Transcript Pork Production

Secure Pork Supply
Board Update
Credit where credit is due!
• Thanks to Dr. Jim Roth
and Dr. Pam Zaabel
– Center for Food
Security And Public
Health @ Iowa State
University
• and the SPS Planning
Committee
Secure Pork Supply Plan
• Center for Food Security and Public Health @
Iowa State CVM has received USDA funding to
develop the plan.
– Coordinating with the Center for Animal Health &
Food Safety @ University of Minnesota who also has
USDA funding
– Will cover movement of swine between production
sites and processing plants
3
Secure pork supply (Patrick's Interpretation )
• SPS is basically a “club”
• The benefits that “club” members get the
opportunity to move pigs sooner than “non-club”
members in an outbreak.
– This is because members agree to implement:
• a valid pre-harvest traceability program
• standardized bio security practices
• disease surveillance the level to achieve a defined
status
4
Secure Pork Supply
• Built on the experiences of
– Secure Egg Supply
• Move eggs in the event of HPAI
• Plan has resulted in MOU’s between IA, MN, NE and CO
– Secure Milk Supply
• Move milk in the event of FMD
– Secure Turkey Supply
• Move turkey’s to harvest in the event of HPAI
5
Secure Pork Supply Planning Committee
• First meeting October 11-12, 2011
• Working Groups formed:
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Biosecurity (pre and post outbreak)
Surveillance (pre and post outbreak)
Compartmentalization/Monitored Premises
Data Collection, Management, and Sharing
Risk Assessments
Communications
Plan for response to an FAD Outbreak Tomorrow
Secure Pork Supply
• First draft (completed May 2013) covers:
–
–
–
–
Biosecurity
Pre-harvest traceability
Outbreak tomorrow plan
Data and information sharing agreements
•
•
•
•
7
Producers
State Vets
National animal health laboratory network
Packers and Processors
Secure Pork Supply
• Parts still under development
– Data management, risk assessments and disease
surveillance are longer-term projects and will be
incorporated in future drafts as they become
available.
8
Secure Pork Supply
• Groups provided the draft for review:
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
9
State and Federal Animal Health Authorities
USDA FSIS
State Pork Producers Associations / Councils
Checkoff’s Swine Health Committee
AMI / NAMA
AASV’s FAD and Swine Health Committees
Packers and Processors
Secure Pork Supply
• Next steps
– Continue to bird-dog the process
• Review & Incorporate Comments
• Focusing on getting the disease surveillance section
completed
– Engage industry leadership on compliance and
verification issues
• Program needs to be credible and workable
• Need to consider how the industry can verify
compliance
10
Secure Pork Supply
• …is a game of “connect the dots”
– Many of the “practices” already occur
• Needs to be documented and verified
– Data & information already exists
• Sits in multiple private and government databases
– A “common denominator” is necessary to link
everything together
• Standard Premises Identification Number
11
Data Collection, Management &
Sharing
12
Producers
13
Valid Pre-harvest Traceability
• Identify all premises with the standard PIN
– Industry is solidly behind PIN’s
• Implement the Swine ID Standards and maintain
records in electronic format
– Associates PIN’s with movements
• Use Electronic Certificates of Veterinary
Inspection or electronic IMR’s
– Associate PIN’s with source and destination
• Allow access to movement data by animal health
officials
14
15
Disease Surveillance
• Maintain animal inventories by premises in an
electronic format
• Submit surveillance data and samples in
accordance with SPS Surveillance Plan
• Include validated PIN on all diagnostic laboratory
submission forms
16
Validated PIN’s
17
Official PIN Tags
• Sow Packer Requirement
– Condition of sale by January 1st 2015 by various
companies
– Must be a USDA Approved Official PIN Tag
• http://www.aphis.usda.gov/traceability/downloads/swi
ne_device_listing.pdf
– Industry support for this @ Pork Forum
18
19
Official PIN Tags
• Only 2 companies currently have USDA approval
to manufacture and are selling official PIN Tags
– Destron Fearing
– Allflex
• Available in multiple colors
– Some packers prefer pink
20
Official PIN Tags
• The PIN on the Official Tag is the USDA allocated
Standardized Premises Identification Number
(PIN) and not the State allocated Location
Identifier (LID)
– When ordering the manufacturer will ask for the PIN
so they can validate it to the address of the site
21
Official PIN Tags
• According to the Swine ID Program Standards the
PIN on the Tag should be the PIN of the breeding
farm she was on prior to entering harvest
channels
– Works for systems that are not parity segregated
• Parity segregated systems
– Work with the State Vet to determine what PIN make
the most sense
– Producer records maintain the traceability
22
Official PIN Tags
• One (or one set) and your done
– Once identified with one PIN tag or a set of official
tags with same PIN and production number then that
is it. Producers do not need to put in a new one if the
animal moves to another production site BUT they do
need to record that movement in case of a traceback.
