Transcript Document
26
th
March 2015 • St Catharine’s College• Cambridge
“Emerging Economies During and After The Great Recession”
China Confronts the Great Recession: “Rebalancing” Neoliberalism, or Else?
Dic Lo
SOAS, University of London [email protected]
The Background/Context
• Back in 2007-
2008, amid the outbreak of the US financial crisis, China’s good economic
performance (and its role in sustaining world development) was widely praised by both domestic and international public opinions. Optimism over the future prospects prevailed.
Now, by 2014, things have changed. Pessimism seems to have become predominant.
• The actual economic performance has indeed turned to the worse: slowdown in economic growth, the property bubble, the expansion in financial risks and debt burdens, the threat of deflation,
the policy dilemma faced by the state...
• A specific policy line has thus been promoted by the media, the international establishments, and sections of the Chinese state. This centres
on “rebalancing” and “restructuring” –
to rely on austerity and market reforms for coping with financial risks, whilst maintaining an acceptable pace of growth.
• The “New Normal”, a notion that has by now become central to official discourses, is the underpinning of this policy line. The dominant interpretation of this notion goes in the following way: the dynamism of long-term economic growth has already been seriously weakened, so that rapid economic growth is no longer sustainable – even an acceptable pace of growth requires getting “reform dividends”.
• In a sense, this notion can be understood as the latest version of the “China story” à la the Washington Consensus. It contends that the model of China’s economic growth over the past three decades was not sustainable in the first place, that fundamental restructuring is needed in order to make growth sustainable, and that any deviation from restructuring is unreasonable and will only result in disasters.
• The conclusion: the restructuring, and Chinese economic transformation in general, must be in the direction of converging to the neoliberal model, i.e., the model of a financialized free market economy.
•
How valid is this “China story”? How reasonable is the policy made on th
e basis of this story
–
not only for coping with financial risks but also for promoting long-term economic (and social) development?
• Note that the emphasis on restructuring, instead of state expansionary policy, is tantamount to dismissing the strategy of
“growing out of debts”. Yet, it
is
precisely this strategy (“
expanding public investment to stimulate growth, thereby reducing debts
”
) which helped China to get out of economic predicament in 1998-2002. And the condition of public finance in 2008, or even 2014, was far superior to that in 1998.
• Long term, Chinese economic transformation since the late 1990s
–
in view of its structural dynamics and institutional attributes
–
has in fact tended to converge to what can be termed the
“
Golden Age Model
”, i.e.,
the model of social and economic development that prevailed in advanced capitalist countries in their Golden Age (circa 1950-1973). It is the neoliberal orientation of state policy since 2008 that has fundamentally undermined this convergence. The future prospects thus hinges on the rivalry between the two opposite directions.
The “New Normal” and its Criticism
•
The mainstream interpretation of the “New Normal” is based on three, related arguments.
• First, the accumulation of financial risks and debt burdens is the result of the weakening of growth dynamism with the productive sector
–
rising cost, low efficiency, excess capacity, etc., ultimately showing up in the form of profitability decline. • Second, the weakening of growth dynamism has been mainly caused by the exhaustion of
“demographic dividends” –
i.e., either by the growth slowdown in the supply
of “cheap labour”, or by the fact that “super
-
exploitation of labour” has reached its limit.
•
Third, fundamental market reforms (“reform dividends”) will be needed for maintaining an
acceptable pace of growth, because the Chinese economic system
–
esp. the sector of state owned enterprises (SOEs)
–
is grossly inefficient. Past economic growth has been achieved despite, not because of, this system.
The first argument simply does not fare well with existing evidence. Taking industry as representative of the productive sector, it is observable that its profitability performance is far from undergoing a trend of secular decline (
Figure 1
).
Hence, it is unconvincing to claim that capital has flowed to the bubble sectors due to profitability decline in the productive sector. It can be argued that accumulation of financial risks and debt burdens has been caused, internally, by deficiency with the financial sector.
Indeed, it can be even argued that this deficiency, by financializing the economy (esp.
crowding out productive investment), has caused the growth slowdown.
Nor is the second argument sufficiently founded. It is easily observable that the immediate driving force of economic growth over the past three decades has been improvement in labour productivity, rather than the growth in labour supply (
Table 1
).
Figure 1. Pre-tax Profit Rate of Industry
•
35.00%
•
30.00%
•
25.00%
•
20.00%
•
15.00%
•
10.00%
•
5.00%
•
0.00%
•
SOEs
•
Non-SOEs
Sources:
China Statistical Yearbook
and
China Industrial Economics Statistical Yearbook
, various issues.
Note: SOEs = state-owned enterprises; Non-SOEs = non state-owned enterprises.
