Transcript Evropska unija kao globalni politički akter

Moć u međunarodnim
odnosima
I Različita viđenja moći u međunarodnim
odnosima
II Merenje moći u međunarodnim
odnosima
III Problemi sa merenjem moći u
međunarodnim odnosima
IV Literatura
I Različita viđenja moći u
međunarodnim odnosima
Power is an of the essentailly contested concepts in
tne study of international relations (Evans, Newnham,
The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations)
“The concept of Power is one of the most troublesome
in the field of international politics” (Robert Gilpin)
Power, like a host of other important concepts in IR, is
an essentially contested concept – it means quite
different things to different people (Brian C. Schmidt)
Moć je, kao i ljubav, mnogo lakše iskusiti nego
definisati ili izmeriti. (Dzozef Naj)
“Ono što je energija u fizici to je moć u politici” –
Bertrand Rasel (1938, Power: A New Social Analysis,
London: George Allen & Unwin)
“i want to begin by suggesting three reasons for both the
trouble and controversy. The first is that the concept of power
is primitive in the specific sense that its meaning cannot be
elucidated by reference to other notions whose meaning is
less controversial than is own. (“Truth” is another such
primitive concept)…
The second reason is that the concept of power is essentially
contested… in other words, it cannot be disconnected from
what we commonly call the “value assumptions” of the person
making the judgment.
Third, the contestedness of power – the fact that what counts
as power and being powerful is controversial matters. For, as
Stefano Guzzini argues, it has performative role in our
discourse and, more particularly, our political discourse: how
we conceive of power makes a difference to how we think
amd act in general and more particularly in political context.
(Steven Lukes)
David Baldwin describes the two
dominant traditions of power analysis in
International Relations: in terms of
elements of national power approach
which depicts power as resources and the
relational power approach, which depicts
power as an actual or potential
relationship.
National power approach
Proponents of the elements-of-national power
approach equate power with possession of
specific resources.
All of the important resources that a state
possesses are typically combined in some
fashion to determine its overall aggregate
power. The resources that are most often used
as an indicator of national power include the
level of military expenditure, gross domestic
product, size of the armed forces, size of the
territory and population.
Nemački fizičar Vilhelm Fuks je svoju formulu
moći izrazio kao sumu proizvedene energije,
proizvedenog čelika i kubnog korena broja
stanovnika. Godine 1963. njegova tako dobijena
tablica najmoćnijih imala je na vrhu SAD (100),
SSSR (67), Kinu (41), SR Nemačku (15), Japan
(14), Beliku Britaniju (12) i Francusku (7) dok su
mu predviđanja za 1980. godinu davala sledeću
sliku: Kina (250), SAD (160), SSSR (120), Japan
(39), SR Nemačka (25), Velika Britanija (19).
Relational power approach
This approach was championed by behavioral – oriented
political scientists during the 1950s and 1960s.
According to Robert Dahl, who was an influential
advocate of the relational conception of power, “A has
power over B to the extent that he can get B to do
something that B would not otherwise do”.
Fundamental to the relational conception of power is the
ability to demonstrate a change in outcomes.
Power as a set of material resources id deemed to be
less important than the actual ability of Actor A to change
the behavior of actor B.
Rather than power being a “one size fits all”
category, the relational approach disaggregates
power into a number of component parts in
order to demonstrate how it is exercised in
specific issue –areas. The dimension of power
typically include its scope (the objectives of an
attempt to gain influence over which issue), its
domain (the target of the influence attempt(, its
weight (the quantity of resources) and its costs
(opportunity costs if forgoing a relation).
Vojin Dimitrijević, Radoslav
Stojanović
Moć je stepen sposobnosti da se drugi subjekti privole ili nateraju da
ponašanje koje posednik moći želi. Kibernetički moć se može odrediti kao
stupanj verovatnoće da će ishod biti onakav kakv subjekt želi. Ovako
određena moć je bezvrednosna: sam apo sebi, ona nije ni dobra ni loša,
dobre su i loše svrhe za koje će se ona upotrebiti.
Teškoće u odmeravanju moći pa i uspeh da se ona nametne lažni o njoj,
zansovane su na okolnosti da se ispoljavanje moći ne može zamisliti bez
sudelovanja jednog nematerijalnog, pa prema tome i objektivno nemerljivog
elementa. Kao što je poznato reč je o moralu, koji u ovom kontekstu dobija
voljno značenje rešenosti i spremnosti stanovništva na zalaganje,
samopregor i borbu. U srži morla je motivacija.
Važnost moralnog elementa obavezuje nas da načinimo jasnu razliku
između moguće i stvarne moć. Latentna moć bi se onda označila kao
potencijal koji u datom odnosu može biti iskorišćen ili neiskorišćen.
Da bi se dakle potencijal oživeo, potrebno je dejstvo moralnog činioca: bez
njega potencijal ostaje mrtav, ali se naravno skromni potencijal nikakvim
naporom ne može čarobno uvećati.
Dok se ranije pomenuti elementi moći mogu na manje ili više savršene
načine meriti i upoređivati, moralni elementi se mogu samo procenjivati...
Dragan R. Simić
Šta je moć uopšte i posebno u
međunarodnim odnosima?
Koji su i kavi su izvori moći nekada i
danas?
U kojim se sve vidovima moć ispoljava?
Kako zadovoljiti teorijsku i praktičnu
potrebu za tačnim merenjem moći?
Za Maksa Vebera moć predstavlja izglede da se u okviru
jednog društvenog odnosa sprovede sopstvena volja
uprkos otporu, bez obzira na čemu se zansivaju ti
izgledi.
Kenet Volc – Moćan je onaj ko utiče na drugog više nego
onaj na njega
Moć za šta? (Naj)
“Postoji jedna neuhvatljivost povodom moći koja joj daje
skoro avetinjsko svojstvo... Mi znamo šta je a ipak se
srećemo sa beskrajnim teškoćama u pokušaju da je
odredimo. Mi možemo da kažemo su pojedinac ili grupa
moćniji od ostalih, ali ipak moć ne možemo meriti”
(Arnold Rouz)
Georg Švarcenberger
“Mesto moći je na pola puta između uticaja
i sile (force), Uticaj se vrši ubeđivanjem.
