Transcript Clark Slides - Brian M. Lucey

What can we expect of Board Directors?
Professor Blanaid Clarke
McCann FitzGerald Chair of Corporate Law
Trinity College Dublin
ESRC People Risk Seminar, Dublin
26 March 2014
The presentation will examine:
• Our expectations of the role to be played by
directors
• Our expectations in terms of their qualification
and competences
• Will this improve the contribution of directors?
1
I. Background
Hard Law
- Statutory qualifications and duties of directors at national level
- Common law fiduciary duties
- Criminal Law sanctions
EU Corporate Governance Green Paper (2011), EU Company Law
Action Plan (2012)
EU Commission Study on Directors’ Duties and Liability (2013)
identified “gaps and deficiencies exist less with regard to the
substantive rules on directors’ duties, and more in relation to
enforcement”
2
Soft Law
- EU Commission Recommendation on Strengthening the Role
of Non-Executive or Supervisory Directors (2005)
- National, International and transnational
Corporate Governance Codes (http://www.ecgi.org)
- A significant number of the changes have been implemented
on foot of perceived corporate scandals
3
Ireland
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Corporate Governance Code for Credit Institutions and Insurance Undertakings 2013
Code of Practice for Good Governance of Community, Voluntary and Charitable
Organisations in Ireland 2012
Corporate Governance Code for Collective Investment Schemes and Management
Companies 2011
Corporate Governance Code for Irish Domiciled Collective Investment Schemes 2010
Code of Corporate Governance for Independent Directors of Investment Funds 2010
Corporate Governance Code for Credit Institutions and Insurance Undertakings 2010
Irish Development NGOs Code of Corporate Governance 2008
Corporate Governance for Reinsurance Undertakings 2007
Corporate Governance, Share Option and Other Incentive Schemes 1999
4
- The UK Corporate Governance Code 2012
- The UK Stewardship Code 2012
- Corporate governance in central government departments: Code of good practice 2011
- Corporate Governance Guidance and Principles for Unlisted Companies in the UK 2010
- The AIC Code of Corporate Governance October 2010
- The UK Stewardship Code 2010
- The UK Corporate Governance Code 2010
- A Stewardship Code for Institutional Investors 2010
- The Audit Firm Governance Code 2010
- A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities (The Walker Review) 2009
- The Combined Code on Corporate Governance 2008
- Guidelines for Disclosure and Transparency in Private Equity 2007
- The Combined Code on Corporate Governance 2006
- Good practice suggestions from the Higgs Report 2006
- Internal Control: Revised Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code 2005
- Corporate governance in central government departments: Code of good practice 2005
- Pension Scheme Governance - fit for the 21st century: A Discussion Paper from the NAPF 2005
- Good Governance: The Code of Governance for the Voluntary and Community Sector 2005
- Corporate Governance: A Practical Guide 2004
- The Combined Code on Corporate Governance 2003
- Audit Committees - Combined Code Guidance (the Smith Report) 2003
- The Higgs Report: Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors 2003
- The Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and Agents - Statement of Principles 2002
- The Hermes Principles 2002
- Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors (Consultation Paper) 2002
- Code of Good Practice 2001
- The Combined Code: Principles of Good Governance and Code of Best Practice 2000
- Hermes Statement on International Voting Principles 1999
- The KPMG Review Internal Control: A Practical Guide 1999
- Internal Control : Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code (Turnbull Report) 1999
- Hampel Report (Final) 1998
- Greenbury Report (Study Group on Directors' Remuneration) 1995
- Cadbury Report (The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance) 1992
5
RiskMetrics Study on Monitoring and Enforcement Practices in Corporate Governance in the
Member States (2009)
• Overwhelming support for comply-or-explain regime
from regulators, companies and investors
• Wide consensus it does not function perfectly
• Poor quality of company disclosure and insufficient
explanations
• Information on board and remuneration constitutes
2/3 of all explanations for deviations
• Monitoring and enforcement remains problematic
6
Influencing Factors
• Trend towards shareholder engagement
• Changes in corporate ownership and
investment and trading practices
• Lessons from the Financial Crisis
7
8
Global Corporate Governance Failings
in Financial Institutions
• Risk Management and Internal Control
Failures
• Deficiencies in the Profile and Practice of
Directors and Senior Management
• Perverse Incentives
• Failures in Disclosure and Transparency
• Complex and Opaque Corporate and Bank
Structures
9
II. Role of the Board
• “Every public company should be headed
by an effective board which can both
lead and control the company”- Cadbury
Code (1992)
• “We expect [non-executive directors] to
behave as hard-nosed businessmen,
referees, coaches, visionaries and saints,
while giving only a few days a year to the
job”. (Economist, 1994)
10
UK Corporate Governance Code 2012
• Every company should be headed by an effective board which is collectively
responsible for the long-term success of the company.
