Transcript Document

USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
‘Oh what a tangled web’:
EBO in Theory and Practice
Rob Grossman-Vermaas
EBO Concept Lead
Centre for Operational Research and Analysis
DDA/CFEC
ISMOR, UK, Aug 05
UNCLASSIFIED
Unclassified
17 May 2005
1
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
Life is really simple… but we insist
on making it complicated
- Confucius
Unclassified
17 May 2005
2
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
Outline
1.
2.
3.
4.
EBO concept development
EBO experimentation
EBO in practice
Observations and Conclusions
The reported results, their interpretation, and any opinions expressed therein,
remain those of the authors and do not represent, or otherwise reflect,
any official opinion or position of DND or the Government of Canada.
UNCLASSIFIED
Unclassified
17 May 2005
3
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
The Six Flavours of EBO…
1. ‘EBO’ is a planning methodology that links strategy to operations…
2. ‘EBO’ is efficient ‘targeting’ and ‘shock and awe’…
3. EBO consider the application of all available sources of power…
4. EBO involve rapid, decisive operations and rapid dominance…
5. EBO require ‘knowledge’ principles for analysis and support…
6. EBO benefit from Systems of Systems analysis…
Unclassified
17 May 2005
4
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
The Six Fallacies and Flaws of EBO…
1. The Air Force invented it…
2. EBO is too connected to strategy, or,
not connected enough to strategy…
3. EBO derives from a position of strength, therefore, close
combat is always wrong…
4. Relies on ‘ch’i’ rather than ‘cheng’ –
• extraordinary vs. ordinary;
• direct vs. indirect
5. We can predict cause and effect…
6. EBO is ‘old wine in new bottles’
Unclassified
17 May 2005
5
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
The Seventh Fallacy or Flaw of EBO?
There is an accepted understanding of EBO
Unclassified
17 May 2005
6
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
An ‘Effect’
Clear statement for each Effect (written and understood):
•Identifies who or what is to be ‘influenced’, ‘affected’
•Suggests ‘nested’ or ‘environmental’ Effects
•Suggests the desired environmental state as a
consequence of an action(s) - measures
•Is descriptively written (how and why)
•Includes a timeframe (days, weeks, months)
•Is assignable, measurable, achievable
UNCLASSIFIED
Unclassified
17 May 2005
7
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
EBO : Conceptual Requirements
EBO incorporates:
• Complexity and cause and effect
• Systemic knowledge: environment dependencies/links/weaknesses
• Multiple levels of conflict
• Planning (EBP) process and capable organization
• Cognition and decision making in ‘real time’ – tools, models,
assessment
• Adaptive environment (fluidity of system)
• Risk analysis, MOE/MOP and metrics over time and space
• Synchronization of actions aligned to capabilities over time and space
• Non-military and military planning and assessment construct
•Knowledge
Unclassified
17 May 2005
8
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
Assessment of the System(s)
Academia
Nat’l and
Int’l Intelligence
Vulnerabilities
Social and Cultural
Political
Dependencies
Economic
Physical
Defence
OGDs
IGOs,
NGOs
Private Industry
nodes +
dependencies
Strengths
Legal, Ethical
and Moral
Scientific
and Technical
Relationships
Weaknesses
Military
System Understanding
Unclassified
17 May 2005
9
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
A Complex Effects-based Environment
Unclassified
17 May 2005
10
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
EBO: the inter-agency perspective
• Cultural, social, economic, dependency, humanitarian, developmental issues
critical to Effects-based concept
• Complex conflict environments favour ad hoc inter-agency command
arrangements
• Inter-agency coordination group should not formalize its organization,
processes, roles
• Consideration of development of inter-agency protocol or best practices
• HQ consider including liaisons to NGOs, IGOs and vice versa (PACOM)
– Inter-agency support is an integral ingredient for a functional Effects-based
concept
•Relationships? Authority? Strategic vs. operational vs. tactical
•Coordination? Direction? Advice?
Unclassified
17 May 2005
11
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
National links
COALITION
STRAT
OPCDR
co-ordination
authority
OPS
MNIG
co-ordination
authority
COS
CTFHQ
D/MNIG
Nations reps
TACT
UNITS
UNITS
UNITS
UNITS
UNITS
MNIG board
EMBASSIES
& HoMs
HEADS of
MISSION
ACTORS
ACTORS
Dep./CMNIG
STAFF
CC
Unclassified
IOs &
NGOs
STAFF
STAFF
FCDR
NATIONS
AGENCIES
& GOs
17 May 2005
12
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
EBO MOE/MOP Analysis
100%
2S
3S
MMA1 categories.
