Transcript Presentazione di PowerPoint

Fighting Asymmetric Conflicts:
Politics and Public Opinion in the post-Heroic
Western World and in Militant Societies
NATO Rapid Deployable Corps - Italy
Prof. Dr. Massimo de Leonardis
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
28th January 2010
Subjects
I.
The pre-eminence of cultural asymmetry:
1.
2.
3.
Definitions
The ascendancy of irregular conflicts
Total and limited wars
II.
Post-heroic Western world and militant Islam:
1.
2.
3.
American and European attitudes towards war
The “Powell Doctrine”
Christianity, Islam and war
III. Looking for public support to the war in Afghanistan
1.
2.
3.
No easy solutions since our problem has deep historical roots
Stress the strategic reality without raising unreal expectations
Stability, democracy and military force
2
American definition of asymmetric war
A conflict is asymmetric when
belligerents «do not fight fair», using
weapons in a non conventional way.
One side aims to break the political and
psychological cohesion of the Western
society;
the
other
relies
on
technological superiority and tries to
avoid the employment of troops which
is politically risky.
3
French definitions
•
Dyssimétrie is described as a disequilibrium
between antagonists pertaining to the level of the
stakes and the performance of means, but not so
much to the type of these means and to the
behaviour of belligerents.
•
Asymmétrie exists when the behaviour, morals,
modes of action and instruments employed by
belligerents are radically different.
4
Irregular conflicts
•
Irregular conflicts always existed, even if they were a
minority until the Second World War. In the XVII century
we had the «small wars» that local militias of peasants
fought against armies which had defeated the professional
troops and invaded the territory. Insurgencies against French
invaders motivated by political and religious feelings
established a pattern of guerrilla warfare which re-emerged
in the anti-Nazi partisan resistance during the Second World
War.
•
After the Second World War the situation changed: the Cold
War was symmetric, but real, hot wars were asymmetric and
in most cases Western armies lost against guerrillas.
5
The War in Vietnam
Americans didn’t loose major battles,
simply abandoned the fight for the reason
explained by General Giap: «The enemy
will be caught in a dilemma: he must
continue the war for a long time in order to
obtain victory, but he doesn’t have the
psychological and political means to fight
a long war». Americans lost for political
and media reasons.
6
1st February 1968: General Nguyen Ngoc Loan
executing on the spot a Vietcong officer
7
8 June 1972: Kim Phúc running down a road near
Trang Bang after a napalm attack
8
Changing Western attitudes towards war
• In the past, Western rulers accepted the
necessity of being harsh while fighting in
Third World scenarios.
• Nowadays that kind of behaviour is
unacceptable and the gap of asymmetry
widens: Western armies must adhere to
strict rules, which mean nothing for their
enemies.
9
Cultures and war
«War embraces much more than politics: ... it is
always an expression of culture, often a
determinant of cultural forms, in some societies
the culture itself», writes British military
historian John Keegan, who poses the problem of
a possible «inutility of the “Western way of
warfare” when confronted by an opponent who
refuses the share its cultural assumption».
10
Limited and total wars
• Stasis, war among adversaries separated by matters of
interest, though within an institutional framework and having
common values.
• Polemos, war between enemies, divided by opposite
conceptions of the world. It’s a “total war”.
• Civil wars are polemos, since they are «the most ‘real’ war of
wars ... the most ‘total’ war, during which there are no limits to
aggressiveness, nor are there any humanitarian rules». The
“total war” «exceeds the distinction between combatants and
non-combatants».
• The different attitude towards “war” is today one of the most
striking examples of the diversity between Western civilization
and Islam.
11
The post-heroic Western world
• Before 1914 war was almost universally considered
an acceptable, perhaps an inevitable and for many
people a desirable way of settling international
differences.
• Two world wars changed radically the attitude of the
West towards war and brought to what Edward
Luttwak in the mid-Nineties called the «post-heroic
warfare».
12
American and European attitudes towards war
13
No more combat troops in Afghanistan
14
The «Powell Doctrine»
• The «Powell Doctrine», prescribed to start a conflict only if
some conditions existed:
• certitude of victory;
• public opinion’s support in front of a clear threat to national
interest;
• employment of massive means to leave no hope to the
enemy;
• possibility of a rapid victory before the popular consensus
faints;
• possibility to determine the beginning, all the phases and the
end of hostilities.
15
The suicidal terrorist
Osama Bin Laden is the personification of the
«industrial partisan» described in 1963 by Carl
Schmitt; in the name of a «moral obligation» he
kills using modern technology. Islam brings the
only real new thing: the suicidal terrorist.
Neither Christians nor Communists and other
atheists ever dared to kill themselves to kill
others: neither of them has the seventy young
virgins waiting for him in Paradise.
16
Christianity, Islam and war
• «An army ready to die in order to obey
God is invincible». Allah has never been a
pacifist, while today many Christians are
at least very reluctant to use military
force.
• Large sectors of Muslim public opinion
extol terrorists, while in the West we call
for the respect of strict legal procedures
and express indignation for the “collateral
damages” against civilians.
17
Looking for public support to the war in
Afghanistan
• Democracies are reluctant to go to war, need
strong idealistic reasons for that, but look for an
“exit strategy” when results are slow and body
bags return home.
• It’s always better to describe reality as it is.
About Afghanistan the issue is perfectly clear:
«The security of the Duomo lies in Kabul». If
we don’t win there, they will come here.
18
Imposing democracy?
• Do not talk of introducing democracy. It is a
wrong aim in itself. It alienates Muslim public
opinion since it smacks of cultural imperialism.
Large sectors of Western public opinion think
the game not worth the candle and unrealistic.
• Let’s talk instead of fostering a representative
government respectful of local traditions and
basic human rights.
19
Combat and reconstruction
• The task of fighting the Talibans and the
terrorists cannot be separated from that of
fostering the country’s reconstruction.
• It’s an escape from reality to say we should
provide more aid but send no more troops. The
employment of more troops, in a more
“aggressive” way would allow reducing air
attacks and avoiding civilian casualties.
20
Politically correct language
•NATO Strategic Concept of 1999 says that «The
Alliance’s forces must therefore be able ... - in case
of conflict - to terminate war rapidly by making an
aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack
and withdraw» [§ 47], avoiding to say directly that
NATO must defeat the enemy and win the war.
•Admiral Ellis, CINCSOUTH and VI Fleet
Commander, on Navy day of Oct. 1999: «America
will continue to need a navy that can go anywhere,
fight when it must and win unequivocally when
called to action».
21
The importance of the Church attitude
Cardinal Ruini at the funerals of the
soldiers fallen at Nassiriya referring to the
terrorists said: «We will not run away in
front of them, on the contrary we shall
confront them with all the courage, the
energy and the determination we can
muster».
22
Conclusion
American Secretary of Defense Robert Gates about
Afghanistan said: «[If] an alliance of the world’s
greatest democracies cannot summon the will to get
the job done in a mission that we agree is morally just
and vital to our security, then our citizens may begin
to question ... the utility of the 60-year-old
transatlantic security project itself’». The issue is at
the same time less and more serious. NATO would
survive a “strategic retreat” in Afghanistan. Bur this
would cast serious doubts on the possibility of the
West to maintain the predominance enjoyed in the
last centuries.
23
Conclusion
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