Transcript Invasione Afghanistan - University of Cagliari

Afghanistan
from “Regional Stability” to
ISAF
Sources:
The National Security Archive
S. Coll, Ghost Wars
nato.int
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Outline
 The
Phase of Regional stability
 Afghanistan-Background
 The Soviet invasion
 The Carter Doctrine
 The Reagan Doctrine
 9/11 and the Creation of ISAF
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US policy: the phase of regional
stability
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Bases of US policy since the early 1950’s:
A. by itself is of little importance, but the area around it
(Persian Gulf and sea lines and ports Indian Ocean) was
deemed critical
A. within regional policy of strong and friendly ties with
Iran and Pakistan: policy essentially based on balance of
power
main aim: to prevent “excessive” Soviet influence
After 1953, Soviet policy in A. viewed as defensive
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 1954: Soviet attention
to A. is part of a general effort to counter recent Western
(particularly US) gains in the Middle East-South Asia area
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…regional stability, 1960’s-1970’s
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USSR-A. relations grow stronger, USSR is one of
largest sources of foreign aid
DoS 1962: US fostering of active hostility toward
USSR [can] only serve to weaken A’s ability to
survive
DoS 1976: A is a militarily and politically neutral
nation, effectively dependent on the SU, still US is
not nor should it become committed to or
responsible for the ‘protection’ of A in any respect
Balance of power is in favor of US: no significant
threat is in view
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Phase of regional stability ends
Situation drastically changes in 1979:
 Iranian revolution
 USSR deploys 100,000 troops to A
 Red Army within striking distance of
Pakistan and Iran
 Soviet policy is suddenly described as the
gravest threat to world peace since WWII
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Afghanistan-Background
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Early 1970’s: growing discontent over monarchy
(Zahir Shah)
World Bank estimate: A’s per capita GNP $70, it
ranks 73rd in list of 83 underdeveloped countries
US Emb. Kabul, 1971: there has been increased
leftist activity which can be attributed to increased
disillusionment and frustration with the existing
social/economic conditions and the apparent
inability or unwillingness of the leadership to
tackle boldly the nation’s problems
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…Background
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1973: while Zahir is vacationing in Rome, his
cousin Mohammad Daud takes power and declares
end of monarchy
Rival groups:
1-People’s Democratic Party of A. (PDPA),
Marxist oriented and divided in two factions
2-Islamic elements, some had studied in Egypt
where came into contact with the Muslim
Brotherhood
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Form the Islamic Society Party (Jamiat-i Islami)
Fought by Daud, they flee to mountains or Pakistan
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Daud’s action-US position
Saur (April) revolution, 1978
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Daud purges leftists from govt; bans political
opposition (1975); strengthens ties with Iran and
US
US welcomes D’s policy; DoS (1977): Daud has
made significant contributions to the improvement
of regional stability—thereby helping to fulfill
another principal US objective
PDPA (also with Soviet pressures) overcomes
differences, infiltrates the army
April 1978Daud is overthrown by the military
in cooperation with PDPA: it’s the Saur revolution
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US reaction
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US Emb. detects no Soviet hand in Saur coup,
tends to hold Daud responsible for neglecting
religious leaders and intellectuals
However, Carter Administration finds itself in
dilemma. Memo to Cyrus Vance, Apr. 30: We need
to take into account the mix of nationalism and
communism in the new leadership and seek to
avoid driving the regime into a closer embrace
with the SU than it might wish
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…US reaction
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But a hard-line approach is also envisaged
in same memo: Anti-regime elements in A
will be watching us carefully to see if we
acquiesce in or accept the communist
takeover…Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and
others of our friends in the area will see the
situation clearly as a Soviet coup. On the
domestic front, many Americans will see
this as an extension of Soviet power…
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…US reaction
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US thus compromises, maintaining correct
relations with A. Govt while keeping channels
open to the opposition
US double policy does not last long:
Dec 1978: A-USSR treaty of friendship-more
Soviet aid and advisers reach Kabul
Dissatisfaction with PDPA mounts in A
Amb. Dubs kidnapped by anti-govt Shiites;
clumsy police action; independent US
investigation refused by A. govt.
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Towards covert support
Brzezinski:
 USSR has territorial designs in A and possibly
the whole South Asian region
 If DRA consolidates power, USSR may turn A
into launching pad for aggression in the region
 pushes NSC decision to be more sympathetic to
those Afghans who are determined to preserve
their country’s independence
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Covert aid to Islamic dissidents
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Which groups should be helped? US Emb. charged to ask
Pakistani military officials to recommend rebel
organization that would make best use of US aid
CIA-radical leaders meetings (Hekmatyar)
Documents seized by Iranian “students” in US Emb.
