Transcript Donor Sponsored Anti-Corruption: A Qualitative Assessment

Some Reflections on Donor
Sponsored Anti-Corruption
Bryane Michael, Linacre College
Tallinn, Estonia October 2004
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Overview
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Why Anti-Corruption?
Trends in Corruption Control
Why did anti-corruption evolve?
What does the anti-corruption “industry” look like?
Anti-Corruption in Central and Eastern Europe
Anti-Corruption in Africa
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Derivatives
UN Anti-Corruption Convention
Parliaments
IMF Codes
National Programmes
Second Wave of Anti-Corruption
The Underlying Reasons for AntiCorruption
Markets
• Liberalisation sets market price
for bribery
• Non-locals don’t internal local
negative externalities
• Bribes + fines as rational option
.
• “Sauve qui peut” mentality
• Diminishing Solidarity
• No local sanctions for
violating local norms
“Civil Society”
• Privatisation increases
public-private
transactions
• Regulations shifted to
markets and civil society
• Bureaucrats in
business
Governments
Shift from regulated to deregulated forms of national production cause “gap”
where bribery is high return and low prob./cost of detection.
Why Anti-Corruption?
Popularity of Anti-Corruption

Number of References
(left for corruption, right
for anti-corruption)
Figure 1: Frequency of Citations in World Press: Corruption and AntiCorruption
1,600.0
140.0
1,400.0
120.0
1,200.0
100.0
1,000.0
80.0
800.0
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60.0
600.0
400.0
40.0
200.0
20.0
0.0
0.0
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Year
Corruption
Anti-Corruption

Anti-Corruption as
become very popular
Concomitant with
interest in corruption
Engendered donor
interest
Politician's Logic
(something must be
done, this is
something, therefore
it must be done)
Source: (1)
Why Anti-Corruption?
Control of Corruption Depends on
Region
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Figure 1: Control of Corruption in CEE
100

Percentile rank
80
60
40

20
A
fri
Fo
ca
rm
er
So
vi
et
U
ni
on
As
ia
Su
bs
ah
ar
an
So
ut
h
As
ia
Ea
st
Eu
ro
pe
a
Ea
st
er
n
Af
ric
or
th
Ea
st
&
M
id
dl
e
La
ti n
Am
er
ic
a
&
N
C
O
EC
ar
ib
be
an
D
0
Control of Corruption
is a mixed bag
Failure of national
government suggests
role of intergovernmental actors
(UN, WB, etc.).
High stakes in
Eastern Europe –
tunneling, dirty
privatisation, revision
of nationalism and
proto-communism.
Source: Kaufmann et al . (2003).
Trends in Corruption Control
Corruption where no Rule of Law
Figure 9: Comparing Rule of Law

Region's percentile rank
100
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80
60