Sila predstavlja fizički postignuto
potčinjavanje volje drugoga. Nasuprot
uticaju i sili, moć podrazumeva nametanje
sopstvene volje grupi ili volje jedne grupe
drugoj, ako je moguće bez primene sile, ali
ako to nije moguće, primenom najmanje
potrebne sile.”
Karl Dojč
Moć se može raščlaniti na nove dimenzije, koje
onda bolje govore o njenoj promenjivosti i
neprimenjivosti, pa čak i o eventualnoj “nemoći”
moći. U tom pogledu najdalje je otišao Karl Dojč
koji predlaže sledeće dimezije moći. Prva je
njena količina, težina (weight) koja pokazuje do
koje mere nosilac moći može da promeni tok
događaja, odnosno tuđe ponašanje. U
slučajevima koi se ponavljaju, ova se količina
može meriti time što se uobičajeni ishodi
poredes ishodom za koji se zalagao posednik
moći (npr. Glasanje u UN-u)
Druga dimenzija je prostor (domain) koji ukazuje na to
gde se nalaze ljudi čije se ponašanje ispoljavanjem moći
verovatno menja. U ovom pogledu najupadljivija je
razlika između moći jedne države na sopstvenoj teritoriji i
u inostranstvu.
U opisivanju moći dalje treba uzeti u obzir njen opseg
(range) koji Dojč definiše kao razmak između najviše
nagrade i najstrože kazne koje nosilac moći može dati ili
izvršiti.
I na kraju, moć ima svoj i svoj domašaj (scope), prema
vrstama ili klasama ponašanja na koje se može uticati.
Michael Barnett and Raymond
Duvall
The potentially system-defining attacks of September 11,
the war on terrorism, and the U.S. invasion and
occupation of Iraq have caused scholars and
practitioners to refocus attention on a central concept in
international politics: power.
Ever since Carr delivered his devastating rhetorical blow
against the “utopians” and claimed power for “realism,”
the discipline of international relations has tended to
treat power as the exclusive province of realism.
Accordingly, a concern with power in international
politics is frequently interpreted as a disciplinary
attachment to realism.
Associated with this tendency, there is a widely
accepted conceptualization that is viewed as the
only way to understand power: how one state
uses its material resources to compel another
state to do something it does not want to do.
Most introductory texts to international relations
cleave to this formulation. Attempts by scholars
to operationalize power follow from this
definition. The substantial literature on the
“paradoxes of power” revolves around the
disconnect between capabilities and outcomes.
The starting point for opening the
conceptual aperture is to identify the
critical dimensions that generate different
conceptualizations of power. In general
terms, power is the production, in and
through social relations, of effects that
shape the capacities of actors to
determine their circumstances and fate.
This definition informs our argument that conceptual distinctions of
power should be represented in terms of two analytical dimensions
that are at the core of the general concept: the kinds of social
relations through which power works; and the specificity of social
relations through which effects on actors’ capacities are produced.
The first dimension—kinds—refers to the polar positions of
social relations of interaction and social relations of
constitution. Accordingly, power is either an attribute of particular
actors and their interactions or a social process of constituting what
actors are as social beings, that is, their social identities and
capacities. It can operate, for example, by pointing a gun and
issuing commands, or in underlying social structures and systems of
knowledge that advantage some and disadvantage others. The
second dimension—specificity—concerns the degree to which
the social relations through which power works are direct and
socially specific or indirect and socially diffuse. It can operate,
for example, at the very instant when the gun is brandished, or
through diffuse processes embedded in international institutions that
establish rules determining who gets to participate in debates and
make decisions.
These two dimensions generate our taxonomy of four
types of power.
The first type is power as relations of interaction of
direct control by one actor over another— Compulsory
Power; the second is the control actors exercise
indirectly over others through diffuse relations of
interaction—Institutional Power; the third is the
constitution of subjects’ capacities in direct structural
relation to one another— Structural Power; and the
fourth is the socially diffuse production of subjectivity in
systems of meaning and signification—Productive
Power. These different conceptualizations provide
distinct answers to the fundamental question: in what
respects are actors able to determine their fate, and how
is that ability limited or enhanced through social relations
with others?
E. H. Carr
Carr argued that power is indivisible, yet he
claimed that for purposes of discussion it could
be divided into three categories: military power,
economic power, and power over opinion.
Yet because of the ever-present possibility of
war breaking out, Carr argued that military
power was the most important form of power in
international politics…”The supreme importance
of instrument lies in the fact that the ultima ratio
of power in international politics is war”
“Oni koji imaju i oni koji nemaju”
Hans J. Morgenthau
“International Politics, like all politics is a struggle
for power”
“Whatever the ultimate aims of international
politics, power is always the immediate aim”
When we speak of power we mean man’s
control over the minds and actions of other
men… this is a psychological relation between
those who exercise it and those who over whom
it is exercised.”
Like other classical realists, Morgenthau
equated power with the possession of both
material and non-material resources.
Morgenthau distinguished between two
types of elements that contributed to the
power of a nation: those that are stable
and those subject to a constant change.
The stable elements which are largely of a
quantitative nature, included geography, natural
resources (food and raw materials), industrial
capacity, military preparedness and population.
Morgenthau identified four qualitative, nonmaterial factors that have a bearing on a
national power: national character, national
morale, the quality of government and the
quality of a nation’s diplomacy.
Morgenthau signaled out the quality of
diplomacy as the most important factor
contributing to the power of a nation.
According to Morgenthau, “the conduct of
a nation’s foreign affairs by its diplomats is
for national power in peace what military
strategy and tactics by its military leaders
are for national power in war”
Joseph Nye, Jr.
Moć je sposobnost da se postignu nečije svrhe ili ciljevi. Još preciznije rečeno,
to je sposobnost da se utiče na druge i da se ostvare željeni rezultati. Robert
Dal, politikolog sa Jejl Univerziteta, definiše moć kao sposobnost da se drugi
primoraju da urade nešto što inače ne bi uradili. Ali, kada merimo moć u smislu
promenjenog ponašanja drugih, potrebno je da poznajemo njihove želje. U
suprotnom, bili bismo u pogrešnom uverenju o stanju moći, kao što je to slučaj sa
lisicom koja misli da će povrediti zeca koji živi u trnju ako ga u njega baci. Često je
teško unapred znati kako će se drugi ljudi ili države ponašati u odsustvu uticaja sa
strane, .