23
Official PIN Tags
24
Disease Surveillance
• Allow veterinary diagnostic labs to pass through
the PIN’s associated with subsets of diagnostic
samples to the NHALN for the express purposes
of surveillance for foreign animal (and program
diseases)
• Allow Packers/ Processors to pass through the
PIN’s associated with diagnostic samples for the
express purposes of surveillance for foreign
animal (and program diseases).
25
Disease Surveillance
• Allow access by state and federal animal health
officials to the geospatial information stored in
the National and State Premises Repositories for
the express purposes of emergency preparedness
and surveillance for foreign animal (and program
diseases).
26
Recommendations (Not Required)
• Annual Employee FAD Awareness
• Separate PIN’s for epidemiological separate
premises more than ¼ mile apart.
• Provide annual premises updates to SAHO
• Develop Swine Health Production Plans for routine
interstate movements of feeder pigs(9 CFR 71.19)
– A word on the Code
27
Sow / Boar Surveillance
Market Hog Surveillance
Veterinary Diagnostic Labs
Packer
Received Pigs from SPS sites:
AA13579 on XX / XX /2012
BB24688 on XX / XX /2012
ETC…..
PIN#-765432A: Pork Packer
PIN#-AA13579:
Wean to Finish
PIN#-1234567B:
Wean to Finish
What the State Vet can determine:
1. Site is a part of Secure Pork?
2. Valid traceability system up and running?
3. Standardized biosecurity in place?
Permitted
4. Achieved a negative
disease status?
Movements
PIN# -123456A:
Sow Farm
PIN#-BB24688:
Wean to Finish
PIN#-1234567C: Swine Finisher
E2E Proof-of-Concept Demonstration
Premises and Plants (SCS)
Producer (3rd Party S/W)
Testing Results (Diag. Lab)
Producer Census
and Movement
Data
State
Premises
and Plant
Data
Testing Data
Show the day-to-day
usefulness for monitoring
facility disease status.
Show premises disease status
and support the decision on
whether or not to move animals.
Thank You!
This message funded by America’s Pork Checkoff Program.
Secure Pork: Disease Awareness,
Preparedness, Response and Recovery
Dr. Patrick Webb
Director, Swine Health Programs
Secure Pork Supply Plan
A Continuity of Business Plan for the
Swine Industry in the Face of a Foreign
Animal Disease
James A. Roth, DVM, PhD, DACVM
Center for Food Security and Public Health
College of Veterinary Medicine
Iowa State University
US Animal Agriculture is Highly Vulnerable
to Foreign Animal Diseases
• US production animals have no immunity to
FADs
• Export markets will be lost
• Prices will drop dramatically
• Emergency vaccine stocks are far below what
would be required to address a livestock
dense state or multi-state outbreak
• The size, structure, efficiency, and extensive
movement inherent in the U.S. livestock
industries will present unprecedented
challenges in the event of a FAD outbreak
USDA APHIS Foreign Animal Disease
Preparedness and Response Plan
USDA FAD PReP FMD Response Plan
38
Common Components of Secure Food Supply
Business Continuity Plans
Secure Egg Supply (HPAI); Secure Turkey Supply (HPAI); Secure Milk Supply (FMD);
Secure Pork Supply (FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD)
– Voluntary pre-outbreak preparedness components
– Biosecurity, surveillance, epidemiology
questionnaires, movement permits
– Risk assessments (completed and in process)
– Plans must be based on current capabilities and will
evolve with science, risk assessments and new
capabilities
– Guidelines only: Final decisions made by
responsible officials during outbreak
– Outreach and training pre and post outbreak
SPS Partners
• SPS Planning Committee
– Federal and State officials
– Representatives of all phases of the
swine industry
– NPB, NPPC, AASV
– Academia
• Iowa State University
• University of Minnesota
FADs included in SPS plan
• Foot and mouth disease
– Swine, cattle, sheep, goats, deer
• Classical swine fever
• African swine fever
• Swine vesicular disease
Foot and Mouth
Disease : 7 days
post infection
PIADC
Disease Transmission
(FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD)
• Not zoonotic
• Direct contact and oral exposure
are the most important routes of
infection for swine (Pigs are
relatively resistant to airborne
infection by all 4 FADs)
• Indirect contact (fomites) also can
play a lesser role for transmission
• Pigs exhale large concentrations of
FMDV, cattle are highly susceptible
to aerosolized virus
Secure Pork Supply Planning
Committee
• First meeting October 11-12, 2011
• Working Groups formed:
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Biosecurity (pre and post outbreak)
Surveillance (pre and post outbreak)
Compartmentalization/Monitored Premises
Data Collection, Management, and Sharing
Risk Assessments
Communications
Plan for response to an FAD Outbreak
Tomorrow
Getting On the Same Page
44
North American Animal Agriculture
Industry is Unique
• The size, structure, efficiency, and
extensive movement inherent in the U.S.