40
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20
0
on
a
So
vie
tU
ni
Af
ric
m
er
Fo
r
Su
bs
a
So
ha
ra
n
ut
h
As
ia
si
a
tA
ar
ib
C
&
a
ic
Am
er
Ea
s
be
an
a
Af
ric
N
La
t in
M
id
dl
e
Ea
st
&
Ea
s
te
rn
or
th
Eu
ro
O
EC
pe
D
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Corruption where no
rule of law
Corruption where rule
of law!
Donor response has
been to write laws
Writing Laws ≠ Rule
of Law!
Something more
must be done.
Source: Kaufmann (2003)
Trends in Corruption Control
Supply and Demand for Anti-Corruption
Demand
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α
Supply
Demand
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Need for anti-corruption
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Intermediate demand
Supply
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“Practitioners” in a post-Washington Consensus world
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Derivative products – media, training, etc.
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If you build it, they will come (Say’s Law)
Source: (2)
Why did anti-corruption evolve?
Donors Respond to (Political) Market
Demand
Demand for anti-
Value
AntiCorruption
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S
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D’
corruption increased
Supply increased for
higher values of AC.
Donors get kudos
and increased
budgets.
National govts
“supporting” anticorruption while their
firms get contracts
D
Level of Anti-Corruption Activity
Source: (3)
Why did anti-corruption evolve?
Anti-Corruption Schools of
Practice
Universalistic
Static-Centre
Society-Centric
Critical
Focus
“Society”
State
Civil society
“Power institutions”
What
Mechanistic programmes
Government reform
Social reproduction
Epistemic
contestation
Examples
Integrity systems
Civil service reform,
budget reform,
administrative
reform
Media, schools, NGOs,
cultural institutions
Critiques of
international
organisations and
governments
Some
Practitioners
World Bank Institute,
Transparency
International
World Bank’s PREM,
SIGMA, EU, private
sector contractors
Private sector contractors,
NGOs, universities
Academics
Country
examples
Albania, Latvia, Poland
Czech Republic,
Hungary
Bulgaria
Everywhere and
nowhere
Source: (5)
Different theories about fighting corruption are emerging – based on theory and practice
What does the anti-corruption “industry” look like?
The Anti-Corruption Industry: Overview
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Anti-Corruption has become an industry
Global budget at least $100 million.*
Most active countries are Russia, Romania,
Ukraine, Albania, Armenia and Indonesia.*
Over 2,500 “anti-corruption practitioners”
Large part of development agenda: 187 stories
in week of 1-5 April 1-5 2003.
* These figures are rough estimates based on partial data.
Source: (2)
What does the anti-corruption “industry” look like?
“Industrial Structure” of AC Work
International organisations –
national governments
World Bank – AC Programmes
IMF – Codes and Standards
OECD – Convention
UN – Conventions, programmes
International businessnational partners
PwC Opacity
Oxford Analytica
“Derivative business”
International NGOs –
national NGOs
TI – action plans
Soros – programmes
Source: Michael and Langseth, 2002
Globalisation is coming…
What does the anti-corruption “industry” look like?
Donor supported Anti-Corruption Agencies
7
2
Source: (5)
What does the anti-corruption “industry” look like?
Propagation Mechanism: Example of the
World Bank
CEE/FSU
4
USA
1
5
East Asia:
Hong Kong
2
Latin America:
Bolivia,
Nicaragua,
Venezuela
3
Africa
Uganda,
Tanzania
SE Asia:
India
Thailand
Source: (5).
What does the anti-corruption “industry” look like?
The Anti-Corruption Ecosystem
Most developing
Governments countries
World Bank
OSI
USAID
Prestigious US
Universities
Universities/
Research Centres
Donors
Developing
country
facilities
OECD
UNDP
Contractors
QuasiThink-tanks
Transparency
International
NGOs
money
ideas
Source: (5).
Large consulting companies
“Beltway Bandits”
Community groups
What does the anti-corruption “industry” look like?
Corruption’s First Wave: Awareness
Raising (1990-2002?)
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Global dissemination of anti-corruption action plans
Global: United Nations (UN) Conventions against Corruption or the UN
International Code of Conduct for Public Officials
Regional: Interamerican Convention against Corruption, The Council of
Europe's Anti-Corruption Treaties, European Union Against Corruption,
OECD Convention
National:
Africa: Nigeria, Morocco, and Zimbabwe, Ghana, Malawi, Bénin, Maroc,
Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania
Eastern Europe: Albania, the Baltic republics, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia,
Ukraine
Former Soviet Union: Russian Federation, Georgia, and Kazakhstan
East Asia: Thailand, Philippines
Source: (2)
What does the anti-corruption “industry” look like?
Africa is a Large European Donor Target
Figure 1: Relative Global Distribution of AntiCorruption Projects
"World"
6%
Americas
12%
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East Asia and
6% Pacific
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Eastern Europe
and Central Asia
17%
Sub-Saharan Africa
47%
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2%
Middle East and
North Africa
African countries rate
high on corruption
La Politique du ventre
Donors have done
much work in Africa
Not shown: Most of
these projects are
“awareness raising”
Not “high stakes”
region for donors.
10%
South Asia
Source: Utstein Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (2004)
Anti-Corruption in Africa
Donor AC in Africa
UNDP
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CICP
1997
Donor work
“lumpy”
Led by work in
East Africa
Africa centre of
“first wave”
activities
Few “hard” anticorruption
measures taken
(compared with
other regions)
1994-1998
1995-1998
1998
9th
IACC
Source: Langseth (1998, 2002). Map from “The Africa Guide”
1998, 1999
Anti-Corruption in Africa
Disparity Across Africa
Figure 4: Concentration in Africa’s South and East
Angola
3
Mauritania
Botswana
2
Mozambique
1
10
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Burkina
Faso
2
Namibia
4
Burundi
1
Nigeria
5
Cameroon
1
Rwanda
2
Dem. Rep.
of Congo
1
Sierra Leone
8
11
South Africa
20
Tanzania
16
Ethiopia
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Ghana
9
Kenya
20
The Gambia
2
Lesotho
1
Uganda
22
Malawi
17
Zambia
23
Zimbabwe