Bihejvioristička definicija moći može biti od koristi analitičarima i istoričarima koji
znatno vreme posvećuju rekonstruisanju prošlosti, ali za političare u svakodnevnim
poslovima i za vođe, ona se može činiti kao isuviše efemernog karaktera. Zbog toga
što se sposobnost uticaja na druge često povezuje sa posedovanjem
određenih resursa, političke vođe uopšteno definišu moć na ovaj način. Ti
resursi između ostalog uključuju stanovništvo, veličinu terirorije, prirodna
bogatstva, ekonomsku snagu, vojnu moć, i političku stabilnost. Prednost ove
definicije jeste u tome da tu moć izgleda mnogo konkretnija, merljivija i predvidljivija,
nego što je to slučaj sa bihejviorističkom definicijom. Moć u ovom smislu znači
posedovanje jakih karata u partiji pokera međunarodne politike. Osnovno pravilo
pokera je da, ako vaš protivnik pokaže karte koje su jače od svake od vaših karata,
spustite ruke. Ako znate da ćete izgubiti rat, ne započinjite ga.
Kao u pokeru, veštine kao što su blefiranje
i varanje mogu da nekim igračima daju
značajnu prednost. Čak i kad nema
obmanjivanja, može se pogrešiti povodom
toga koji od izvora moći su relevantni u
nekoj određenoj situaciji. Na primer,
Francuska i Britanija su 1940. godine
imale više tenkova nego Hitler, ali je on
imao bolju sposobnost manevrisanja i
bolju vojnu strategiju.
Uz to, postoji i faktor koji se ponekad zove “drugo lice moći.” Primoravanje drugih
država na promene može se nazvati direktnim ili zapovednim metodom sprovođenja
moći. Takva tvrda moć može počivati na obećanju nagrade (šargarepa) ili pretnji
(štap)
Postoje, međutim, i meki ili indirektni način za ostvarenje moći. Neka zemlja može da
u svetskoj politici postigne željene rezultate zato što druge zemlje žele da je imitiraju
ili su saglasne sa sistemom koji takve rezultate proizvodi. U tom smislu, podjednako
je važno postaviti dnevni red i privući druge aktere u svetskoj politici kao i primoravati
druge na promene u konkretnim situacijama. Ovaj aspekt moći - navesti druge da
hoće ono što vi hoćete - može se nazvati moć privlačnosti ili ponašanje zasnovano na
mekoj moći. Meka moć može počivati na takvim izvorima kao što su privlačnost
nečijih ideja ili sposobnost da se politički prioriteti postave na način koji oblikuje želje
drugih. Roditelji tinejdžera znaju da će, ako su oblikovali uverenja i preference svoje
dece, njihova moć biti veća i trajaće duže nego da su se oslanjali samo na aktivnu
kontrolu. Na sličan način, političke vođe i pristalice konstruktivističke teorije već dugo
razumeju moć koja dolazi iz postavljanja dnevnog reda i određivanja okvira rasprave.
Sposobnost da se ustanove želje teži da se poveže sa neopipljivim izvorima moći kao
što su kultura, ideologija i ustanove.
Tvrda i meka moć su povezane, ali nisu iste. Materijalni
uspeh čini kulturu i ideologiju privlačnom, a izostanak
rezultata u ekonomskoj i vojnoj sferi dovodi do sumnji u
same sebe i do krize identiteta. Meka moć se ne zasniva
isključivo na tvrdoj moći. Meka moć Vatikana nije iščezla
sa smanjenjem veličine papske države u devetnaestom
veku. Kanada, Švedska i Holandija danas teže da imaju
više uticaja nego neke druge države podjednakih
ekonomskih ili vojnih kapaciteta. Sovjetski Savez je
posedovao značajnu meku moć u Evropi posle Drugog
svetskog rata, ali ju je protraćio nakon invazije Mađarske
1956. i Čehoslovačke 1968. godine.
Hard and Soft Power
Power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to
get a desired outcome. Historically, power has been
measured by such criteria as population size and
territory, natural resources, economic strength, military
force, and social stability.
Hard power enables countries to wield carrots and
sticks to get what they want. The Pentagon’s budget for
FY2008 is more than $750 billion and growing, many
times more than the nearest competitor. The United
States has the world’s largest economy, and more than a
third of the top 500 global companies are American.
There is no other global power, and yet American hard
power does not always translate into influence.
Trends such as these have made power less tangible and coercion less
effective. Machiavelli said it was safer to be feared than to be loved. Today,
in the global information age, it is better to be both.
Soft power is the ability to attract people to our side without coercion.
Legitimacy is central to soft power. If a people or nation believes American
objectives to be legitimate, we are more likely to persuade them to follow
our lead without using threats and bribes.
Legitimacy can also reduce opposition—and the costs—of using hard power
when the situation demands. Appealing to others’ values, interests and
preferences can, in certain circumstances, replace the dependence on
carrots and sticks. Cooperation is always a matter of degree, and it is
profoundly influenced by attraction.
Militaries are well suited to defeating states, but they are often poor
instruments to fight ideas. Today, victory depends on attracting foreign
populations to our side and helping them to build capable, democratic
states. Soft power is essential to winning the peace. It is easier to attract
people to democracy than to coerce them to be democratic.
Smart Power
Smart power is neither hard nor soft—it is the skillful
combination of both. Smart power means developing
an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to
achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and
soft power. It is an approach that underscores the
necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in
alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to
expand American influence and establish the legitimacy
of American action. Providing for the global good is
central to this effort because it helps America reconcile
its overwhelming power with the rest of the world’s
interests and values.