3
1S
2
Effect (MOE)
1
MMA2 categories
Generic Trend Line
Actions (MOPs)
100%
•Effects in Red are in process or not yet achieved
•Effects in Green are Achieved
Unclassified
17 May 2005
13
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Experimentation:
MNE 4 (20 Feb-17 Mar 06)
Unclassified
Aim: To explore concepts and supporting tools for
Effects Based Operations (Knowledge, Planning,
Execution, Assessment) within a coalition
environment involving Stability Operations with
increasing levels of violence in order to assist the
development of future processes, organizations and
technologies at the Coalition Task Force (CTF)
level of command
Unclassified
17 May 2005
14
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Multinational Experiment 4
Unclassified
Other Participants
Multinational (MN)
Effects Based Operations
Organization
Analysis
Lead
Intelligence
Tiger Team
Lead
Information Operations
MN Effects Based Operations
Concept of Operations
Combined Task Force Information Operations Plan
Concept of
Operations
Knowledge
Base Development
Intelligence
Effects-based Plan
Implementing
Procedures
Multinational
Interagency Group
Implementing
Procedures
Concept of
Operations
Effects Based Tools
Concept of
Operations
Combined Task Force
Intelligence Plan
Implementing
Procedures
Tools
Implementing
Procedures
Effects Based
Execution
Tiger Team
Lead
Concept of
Operations
Technical Demo
Concept of
Operations
Combined Task Force
Strategic Guidance
Combined Task Force
Political-Military Plan
National Political-Military
Plan
Multinational
Experiment 4
Multinational Information Sharing
Strategic Context
Knowledge Management
Unclassified
17 May 2005
15
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Relationships among the Four
Components of EBO for MNE 4
Unclassified
Knowledge Base
(Development)
Effects-Based
Planning
Effects-Based
Planning
Effects-Based
Execution
Effects-Based
Execution
Effects-Based
Assessment
Effects-Based
Assessment
time
T=0
Unclassified
T=1
17 May 2005
16
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
Unclassified
17 May 2005
17
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
EBO in practice (CJTF 180)
•Joint Effects Coordination Board (JECB)
- synchronization of lethal and non-lethal effects
- ‘targeting’ board (J2/J3)
- Intelligence, Info Ops, Mil Ops provide assessments
- quantitative and qualitative
•Joint Effects Working Group (JEWG)
- weekly staff coordination
- JEWG briefs JECB
- Based on Commander’s Intent
- Develops supporting effects
•Targeting Battle Rhythm
- OPORD establishes 3 week battle rhythm resulting in
weekly FRAGOs
- Changes are incorporated into decision making process
= Results in production of (refined) Commander’s desired Effects
Unclassified
17 May 2005
18
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
EBO in Practice:
(Operation Iraqi Freedom)
Unclassified
• Finding: ‘Based on initial understanding of the enemy, integrated kinetic and
non-kinetic actions and multiple, high-tempo lines of operation were unleashed
to achieve enemy disintegration and regime collapse; when execution exceeded
capacity to understand change, operations reverted from an effects to attrition
focus’.
Desired
Objectives
Effects
• Why it happened:
– Difficulty gaining knowledge to identify appropriate effects, desired
Maturing
actions, & cascading or 2d & 3d order effects.
– Limited collection on non-kinetic actions, notably IO
Least
– Over focused on measures of performance, rather than measures of
Mature
effectiveness and merit
Assess
Least
Most
– Insufficient interagency, joint and Service integration hindered execution
Enabled
Mature,
/ support of effects-based action
Routine
• What should be done:
– Enhance C2 and C2I technology, procedures, & organizations to deal
with war’s new character/conduct
OutActions
– Create routine joint and function integration via training & organization;
comes
extend jointness to the lowest levels possible
– Inculcate EBO via world-class experiment & training venues
Source: US Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned
Unclassified
17 May 2005
Tasks
19
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
EBO in Practice (NATO ISAF)
•ISAF ‘targeting’ and assessment cycles
- NO defined methodology
•PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC)
•ESC Working Group (Indicators and MOEs)
•MOEs on Security, Governance and Development
Unclassified
17 May 2005
20
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
EBO in Practice vs. Theory
•Little integration between CJ2, CJ3/7, CJ5, CJ9
•Task over process vs. process-driven
•Sporadic inter-agency coordination
•Immature analysis techniques
•Confusion over MOE and MOP
•Military vs. non-military planning and assessment constructs
Unclassified
17 May 2005
21
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
Observations and Conclusions
•Prescription vs. guidance
•Operational ‘redux’ (levels are archaic)
•Knowledge and technology
•Culture
•‘Inter-agency’ includes the military
•Doctrine vs. concepts
•Don’t break what isn’t broken
•Complexity + complicatedness = confusion…
Unclassified
17 May 2005
22
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
Questions?
[email protected]
1 613 990 7436
Unclassified
17 May 2005
23
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
Effects Based Operations
‘Operations designed to influence the long- or short-term state of a
system through the achievement of desired physical or
psychological effects. Operational effects are sought to achieve
directed policy aims using the integrated application of all
applicable instruments of hard and/or soft power. Desired effects,
and the actions required to achieve them, are concurrently and
adaptively planned, executed, assessed (and potentially altered)
within a complex and adaptive system’
CA working definition
Unclassified
17 May 2005
24
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Century Conflict:
Towards an Effects-based Policy?