Table 1. Average Growth Rate of Real GDP and Total Labour Employment
(
%
) 1978-2013 (a)
Real GDP
9.77 (b)
Total Employment
1.47 (a)-(b)
8.30
1978-1992 1993-2013 1993-2002 2003-2013 2003-2007 2008-2013 Sources:
China Statistical Yearbook
2014. 9.39 10.02 9.83 10.18 11.64 8.98 2.67 0.72 1.03 0.45 0.55 0.36
6.72 9.30 8.81 9.73 11.09 8.62
• Conceptually, there can be three different sources of improvement in labour productivity.
The first possible source is lengthening per-worker working hours and increasing work intensity, i.e., increasing the exploitation of labour. Given the physical limits to workers, it is unlikely that this source has significantly accounted for the productivity improvement of that pace and duration as indicated in Table 1.
• The second possible source is the transfer of labour from the rural-agricultural sector to industry-services, the latter being with much higher levels of productivity. This is likely to have been of importance; existing estimates put it as high as accounting for 40% of actual improvement in labour productivity.
• But, note that this process of labour transfer is almost a uniquely Chinese phenomenon on the world scale over the era of Globalization. The existence of surplus labour in the rural agricultural sector, a structural characteristic of many developing economies, is only a necessary condition for the transfer. The transfer has been associated with a fast process of industrialization-urbanization, which necessarily entails sufficient productive investment.
• Third, technological progress. Productive investment, by raising the capital-labour ratio, is likely to have been the main source of improvement in labour productivity. Conceivable mechanisms include embodied technical change, as well as dynamic efficiencies such as learning by doing, economies of scale and scope, and organizational efficiencies.
• Rapid growth in productive investment, and with it persistent rise in the investment-GDP ratio, is precisely a salient characteristic of Chinese economic development over the reform era (
Figure 2
).
This characteristic is at any rate outstanding on the world scale. • It is of note that the pace of investment growth has tended to accelerate since the late 1990s. Put another way, a capital-deepening path of economic growth has prevailed since then – in sharp contrast to the labour-intensive path in the first twenty years of the reform era.
• The acceleration of productivity growth since the late 1990s, as indicated previously in Table 1, appears to indicate the efficiency advantage of this capital-deepening path.
Figure 2. Investment-GDP ratio
(
%
) • 90.00% • 80.00% • 70.00% • 60.00% • 50.00% • 40.00% • 30.00% • 20.00% • 10.00% • 0.00% • (I/Y) (I'/Y) Sources:
China Statistical Yearbook
2014. Note: I = gross capital formation; I’ = total fixed-asset investment; Y = GDP.
Social and Economic Development
• Compared to the labour-intensive path of economic growth, the capital-deepening path since the late 1990s has achieved not only faster productivity growth but also better results in social development.
• The capital-deepening path has been more, not less, favourable to consumption growth (
Table 2
).
Put another way, the gains in economic growth have been successfully translated into raising the living standards of the society as a whole.
• Capital-deepening growth has also been more, not less, favourable to employment creation.
In the period 1978-1992, employment in the secondary and tertiary sectors on average increased by 11.16 million persons a year. The number increased to 12.07 million in the period 1993-2013. And, in the sub-period 2003-2013, the number was 14.49 million. A trend of acceleration of growth is clearly evident.
Table 2. Consumption and Investment: Average Annual Real Growth Rates (%)
Consumption Investment
1978-2013
9.22
11.26 1978-1992 1993-2013 1993-2002 2003-2013
8.73 9.56
8.65 10.39 8.87 12.89 11.06 14.58 2003-2007 2008-2013 10.09
10.63
16.06 13.37 Sources:
China Statistical Yearbook
2014. Note: Consumption and Investment (i.e., gross capital formation) are both components of aggregate expenditures. Their real growth rates are calculated by using the consumer price index and fixed-asset investment price index, respectively, as the price deflators.
• Capital deepening and productivity improvement, together with changes in the social political environment meanwhile, has further resulted in rises in labour compensation – a reversal of the trend of persistent stagnation prior to the late-1990s.
• This reversal is clearly evident in the comparison of the trend of the average annual real growth rates of the wage rate in the urban-formal sector (cheng zhen zhi gong) and that of per-capita real GDP (
Figure 3
).
Figures from the National Bureau of Statistics, as well as from various surveys, indicate that the wage rate of secondary and tertiary employees outside the urban-formal sector has also registered rapid growths in recent years.
• On the whole, China’s social and economic development since the late-1990s (including the years 2008-2013) has appeared to be very encouraging: unprecedented, sustained rapid growth in output and productivity, consumption and investment, and employment and labour compensation. This is a far cry from the dominant, neoliberal interpretation of the “New Normal”.