Главне Најеве тезе:
Моћ зависи од
контекста
промењена природа
моћи
“The second face of
power”
Раздобље
Водећа
држава
Главни
извори
моћи
XVI век
Шпанија
Златне
полуге,трговина са
колонијама,
најамничке војске,
династичке везе
XVII век
Холандија
Трговина, тржиште
капитала,
морнарица
XVIII век
Француска
Величина
становништва,
индустрија
пољопривредних
призвода,
ефикасна јавна
управа, војска,
култура (мека моћ)
Моћ зависи од
контекста
промењена природа
моћи
“The second face of
power”
XIX век
Велика Британија
Индустрија, политичка
кохезија која влада у
држави, стабилне
финасије и ефикасан
кредитни систем,
морнарица, норме које
одишу духом
либерализма (мека
моћ), острвски
положај земље (што је
чини лаком за
одбрану у случају
евентуалног напада)
XX век
Сједињене Америчке
Државе
Економска снага,
вођство у области
научних и
технолошких
достигнућа,
географски положај,
војна моћи снага
савезника,
универзаклистичка
култура и формирање
међународних режима
који су одраз духа
либерализма (мека
моћ)
XXI век
Сједињене Америчке
Државе
Лидерство у области
технологија, војна и
економска моћ,
центар
транснационалних
комуникација, мека
моћ
The United States has in its past wielded hard
and soft power in concert, with each contributing
a necessary component to a larger aim. We
used hard power to deter the Soviet Union
during the Cold War and soft power to rebuild
Japan and Europe with the Marshall Plan and to
establish institutions and norms that have
become the core of the international system.
Today’s context presents a unique set of
challenges, however, and requires a new way of
thinking about American power.
Pol Kenedi
Declinists vs. Revivalists
Declinists:
Најпознатији представник ове школе – Пол
Кенеди, професор историје и великих
стратегија на Јел Универзитету
књига:”The Rise and Fall of Great Powers”,
Random House, New York, 1987
Српско издање ове књиге: Успон и пад
великих сила, Службени лист СРЈ, Београд,
ЦИД, Подгорица, 1999
Главне Кенедијеве тезе:
Историја света у последњих
500 година као историја
успона и падова великих
сила
“Историја успона и пада
великих сила никако није
завршена”
Однос између економије и
стратегије као суштински.
Раздобље
Водећа држава
XVI век
Шпанија
XVII век
Холандија
XVIII век
Француска
XIX век
Велика Британија
XX век
Сједињене
Америчке Државе
XXI век
Сједињене Америчке
Државе? Кина?
Индија? Европска
унија? Русија?
ПРОЛОГ:
Која ће држава бити следећа водећа светска сила?
“Моћ држава, једних у односу на друге, никада не остаје
константна, углавном због неједнаке стопе раста у
различитим друштвима и технолошким и организационим
продорима који доносе већу предност једнима него
другима”
О кинеском потенцијалу за господарење светом у време
адмирала Ченг Хоа, изненадном повлачењу и “европском
чуду”
“Богатство је обично нужно да би се подупрла војна моћ, а
војна моћ је обично нужна да се богатство стекне и
заштити”
“Ако се међутим, сувише велики део државних ресурса
одврати од стварања богатства, и уместо тога усмери у
војне сврхе, онда то на дужи рок вероватно води
слабљењу снаге државе... Исто тако, ако држава сувише
стратешки растегне своје снаге, рецимо освајањем
пространих територија, или вођењем скупих ратова – она
ризикује да потенцијалне користи од спољне експанзије
буду надмашене великом ценом свега тога – што
представља дилему која постаје акутна ако је дотична
држава ушла у период релативног економског опадања..”
“Велике силе у релативном опадању
инстинктивно реагују већим трошењем
на безбедност, а тиме одвраћају
потенцијална средства од инвестирања
и погоршавају свој дугорочни проблем”
Сједињене Државе: проблем
броја 1 у релативном опадању
1)
2)
САД не могу да избегну два велика теста који су
пролазиле све велике силе:
Да ли оне могу одржати равнотежу између потреба
одбране како их држава опажа и средстава које
поседује за извршење ових обавеза и
Да ли оне могу да сачувају економску и технолошку
базу своје моћи од могуће ерозије у суочавању са
моделима глобалне призводње који се стално мењају
САД су наследник огромног броја стратешких обавеза
које су одређене у претходним деценијама, када је
политички, економски, и војни потенцијал ове нације за
утицање на светске послове, изгледао много поузданији
“као последица тога, Сједињене Државе се сада излажу
ризику тако познатом историчарима успона и пада
великих сила који се грубо може назвати ИМПЕРИЈАЛНА
РАСТЕГНУТОСТ (Imperial overstretch): другим речима, они
који доносе одлуке у Вашингтону се морају суочити са
мучном и трајном чињеницом да је укупан збир глобалних
интереса и обавеза Сједињених Држава сада много већи
од снаге државе да их брани истовремено.”
Претња по националне интересе у иностранству –
интерeсе који су у тој мери распрострањени да би их било
тешко бранити све истовремено, а, ипак, готово
подједнако тешко напустити било који од њих без даљег
излагања ризику.
Упркос сталној заинтересованости ове књиге да иде
трагом “крупних тенденција” у светским пословима
протеклих пет векова, она не тврди да економија
детерминише сваки догађај, или да је она једини
узрок успеха и неуспеха сваке државе. Напросто је
сувише много доказа који указују на друге
ствари: географија, војна организација, морал
нације, систем савезништва... Оно што изгледа
да је ипак непобитно, јесте да у развученим
ратовима великих сила (обично и коалиција) победу
задобија страна са напреднијом производном
основом – или, како су шпански капетани имали
oбичај да кажу, ономе ко има последњи ескудо” (Pol
Kenedi)
Revivalists
Најпознатији представник ове школе – Џозеф
С. Нај, Јр., професор међународних односа и
дугогодишњи декан на John Kennedy School
of Government, Harvard University
књига:”Bound to lead: the Changing Nature of
American Power”, Basic Books, New York, 1990
Текстови:„Understanding U. S. Strenth“, Foreign
Policy, Fall 1988; „ Soft Power“, Foreign Policy,
Fall, 1990; Against ‘Declinism’, The New
Republic, October 15, 1990, pp. 12-13.