Donor work in
Africa uneven
Few reports from
South Africa
East Africa still
priority
6
Source: Utstein Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (2004)
Anti-Corruption in Africa
Some African Action Plans are Swishy
Figure 9: The Specificity and Relevance of World Bank Sponsored
Anti-Corruption Programmes
(one is lowest score and five is highest)
Country
Specificity
Relevance
Benin
2.4
2.8
Ethiopia
1.3
1.4
Ghana
1.8
2.3
Kenya
2.5
2.7
Malawi
2.4
2.4
Tanzania
2.5
2.4
Uganda
1.7
1.9
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Action-planning
non-specific and
not-relevant
Donor cooperation could
be improved
Lack of political
will on Africa’s
part or guts on
donors’ part?
Source: (4)
Anti-Corruption in Africa
Eastern Europe: A Failed Opportunity?
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Unlike Africa, high possibility for positive change and
high stakes region for donors
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Ostensibly can make institutions from scratch
Lots of Western money pouring in
Honeymoon Effects in New Public Administrations!
Ambivalence about corruption
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Collapse of Evil Empire
Lots of capital (potential effective demand)
de facto privatisation
Smart – tunneling and foreign Bank accounts
Without a map and without laws
One of us (European Union)
Anti-Corruption in CEE
Anti-Corruption Training in CEE
in
e
ia
rb
ia
R
lb
a
A
us
s
ni
a
kr
a
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Se
5
Po
la
10
nd
U
C
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Li
th
15
ch
e
z
tv
ia
20
La
Number of reported types of
anti-corruption activity
Figure 1: Reporting on Anti-Corruption Training
0
Country
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Training needed
in new systems
Donors practice
de facto triage
with unknown
logic.
Training needed,
but about what?
Source: Michael (2004a).
Anti-Corruption in CEE
Anti-Corruption Training in Central
and Eastern Europe
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Wide variation between the level and focus of anti-corruption
training
Integration into the European Union appears to be positively
correlated with anti-corruption education.
Focus on anti-corruption legislation
But little consideration of how training and education can help
with the implementation of this legislation.
Much anti-corruption training appears contingent on international
technological assistance
A key priority for all the countries appears to be to define
what their educational priorities are at a national level and to
design anti-corruption training so as to fulfil those priorities.
Source: (1)
Anti-Corruption in CEE
Implicit Strategic Focus Emerging From
the Case Studies
Area
Albani
a
Czech
Latvia
Lithuani
a
Poland*
Russia
Serbia
Ukraine
Integration
Low
High
High
High
Low?
Low
?
High
Retraining
High
High
High
High
High?
Yes
?
High
Level
?
High
High
High
?
?
?
?
Certificatio
n
?
Yes
?
Yes
Yes
?
?
?
Quality
assess
?
Yes
?
High
Yes
Yes ?
?
Yes ?
University
High
(TIPA)
High
Medium
High
High?
?
Medium
Source: (6)
Anti-Corruption in CEE
Recommendations to Candidate States
and Training Needs
Recommendation
Training
Importanc
e*
Type of Training to be done?