Figure 3. Growth of per-capita real GDP and real urban wage rates (5-year moving average)
•
16%
•
14%
•
A B
•
12%
•
10%
•
8 %
•
6 %
•
4 %
•
2 %
•
0 %
Sources:
China Statistical Yearbook
and
China Statistical Abstract
, various years. Note: A = per capita real GDP; B = urban real wage rate.
Inspirations from the “Golden Age Model”?
• Concurrent growths in productivity and the wage rate, and in consumption and investment, are precisely the defining characteristics of the development model in advanced capitalist economies in the Golden Age era. Central to the model is the existence of a series of structural-institutional conditions that underpin persistent growth in productive investment.
• Theoretically, the structural dynamics of the model has two crucial aspects. In production, the model requires parallel growths in the capital-labour ratio and labour productivity. In distribution, it requires parallel growths in labour productivity and the wage rate.
• The combination of these two aspects results in stable shares of labour and capital in total output, which, in turn, result in parallel growths in consumption and output. The end result is a stable profit rate, which is the foundation of the persistent growth in productive investment (and therefore economic growth) – at least in a capitalist setting.
• What will happen if the required conditions do not hold? In the realm of distribution, a balance tipping to the wage rate could lead to profit squeeze, while that tipping to labour productivity could lead to under-consumption or over-accumulation. Either way, the result could be investment stagnation and hence the slowdown of growth.
• In the realm of production, labour productivity growth is a necessary condition for growth in the capital-labour ratio. To sustain this necessary condition requires enhancing work intensity and gaining economies of scale, along with truly technological change. To make it a sufficient condition requires restrictions on allocation outlets of resources that are alternatives to productive investment (i.e., the predominance of speculative financial activities in the economy).
• The structural dynamics characterized above requires, correspondingly, a particular set of institutional arrangements as its underpinnings.
• Both for enhancing work intensity and gaining economies of scale, there requires the existence of “Big Business”, i.e., large-scale enterprises in oligopolistic markets. But “Big Labour”, i.e., collective bargaining, would then be needed as a countervailing force – in order to ensure wage growth catching up with productivity growth (and hence consumption growth catching up with output growth). Insofar as wage growth lags behind, “Big Government”, i.e., the welfare state, will need to come out as the remedy.
• Government promotion of productive investment, and restriction on alternative allocation outlets, is also needed insofar as productivity growth is insufficient to induce productive investment (the “Military-Industrial Complex”, SOEs, etc.).
• The structural-institutional nexus characterized above does not necessarily ensure long term economic growth and near-full employment. Even if consumption and investment growths do occur, the effect of the nexus still depends on the potential of productivity improvement. Theoretically, this potential hinges on two conditions: the balance between consumption and investment growths, and the appropriate technological-organizational condition.
• Historically, the Golden Age Model does have the tendency to generate the outcome of excessive investment and under-consumption. This character is similar to that of the famous Feldman Manalanobis-Domar model of economic growth. In the circumstance where product innovation is not fast enough to counter-act this tendency, outward investment becomes an important solution.
• As for the technological-organizational aspect, both theoretically and historically, the
weakening of growth dynamism is typically associated with the bureaucratization of the “Big Business, Big Government, and Big Labour” institutional arrangements.
• At any rate, the Golden Age was characterized by sustained rapid economic growth and near full employment over a long period of time
–
although it is likely to have been the exception rather than the norm in the history of capitalism. Entering the era of neoliberalism, the conditions indicated above have ceased to exit, and economic growth has turned to rely on a range of structural-institutional conditions in line with neoliberal Globalization.
China Converging to the “Golden Age Model”?
In China, undoubtedly, the institutional underpinning of investment growth has been the leading role of the state in the economy. • The arrangement of the system of public finance has been geared towards promoting infrastructure investment; the research and development of frontier and strategic technology have been mainly driven by state promotion or inducement. State banks, which have continued to dominate the financial sector, have been instrumental to productive investment. Finally, state-owned enterprises have been the main carriers of the structural dynamics of Chinese economic transformation as characterized above • After more than three decades of reform (esp. the mass privatization drive of the 1990s), what remain of SOEs today are mostly capital-intensive, technologically-advanced, large scale enterprises. A pattern of specialized division of labour is thus in existence between SOEs and non-SOEs, where the latter are mostly labour-intensive enterprises (
Figure 4
).
The efficiency attributes of SOEs are more consistent with the capital-deepening path of economic growth.
•
Figure4. SOEs’ Shares of Output, Employment, and Capital in Chinese Industry (%)
•
100.00%
•
90.00%
•
80.00%
•
V
•
L
•
K
•
70.00%
•
60.00%
•
50.00%
•
40.00%
•
30.00%
•
20.00%
•
10.00%
•
0.00%
Sources:
China Statistical Yearbook
and
China Industrial Economics Statistical Yearbook
, various issues. Note:
V
= industrial value-added;
L
= number of employees;
K
= net value of fixed assets. The value-added data of all industrial enterprises refer to the industry component of GDP. The capita data of these enterprises are estimates, assuming that the capital-out ratios are the same for non-SOEs below and above designated scales.