• The board’s role is to provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company
within a framework of prudent and effective controls which enables risk to
be assessed and managed. The board should set the company’s strategic
aims, ensure that the necessary financial and human resources are in place
for the company to meet its objectives and review management
performance. The board should set the company’s values and standards
and ensure that its obligations to its shareholders and others are
understood and met.
• The board is responsible for determining the nature and extent of the
significant risks it is willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives. The
board should maintain sound risk management and internal control
systems.
11
The Role of the Non-executive directors is:
• constructively challenge and help develop proposals on strategy
• scrutinise the performance of management
• monitor the reporting of performance
• satisfy themselves on the integrity of financial information
• ensure that financial controls and systems of risk management
are robust and defensible
• determine appropriate levels of remuneration of executive
directors
• appoint/remove executive directors and engage in succession
planning
12
We expect [non-executive directors] to act as:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Auditors
Risk Experts
Strategists
Corporate Advisers
Recruitment Advisers
Public Servants
Stewards
III. Board Composition
• “the calibre of the non-executive members of
the board” (Cadbury Code, 1992)
• “The board and its committees should have the
appropriate balance of skills, experience,
independence and knowledge of the company to
enable them to discharge their respective duties and
responsibilities effectively.”
• Sufficient time to discharge their responsibilities
effectively.
• Information & Support
• Development
• Board Evaluation
CRD IV
• “sufficiently good repute and possess sufficient
knowledge, skills and experience to perform their
duties”
• “act with honesty, integrity and independence of mind
to effectively assess and challenge the decisions of the
senior management”
• “commit sufficient time to perform their functions”
(See also: The Corporate Governance Code for Credit
Institutions and Insurance Undertakings)
We expect [non-executive directors] to be:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Qualified
Experienced
Independent and bringing an independent judgement to bear
Committed
Available (i.e. limited other directorships)
Informed
• Challenging
• Interesting
• Humorous
“In Ireland poor governance may well have
been exacerbated by the concentrated
nature of corporate life where challenge
and assertiveness in the Board room was
perhaps blunted by the social constraints
of working and living in a small business
community in a small country.”
– Matthew Elderfield
18
We expect Diversity in our Boards
UK Corporate Governance Code Principles
• There should be a formal, rigorous and transparent procedure for the
appointment of new directors to the board.
• The search for board candidates should be conducted, and appointments
made, on merit, against objective criteria and with due regard for the
benefits of diversity on the board, including gender.
Provisions
• A separate section of the annual report should describe the work of the
nomination committee, including the process it has used in relation to
board appointments. This section should include a description of the
board’s policy on diversity, including gender, any measurable objectives
that it has set for implementing the policy, and progress on achieving the
objectives.
19
Proposal for Gender Diversity Directive for Listed companies (excluding
SMEs)
- Binding Minimum Objective of 40% Women Non-Executive Directors by
2020
- Appointments on basis of pre-established, clear, neutrally formulated
and unambiguous criteria
- Positive discrimination for candidates of equal merit “unless an
objective assessment taking account of all criteria specific to the
individual candidates tilt the balance in favour of the candidate of the
other sex”
Proposal for Directive to provide for Non-Financial and Diversity Reporting
- ‘Comply or Explain’ requirement for large listed companies
- Description in the Corporate Governance Statement of the Company's
diversity policy for its administrative, management and supervisory
bodies covering:
• age, gender, geographical diversity and educational and
professional background
• the objectives of the diversity policy
• Manner of implementation and the results in the reporting period
Will these boards work?
House of Lords & House of Commons Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards
‘An accident waiting to happen’: The failure of HBOS
“I have no doubt that the HBOS Board was by far and
away the best board I ever sat on. My recollection of the
culture and characteristics of the Board was one of
openness, transparency, high intellect, integrity, good
working relationships between the Chairman and Chief
Executive, and a suitable diversity of backgrounds, mix
of experience and expertise to maximise effectiveness
[...] If with the benefit of hindsight I was asked if I wanted
to sit on this board again I would be saying yes.” - Sir
Ronald Garrick, Senior Independent Director, Deputy
Chairman
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards Conclusions
• The corporate governance of HBOS at board level
serves as a model for the future…It represents a
model of self-delusion, of the triumph of process
over purpose.”
• “The Board made effective but supportive
challenges, as necessary, and would not seek to
second guess executive management’s
formulation of strategy.” – Board Assessment
Milgram (1974)
24
8 Symptoms of Group-Think
Overestimations of the Group
1. Illusions of invulnerability
2. Unquestioned belief in the morality of the group
Closed-Mindedness
3. Rationalising warnings
4. Sterotyping Opponents
Pressures toward Uniformity
5. Self-censorship of deviating ideas
6. Illusions of unanimity among group members
7. Direct pressure to conform
8. Mind guards
Cognitive
Biases
Availability
Framing
Anchoring
Relative
Positioning
27