Cross-party consensus on anticorruption policy
2
Awareness raising
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Detailed research on corruption
4
Skills building
Education and public awareness initiatives on
corruption
4
Awareness raising
Prosecutors protection from undue influences
2
*
Reform legislative processes to restrict “State capture”
3
Awareness raising
Phase out patronage in public service appointments
3
Awareness raising
Carry out an “Audit of Public Administration” and of
licensing/permits
3
Skills building
Provide for citizens redress/appeal procedures
4
Awareness raising
Abuse of conflicts of interest prevention
3
Awareness raising
Devise Codes of Ethics in public administration
4
Skills building
Audit and control of local government
3
Skills building
Reform party funding rules
3
Awareness raising
Public procurement reform
3
Awareness raising

Welcome to the
EU
Adopting
recommendation
will need training
Training should
be targeted.
EnsureFor
independence
of broadcasting
regulators
3 very important.
* The measure of relative importance is
Note:
training importance,
1 is little
importance and 5 is
taken from Michael (2004b)
while a discussion of the type of training to be undertaken can be found in Michael (2004c).
Anti-Corruption in CEE
Prelude to OECD Convention: International
Conventions and Agreements
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Council of Europe
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Organization of American States
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Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
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Convention of the European Union on the fight against corruption involving officials of
the European Communities or officials of Member States
OECD
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Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
EU
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Civil law Convention on Corruption
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
Rules of Conduct - Extortion and Bribery in International Business Transactions
United Nations
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United Nations Convention against Corruption
United Nations Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial
Transactions
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
The OECD Convention
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OECD is the group of rich countries
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business
Transactions
“a crime to offer, promise or give a bribe to a foreign
public official in order to obtain or retain international
business deals”
“the 35 signatory countries to adopt common rules
to punish companies and individuals who engage in
bribery transactions. So far, 28 countries have been
subjected to close monitoring to determine the
adequacy of their implementing legislation.”
Source: OECD (2002)
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
Provisions of the Convention
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Establish that "bribery of a foreign public official" is a
criminal offence. (Article 1, Section 1-3)
“Penalties shall be comparable to that applicable to the
bribery of the Party's own public officials” or “to effective,
proportionate and dissuasive non-criminal sanctions,
including monetary sanctions” in case of no criminal
responsibility in the adopting country. (Article 3).
Bribes are seized
Also covers money laundering and accounting, mutual legal
assistance, and extradition
Provisions for monitoring and follow-up
Provisions for amendment and withdrawal
Source: OECD (2002)
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
A timeline
1997
Revised
recommendation
1999
Convention enters
into force
The Law
2000
2001
Monitoring:
Phase 1
Start 1999
Monitoring:
Phase 2
Start 2001
Letter of the
Law
Spirit of the
Law
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
Countries which have ratified the
Convention
Argentina
Czech
Republic
Ireland
Norway
Turkey (*)
Australia
Denmark
Italy
Poland
United Kingdom
Austria
Finland
Japan
Portugal
United States
Belgium
France
Korea
Slovak Republic
Brazil (*)
Germany
Luxembourg
Slovenia
Bulgaria
Greece
Mexico
Spain
Canada
Hungary
Netherlands
Sweden
Chile (*)
Iceland
New Zealand
Switzerland
Source: OECD (2002)
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
Phase 1: Monitoring
April 1999
Germany, Norway,
United States
February 2001
Luxembourg,
Netherlands,
Poland
July 1999
Bulgaria, Canada,
Finland, Greece,
Korea
April 2001
Argentina, Italy
October
1999
Belgium, Hungary,
Iceland, Japan, Sweden
June 2001
New Zealand
December
1999
Australia, Austria,
United Kingdom
November 2001
Portugal
February
2000
Mexico, Slovak
Republic, Switzerland
June 2002
Ireland
March 2000
Czech Republic, Spain
December
2000
Denmark, France
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
Outreach (2): Role of CSOs
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
CSO “participation” in country reviews
CSO partnership in regional outreach
activities:

