Transcript Public private partnerships in education

Public private partnerships
in education in India
by
Geeta Kingdon
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Quality crisis – primary level; secondary level
Solutions not in inputs but in incentives for T and schools
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Performance related pay for teachers
Changed accountability system via PPPs
Table 10.3
Pass rates in exams of the UP High School Exam Board
Percentage of exam-takers who passed
Year
1988
Regular candidates
49.6
Private candidates
40.6
Total
46.6
1989
47.6
39.4
44.8
1990
46.4
40.4
44.2
1991
61.2
52.2
57.0
1992
17.3
9.0
14.7
Source: Swatantra Bharat (High School Exam Results Supplement) Wed 15th July 1992, p3.
Public private partnerships
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Private schooling growing rapidly
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If private schools attract HHs, they must operate with
some competitive advantages
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Its the nature of these advantages that shapes views
about how the private sector can be most effectively used
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Challenge for policy – how to harness the efficiency /
accountability of private schools to create better outcomes
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PPPs are avowedly one way of doing that
PPPs permit separating operation from
funding
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Woessman’s findings suggest it makes fundamental diff how partnership
between public & private is set up.
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private op with public funding brings large gains
public op with private funding brings large losses
PPPs in education
2 types of PPPs combine private operation /
public funding
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2.
direct aid to private schools (supply-side funding)
school vouchers to parents (demand-side funding)
School Vouchers PPP – demand side funding
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Govt funds go to schools via voucher to families
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Aim - school choice sets up competition bet schools
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Evidence – Colombia/Chile. 2 randomised studies
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Critique - Exacerbate inequality
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poor parents cannot supplement V, have to remain in public schools
private schools can reject poor applicants on grounds of low
achievement
Suggested solution (Nechyba, 2005)
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voucher amount made inverse to the economic status of HH, so
poorest receive highest-value vouchers
PPP in education in India
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Aided Schools – extensive form of PPP
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Enrolment share
History
Funding formula
Relative performance
Political economy aspects
New proposed PPP in education
Inter-state variation in PA schools’ share of total public
education expenditure
History
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Inherited from British
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Originally by religious/linguistic minorities
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At independence
 avoided govt. regulations
 teachers recruited by school
 autonomy to set staff-discipline/firing policies
 teachers paid out of school revenues
 had to attract students to succeed – only partly
funded
Evolution, funding
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Over time, aided school teachers became unionised
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Lobbied in mid-late 1960s - paid directly by state
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Passage of important Acts in 1971 and 1972
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In 1982, teacher recruitment by state appointed body
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Massive centralisation; reduced local accountability
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Efforts in 1990s to give local managers greater say opposed
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Block grant, based on # of sanctioned teachers
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No incentives in grant formula
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12 – 22% of MLCs have been teachers
Grant formula devoid of performance
conditions and unresponsive to needs
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Block grant, based only on number of sanctioned T
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To increase efficiency, there needs to be a formula
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System of grants-in-aid same as 150 years ago.