and North American livestock industries will
present unprecedented challenges in the
event of a FAD outbreak
• Strategies for the response to, and
management of, a FAD outbreak will change
as the outbreak progresses and will depend
upon the magnitude, location and other
characteristics of the outbreak.
Phases and Types of FMD
Response
http://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/pdf/phases-and-types-of-an-fmd-outbreak
Phases of FMD Response
FMD Detection in the United States:
Types of an FMD Outbreak
Six Types of FMD Outbreaks
Size of FMD
Outbreak
(in terms of
animals,
premises,
and
jurisdictions
affected)
Type 3:
Large
Regional
Type 4:
Widespread
or National
Type 6:
Catastrophic
North
Type 5:
Catastrophic American
U.S.
Type 2:
Moderate
Regional
Type 1:
Focal
Response Shifts from Emphasis on Stamping-Out
to Emphasis on Alternate Strategies (duration of FMD response)
48
Differentiating between Types of FMD
Outbreaks
Geographic
Size of
Outbreak
Animal
Movement
Number
of
Premises
Size of
Premises
Type 1-Focal
FMD outbreak
One state or
small region
Type 2Moderate
regional FMD
outbreak
Few focal
areas in one
region
Type 3-Large
regional FMD
outbreak
Multiple
areas in a
region
Type 4Widespread or
national FMD
outbreak
Type 5Catastrophic
FMD outbreak
Type 6-North
American FMD
outbreak
Vaccine
Assumptions
Appropriate Strategies
Minimum Time Required to
Achieve FMD Free Status*
No extensive
animal
movement
No extensive
animal
movement
out of the
Control Area
Small
number
Relatively
small
Not applicable
Stamping-out
3 months after the last case
Small to
moderate
number
Small to
medium
Sufficient vaccine is
available to vaccinate
designated animals
Stamping-out
Vaccinate-to-kill
Vaccinate-to-slaughter
Discontinue vaccination
after the last case
Moderate
number
Medium
to large
Sufficient vaccine is
available to vaccinate
designated animals
Vaccinate-to-live
Vaccinate-to-slaughter
Discontinue vaccination
after the last case
Widespread
areas of
infection
No extensive
animal
movement
outside of the
region
Extensive
animal
movement
3 months after the last case and
slaughter of all vaccinated
animals, or 6 months after last
case or last vaccination if all
vaccinated animals are not
slaughtered
12 months after the last evidence
of FMD infection and the last FMD
vaccine was administered
Moderate
to large
number
Medium
to large
Sufficient vaccine is
available to vaccinate
designated animals
Widespread
areas of
infection
Extensive
animal
movement
Large
number
Large
Sufficient vaccine is
NOT available to
vaccinate designated
animals
Widespread
infection in
Mexico /
Canada/ US
Extensive
animal
movement
Large
number
Large
Sufficient vaccine is
NOT available to
vaccinate designated
animals
Vaccinate-to-live
Vaccinate-to-slaughter
Continue vaccination
after the last case
Endemic FMD control
program
Vaccinate-to-live
Continue vaccination
after the last case
Endemic FMD control
program
Vaccinate-to-live
Continue vaccination
after the last case
FMD Free with Vaccination: 18
months after the last case
FMD Free with Vaccination: 2
years after the last outbreak
FMD Free with Vaccination: 2
years after the last outbreak
FMD Outbreak in Iowa—Large Control Area
Source: NASS, 2007
Number of Swine Affected: 19,883,988
Number of Bovines Affected: 2,366,535
Number of Operations Affected: 110,727
50
Type 5 – Catastrophic FMD
Outbreak
Widespread areas of infection are detected involving a large
portion of the United States. Sufficient vaccine and resources
are not available to quickly vaccinate all designated
susceptible animals in the affected regions. The number of
vaccinated animals is too great to consider a vaccinate-to-kill
or vaccinate-to-slaughter (only) policy. It becomes apparent
that FMD is widespread, and will not be eradicated within a
year.
