Chapter 11: The Economics of Financial Regulation

2. The Great Depression as Regulatory Failure

Remedies

1. Deposit insurance (FDIC) to prevent bank failures Encourages asymmetric information and creates moral hazard.

2. Glass-Steagall restricted bank activities, separating commercial and investment banks

Less competitive industry, less innovation.

3. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) created to screen for adverse selection in public incorporations, offset asymmetric information, monitor moral hazard

Increases costs of access to capital and thus entry to markets; decreases competition, discourages growth.

4. Better But Still Not Good: U.S. Regulatory Reforms 1989 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) • re-regulation of S&Ls, bailout of S&Ls.

1991 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) • continued the bailout of the S&Ls and the deposit insurance fund, raised deposit insurance premiums, and forced the FDIC to close failed banks using the least costly method.

1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act • overturned most prohibitions on interstate banking. 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act • repealed Glass-Steagall, allowing the same institutions to engage in both commercial and investment banking activities.

4. Better But Still Not Good: U.S. Regulatory Reforms

Results

More competition



More activities



consolidation conglomeration

“

Too big to fail

”

or the

“

Bigness Dilemma

” Size creates efficiencies of scale and allows for diversification… does size create moral hazard?

5. Basel II, III, and Dodd-Frank

International regulatory standards

The Bank for International Settlements (Basel, Switzerland)

In conventional measures of capital requirements and liquidity, Capitalization requirement based on minimum leverage ratio = Capital/Assets, treating all assets as equally risky.

1988 Basel I

Measured Capitalization requirement by risk weighting: Ranking assets by risk and using their risk-adjusted, weighted average capital ratio.

5. Basel II, III, and Dodd-Frank

International regulatory standards

The Bank for International Settlements (Basel, Switzerland)

2008 Basel II

(announced 2004) Three “ pillars ” of regulation: Capital Supervisory review process Market discipline

5. Basel II, III, and Dodd-Frank

International regulatory standards

The Bank for International Settlements (Basel, Switzerland)

Three “ pillars ” regulation: of • Capital • Supervisory review process • Market discipline

2008 Basel II

(announced 2004) The supervisory review process assesses: C = Capital A = Asset quality M = Management E = Earnings L = Liquidity (reserves) S = Sensitivity to market risk

5. Basel II, III, and Dodd-Frank

International regulatory standards

The Bank for International Settlements (Basel, Switzerland)

Three “ pillars ” regulation: of • Capital • Supervisory review process • Market discipline

2008 Basel II

(announced 2004) Problems of Capital assessment and • • • Supervisory review process : • variables difficult to ascertain • • variables difficult to verify variables are volatile off-balance sheet activities low motivation for regulators Asymmetric information • Principle agent

5. Basel II, III, and Dodd-Frank

International regulatory standards

The Bank for International Settlements (Basel, Switzerland)

Three “ pillars ” regulation: of • Capital • Supervisory review process • Market discipline

2008 Basel II

(announced 2004) • • Market discipline: Bank regulators should see themselves as aides, as helping bank depositors (and other creditors of the bank) and stockholders to keep the bankers in line.

Most important in less-developed countries where regulators are more likely to be “ on the take.

”

5. Basel II, III, and Dodd-Frank

International regulatory standards

The Bank for International Settlements (Basel, Switzerland)

2019 Basel III

(announced 2004) • • U.S. implementation of Basel II was disrupted by the worst financial dislocation in 80 years.

Intense lobbying pressure combined with the uncertainties created by the 2008 crisis led to numerous changes and implementation delays.

5. Basel II, III, and Dodd-Frank

•

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Protection Act (2010) mandates the creation of a new:

– Financial Stability Oversight Council – Office of Financial Research – Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; – Advanced warning system that will attempt to identify and address systemic risks before they threaten financial institutions and markets.

5. Basel II, III, and Dodd-Frank

•

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Protection Act also calls for:

– More stringent capital and liquidity requirements for LCFIs – Tougher regulation of systemically important non-bank financial companies – The breakup of LCFIs, if necessary – Tougher restrictions on bailouts – More transparency for asset-backed securities and other “ exotic ” financial instruments – Improved corporate governance rules designed to give shareholders more say over the structure of executive compensation.