“The founding fathers were already worrying about decline on
the eighteenth century. The theme returned in the 1890s with
the closing of the American frontier. More recently, in the
1950s the Soviet launch of Sputnik was taken as a sign of
relative American decline, as was the oil crisis of 1973.”
“Americans are worried about national decline. Many believe
that the country is overextended and should reduce its
external commitments. But in a world of growing
interdependence among nations, this advice is the wrong
answer, and U. S. decline is the wrong question. Not only is
the premise debatable, but it diverts our attention from the
real question: How is power changed in modern
international politics”
By 1989, half the American public believed that the nation was in
decline… Immanuel Walerstein sees overstretch as “a regular
happening” with decline starting in Venice around 1500, in Holland
around 1660, in Britain around 1873, and in America around 1967.
Historical analogies as misleading things
For the last decade and half the American share of world product
has held stable at about 23 percent of the total.
For Kennedy theory applied to the American situation, the burden of
defense should have increased over time. Yet even before the end
of the cold war, the opposite was the case: defense was 10 percent
of GNP in 1950s, 6 percent in the 1980s, and falling toward a
projected 4 percent by the mid – 1990s.
The United States are still the largest possessor of both “hard”
power – the ability to command others, usually through the
use of tangible resources such as military and economic
might – and “soft” power – the ability to co-op rather than
command, to get others to want what you want.
There is no reason why Americans cannot afford both Social
Security and International Security
“Две промене у светском положају Америке имају дубоке
корене. Једна је у томе да се моћ глобалне привреде све
више шири међу другим земљама, посебно америчким
савезницима. То је добрим делом било резултат
послератне америчке политике. Уместо да теже
хегемонији над савезницима, Сједињене Државе су
одлучиле да стимулишу њихово економско оживљавање.”
“Други дугорочни узрок измењеног глобалног положаја Америке
је све већа сложена међузависност која је смањила могућност
да нека земља врши одлучујући утицај над читавим
системом...улога војне силе се суптилно мења. Та сила у неким
ситуацијама остаје најефикаснији облик моћи. Али, уопште узев,
та сила постаје скупља да би је велике силе успешно
примењивале, како су то Американци закључили у Вијетнаму, а
Совјети схватили у Авганистану. Нето дејство тих промена
нагриза међународну хијерархију која се по традицији заснива
на војној моћи. Други извори моћи као што су економска
виталност, дипломатска вештина, привлачне културне
вредности, друштво склоно отвореном кретању
информација постају све значајнији.
John J. Mearsheimer
Power lies at the heart of international politics, yet there is considerable
disagreemnet about what power is and how to measure it.
Power as a currency of international relations and force is a ultimate
ratio of international politics.
States have a two kind of power: latent power and military power.
These two forms of power are closely related but not synonymous,
because they are derived from different kind of assets.
Latent power refers to the socio-economic ingredients that go into
building military power; it is largely based on a state’s wealth and the
overall size of its population. Great powers need money, technology, a
and personnel to build military forces and to fight wars, and a state’s
latent power refers to the raw potential it can draw on when competing
with rival states.
In international politics, however, a state’s effective power is ultimately
a function of its military forces and how they compare with the military
forces of rival states…Therefore, the balance of power is largely
synonymous with the balance of military power. I define power largely in
military terms… (The Tragedy of Great Power Politics)
Power as an goal
Power as an asset
Koji su glavni problemi kad se
procenjuje moć u međunarodnim
odnosima?
Power is an elusive concept. It is hard to define,
measure or describe exactly how it works. Former
John Kennedy School of Government Dean, Joseph
Nye wrote: “Power is like weather. Everyone talks
about it, but few understand it.. Power is like love…
easier to experience than to define or measure”
Stalna promenljivost
Subjektivnost
“Percepcija moći”
Nepostojanje instrumenata za merenje moći –
rat kao najbolji instrument za merenje moći?
Problem kriterijuma – GDP, GNP, PPP, GDP per
capita
Uspon i opadanje u moći je pre proces nego
nešto što se dešava brzo.
Power is not a simple and stable
phenomenon. Indeed, it is very much a
political chameleon, constantly changing
even while it remains the same (John T.
Rourk)
Power Dynamics
Absolute and relative power
Objective and subjective power
Situational power
Moć je uvek moć u odnosu na neke
druge
“То да ли је држава данас моћна и
богата или није, не зависи од обиља
или сигурности њене моћи и богатства,
већ првенствено од чињенице да ли
њени суседи поседују више или мање
тога од ње.” (фон Хорник, немачки
меркантилистички писац)
Konverzija moći je osnovni problem koji se pojavljuje
kada govorimo o moći u smislu izvora. Neke zemlje su
bolje od drugih u u pretvaranju svojih resursa u neki praktičan
uticaj, slično kao što neki vešti igrači pobeđuju uprkos tome
što su im u rukama slabe karte. Konverzija moći je
sposobnost da se potencijalna moć, koja se meri resursima,
pretvori u stvarnu moć, koja se meri promenom ponašanja
drugih. Da bismo ispravno predvideli ishode, potrebno je da
poznajemo i veštine zemlje po pitanju konverzije moći i izvore
moći koje poseduje.
Drugi problem tiče se određivanja koji resursi pružaju
najbolju osnovu za moć u nekom određenom kontekstu.
Resursi moći uvek zavise od konteksta. Tenkovi nisu tako
dobri u močvarama; u devetnaestom veku uranijum nije bio
resurs moći. U ranijim razdobljima ljudske istorije bilo je lakše
suditi o vrednosti izvora moći. Na primer, u vreme agrarnih
ekonomija Evrope 18. veka, stanovništvo je predstavljalo izvor
moći od presudne važnosti, jer je ono obezbeđivalo osnov za
prikupljanje poreza i regrutovanje pešadije.
WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH
The Rules of Power Analysis
Rule No. 1: Be Clear About Definitions of
Power
Rule No. 2: Watch the Goalposts
Rule No. 3: Do Not Rely on a Single
Indicator
Rule No. 4: Consider Latent Power
Rule No. 1: Be Clear About Definitions of Power
What have shifted are peoples' views of the real utility of
these resources and capabilities. Current discussions of
the limits of US power are really focused on the limited
usefulness of large amounts of military and economic
capabilities. Political scientists generally use the term
"power" to refer to a relationship of influence. As Robert
Dahl put it, power is "ability to get B to do something it
would not otherwise have done" or, of course, to prevent
B from doing something it otherwise would have done).