 Declare FMD to be an endemic disease and implement a
program for long term eradication and control, including
vaccinate-to-live
Outbreak Tomorrow
52
Controlled Movement of Swine
in an FMD Outbreak
– At the beginning of an outbreak
• No new movements initiated from the FMD
control area
• 625,000 pigs on the road each day
– Some will have come from the control area
– ~400,000 to 500,000 hogs and sows slaughtered
daily
– Restarting movement
• Depends on the type of outbreak
Controlled Swine Movement To
and Through a Packing Facility
• Swine may be infected with FMD virus before
showing any clinical signs or testing positive by
PCR
• It is not possible to prove freedom from FMD
infection in a herd, or in an individual animal. It
is only possible to establish that there is lack of
evidence of infection
• Therefore, all pork from a processing facility that
has received swine from the FMD Control Area
will be considered to potentially contain the FMD
virus
Controlled Swine Movement To
and Through a Packing Facility
• FMD is not a public health or food safety
problem
• Animals which pass ante-mortem and postmortem inspection by USDA FSIS are safe for
human consumption, even if they may be in the
pre-clinical stage of FMD infection
• Regulations regarding feeding garbage to swine
must be strictly enforced.
Controlled
Swine Movement To and
Through a Packing Facility
• At the beginning of an FMD outbreak (Phase 1)
– Packing plants should continue to process all swine in
the plant and in transit to the plant which cannot be
turned back or euthanized while in transit
• During a large FMD outbreak (Phase 2, Type 3 or
greater)
– Market ready hogs and sows, from herds in the Control
Area with no evidence of infection should be sent to
slaughter as quickly as possible
Controlled Swine Movement To and
Through a Packing Facility
• Processing of swine should continue, even if it is
known that FMD infected animals have been in
the plant
– Federal and State Officials (Incident Command Post)
would need to agree to this
– Packing facility owners/managers would also need to
agree to this
Controlled Swine Movement To and
Through a Packing Facility
• Modern packing facilities process thousands of
swine daily. At any point in time, there may be
thousands of live animals in lairage awaiting
slaughter.
• If any animals are incubating the virus, and the
processing of swine is stopped, the virus will
rapidly multiply in the swine in lairage.
• The thousands of animals that are in transit to
slaughter facilities will not be able to be unloaded
if the processing of swine at the plant is not
continued.
Controlled Swine Movement To
and Through a Packing Facility
• Processing of all healthy animals in the
slaughter facility and in transit to the
facility is the fastest way to dispose of
those animals and presents the lowest risk
of spreading FMD infection
• It also reduces the need for carcass
disposal and preserves high quality
protein for human consumption
Controlled Swine Movement To
and Through a Packing Facility
• Finished products from any processing plants that received
swine from the Control Area must be considered to
potentially contain FMD virus
• Processed product should be quarantined and placed in cold
storage until a decision is reached by Incident Command on
allowable uses for the product
• If the outbreak is quickly controlled by stamping out, the
product should be destroyed
• If it becomes apparent that the outbreak is extensive, the
product should be released for domestic sale
Controlled Swine Movement To
and Through a Packing Facility
• Packing plant employees, service personnel, and truck
drivers must observe proper biosecurity protocols to avoid
transmitting the FMD virus when they leave the plant
• All potential fomites leaving the plant must be cleaned and
disinfected
• This will be difficult to implement on an emergency basis
• Ideally, an emergency plan for implementing biosecurity
will be in place before an outbreak
• Biosecurity measures will be needed whether the plant
receiving FMD infected animals continues or halts
processing of healthy animals
Problems to Address
• Will the pork consuming public accept the
product?
• Will Packers be willing to continue to process
animals from an FMD control area in a large
outbreak?
– Will the economics make sense for the Packers?
• Cold storage facilities for excess pork in the
first months of an outbreak?
• Disposition of herds that have recovered from
infection?
