Transcript スライド 1 - Brazilian–Argentine Agency for

SEMINARIO ABACC 20 ANOS
10-11 November 2011
Rio de Janeiro, BRAZIL
Japan's Efforts on Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Regional Framework
HIROSHI TAMAI
Department of Science and Technology
for Nuclear Material Management (STNM)
Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)
CONTENTS
 Japan’s Position
 State’s System of Accounting for and Control
of Nuclear Materials (SSAC)
 Regional Framework
 Impact of Fukushima-Daiichi NPP Accident
This presentation shows neither official statement of
Government of Japan nor that of JAEA.
2
Japan’s Position
Japan’s Policy on Peaceful Nuclear Activity
Japan：
- only nation suffered by Atomic Bomb
- actively promotes the policy on peaceful nuclear activity
disarmament
non-proliferation
Japan was the first bombed nation
and shall be the last one.
◆ Atomic Energy Basic Law (Dec. 1955)
The research, development and utilization
of atomic energy shall be limited to
peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring
safety and performed independently
under democratic management, the
results there from shall be made public to
contribute to international cooperation.
◆
Three Non-nuclear Principles
Nuclear weapons: not making, not
possessing, not bringing in
Memorial Dome (Hypocentre in Hiroshima)
registered as the World Heritage in Dec. 1996
4
Japan’s Chronology of Peaceful Nuclear Activity
1945.8 Atomic bombs on Hiroshima & Nagasaki
1947 The Constitution
1955 Atomic Energy Basic Act
1957 accepted to IAEA
first application of IAEA safeguards to JRR-3 fuel
1967 Three Non-nuclear Principles
NSG 1975
CSA in force 1977
1976 ratified NPT
PP Convention in force 1988
signed CTBT 1996
AP in force 1999
IS Broader Conclusion 2004
Nuclear Terrorism Convention concluded 2007
State level approach 2011
5
State’s System of Accounting for and
Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC)
Legislative Measures for SSAC in Japan
◆ Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material,
Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors (Jun. 1957) - Accountancy & Control
- Safeguards Inspection
Chap.1 General Rules
Chap.2~6-1
Regulations concerning individual business
Chap.6-2
Control concerning the uses of international controlled
material (U, Pu, Th)
Permission, Report, Record, Accounting and Control, Safeguards
Inspection, Designated organisation
Chap.6-3
Concerning welding inspection
Chap.7 Designation and Permission, Collecting reports,
Entering inspections
Chap.8 Penal rules
◆ Ordinance for the Use of International Controlled Material
7
SSAC Inspections in Japan for 2010
Number of
Material
Accountancy
Number
of
Facilities
and LOFs
Reports
6
486
31,605
330
24
306
81
3,323
295,043
599
46
553
3
832
71,884
1,038
106
932
R&Ds, LOFs
209
1,931
85,589
418
32
386
Total
299
6,572
484,121
2,385
208
2,177
Categories
Fabrications
Reactors
Reprocessing
Persons Day Inspection
(PDI)
Data
JSGO
NMCC
Note: PDI does not include the person days of DIV and CA
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Development of Integrated Safeguards in Japan
First Broader Conclusion on Japan by IAEA (Jun. 2004)
Introductory Statement of the Director General of IAEA at Board of Governors:
“I am pleased to note that the secretariat was recently able to reach all conclusions needed for the
implementation of integrated safeguards in Japan-the State with the largest nuclear program
subject to Agency safeguards.”
Facility Level Integrated Safeguards (2004-)
2004
2005
2008
2011
LWR without MOX, RRCAs, Spent Fuel Storage
LWR with/without MOX, LEU
RRP
Small Facilities and LOFs, Nigyo-Toge R&D
Site Level Integrated Safeguards (2008-)
2008
2009
2010
2011
JNC-1 site (TRP, PFPF and etc.)
JNC-4 site (Monju Fast Breeder Reactor)
JNC-2 site (Joyo Fast Reactor, Critical Assembly and etc.)
JNFL-2 site (Rokkasho Enrichment Plant and etc.)
Development of Integrated Safeguards approaches for all
facilities and LOFs in Japan was completed as the end of 2010.