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pass rate fixed at a paltry 45 percent (pass mark set low 33%)
No. of working days
political manoeuvres overrule provisions to regulate grants
By contrast, British system underwent revolutionary changes,
became more objective. based on dozen needs indicators
Japanese & other countries’ grant formulae
Rational grant structure a policy correction potentially
high pay-offs in terms of improved cost-efficiency
Relative effectiveness of aided
schools
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Quantitative studies relied on small surveys – Govinda &
Varghese (1993); Bashir (1994); Kingdon (1996)
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Use different methods, diff levels of education, diff states
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General conclusion
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P schools outperform G and A schools in all 4 states
A schools outperform G schools in some states and the
vice versa in others
Summary of findings
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Bashir (1994, 1997) Tamil Nadu, primary schools
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Govinda and Varghese (1993) Madhya Pradesh primary schools
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achievement levels in P schools considerably higher – in both maths and
language – than in G schools. But they pool A and P schools
Kingdon (1994, 1996) Uttar Pradesh, junior schools
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P performed better than G in math
P performed no better than G in Tamil language but they were E/M
A schools more effective than G schools
P school students outperformed their A and G counterparts
A and G schools were similar
Non-standardised comparisons across G, A, P schools
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Tooley & Dixon (2003), Andhra Pradesh – don’t include A schools
CBSE board data (2004) Delhi Municipality area
Problems of inference
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Even with measured student traits inference is difficult
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Need randomised experiment or correction for selection
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Kingdon on UP, India, attempts to address SSB
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Illustrate from that
Govt. maths score
Private maths score
Aided maths score
.1
.05
0
0
10
20
math
30
40
Political economy
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This form of PPP not cost-effective
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Lack of incentives in grant formula
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Suffered loss of local accountability
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Strength of unions (NCT) - “some of the Principals deposing before us lamented
that they had no powers over teachers and were not in a position to enforce order and
discipline. Nor did the District Inspectors of Schools and other officials exercise any authority
over them as the erring teachers were often supported by powerful teachers’ associations.
We were told that that there was no assessment of a teacher’s academic and other work and
that teachers were virtually unaccountable to anybody” (NCT, 1986, p68).
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Aided school teachers hold political office
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Teachers are legislators (MLAs & MLCs)
Aided teachers in politically advantageous position
NCT 1986: “the most important factor responsible for vitiating the atmosphere in
schools, we were told, has been the role of teacher politicians and teachers’
organisations”.
Conclusions – so far
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PPP not a panacea
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The design of PPP matters
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India’s experience has lessons
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whether/what are incentives built into grant
capitulation to teachers’ demands for comparable treatment to G
and to be sheltered from local level accountability
if A and G operate together, political pressure can mount, but?
Why certain PPPs work well or not, is the Q: devil in detail
PPP reform in education
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Considering new per-student subsidy to private schools; again supply-side
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Draft ‘Right to Education’ Bill 2005 : private schools to give 25% of places to
‘weaker sections’
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Govt promises to reimburse the schools
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Expect long queues; way of selection not specified
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Implications for number of private schools / fee levels not thought through
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unclear whether response will be to create new places or to replace 25% of
existing students or both
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If existing students replaced, departure of fee-paying students increases demand
for establishment of new private schools, which will themselves allocate 25%
places to poor students. Overall, number of private schools likely to increase
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Govt will compensate schools at the lower of private school’s fee rate and PPE in
public schools. Since public PPE is much larger, could increase private fee levels
Lack of PPP debate
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In many countries vigorous debate / experimentation with diff types of
PPPs, including demand-side funding (vouchers)
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[1] Non-acceptability of profit-based approach
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[2] Most obvious failure of schools – lack of resources
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Unlikely reason for lack of consideration of vouchers
India proposes to use P fee-charging schools
seen as demotivating
obvious solution – fix physical deficiencies/provide inputs
other countries, focus of reform moved to improving incentives
[3] Fear of upsetting powerful vested interests
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teacher unions vehemently oppose decentralising reform
also likely to oppose competition reform
edu legislation follows teacher lobbying
no state govt. courage to touch Acts that upset TUs
possible TUs stronger force in India than others
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[4] Disappointing past experience with PPP
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[5] Voucher schemes raise equity concerns
(Hsieh & Urquiola, 2003; Ladd, 2002)
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Arguably potentially addressed by voucher design
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Voucher can be an efficient targeting tool, with higher voucher
amounts going to poorer children
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However, devising PPP scheme which targets diff voucher
amounts to diff groups carries own admin and implem problems
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[6] Concerns about implementation
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Will adequate private entrepreneurs come forward
How to implement choice in small villages
Weak systems to ensure compliance with standards
Illiterate parents making informed school choice
Scope for corruption under weak monitoring
PPP design needs careful thought
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Formula needs reform, contracts encourage accountability
widespread debate
international evidence
pilot testing