Data Collection, Management &
Sharing
64
Producers
65
Valid Pre-harvest Traceability
• Identify all premises with the standard PIN
– Industry is solidly behind PIN’s
• Implement the Swine ID Standards and maintain
records in electronic format
– Associates PIN’s with movements
• Use Electronic Certificates of Veterinary
Inspection or electronic IMR’s
– Associate PIN’s with source and destination
• Allow access to movement data by animal health
officials
66
67
Disease Surveillance
• Maintain animal inventories by premises in an
electronic format
• Submit surveillance data and samples in
accordance with SPS Surveillance Plan
• Include validated PIN on all diagnostic laboratory
submission forms
68
Validated PIN’s
69
Disease Surveillance
• Allow veterinary diagnostic labs to pass through
the PIN’s associated with subsets of diagnostic
samples to the NHALN for the express purposes
of surveillance for foreign animal (and program
diseases)
• Allow Packers/ Processors to pass through the
PIN’s associated with diagnostic samples for the
express purposes of surveillance for foreign
animal (and program diseases).
70
Disease Surveillance
• Allow access by state and federal animal health
officials to the geospatial information stored in
the National and State Premises Repositories for
the express purposes of emergency preparedness
and surveillance for foreign animal (and program
diseases).
71
Recommendations (Not Required)
• Annual Employee FAD Awareness
• Separate PIN’s for epidemiological separate
premises more than ¼ mile apart.
• Provide annual premises updates to SAHO
• Develop Swine Health Production Plans for routine
interstate movements of feeder pigs(9 CFR 71.19)
– A word on the Code
72
National Animal Health Laboratory
Network
73
Data Collection
• Request premises identification numbers (PIN) on
all swine diagnostic specimens submitted as a
part of the surveillance component of the SPS
plan
• Use either separate forms or have an area on
current form to indicate the samples submitted
are for the surveillance component of the SPS
plan
74
Process Surveillance Submissions
• Receive surveillance samples with accompanying
producer information submitted for SPS plan
• Scan validated PIN’s into the LIMS and associate
with the accession/case
• Pass through PINs with diagnostic samples for
surveillance for FADs (and program diseases)
• Conduct routine testing on samples and report
out results to producers / veterinarians
75
Data Sharing
• Coordinate transfer of FAD surveillance results
with PINs into SPS information reporting system
prior to and during an outbreak
• Follow current NAHLN protocols for reporting
FAD testing data related to the SPS plan including
reporting to state and federal animal health
officials
76
Recommendations (Not Required)
• Add a statement to the diagnostic submission
form reminding producers of what participation
means
– “I agree to the steps outlined in the document titled
secure pork supply step for producers participation”
77
Packers and Processors
78
Pre-harvest traceability
• Develop ability to capture and associate PINs of
sending premises with normal business
information
• Develop a mechanism to record information
regarding conveyances for each group / lot
• Develop a mechanism to share the following
information associated w/ each group / lot
– Sending premises, conveyance identification, group lot
number or animal identification, date of shipment,
number of head
79
Biosecurity
• Develop plan with USDA for implementation and
verification plant biosecurity standards in the
Packer / Processor FAD strategy document
80
Disease Surveillance
• Develop and test a mechanism to associate PINs
with diagnostic samples collected at the plant
• Develop protocols to deliver diagnostic samples
to laboratories using common shipping methods
or plant employees
• Pass through PINs associated with diagnostic
samples for the express purpose of surveillance
for FADs (and program diseases) prior, during and
after an outbreak
81
Recommendations (Not Required)
• Implement awareness training for employees
• Develop and implement plans for reporting
suspect FADs
• Develop policies for plant operations in the
control area based on the Packer / Processor
FADs Strategy Document
• Categorized products into trade categories as
outlined in the Packer / Processor FADs Strategy
Document
82
State Animal Health Officials
83
Pre-harvest traceability
• Issue separate PINs for epidemiologically
separate premises separated by more than a
quarter-mile
• Accept electronic formats of CVI’s and interstate
movement reports that include validated PINs for
sending and receiving premises participating in
an SPS plan
84
Disease surveillance
• Access geospatial information stored in the
State/National premises repository for the
express purposes of emergency preparedness
and surveillance for foreign animal (and program)
diseases
85
Communication
• Communicate with NAHLN labs concerning FAD
testing results using current reporting channels
for samples submitted through the SPS plan
• Communicate with SAHO’s in surrounding states
concerning compliance with SPS plans
– Premises information, approved biosecurity audits,
test results for samples submitted under the
surveillance component of the SPS plan
86
Communication
• Communicate with other SAHO’s and the incident
command any adverse findings, noncompliance
with SPS standards or protocols, results of site
evaluations and regulatory actions taken
87
Animal Movement
• Allow swine already in transit to cross state
borders according to the controlled movement
component of the SPS plan at the beginning of an
FAD outbreak
• Allow swine across state borders according to the
controlled movement component of the SPS plan
when movement is restarted after beginning of
an outbreak
88
Recommendations (Not Required)
• Work with producers to develop swine
production health plans for routine interstate
swine movements of feeder pigs with no change
of ownership as established by 9 CFR 71.19
89
Biosecurity
90
Biosecurity Lines On Production Sites
• Lines are imaginary or real barriers to reduce risk
of pathogen exposure to pigs
– Perimeter Buffer Area (PBA)
• Outer control boundary set up around the perimeter of
the site to limit access of the outside world to close
contact with animal buildings
– Interior Clean-Dirty Line (ICD)
• Established to isolate pigs on the clean side of the
production site from sources of infection on the dirty
side of the production site
Biosecurity Lines on Production Sites
• Criteria for each line addresses risk mitigation
measures for swine, people and fomites
• Producers would work with herd veterinarians to
establish lines and protocols.