In international relations, the same term of "power" is
often equated with resources: measurable elements that
states possess and use to influence others. In popular
commentary-, these two meanings of power are often
conflated, with unfortunate results.
To begin with, the challenge of converting power-as resources into poweras-influence is not a uniquely US problem. All great powers confront these
challenges. If the cause of the new gloominess concerning US power had to
he reduced to one word, it would be "Iraq." In 2003, fresh from apparent
military- victories in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States appeared to be
a colossus. Yet in 2007, its inability to suppress the Iraqi counterinsurgencyand civil war seems to have revealed feet of clay. All the hard data on US
military superiority—its over one-half of global defense spending, .some 70
percent of global military R&D, and dominance in information-intensive
warfare—now appear in a new light. The world's most vaunted military
machine is not even able to tame disorganized Sunni and Shi'a militias in
Mesopotamia.
But the example of Iraq exhibits a balance of power dynamic between
states and non-state insurgents, not one between several different states.
There is no reason to believe that China, Russia, India, or the European
Union would perform any better if faced with the challenges that the US
military confronts in Iraq. Some scholars argue that Iraq demonstrates new
information about the state versus non-state balance.
Once an insurgency takes root, governments
rarely prevail. When they do—as in die case of
Britain in South Africa at the turn of the last
century and more recently, Russia in
Chechnya—it is usually the result of deploying
very large military forces willing to use ferocious
violence on a mass scale against innocent
civilians. With a comparatively small force in a
large and populous country, the United States'
inability to foster stability in Iraq is tragic, but not
surprising.
Rule No. 2: Watch the Goalposts
The larger problem with conflating poweras-resources with power-as-influences
that it leads to a constant shifting of the
goalposts. The better die United States
becomes at acquiring resources, the
greater the array of global problems it is
expected to be able to resolve, and the
greater the apparent gap between its
material capabilities and die ends it can
achieve.
Rule No. 3: Do Not Rely on a Single
Indicator
Current projections of China's economic rise may well be
overstated. Iraq aside, what is most responsible for the
virtual shift to multipolarity is not a word but an acronym:
PPP. PPP stands for the "purchasing power parity"
estimate of countries' exchange rates—the size of their
economies in dollar terms. Although the prices oi many
manufactured products tend to be equalized by
international trade, the price of labor is not, and therefore
labor-intensive products and services tend to be
relatively cheap in poor counties. PPP corrects for this
discontinuity by using prices for a locally selected basket
of goods to adjust the exchange rate for converting local
currency into dollars. As University of Pennsylvania
professor Avery Goldstein notes, "the World Bank's
decision in 1994 to shift to a PPP estimate for China's
economy was crucial in propelling perceptions of that
country's imminent rise to great power status."
But forecasts about China's rise should not he based on predictions
on its living standards. They should discuss China's presence as a
great power in international politics— its ability- to use money to
purchase goods and influence matters abroad. PPP clearly
exaggerates this sort of power. No one knows how much to discount
the PPP numbers for the purposes of making comparisons of
national power. What is certain, economist .Albert Keidel notes, is
that one should not "use projections of national accounting growth
rates from a PPP base. This common practice seriously inflates
estimates of Chinas future economic size—exaggerating the speed
with which China's economy will overtake that of the United States
in total size." Projections must take into account the fact that growth
will cause prices to converge with international norms, and thus the
PPP to converge with the market exchange rate. Using such a
methodology, Keidel estimates that it will take until 2050 for China's
total economic size to equal the United States. National power is a
complex phenomenon.
Rule No. 4: Consider Latent Power
US military forces are stretched thin, its budget and trade deficits arc high,
and the country continues to finance its profligate ways by borrowing from
abroad—notably from the Chinese government. These developments have
prompted many analysts to warn that the United States suffers from
"imperial overstretch." And if US power is overstretched now, the argument
goes, unipolarity can hardly be sustainable for long. The problem with this
argument is that it fails to distinguish between actual and latent power. One
must he careful to take Into account both the level of resources that can he
mobilized and the degree to which a government actually tries to mobilize
them. And how much a government asks of its public is partly a function of
the severity of the challenges that it faces. Indeed, one can never know for
sure what a state is capable of until it has been seriously challenged.
"self-inflicted overstretch"— in which a state lacks the sufficient resources to
meet its current foreign policy commitments in the short term, but has
untapped latent power ;and readily available policy choices that it can use to
draw on this power. This is arguably the situation that the United States is in
today.
Gregory Treverton, Seth G.
Jones (RAND)
“Measuring power: how to
predict future balances”,
Harvard International Review,
Summer, 2005
Power is an elusive concept. As the political scientist
Hans Morgenthau wrote, "The concept of political power
poses one of the most difficult and controversial
problems of political science." Understanding the nature
of power has long been central to the study of
international relations and to the work of the US
Intelligence Community. The task is now all the more
important and elusive, because the United States enjoys
an unprecedented amount of economic, military, and
technological might in comparison to other states. Yet it
must exercise its power in a world not only of staterelated constraints on that power, but also of
transnational forces and non-state actors that act as
competitors, qualifiers, constrainers, and, sometimes,
enhancers of that power.
State power can be conceived at three
levels: the level of resources or
capabilities, also known as power-inbeing, the level of power conversion
through national processes, and the
level of power in outcomes, by which we
refer to a state's tendency to prevail in
particular circumstances.
The starting point for thinking about--and developing
metrics for--national power is to view states as
"capability containers." Yet those capabilities-demographic, economic, technological, and others-become manifest only through a process of conversion.