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Contribution to IAEA Safeguards Issues
 Safeguards Framework
- Adoption of INFCIRC/153
- Adoption of INFCIRC/540
- IAEA Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI)
Enforcement of safeguards measures
 Technical Projects
- Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP): 1980-82
Establishment of safeguards measures in centrifugal enrichment plant
- Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise (TASTEX): 1978-81
Improvement of safeguards technologies in Tokai reprocessing plant
- Large Scale Reprocessing Plant Safeguards (LASCAR): 1988-92
Development of effective safeguards technologies in large reprocessing plant
- Information Treatment Assistance Programme (ITAP): 1992-98
Effective evaluation of safeguards information
- Japan Support Programme for Agency Safeguards (JASPAS): 1981Development of technologies for advanced inspections
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Regional Framework
Cooperation in Regional Framework
Research & Development in Asia & Pacific
RCA (1972- ) ‘Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to
Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific’
- Research, Development, Training in Nuclear Science and Technology
- 17 member states
FNCA (1990- ) ‘Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia’
-
Socioeconomic development in peaceful and safe utilization of nuclear
technology
12 member states
APSN (2009- ) ‘Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network’
- Improvement of quality, effectiveness, efficiency of safeguards implementation
- 14 member states
Background of Nuclear Renaissance in 21 Century
Energy Security & Environmental Security
=> Revival of Nuclear Energy
New comer countries to have Nuclear Power Plant
=> Support for infrastructure
Japan’s Standpoint
Support cooperation
- material/equipment for nuclear plant
- domestic framework to ensure 3S aiming
at peaceful use
Bilateral Cooperation Agreement
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Bilateral Cooperation Agreements between Japan
・Peaceful use of Nuclear Materials => Ensuring Safeguards, Security/PP
・Export/Import of nuclear materials, Technical cooperation, Transfer
・Regulation on enrichment and reprocessing
Nations concluded/signed the Agreement/Memorandum between Japan
signed
1998
signed
2006
1980
2011
1990
1988
1986
signed
signed
MoC
MoC
Negotiation
in progress
1982
Other MoC (Memorandum of Cooperation ):
Italy, Kuwait, Mongolia, Poland, UAE
Other Negotiation in progress:
India, South Africa, Turkey, UAE
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SSAC Training Course
Structure
Program
Entrust
Training
MEXT
Request to
cooperation
Countries
IAEA SG Support
Program (JASPAS)
・IAEA Safeguards ・SSAC
・Accountancy & Control
・Design Information
・Exercise for NDA and C/S
・Facility Visit
Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia,
Philippine, China, Bangladesh, South Korea,
Mongolia, Myanmar, Singapore, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Russia, Australia, Others
Lectures
Purpose of Training
IAEA, MEXT, NMCC, JAEA
• To provide participants with institutional and operational
concepts and technology in the areas of nuclear material
accountancy and control systems.
• To enable participants to initiate, operate and maintain such
systems in their countries to meet national safeguards
objectives.
• To meet international standard required by the IAEA.
SSAC Training Course for Asian and Pacific region is held every year.
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Integrated Support Center for Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security
MEXT
Cooperation
Building a framework
IAEA
METI NISA
US(DOE)
Cooperation
Integrated Support Center for
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security
Cooperation
Domestic
Organizations
Nuclear security
・Security of nuclear material,
facilities and transport
・Exercise at a mock facility
Nuclear non-proliferation
and Safeguards
・Human resources development
for Asian countries
・Training course for IAEA
inspectors
Cooperation
ROK,
China,
Hub for International Joint Research
ASNO
Australian Safeguards and
Non-proliferation Office
Background
FNCA, APSN
EU
etc
Asian countries
Kazakhstan, Mongolia
(Expert Seminar in 2011)
Japan’s National Statement at the Nuclear Security Summit (2010, Washington)
Japan will this year establish a regional center for the strengthening of nuclear security,
tentatively named “the Integrated Comprehensive Support Center for Nuclear Non16
Proliferation and Nuclear Security for Asia” under JAEA.
Present Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
Semey (2009)
Definition by UN
Bangkok (1997)
Pelindaba (2009)
Rarotonga (1986)
Tlatelolco (1969)
(a)Total absence of nuclear
weapons
(b)An international system of
verification and control
General Assembly resolution
34/72B (1975)
Description in Treaty
Obligations
• nuclear weapons: to prohibit and prevent test, use, manufacture, production,
acquisition, receipt, storage, installation, development, possession
Control system
• IAEA safeguards
(Regional system not explicitly indicated)
Weapon States Protocol
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Prospect of North-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
Korean Peninsula Denuclearization Statement (1991)
DPRK: withdrawal from NPT (2003)
nuclear tests (2006, 2009)
de facto dead letter
Mongolian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (1992)
adopted by the UN General Assembly (1998)
(Resolution 53/77D, 55/33S)
Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (1997)
entry into force
Issues on the North-East Asia NWFZ
• purpose: mutual observation ? cooperation enforcement ?
total/partial denuclearization ? ASIATOM ?
regional backend ?