Teheran
Carter’s Directive, July ’79 (nearly 6 months before the
invasion):
CIA authorized to spend $500,000 on propaganda and
psychological operations, to provide radio equipments,
medical supplies and cash to the Afghan rebels
Saudi Arabia “matching program”
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Brzezinski interview
“Le Nouvel Observateur”, Jan 15-21
1998
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It was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed
the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of
the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day
I wrote a note to the president in which I explained
to him that… this aid was going to induce a Soviet
military intervention…
We did not push the Soviets to intervene, but we
knowingly increased the probability that they
would
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…Zbig’s interview, 1998
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Q: You don’t regret anything today? A: That secret
operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect
of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and
you want me to regret it? The day that the Soviets
officially crossed the border I wrote to President
Carter: we now have the opportunity of giving to
the USSR its Vietnam war. Indeed, for almost 10
years Moscow had to carry on a war
insupportable by the govt, a war that brought
about the demoralization and finally the breakup
of the Soviet empire
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…Zbig’s interview, 1998
Q: And neither do you regret having
supported the Islamic intégrism, having
given arms and advice to future terrorists?
 A: What is most important to the history of
the world? The Taliban or the collapse of
the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslem
or the liberation of Central Europe and the
end of the cold war?
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…Zbig’s interview, 1998
Q: Some stirred-up Moslems? But it has
been said and repeated: Islamic
fundamentalism represents a world menace
today
 A: Nonsense! It is said that the West had a
global policy in regard to Islam. That is
stupid. There isn’t a global Islam
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The invasion, Dec. 24-25, 1979
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USSR tries to moderate A govt and bring moderate
PDPA faction to power, seeks participation of
other elements in govt
US Emb. Kabul informed of Soviet steps, that
bring no results
Oct: Soviet ascertain that A govt lost control of 23
out of 28 provinces
Nov: Soviet forces moved to border; Warsaw Pact
forces placed on advanced state of readiness
Dec 24: the invasion begins
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The invasion: political meaning
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For USSR: it symbolized the limits of Soviet
influence in A.
USSR unable to stabilize DRA govt through
political means, attempts to do so with military
force
(US did the same in Vietnam)
For USA: invasion coincides with 1)decline of US
influence in Iran and several Third World
countries where “pro-Soviet” govts have seized
power; 2)eve of election year
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US perceptions
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Regional stability already made vulnerable by
Iranian revolution; Balance of power shifts in
favor of USSR
USSR’s action puts Pakistan and Iran itself at the
Red Army’s mercy; becomes the gravest threat to
world peace since World War II
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA): The key
motivation that propelled Moscow’s move was to
bring its long-standing strategic goals closer
within reach. Control of A would be a major step
toward overland access to the Indian Ocean and
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to domination of the Asian sub-continent
The Carter Doctrine
State of the Union, Jan 23, 1980:
 Premise: Aggression unopposed becomes a
contagious disease…
 Doctrine: An attempt by any outside force to
gain control of the Persian Gulf region will
be regarded as an assault on the vital
interests of the US and will be repelled by
any means necessary, including military
force
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…Carter
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However, Carter is not prepared to go to war and
looks for alternatives in order to 1)slow down a
potential Soviet drive; 2)make Moscow pay a high
price for intervention
International economic sanctions; boycott of the
Moscow Olympic games; military access
agreements with Asian countries; more covert aid
to Mujahedin
Not all US officials believe that USSR is engaged
in expansionist drive. They ask to provide
Moscow with way out by quiet diplomacy
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…Carter
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Cold war logic and electoral debate
US: the view prevails that quiet diplomacy won’t
work, even moderates distrust the Soviet
willingness to negotiate in good faith and support
covert aid to the rebels
Carter opts for a two-track approach: supporting
moderate levels of covert aid and seeking a forum
for a negotiated settlement
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Ronald Reagan
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RR victory in 1980 elections: end of the
negotiation track, beginning of hard line based on
A rebels and other anti-communist insurgencies
around the world
To RR rebels (like Contras) are Freedom fighters,
the moral equivalent of our founding fathers
Reagan Doctrine (State of Union, 1985): Support
for freedom fighters is self defense
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…RR
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Few believe that A rebels may defeat Red Army
Objective is to tie Soviets down in A until cost of
occupation become unsustainable
The key is Pakistan, led since 1977 by General Zia
P receives 6-year economic and military aid
package that elevates P to top recipients of US aid
Congress accepts Zia as allied and pushes for
more covert aid to Mujahedin
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Aid to Mujahedin approved by US
Congress and delivered by CIA
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Total amount: about $3b
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Considerable contributions by Saudi Arabia
Annual military assistance: $700m (more than
what Pakistan was receiving)
Swiss and British anti-aircraft missiles; Stinger
missiles (never before had CIA provided US made
weaponry as part of covert insurgency support
operation)
Use of Public Diplomacy
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Soviet withdrawal
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USSR: costs of the war by late 1986:
signs of a loosing, unpopular war: low moral,
criticism, drug and alcohol abuse…
billions of rubles spent in crumbling economic
situation
unrest in Islamic population of Soviet Asian
republics
M. Gorbachev: a new approach to the Third World
April 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered
accord (the Geneva Accords) requiring USSR to
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withdraw
…Soviet withdrawal
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The withdrawal was completed by February 15,
1989
A warming of relations moved US and USSR to
try for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict
Trend accelerated by the 1991 collapse of the
USSR which reduced Moscow’s capacity for
supporting communist regimes in the Third World
On September 13, 1991, Moscow and Washington
agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid to the
Afghan combatants
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