States need to convert material resources, or economic
prowess, into more usable instruments such as combat
proficiency. In the end, however, what policymakers care
most about is not power as capability, or even power
converted from national ethos, polities, and social
cohesion. They care about power in outcomes. That third
level of power is by far the most elusive, for it is
contingent and relative. It depends on how the power
manifests itself, and against whom the power is
exercised.
the first level of state power
The main categories used to identify the first level of
state power, the level of capability, are gross domestic
product (GDP), population, defense spending, and a less
precise factor capturing innovation in technology. Using
these estimates, power is summed as a percent of total
global power, and fourteen states hold at least a one
percent share. The United States is at the top of the
power structure, though it is hardly an isolated and
unilateral power. While the United States currently holds
nearly a fifth of total global power, it is closely followed
by the European Union, considered as a unified actor,
and China, which each hold about 14 percent. India,
moreover, holds about 9 percent, while Brazil, South
Korea, and Russia each hold about 2 percent.
These numbers, though only estimates, suggest possible
alliances that could match the power of the United States
acting alone or with its traditional allies. Such a power
assessment also examines the most likely locations for
future conflict, based on six criteria. Projections indicate
that Asia is by far the most dangerous region, with six of
the eight most conflict-prone bilateral balances involving
China. The assessment also indicates that by 2015, the
level of US power will be closely threatened by China
and India, while the European Union and all non-US
members of the Group of Eight will experience a slow
decline in power.
Converting Resources into Power
Carnegie scholar Ashley Tellis and his
colleagues at RAND have recently offered a reexamination of the concept of "national power."
They began by assuming that a meticulous
detailing of visible military assets is required to
understand the true basis of national power. It
also requires a scrutiny of such variables as the
aptitude for innovation, the nature of social
institutions, and the quality of the knowledge
base. For Tellis and his colleagues, all of these
factors influence a country's capacity to produce
the one element that is still fundamental to
international politics--effective military power.
Their core argument is that national power is divided into
three linked realms: natural resources, national
performance, and military capabilities. The first realm
encompasses the level of resources either available to,
or produced by, a country. The second realm, national
performance, is derived from the external pressures
facing a country and the efficiency of its governing
institutions and its society at large. The third realm,
military capabilities, is understood in terms of operational
proficiency or effectiveness. Military capability is
produced as a result of both the strategic resources
available to a military organization and its ability to
convert those resources into effective, coercive power.
These three realms taken together describe national
power.
The Tellis approach is still one of material capabilities,
though it gets to what might be called power-in-being. It is
about usable power, but does not involve power outcomes.
Rather than regard states as simple "containers of
capability," this approach considers ideas, organization,
and politics. Its ultimate objective is to understand the
process by which national resources are converted into
military capabilities--especially those that will improve
combat proficiency. In fact, Tellis' approach can be applied
to any country, and his team has empirically applied the
analysis to China. But since data can easily overwhelm the
exercise, it is imperative at a macro level to focus on the
three or four most critical factors. Therefore, the interplay of
power resources, transformative capabilities, and outcomes
have dominated the discussion.
Though many of the issues explored by Tellis and his colleagues are
critical, there is still a need to think about broadening the scope of
indicators. In general, four additional areas are important for power
conversion. The first area encompasses economic issues, including
access to capital. Researchers have generally focused on domestic
economic resources and capabilities. Changes in the global economy,
however, have created an impetus to find new indicators that measure the
ability of states to utilize global resources for domestic activities. For
example, it will become increasingly important to determine the impact of
outsourcing domestic jobs to companies in foreign countries. A second
area involves the institutions and political structures specific to a
given state. Important indicators include the level of corruption and the size
of what is called the "selectorate"--in other words, the size of the group to
which a leader is actually accountable. This indicator matters especially
because it affects the ability of states to allocate and distribute resources. A
third, and related, area incorporates values, trust, social capital, and
other aspects of civil society. That is, how do people cooperate and
interact in political and economic relationships? The final area is social
structure, a measure that includes societal stratification and ethnic and
class divisions.
Strategic Resources
What variables will help us to identify the great powers in
the international system in 2020? I
mportant variables include population, human capital,
economic power, technological prowess, and military
capabilities. However, the single most important form of
power in 2020 will continue to be military power.
Though military power is best indicated by defense
budgets, other measurements might include specific
military expenditures such as ground, air, and naval
force spending. While these indicators are easily
quantifiable, however, they do not always correlate well
with military effectiveness. In fact, history demonstrates
that smaller armies have defeated larger opponents
because of better training, doctrine, and strategy.
Today, economic power is the ultimate foundation of
military power, and the best indicator of economic power
is GDP. Like defense budgets, however, GDP provides
only a limited picture of power. It says little about the
composition of the economy, such as whether it is
spearheaded by leading sectors, or dominated by old
and declining ones. Therefore, it is often equally
important to consider variables such as human capital
and technology. The best "off the shelf" measure of
human capital is the average year of educational
attainment. When measuring technology, the best
indicator is per capita expenditure on research and
development.
Ultimately, however, none of these indicators
provides a complete picture of power in 2020.
Articulating an ideal indicator is difficult and,
perhaps, impossible. But it is likely to have
something to do with "quality": the ability of
states to convert these components into outputs
and make use of them. What truly determines
power in the end is a state's ability, through unity
and purpose, to mobilize and pursue national
ambitions.
Instruments of Power
Why do we evaluate and forecast levels of power? Power
assessment is crucial to understanding future national security
threats and developing useful instruments to address them. It is
argued, for example, that future threats to the United States will be
caused by a combination of economic, military, environmental, and
other variables. An abbreviated list of these threats includes
terrorism, pollution, transnational organized crime, demographic
changes, and even new health threats such as Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome.
Therefore, a menu of "old" and "new" power instruments will be
needed to combat these threats. In fact, several "old" power
instruments need to change--one of which is the military. In the past,
the military focused on conventional and nuclear warfare. In the
future, it will need to focus on countering asymmetric forces.
Economic instruments are equally in need of change; smarter
government instruments would not stifle markets and innovation, but
would provide social protection to populations.
More interesting, perhaps, are the implications for diplomacy as a
traditional instrument of power. Diplomacy in the United States has
traditionally been about selling the American way of life to foreign
governments and populations. A better approach might be to
promote local groups, institutions, and policies that are compatible
with US goals. For example, the US government might initiate a
policy of providing assistance to groups abroad that support ideals
and policies compatible with US interests, even when these groups
do not explicitly support, and perhaps even oppose, the United
States.