• member states: Japan, ROK, DPRK, (Mongolia ?), (China ?)
• step to function: denuclearization, verification
• concern: politically unstable relationship (DPRK, China, any other alliance)
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Way to North-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
Denuclearization
• Mutual confidence building
- political issue like 6-Parties negotiation
• Denuclearization, Verification
- support by nuclear weapon states, etc.
Good practice in Countries of former USSR
• Denuclearization (1995)
• Central Asia NWFZ Treaty (2009)
Japan’s support for their
denuclearization, verification
- Equipment for SSAC & PP
- Cleaning-up & Medical care at test site
Construction of control system (conjecture)
SSAC (already fully implemented in each country)
technical support, transport
RSAC (a good model: ABACC/EURATOM)
- Collaboration with APSN (China, ROK, Japan, Russia, USA…)
- Position in NWFZ (not explicit in present NWFZ)
19
Impact of Fukushima-Daiichi NPP
Accident
Sequence of the Accident
1) Loss of off-site power due to the earthquake
2) Diesel generator inoperable due to the
tsunami
3) All motor operated pumps including ECCS
became inoperable
4) Decrease in reactor water level
5) Uncovering the Core
6) Hydrogen generation due to the ZirconiumWater reaction
7) Possible fuel rod damage
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear
/japanchallenges/pdf/japan-challenges_full.pdf
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Roadmap towards resolving the accident
11 Mar.
3 months
17 Apr.
Step 1
Target
Radiation dose
in steady decline
Stable cooling
[Reactors]
- Resume heat exchange function
- [Unit 1,3] Flood up to top of active fuel
- [Unit 2] Seal the damaged location
Stable cooling
6~9 months
Step 2
Controlling release of
radioactive materials
(significant reduction of dose level)
Achieve cold shutdown
-temperature below 100 degree
-below 1 mSv/yr at site boundary
More stable cooling
- Maintain sufficient level of water
[Spent Fuel Pools]
- Enhance reliability of water injection
- Restore coolant circulation system
- [Unit 4] Install supporting structure
[Contaminated
Water]
Secure storage place
Decrease contaminated water
- Prevent leakage to the outside of the site
(decontaminate and desalt)
Prevent spreading
Install reactor building cover
[Contaminated
Atmosphere/Soil]
by remote-control
- Resume heat exchange function
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Draft Items to be studied for Nuclear Material Control
• Review on nuclear material control technology &
methodology applied in TMI-2 and Chernobyl-4
• Study on concept of nuclear material control &
Safeguards Approach
(1) Nuclear Material in spent fuel pond
- Analysis of possible access paths/access points
- C/S measures
- Verification at shipment
(2) Nuclear Material in core (Debris)
- Estimation and evaluation for initial inventory
- Mapping (incl. degraded fuels, waste materials, dispersed fuel to environment)
- Procedure of Nuclear Material accountancy and declaration
(sample measurement, Shipping container measurement)
- Verification procedure at shipment of debris (Mobile monitoring etc.)
- C/S measures for core debris (if necessary)
- Safeguards approach appropriate to a treatment method of debris
• Study on measurement method for debris
23
JAEA’s Contribution to the Accident
Headquarters of Fukushima Partnership Operations
established on 6 May
To contribute to the resolution of the various challenges
for the ultimate recovery from the accident
Autonomous Unmanned Helicopter
A. Environment Radiation Monitoring
B. Environmental Radioactivity Analyses
C. Resident Public Consulting
D. Scientific Advice and Technical Supports
Monitoring car
E. Equipment Support
(A-D Total 34,884 Man-Days since 11 March.)
http://www.jaea.go.jp/english/jishin/gaiyou/e1103.pdf
Decontamination of Schoolyards
and Swimming Pools
Body washer
Trial of remedial actions for forest
Contamination Survey
Radio controlled vehicle with g-eye
Scientific advice
Technical support
Public consulting
24
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SUMMARY
• Japan has intensively promoted the peaceful use of
nuclear energy based on well equipped SSAC, leading
to the compliance record along the international norms.
• Japan has developed the regional support programme
in aspects of non-proliferation and peaceful use, which
contributes to transparency and confidence building.
• Aiming at NWFZ in North-East Asia, many political and
technical issues are to be cleared for confidence
building and RSAC.
• Lessons from the Fukushima-Daiichi NPP accident
should be shared world-wide to promote the peaceful
use in safe and secure manner.
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Obrigado
por sua audição
Thank you for listening