Transcript A United Nations Emergency Peace Service

Global Conference on the Prevention of
Genocide
McGill University
October 13, 2007
Making Prevention Feasible:
A United Nations
Emergency Peace Service?
“A proposal & recent global initiative to address our five big challenges in
preventing and managing armed conflict”
Challenges Leading to Crisis
1. Preventing genocide & crimes against humanity
2
Challenges leading to crisis:
2. Preventing armed conflict
3
Challenges leading to crisis:
3. Protecting civilians at risk
4
Challenges leading to crisis:
4. Prompt start-up of peace operations
5
Challenges leading to crisis:
5. Addressing human needs in emergencies
6
What is available to:
 Prevent genocide and armed conflict
 Protect civilians at high risk
 Prompt start-up of peace operations
 Address human needs in emergencies
We do have a universal organization already
committed to these challenges…
7
UNITED NATIONS
Not reliable, prompt or
to: optimally effective!
No dedicated capacity of its own
• Stop large scale atrocities
• Enforce treaties, convention or laws
• Conduct peace operations
• Preventive deployments
• Protect civilians
In order to act:
1.Security Council must authorise a response
2.Request assistance from its Member States
3.National governments must agree to lease their
personnel and resources
8
Existing Arrangements
UN Standby Arrangements System
SHIRBRIG
African Union Standby Forces
NATO
European Union ‘Battlegroups’
9
The current arrangements only provide
‘conditional’ access to national standby
resources.
“Many
Member
States
have
argued
against
the
establishment of a standing United Nations army or
police force, resisted into entering into reliable
standby
arrangements,
against the incursion
of
…Under
thesecautioned
circumstances,
the
financial expenses for building a reserve of equipment
United
Nations
cannot deploy
operations
or discouraged
the Secretariat
from undertaking
planning
for potential
operations
prior to the
Secretary-General
‘rapidly
and
effectively’
within
the
having been granted specific, crisis-driven legislative
timelines
suggested.”
authority to do so. Under these circumstances, the
United Nations cannot deploy operations ‘rapidly and
effectively’ within the timelines suggested.”
Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations
Para 90 (2000)
10
National Governments Tend to Wait,
Watch & Often Defer…
11
The Implications
• Later, larger efforts are often needed to stem wider
escalation and spread of armed conflict
• Millions continue to die and millions suffer
• Millions of refugees and internally displaced people
• Hundreds of $ billions required for post-conflict reconstruction and recovery
12
So what now?
The UN must have a capacity to respond:
•Reliably
•Rapidly
•Robustly
•Coherently (integrated)
•Cost-effectively
13
A United Nations
Emergency Peace Service
Requirements (everywhere)
Safety and security
Law and order
Useful services for human needs
15
Why the Concept of a
‘UN Emergency Peace Service’ ?
• Former proposals remain contentious and opposed
• Array of useful services attracts deeper and wider support
• Expands on legitimate, reliable emergency services needed, yet still
unavailable world-wide
• A UN Emergency Service has broad appeal
• May shift global social and national political responses
• A ‘UN Emergency Service’ is a tougher concept to oppose
16
What is Proposed as a UN
Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS)?
 A permanent UN formation
 A ‘first responder’ available immediately
 Requires authorization by the UN Security Council
 Multidimensional and multifunctional service
 Military, police and civilian elements
 Prepared for rapid deployment to diverse crisis
 Pre-trained, well-equipped 18,000 personnel
17
What is Proposed as a UN
Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS)?
