Japan

(FDI-supplier) are:

(1)

In order to benefit from the positive-sum game of FDI, Japan (or any FDI-supplier) should also provide a conducive environment to attract inward FDIs . Outward FDI alone is not likely to improve domestic welfare (just like the case in international trade) unless it is driven by welfare-improving domestic causes. Also, two-way flows in a large number of countries should enlarge the positive sum of FDI.

(2)

In order for Japan (FDI-supplier) to avoid the possible secondary burden of a transfer of productive resources, it should also mobilize local savings by looking for local partners and/or raising local funds when executing FDIs.

(3)

It may be important to retain R&D facilities in the domestic market and preserve technology terms of trade if one supplies technology abroad along with capital.

Looking at the results from Indonesia’s (or any other FDI-recipient) point of view: (1) Indonesia should promote (call back?) inward-FDIs.

(2) (3) Intra APEC FDIs should promote Indonesia’s exports and mitigate BOP problems.

Technology (productivity) enhancement is the key.

(3) Cofinancing (mobilizing domestic savings/investment together with inward-FDIs) will increase Indonesia’s welfare, even though it turns TOT slightly against Indonesia.

27

Revolutions and the Evolution of Economic Systems

Private ownership of the means of production Capitalism Primitive Market Economy

Industrial Revolution Imperialism Monopoly Capitalism

IT-driven Market Economy

The US economy after the IT revolution IT Revolution Colonialism Socialist Revolution Primitive Economy Informal Sector Market-oriented

Larger-scale-organization oriented

Transitional State Socialism Development Planning China under Mao Zedong (Maoist China) Industrialized China

Smaller-scale-organization oriented

Linux USSR

Socialism Utopian Socialism State ownership of the means of production

28

Spending per Capita on Information Infrastructure

in 1998 (US$)

Asia Pacific Eastern Europe & Central Asia Latin America & Caribbean 13.49

22.89

28.28

Sub-Saharan Africa Middle East & North Africa 11.56

19.93

129.11

OECD Countries 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 Source: John Gage, “ From Digital Divide to Digital Opportunity: Business Leaders Report for Davos ” , Development Outreach, World Bank Institute (Spring 2000).

29

Structural Reform for Sustainable Growth

Changing Roles of Government, Corporate, and Household Sectors

Expansion of Corporate Activity and Investment Self-reliance of Individuals

Job choice society Employment practices

Corporate governance

Corporate accounts disclosure Corporate pension (401k type)

Human capital investment

Portfolio investment diversification Corporate restructuring

FDI into Indonesia IT revolution

Regulatory reform Entrepreneurship promotion Corporate taxation

Financial system reform

Personal income taxation

Social security SME policy

Education reform

Public investment reform

Information network

Labor market liberalization

Budget consolidation

Administrative reform

SOE reform

Local gov’t autonomy

Electronic government

Compact and Efficient Government

30

31