• In addition to state-promotion of growth in productive investment, since the turn of the century, there have also been symptoms of the construction of a welfare state.
• In the years 2003-20013, there witnessed the reconstruction of a system of basic national health services, which covers almost the total of the population and is mainly publicly-funded. The provision of affordable housing for the urban poor, though preliminary, has also been under way.
• Most important, in the realm of labour employment, there has been clearly a reversal of state policy: from
laissez faire
towards interventionism, emphasizing that economic growth should
not be based on “cheap labour” and that employment growth should foster increases in
labour compensation. Minimum-wage legislation, the enforcement of the employment contract law, the protection of labour rights, the establishment of collective bargaining, and the rapid rise in the rate of unionization are reflections of this reversal (
Figure 5
).
Figure 5. Proportion of Unionized Workers (%)
• •
60%
•
50%
•
40%
•
3 0 %
•
20%
•
10%
•
0 %
•
1981 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics, Trade Unions,
China Statistical Yearbook China Statistical Yearbook of Trade Unions
, various issues; All China Federation of , various issues.
Note: Figures are the number of members of All China Federation of Trade Unions divided by the total number of employees in the Secondary and Tertiary sectors 。 .
The Neoliberal Intervention and the Uncertain Future
• The Neoliberal Model, or the model of the free market economy, holds the promise of the “natural path of development” – meaning in every point of the path there is optimality in resources allocative. The three generations of the policy doctrines of the Washington Consensus – market and trade liberalization, privatization of public assets and services, and financialization of the economy – all centre on this promise. • But there is a question concerning the consistency of the policy doctrines. Specifically, is speculation tantamount to productive investment, and market liberalization tantamount to financial liberalization?
• Since 2008, financialization and the expansion of speculation have indeed largely weakened the dynamism of the Chinese economy it its convergence towards the Golden Age Model. What have prevailed are asset bubbles, systematic risks, and austerity in policy orientations.
• The ballooning property bubble can be gauged by looking at the trend of expansion of total fixed-asset investment (
FAI
), which broadly encompasses property investment (
PI
) and gross capital formation (
GCF
). As was indicated earlier in Figure 2,
FAI
has persistently exceeded
GCF
since 2004, by a substantial margin. In 2013,
FAI
in exceeded
GCF
by a gigantic magnitude of around 30% of GDP.
• The fact that the
GCF/GDP
ratio remained basically unchanged in the years 2009-2013 suggests that bubble-type property investment might have crowded out productive investment, and this might have in part accounted for the slowdown in economic growth in recent years.
•
This judgement is supported by the evolution of the composition of the stock of “aggregate financing to the real economy”
(AFRE) (
Figure 6
).
In the years 2003-2008, the ratio of AFRE to GDP remained basically unchanged. Thereafter, the surged from 100% in 2008 to reach 207% by the end of 2013. And the increases were mainly accounted for by non-bank financing activities, which were far less regulated than banking activities (and the banks themselves were heavily involved in under-regulated activities).
Figure 6. Stocks of Aggregate Financing to the Real Economy (Ratios of GDP) (%)
Sources: IMF (2014) "People's Republic of China: 2014 Article IV Consultation", IMF Country Report no.14/235.
• The persistent financial expansion, and the flows of capital to the bubble sectors, might well be the result of policy orientations. It is arguable that this is a case of the “Greenspan Put”.
As the banks and the economy as a whole have been held hostage by speculative capitals, the government has had to be exceedingly cautious in order not to let the bubbles go burst.
The result is continuous crowding out of productive investment.
• If policy measures aimed at coping with financial risks are based on the mainstream interpretation of the “New Normal”, the dynamism for the Chinese economy to converge to the “Golden Age Model” can only be fundamentally weakened. Policies in the name of “obtaining the reform dividends” – reducing productive investment (the story of excess capacity), reducing wages (the story of excessive rise in labour cost), dispossessing SOEs (the story of inefficient SOEs), resisting state industrial policy (the story of market distortion), etc. – are all antithetical to the convergence.
• Joseph Stiglitz once point out that the essence of the “Greespan Put” is the privatization of profits and the socialization of costs. In other words, this is to protect the interests of financial
• speculators at the expense of the general public. This is the normalcy of politics in the age of Neoliberalism. In contrast, the foundation of the Golden Age Model is social democratism at the political-social levels.
• What kind of politics, then, will be needed for China? How to prevent state power from being captured by the speculative interests? How to prevent the state economic entities from sliding into financialization and speculation? Finally, how to prevent the decision-making stratum of the public sector as a whole from being bureaucratized?
•