Co-located at a new UN base
Static operational headquarters
Two mobile field headquarters
Integrated, modular formation
Robust security
Civilian police
Skills and services to address human needs
18
SRSG
Office of
SRSG
Annex A
Pers 3 MIL, 2 POL,
10 CIV.
-Senior MILAD,
POLAD & CIVAD
-Policy & Legal
EMC Liaison
Operational Level
UN Emergency Peace Service
Permanent Operational Level
Cell: DPA, DPKO,
OCHA,UNHCR,
Field Log &
National Support
Headquarters and Base
Personnel:
OPERATIONS
270 MIL
40 POL
Military
Staff
1540 CIV
Pers 100 MIL
-Contingency
Planning
-Operations
-Training
-Logistics
-Personnel
CIVPOL
Staff
Pers 25 POL
-Contingency
Planning
-Operations
-Training
-Personnel
-Legal Advisors
SUPPORT
Civilian
Staff
Deployment
Cell
Pers 25 CIV
-Contingency
Planning
-Operations
-Training
-Personnel
-Advisors
Pers 50 MIL, 10 POL&CIV Pers 100 MIL, 1500CIV
-Contingency Move
-Administration
Planning
-Personnel
-Staging
-Housing
-Mission Support
-Finance
-Rotation/Augmentation
-Host Nation Support
Planning
-Airlift/Sealift Contracting
-Deployable Movement
Support Teams
[Joint 24/7 OPS Cell]
DEPLOYABLE ELEMENTS
Military
Police
Civilian
Base Support &
Infrastructure
TRAINING
Doctrine
Training
Standards
Pers 5 MIL, 2 POL., 2 CIV
-Ongoing Development of
Doctrine
-SOPS
-ROE Options
Pers 10 MIL, 2 POL, 2 CIV
-Set & Assess Standards
-Course & Curricula
Development
-Training & Exercises
-Interoperability
Research &
Analysis
Pers 4 MIL, 2 POL, 4 CIV
-Long-Term Planning
-Lessons Learned
-Multidisciplinary
Think Tank
19
Annex
MSN HQ Includes:
Military, Police and Civilian Staff
Political and Legal Advice
Translation/Comms/Signals/Intell.
Defense & Security Platoon
NGO Liaison Team
Technical
Technical
Technical
Recce
Unit
Technical
Recce
Unit
Recce Unit
Recce Unit
B. Composition of Deployable Elements for a UN Emergency Peace Service
(assume 2 MHQ with 2 complete formations)
(assigned to UN Base under a Static Operational HQ and 2 Missions HQs)
Total Personnel in Each: MIL 5000, CIV 304, POL 400
MIL- 4 x 50 Pers
Augmented by CIV
MIL- 2 x 150 Pers
Motorized
Motorized
Light Infantry
Light Infantry
Battalion
Battalion
MIL- 2 x 600 Pers
Helicopter
Squardron
Military&Police Commander
MIL-1 x 250 Pers
CIV-1 x 20 Pers
POL- 1 x 20 Pers
Light
Light
Armoured
Armoured
Recce
Recce
Unit
Unit
Amoured
Amoured
(Wheeled)
(Wheeled)
Infantry
Infantry
Battalion
Battalion
Deputy/SRSG
MIL- 2 x 600 Pers
Mission HQ
Mission
HQ
(Tactical)
(Tactical)
POL- 3 x 125 Per
CivilianPolice
Police
Civilian
Civilian
Police
Companies
Companies
Companies
CIV- 2 x 30 Per
DisasterRelief
Relief&&
Disaster
Humanitarian
Humanitarian
AssistanceTeam
Team
Assistance
CIV- 2 x 10 Per
HumanRights
Rights
Human
Monitors&&
Monitors
Educators
Educators
CIV – 2 x 10 Pers
Conflict
Conflict
Resolution
Teams
Resolution Teams
CIV- 2 x 10 Pers
Peacebuilding
Advisory Teams
MIL-450 Pers
2 flights of 8 utility Helis
1 flight of 3 Heavy Lift Helis
1 flight of Armed Scout Helis
CIV- 10 Pers
Engineer
MIL-500 Pers
Battalion
-3 Field Squadrons
-3 Support Troops
Logistics
Battalion
Medical Unit
MIL- 1 x 500 Pers
MIL-400 Pers
-Forward Surgical Teams
DDDRRR team
CIV- 10 Pers
Environmental
Crisis Response
Team
CIV- 100 Pers
Medical Teams
CIV- 2 x 10 Pers
PublicAffairs
Affairs
Public
20
UNEPS Key Components
A ‘UN 911’ designed to be:
• A complement to existing arrangements (UN,
national, and regional)
• A ‘lead service’ or ‘first-responder’
• Deployable within 48 hrs, sustainable for 6 months
• Competent in diverse emergencies
• A cost-effective investment for ‘we the people’ and
the international community
21
Why this Model for UNEPS?