92
Factors Considered in Setting up
Production Site Biosecurity Lines
• Restricting Entry into the PBA
– Access control
• Ingress / egress
– People
• Routing, designated parking
– Animals
• Animal disposal, feral swine prevention, other livestock
– Fomites
• Area for cleaning and disinfection, feed routing
94
Factors Considered in Setting up
Production Site Biosecurity Lines
• Crossing the ICD line
– People
• Biosecurity protocols
– Animals
• Prevention of non-swine animal exposure
– Fomites
• Biosecurity protocols for delivery of equipment & feed
etc.
96
Factors Considered in Setting up
Production Site Biosecurity Lines
• Crossing the ICD line
– Load out’s
• Portable chutes, common load outs, animal flow etc.
– Carcass removal
• Movement of carcasses and people
– Weather
97
98
Biosecurity Protocols
• Broken into Level I & Level II
– Level I is the default for day-to-day practice
– Level II is a heightened protocol for after an FAD event
• Producers can choose to operate in level II on a
day-to-day basis which would shorten the time
for transition and verification in the event of an
FAD
99
Visitor Biosecurity
• Two levels and each
addresses:
– Limiting visitors
– Requiring sign in
– Following biosecurity
protocols
– Cleaning of equipment
100
Employee Biosecurity
• Two levels and each
addresses:
– General employee
guidelines
– Employee entry
– Employee movement
between sites
– Facility entry
101
Production Site Biosecurity
• Two levels and each
addresses:
–
–
–
–
Access deterrents
Buildings
Pest & wildlife control
Crossing the ICD line
for operating
procedures
– Carcass removal
– Loose pigs
102
Loadout Biosecurity
• Two levels and each
addresses:
– Drivers
– Each load-out area
– Load-out procedures
103
Surveillance
104
Nat’l Surveillance Program – Streams
SHN
DTR Test
1st Pt. Conc.
Vet-D-Lab
Cull Sows
Mkt. Hogs
Waste Feeders
FADD Inv.
Sentinel Vets
PIN Tag Pilot
What is next?
Iowa E2E Project
Communications
109
Communications
• Cross Species FMD Communications Team
– Developed messaging for FMD outbreaks to reassure
the consumer about the safety of pork, beef and milk.
– Currently studying consumer perceptions regarding
vaccine
– Working on an educational strategy to raise retailer
awareness (ounce of prevention)
– http://www.fmdinfo.org/
110
Monitored Premises &
Compartmentalization
111
Setting a High Bar
112
Risk Assessment
113
What is an acceptable risk?
114
SPS Enrolment /Compliance / Verification
• We will be addressing the issue this year
• Goal is to develop a workable, credible and
affordable solution
– Could develop it as a part of PQA plus
115
Putting it all together!
116
Packer
Received Pigs from SPS sites:
AA13579 on XX / XX /2012
BB24688 on XX / XX /2012
ETC…..
PIN#-765432A: Pork Packer
PIN#-AA13579:
Wean to Finish
PIN#-1234567B:
Wean to Finish
What the State Vet can determine:
1. Site is a part of Secure Pork?
2. Valid traceability system up and running?
3. Standardized biosecurity in place?
Permitted
4. Achieved a negative
disease status?
Movements
PIN# -123456A:
Sow Farm
PIN#-BB24688:
Wean to Finish
PIN#-1234567C: Swine Finisher