This strategy may help to legitimize the United States abroad and
help it better achieve policy change through diplomacy and
cooperative efforts. Moreover, it might be beneficial for the United
States to adopt a policy of "strategic restraint." Exercising restraint in
the United States' use of hard power abroad will decrease
counterbalancing and increase regional cooperation.
Improving Our Ability to Forecast
Power
Several variables and indicators provide
information about the current state of
power distribution, especially the softer
forms. Such variables--which include
cultural attractiveness, political outcomes
and rulings, knowledge generation and
use, and governance effectiveness--might
be incorporated in predicting distributions
of power.
The first of these variables, cultural attractiveness, includes the
"consumption" of US culture, the prevalence of English, the spread
of US-style institutions, and the allure of US universities. It would be
interesting to conduct an opinion poll that asked respondents
questions such as: If you could live anywhere in the world, other
than your own country, where would you live and why? Would your
choice be most influenced by economic, political, or cultural factors?
Equally interesting would be an indicator of knowledge generation
and use. This includes a variety of research and development
expenditures (total amounts, basic research levels, military research
levels), the extent of education at the college level and beyond, the
quality of education, and knowledge infrastructure, such as
computers, telephones, and the prevalence of networked users. A
third variable is the set of political outcomes, such as UN votes and
World Trade Organization dispute rulings, that determine which
states win and which lose, while additional indicators may include
the influence of non-state actors, governance effectiveness, and
measures of globalization.
It might be useful to build on these variables and indicators in
several ways. First, they could be incorporated into the set of factors
from which aggregate power indices are computed. In fact, the
system of flexible weighting that already exists should make this
incorporation easy. In addition, it might be useful to create an
absolute power index in contrast to the current index of relative
power. Although states are characterized by their percentage of
system power, many states and non-state actors have been
increasing their absolute power in ways that affect overall system
behavior. For instance, when non-state actors such as terrorist
groups achieve significant absolute power, including the ability to do
harm, that fact may be more important than their relative power,
which is likely to be modest. On the other hand, the relative power of
the United States, while enormous in absolute terms, has limits-limits that have become visible in Iraq. Indicators or thresholds for
absolute power would be helpful.
Second, it may be useful to simplify and
improve the user interface for addressing
power. It might be helpful, for instance, to
add a basic report capability focused on
the indices of power and the component
elements of it. It might also be worth
considering a specialized form to simplify
the controlling of weighting and index
construction.
Forecasts, however, will only be as good as the underlying
model. There are at least three areas where the foundations
of any power model can be enhanced. First, it would be useful
to turn attention to the production function in the economic
model. The quality of economic growth forecasts is
fundamental to most of what the model does. It would be
helpful to better represent that production function in a way
that builds more extensively on current theories of
endogenous growth. Another critical change involves the
development of the education sub-model. Returns to
education, both in terms of quality and prevalence, may have
important implications for models of future power structures.
Third, an area that needs significant work is the
representation of debt and its impact on countries. Significant
power shifts could occur in the international system as a result
of exchange rate changes and financial crises.
relying only on the base case. The most intuitive set of scenarios would
build on different assumptions of economic growth rates. For example, the
RAND Corporation has applied a technique called "fault lines" to China. The
analysis asked what major "fault lines," or adversities, might seriously affect
China's ability to sustain rapid economic growth. It identified such factors as
unemployment, poverty, social unrest, corruption, epidemic diseases, as
well as water resources and pollution. It then asked how these adversities
might occur, and by how much they would affect China's growth.
Wild cards--exogenous shocks to the system--are also important to
consider. Future shocks might include energy system shocks, financial
shocks, collapses of key regimes, or lethal terrorist attacks. One way RAND
has looked at shocks is "breaking" continuities--searching for factors where
predictions of continuity seem dubious, even if predicting exactly how, let
alone when, that continuity might break is elusive. Breaking is especially
likely when two measures of continuity are uneasy partners. For example,
several years ago, work on the Asian Futures model included exogenous
shocks in Korea and China. In Korea, the heavily armed confrontation is
sustained even as North Korea declines economically but does not
collapse. Similarly, in the China-Taiwan conflict, the stand-off goes up and
down in temperature while China does not accept de facto Taiwanese
autonomy, and Taiwan does not declare de jure independence.
In sum, there are a number of steps that must be
taken if we are to better understand power and
forecast international distributions of power.
These include strengthening indices of relative
and absolute power, enhancing the foundations
of the power model, and developing future
scenarios. If taken, these steps can provide
policy makers with a more useful set of variables
to measure power, and ultimately improve their
ability to understand the future security
environment.
Power resources of the Major U. S.
contenders, 1990
Source of Power
United States
Soviet Union
Europe
Japan
China
Basic resources
strong
strong
strong
medium
strong
Military
strong
strong
medium
weak
medium
Economic
strong
medium
strong
strong
medum
Science/
Technology
strong
medium
strong
strong
weak
National
Cohesion
strong
medium
weak
Strong
strong
Universalistic
Culture
strong
medium
strong
medium
medium
International
Institutions
strong
medium
strong
strong
medium
Tangible
Intangible
Power resources of the Major U. S.
contenders, 2008 – moja procena
Sources of
power
United States
Japan
China
Russia
European
Union
India
Basic
resources
strong
medium
strong
strong
strong
Strong to
medium
Military
strong
weak
medium
strong
medium
medium
Economic
strong
strong
strong and
medium
medium and
strong
strong
medium to strong
Science/
Technology
strong
strong
medium
medium
National
Cohesion
strong
strong
strong
medium
weak
weak and
medium
Universalistic
Culture
strong
medium
medium
medium
strong
medium
International
Institutions
strong
strong
medium
medium
strong
medium
tangible
strong
Intangible
Vaš odgovor?
Power resources of the Major U. S.
contenders in the future?
Sources of
power
tangible
Basic
resources
Military
Economic
Science/
Technology
Intangible
National
Cohesion
Universalistic
Culture
International
Institutions
United States
Japan
China
Russia
European
Union
India
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