• Alleviates pressure on national governments
• Builds on and beyond the existing UN foundation
• Universal composition to ensure universal legitimacy
• Advanced training, equipment and standards to ensure
cohesive sophisticated service
22
Why this Model for UNEPS?
• Corresponds to requirements of UN missions
• Provides useful incentives to address human needs
• Assures services to restore law and order
• Maintains robust disincentives to dissuade or deter
and repel further violence
• Ensures a more rapid, reliable, effective response
when the need is imminent
23
UNEPS would Help Reduce:
1. Number of armed conflicts and war crimes
2. Massive suffering and violent deaths
3. Size, duration and number of peacekeeping operations
4. Pressure on national governments and national armed
forces to contribute in the high-risk, critical start-up
phase of operations
5. High costs associated with violent conflict and post
conflict reconstruction
24
Any Progress in Global Initiative?
• International working group of senior scholars,
with executive and secretariat in New York
• 40 CSOs actively supporting, over 350
endorsing
• U.S. H. RES ‘213’ United Nations Emergency
Peace Service Act of 2007
• Increasing Representation World-Wide
25
Representatives of Diverse Sectors
Agreed that:
 Concept is far more appealing
 Case is more compelling
 Model is more appropriate
 UNEPS has more potential
26
UNEPS Potential
Attract and mobilize
 people
 organizations
 eventually governments
Support
 partnerships
 global network
27
Objectives for 2007
• Educational outreach
• Ongoing research to detail requirements
• Generate constituency world-wide at all levels
• Be prepared for the next favorable moment (2008?)
28
Your Thoughts & Questions?
A United Nations Emergency Peace Service?
Dr. H. Peter Langille
[email protected]
In cooperation with ‘Global Action to Prevent War’
Credits
Special thanks for permission to use photos is extended to:
The United Nations
Human Rights Watch
Genocide Watch
Presentation created by:
Dr. H. Peter Langille, Global Common Security.org
Robbyn Evans, rae Communications.com
30
Is This Really Credible or Any
Improvement?
As noted in the 1995 Canadian report, Towards A
Rapid Reaction Capability For The United Nations:
“As professional volunteers develop into a cohesive
UN force, they can assume responsibility for some of the
riskier operations mandated by the Council, but for
which troop contributors have been hesitant to
contribute.
UN volunteers offer the best prospect of a
...
“No matter
difficult
goal now
completely
reliable,how
well-trained
rapidthis
reaction
capability.
seems,
it deserves continued study, with a
Without the need to consult national authorities,
clear
process
assessingand its
the UN could
cut response for
time significantly,
volunteers couldover
be deployed
within
hours of a Security
feasibility
the long
term.”
Council decision…
No matter how difficult this goal now seems, it
deserves continued study, with a clear process for
assessing its feasibility over the long term.”
31
Personnel Selection
 Merit and professionalism
 Universal representation
 Not national/political affiliation
 Contracted and assigned
 Extensive preparation/training
 Reliability, readiness, dedication
 Flexibility in managing diverse
assignments
 Paid, full-time (UN Civil Servant)
32
Removes 1 & 2 and should
Improve 3rd Decision-Making Level
1. National government approval (may be needed urgently)
2. National defence approval (personnel and resources)
3. UN Security Council approval (waits for 1. and 2.)
All have developed unique
excuses for inaction!
33
Why this Model for UNEPS?
• Provides a dedicated, ‘lead service’; a ‘first responder’ for the
critical, initial 4-6 months of complex peace operations.
• Functions until replacement/rotation needed and secured from
multinational contingents
• Provides a modular formation that can be tailored
• Cost-effective and a sound investment for saving lives and money
34