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
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
ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for AsiaPacific
Baltic Anti-Corruption Initiative
Latin America Initiative
Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative for South
East Europe
Anti-Corruption Network for Transition Countries
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
Problems with the Convention
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“Machine mentality” focused on legality
Resources
Political will
Doesn’t address “demand side”
“Defensive participation” ?
Over-Expansion?
Sources: OECD (2002), Transparency International, Financial Times (2000)
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
Outreach reaches the FSU

The Anti-Corruption Network
Steering Committee of 9 International
Orgs and 24 countries covered.
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
“The Network focuses on strategies to reduce public sector corruption
through support for the implementation of appropriate political,
institutional, and economic reforms”
The Action plan covers
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan
and Ukraine

Source: (7)
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Derivatives
How It Works
OECD
Provides support for
Steering Group
Action Plan
Evaluation
Source: (7)
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Derivatives
Legitimacy Issues OECD must Confront
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
Does OECD have right to oversee the review nonmember states? (Sovereignty?)
Participants not official State spokespeople
Undemocratic: not of the (Central Asian) people
Non-participants not invited



And role of IFIs and others unclear
One month passes between establishment and
country reports
Funded by SECO: Swiss State Secretariat for
Economic Affairs

Markets for Swiss firms?
Source: (7)
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Derivatives
UN Convention Against Corruption

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
Attempting to expand the
OECD Convention globally?
Reaction to Sept. 11th?
Successfully negotiated in
October 2003
Adopted in early November
130 governments participating
"Vienna Declaration” in April
2000
criminalising bribery
 improving accounting standards
 preventing money laundering

reducing bank secrecy
 return of illegally obtained assets
 promoting govt/ business cooperation

UN Anti-Corruption Convention
How “tight” is the Convention?

Figure 6: Clarity of UN Convention Against
Corruption
5
Measure 1-5
tight
standards

3

1
-1
Article Number
65
61
57
53
49
45
41
37
33
29
25
21
17
13
9
5
loose
standards
Just as Action
Plans are not
specific, neither is
this Convention
Not very binding
Does lack of
specificity offer
greater or less
possibility for
reducing
corruption?
Source: (8)
UN Anti-Corruption Convention
Role of Parliaments
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Parliament key
watchdog for other
social actors
Actually composed
of other
“stakeholders”!
Parliamentary
sovereignty as key
political principle.
Corruption as vital
part of electoral
politics
Incentive
compatibility of
passing AC?
Parliaments
Recommendations from the Inter-Parliamentary Union
Law-making
Vote appropriate anti-corruption legislation, Vote integrity legislation for members of parliaments, Ensure that appropriate oversight
legislation is adopted, Lobby their governments to sign and/or ratify relevant international instruments, Promote the passage of
freedom of information legislation, Promote the passage of freedom of information legislation, Promote the passage of freedom of
information legislation, Promote party-funding and electoral campaign legislation that fosters transparency.
Oversight
Reinforce mechanisms within parliament for bringing government to account, Ensure that the process for preparing and executing
the national budget is transparent and provides for safeguards against government misuse of public funds and resources, Promote the
creation of watchdog agencies such as the Auditor/Controller General, Ombudsman, etc, Ensure that the opposition is adequately
represented in the parliamentary structures, Institute transparent and stringent mechanisms for the approval of senior government and
public officials
Representation (interaction with civil society)
Encourage the public to denounce and condemn corruption and promote or participate in the promotion of high standards of probity
and moral integrity through public awareness campaigns
Source: Adapted from Inter-Parliamentary Union (2001).
Would you do it if you were an MP?
Parliaments
How Incentive Compatible are IPU’s
Recommendations?
Incentive Compatibility of IPU's Recommendations
4.5
4.0
3.5
Scores
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Law-making
Oversight
PC
E
Representation (interaction with
civil society)
PS
HC
Note: This graph presents the arithematic means of the individual scores in the paper. These results
are for illustrative purposes only given aggregation problems.
Source: (3)
Parliaments
IMF Codes of Fiscal and Monetary
Transparency

Dictate transparency of the public sector in four areas:





Clarity of Roles and Responsibilities
Public Availability of Information
Open Budget (Process of Policy Making) Preparation,
Execution and Reporting
Assurances of Integrity
Public Sector here is mostly executive and Central Bank
IMF Codes
Correlation between fiscal and monetary
transparency
Monetary
Fiscal
1
2
3
Argentina
Hungary
Brazil
Czech
Rep.
Chile

India
Malaysia
Morocco
Taiwan
Colombia
Philippines
Isreal
Poland
Mexico
S. Korea
Peru

Jordan
Russia
Thailand
Indonesia
4
3
2
1
Source:
Venezuel
a
Sri
Lan
ka
Egypt
(9).
Pakistan
China

4

Transparency helps
fight corruption
Also encourages
investors
Institutions matter
(duh!)
Good government
as cause and effect
of AC
Turkey
Correlation Coefficient: 0.64
IMF Codes
The Bases of the Donor Sponsored AntiCorruption Project

Laws





Corruption Prevention Law
Procurement Law
Freedom of Information Law
Law on political finance Corruption
Prevention Council

Activities










National anti-corruption
programme
Custom training
Police training
Investigative journalism training
Legislative training
Administrative training
Ethics training
Handbooks
Distance education
Software-IT

Sectors
 Police Judges
 International cooperation
 Politicians
 Civil society training
 Civil servant training
 Municipal
Public Administration Institute
National Programmes
The Donor Sponsored Anti-Corruption
Programme
Survey
¡Vaya con dios!
National or Specialised
Workshop
“Implementation”
Source: World Bank, TI and UN
National Programmes
An Example of a Survey

Figure 6: Corruption in Slovakia?
% of respondents
70
60
50

40
30
20
10

Officials
Enterprises
M
bl
ic
Pu
y
Ar
m
ed
ia
t
m
en
er
n
Lo
ca
lS
el
f -G
ov
Pa
rli
am
en
t
n
uc
at
io
Ed
C
us
t
om
s
e
st
ic
Ju
H
ea
l
th
C
ar
e
0

Nuanced policy
data not really used
to assign priorities
Puts numbers to
“everything is bad”
Difficulty comparing
across institutions
and countries
No a priori or even
a postiori theory to
explain numbers.
Households
Source: World Bank and USAID (2000)
National Programmes
Uganda: Partial Action Plan
Third National Integrity Workshop, May 28–29 1997, Uganda

Timing
Programme
Responsible
Party
Comments
As of May
’97

1. AWARENESS RAISING (page 1 of 3)
a) Seminars/Workshops
Seminars to enhance ethics,
transparency and accountability
among the following groups:
FY94–
98
(i) District government staff, that
is DAs political (LC V) and
administrative
FY98–
99
(ii) Ministers and Permanent
Secretaries and Chief Accounting
Officers

IGG in
collaboration with
TI, EDI, TIUganda
Ongoing
MoLG, IGG,
Decentralization
Secretariat
Workshops
completed for
Mayors and Town
Clerks
Ongoing
FY98
Prime Minister’s
Office
Chief Accounting
Officers
Done Feb 97
(iii) Judiciary, Magistrates, Police
Prosecutors, State Attorney from
DPP’s office, and prison officials
on the legal framework
May 95
Chief Justice
IGG
Magistrate
Done 97
(iv) Judiciary, Magistrates, Police
Prosecutors, State attorney from
DPP’s office, and Prison officials
on the legal framework
May 95
Chief Justice
IGG
Magistrate
Done 97
Overall IGG



Source: World Bank
Based on impressions
Link with Data?
Continuing
commitment by donors
needed
Training must be more
than cheerleading
conferences
No real sanctions for
non-implementation.
Donor project
managers okay, their
political overlords
weak.
National Programmes
Components of Bolivia’s National
Integrity System

National Integrity
Plan


Judicial Reform
Modernisation of the
State

Perfect on
programme on
paper
Lack on will to
follow through on
both donor and
country side.
No incentives to
implement
Every party gets a
share of the
patronage –- why
change?
Fight Against Corruption
Source: www.integridad.gov.bo
National Programmes
Overlapping generations of Bolivian
governance reform
First generation
reforms
Second generation
reforms
SAFCO
IDC
Judicial reform
PP and
Decentralisation
National
AC Plan
time



Should this have been done in reverse?
How does our programme affect local incentives?
Analysis of political interests!
National Programmes
Why is the First Wave of Anti-Corruption
Finished?