1945 to 1990
•Linear System
•Limited Dimensions
•Sequential
operations
•Reacting to Threats
•Attritional Forces
•Focus on Attack
and Defence
•Single service
focus
•Civilian vs Military
•Mass/Directed
weapons
Unclassified
21st
1991 to 2001
•Asymmetric System
•Increasing Dimensions
•Rapid reaction
operations
•Coping with Threats
•Response Forces
•Focus on
Outcomes/Exits
•Joint/Coalition Focus
•OOTW and Civ-Mil Ops
•Small/Light Weapons
Unclassified
2002 to ?
•Complex Adaptive
System
•Unlimited Dimensions
•Complex operations
•Mitigating Threats
•Agile Forces
•Focus on Effects
•‘Collaborative’ Focus
•Inter-Agency Direction
•Advanced Technology
and WME
Source: Robert Vermaas, Future Perfect: Effects Based Operations, Complexity and the Human Environment
(Operational Research Note, Department
of National
17 May
2005Defence Canada, Ottawa, CA, 2004)
25
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
EBO Relationships (UK JDCC)
Strategic Aim
Obj
Obj
Obj
Strategic Level
E
E
E
E
E
E
As
Obj
Obj
E
E
E
E
E
E
Operational Level
A
A
A
A
Obj
E
Obj
E
E
E
E
Tactical Level
A
A
Unclassified
A
A
A
A
A
A
E
E
A
A A
A
A
17 May 2005
A
A
A
A
A
A
26
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
Hierarchy of Effects
Scale
Psychological
Large
Uncertainty
High
Systemic
Medium
Medium
Physical
Small
Unclassified
Low
17 May 2005
27
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
Example of Operational Objective:
Establish freedom of movement in Qandahar region
R1
A1
A’1
N1
N2
E1
E2
dT
N3
E3
Example of Effect¹: ISAF Force (R1) patrols (A1) ensure freedom of
movement of relief convoys (E1) along Supply Route (N1)
Example of Undesired Effect2, but Warlords ambush (A’1)
open routes (N2) resulting in civilian casualties (E2) and animosity, leading
to negative press coverage (E3) in international news media (N3).
UNCLASSIFIED
Unclassified
17 May 2005
28
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
CA EBO Experimentation
•EBO Concept Development for Experimentation (DDA/CFEC)
vs
•EBO Concept Development thru Experimentation (USJFCOM; CFEC)
•Feasibility Exploration vs. ‘Jumping on the Band Wagon’
EBO (CA and multinational)
a. C2 and inter-agency perspective (Strategic and Operational)
b. Systems and Network Analysis concept and technologies as
enabler to EBO
UNCLASSIFIED
Unclassified
17 May 2005
29
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
Canadian EBO concept Campaign Plan
• Support optimization of existing CA/NATO operational planning
process in light of emerging CA effects-based approach
• Provide functional solutions (based on experimentation) to
support optimized CA planning processes at the strategic,
operational and tactical levels, and modified CA command
organizations (methodologies - analysis; risk; modelling;)
• Influence and learn from development of US/NATO
multinational EBO processes, C2 organizations and technologies
(inter-agency perspective; hard/soft power; long-term effects)
• Inform development of subsequent campaign plans to address
later horizons (where should CF/DND focus in 2020?)
• Inform development of CF/DND doctrine based on concept
development and experimentation of EBO
Unclassified
17 May 2005
30
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
CA EBO Initiatives
• National Security Policy, 2004
- Integrated 3D security approach
(Defence, Diplomacy, Development)
• CDS Vision – ‘integrating effects’
• Multinational concept and policy statements (US; UK)
• Integrated Operating Concept (IOC), 2005
- EBO as an Integrating Concept
- DDA/ACD lead development of concept
• Joint Force Development and Joint Vision, 2005
- Employment of Effects-based approach
• Experimentation and Integration – CFEC - MNE series
• CF/DND; FAC; CIDA; academia
Unclassified
17 May 2005
31
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
Effects Analysis by MOE
MOE [%]
Trend line 2
100
Trend line 1
x
TH
x
x
x
x
Ideal effect line
tR
t1
lead time
Unclassified
tS
t2
t3
planned duration of effect
17 May 2005
tF
t4
t
lag time
32
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
10
0
M
OE
3
[%
]
[%
0
E2
10
MO
]
Weighting of Multi-dimensional EBO MOE
75
75
50
50
25
25
 MOE = 40%
MOE1 [%]
75
50
25
25
75
]
[%
10
0
]
M
[%
5
OE
E
MO
0
10
6
100
75
Unclassified
75
50
50
50
 MOE = 65%
25
25
100
MOE 4 [%]
17 May 2005
33
USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE
Unclassified
EBO in practice (CJTF 180)
•Main ‘combat’ objective:
‘Deny terrorist operatives sanctuary and eliminate
all foreign-sponsored Taliban, Al Qaeda and Hizb-e
Islami Gulbuddin anti-Coalition forces’
(measurable)
•Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180) employed
a method for synchronizing joint fires and effects
•Model for military and non-military integration throughout
CENTCOM – Joint Fires Element
•Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force
(CJCMOTF) – with NGOs
Unclassified
17 May 2005
34