“Awareness” raised a Corruption no longer a fourletter word.
Conference fatigue of organisers and attendees
Eclipsed by “Corporate Governance” as hot topic.
Few demonstrable impacts in reducing corruption


Little impact of international conventions and national laws
No cool theory ever emerged like in transition
pushed by powerful Western professors


Though “anti-corruption” did get its face-men
(and you know who they are).
Second Wave of Anti-Corruption
The “Second Wave of Anti-Corruption”?
Figure 7: Comparison between First and Second Wave Anti-Corruption
First Wave
Second Wave
Time period
1990s
2000s
Focus
Awareness raising
Capacity building
Reception
Copy
Customise
Implementation
Homogeneity
Heterogeneity
Main actors
International
organisations
Multiple national and local
organisations
Source: author.

Knowledge Management




Business Activity




“Real knowledge” in enforcement and financial management.
“Anti-Corruption knowledge” (knowledge about anti-corruption) is real
Optimal method of knowledge management
Tighten the OECD Convention
Self-enforcement anti-corruption contracts
From roving bandit to public goods
Media Activity


Deconcentration
Localisation (increase returns to investigation)
Second Wave of Anti-Corruption
Optimal Degree of Donor Involvement
Information Dissemination
Advocacy
Consulting
Twinning Type
Capacity Building
Active Monitoring
Diplomatic
Pressure
Involvement Level
Advantages
Disadvantages
Information dissemination
Cheap and needed as public good
Low impact
Active Monitoring
Value as public good
Crowds out private sector and can
be unfair
Consulting
Helps build “market” for “AC
Industry”
Crowds out private sector and can
be doctrinaire.
Capacity Building
Fungible for other activites
Expensive and slow, fungible and
may not coincide with incentives
Diplomatic Pressure
Highly effective
Questions of sovereignty
Advocacy
Second Wave of Anti-Corruption
Sources and Citations








(1). The Rise and Fall of the Anti-Corruption Industry: Toward Second Generation AntiCorruption Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe? Local Government Initiative Policy
Brief. 2003.
(2) The Globalisation of Anti-Corruption Policies: The Diffusion of Best Practices and the
Role of Knowledge Management. Public Policy and Public Management in Globalized
World. David Levi-Faur and Eran Vigoda, Editors. Forthcoming.
(3) The Role of Incentive Design in Parliamentarian Anti-Corruption Programmes (with Aare
Kasemets). Presented at Conference. 2004.
(4) What Do African Donor Sponsored Anti-Corruption Programmes Teach Us about
International Development in Africa? Social Policy and Administration 38(4). 2004.
(5) Explaining Organisational Change in International Development: The Role of
Complexity in Anti-Corruption Work. Journal of International Development. forthcoming.
(6) Some Issues in Anti-Corruption Training in Central and Eastern Europe. Preventing
Corruption in Public Administration. Council of Europe publication. Forthcoming. 2004.
(7). Improving the OECD’s Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan. Presented at Conference.
(8) What does the UN Convention Teach Us about International Regulatory
Harmonisation? Presented at Conference. 2004.
Sources and Citations (2)




(9). Assessing International Fiscal and Monetary Transparency:
The Role of Standards, Knowledge Management and Project
Design (with Michael Bates). International Journal of Public
Administration 6(2). 2003.
(10). Depoliticising Anti-Corruption in Bolivia: Local International
Intervention and the State. International Journal of Public
Administration. Forthcoming.
(11). Foreign Sponsored Development Projects in Africa: The
Dialogue Between International and African Judicial Integrity
Projects (with Petter Langseth). Journal of Sustainable
Development in Africa. January. 2003.
(12). How Involved Should the World Bank Be in International
Corporate Responsibility Programmes? A Qualitative Exploration
of Optimal Programme Provision. Forthcoming.