Transcript Religious Language

Religious Language
Some key figures …
Paul Tillich
Anthony Flew
A.J. Ayer
Thomas Aquinas
Ludwig Wittgenstein
What’s the Problem?
Basically, the problem is one of meaning. If we are to believe
in God or some other aspect of religion, we can only do this if
we can use language to talk about it in a meaningful way. If
talk of God is nonsense then the idea of God is nonsense.
The debate is ages old. The religious have always claimed
that the divine is difficult to express in terms of limited human
language. In the Old Testament, the prophet Isaiah found
himself in God’s presence and said, “woe is me, a man of
unclean lips!” This connects with the idea that God is
transcendent – beyond us. Yet, the opposite point has also
long been recognised: if God cannot be described then there
may be little scope for belief.
If this and all other
religious language
is gibberish, then…
… you can forget
about religious truths.
Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism
• A major philosophical distinction in language is made
between language which expresses knowledge and
language which does not.
• Cognitive Language expresses facts and knowledge
(e.g. Mr Bull teaches at Wellington College).
• Non-Cognitive Language expresses things which we
could never know: feelings, values, and (perhaps)
metaphysical claims (e.g. Mr Bull is worth listening
too: teachers are a noble breed).
• Critics of religion might emphasise the Non-Cognitive
nature of much religious language.
Introducing Verification and
Falsification: the Logical Positivists
The first problem or criticism originates
from a group of philosophers called the
Logical
Positivists.
They
were
concerned with the relationship between
the use of language and knowledge,
rejecting as meaningless what they saw
as non-cognitive (fact free) claims.
Gathered in Vienna in the 1920’s, they
were influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein –
perhaps the greatest of all modern logical
philosophers.
Early in his career (in his Tractatus),
Wittgenstein suggested that meaningful
language is connected with the things we
know from our senses. The Logical
Positivists caught onto this idea and used
it to challenge religion: how could
religious language link with sense
experience?
“Whereof we cannot know,
thereof we cannot speak.”
Formalising the argument: A.J. Ayer
‘Verification’ means checking a statement to see if it’s
true. The Verification Principle simply states that:
“A statement which cannot be conclusively verified … is
simply devoid of meaning.”
Verificationists like Ayer hold that statements can only
be meaningful if they can be demonstrated, and these
can be divided into two types:
Meanwhile, a brilliant young
English philosopher - A.J. Ayer became
influenced
by
developments in Vienna. Ayer
developed the idea of a
‘Verification
Principle’
and
decided
that
the
Logical
Positivists
had
uncovered
significant problems in religious
and other metaphysical claims.
In Language, Truth and Logic
(1936), he demonstrated what
he saw as the linguistic faults of
religion.
(1) Analytic propositions, which are true by definition,
either because (a) this is required by the definition of
the words used – e.g. ‘this circle is not a square’, or (b)
because they are mathematical – e.g. ‘2+2=4’.
(2) Synthetic propositions, which are true by
confirmation of the senses – e.g. ‘I can see that it’s
roast for lunch on a Thursday’.
Ayer thought that religious claims are Non-Cognitive
and impossible to verify, so they are meaningless. He
does not say that they are just false; it is more that they
cannot really tell us anything at all.
Him again …
Statement: ‘God is loving
and powerful’ …
Analytically verifiable?
Synthetically verifiable?
… Therefore Ayer would
say: MEANINGLESS
“No sentence which describes the
nature of a transcendent God can
possess any literal significance.”
A Problem in Verification
• However, the idea of a Verification Principle entails a number of
serious problems. How much can we really verify? For
example: did King Harold die at the battle of Hastings? We can
look at some historical records which say he did, but we cannot
(a) observe it ourselves, or (b) subject the hypothesis to any
new or further forms of testing. Perhaps a lot of what we take
for knowledge defies strict verification.
To get around this problem, Ayer developed
the ‘Weak Verification Principle’. Instead of
checking every bit of knowledge with our
logic or senses, he suggested that we might
know things by setting up sensible standards
for evidence – eye-witness accounts,
multiple sources, etc.
Perhaps Harold did die after all …
Some Criticisms of Verification
• John Hick has criticised Ayer, suggesting that talk of God might
be verifiable in principle. Convincing evidence is not apparent
now, but it could be in the future; the whole idea of final
judgement implies that God will be seen and known.
• Richard Swinburne argues that there are propositions which noone knows how to verify but still are not meaningless. He gives
the example of toys which come out of their cupboard at night
and dance around, then returning without a trace. No
observation could ever establish this as truth, but it’s not
meaningless.
• The Verification Principle might contradict itself. The claim that
a statement is only meaningful if it can be verified analytically or
synthetically cannot itself be verified analytically or
synthetically. Is the Verification Principle meaningless?
Falsification: Anthony Flew
• This is the inverse of verification; Flew claimed
that any positive claim we make also assumes
that we deny its negation. If I say that College
work is fun, I am also saying that College work
is not, not fun.
• Flew argued that language is only meaningful
if we can conceive of some evidence which
might count against it. It’s only meaningful to
say that College work is fun because students
might be able to show contradictory
information: boring research projects, or a
limited syllabus.
• The problem with ‘God talk’ is that it often
implies that it could never by falsified: “I know
that God loves me in a special and mysterious
way which no-one may question or disprove”.
If God is just a mystery, then we are not using
language in a constructive, meaningful way.
“If there is
nothing that a
putative
assertion
denies then
there is nothing
which it asserts
either.”
Anthony Flew
Responding to Falsification
• The philosopher R.M. Hare took up the idea of
falsification and used it to describe certain beliefs
which he called ‘bliks’. A blik is a non-rational belief
which could never be falsified (disproved). For
example, let us say that a student is convinced that
his philosophy teacher is trying to kill him but, as
his friends point out, there’s no evidence at all that
this is the case. The student may say that this
teacher is so clever that he would never leave any
evidence of any kind. Bliks are not necessarily
untrue (some are sane and some insane), but they
are groundless.
• John Hick responds by arguing that there are
reasons behind religious beliefs: experiences,
Scripture, etc. He also objects that there is no way
to distinguish between sane or insane bliks, and
the judgement that religion is insane could only
ever be arbitrary.
R.M. Hare
John Hick
Basil Mitchell’s Objection to Falsification
Che – I realise this is very
confusing, but if we learn
this material properly we’ll
get A’s in our exams.
• Finally, Basil Mitchell objects to the idea
that religious claims are groundless
‘bliks’. He argues that religious claims are
grounded in some facts and that the
faithful do allow that evidence may stand
against what they believe. They
recognise, for example, the problem of
evil. However, they do not allow that
belief can or should be verified in a
simple manner.
• Mitchell draws a parable of a man
claiming to be the leader of a resistance
movement – it seems that he supports
the fight but sometimes seems to help the
enemy. One could choose to trust him
despite the contrary evidence. So with
God: one could trust in God while
recognising the contrary evidence: that
he allows evil and suffering, or disbelief.
Introducing Analogy and Symbol
• Another area or problem on which you tend to
get exam questions is analogy and/or symbol.
These could be asked separately or together, or
as part of a general question on religious
language. So, it’s important to learn it all!
• Essentially, we are now looking at attempts to
say that religious language can be used
meaningfully, only not in a direct or
simplistically descriptive sense. Philosophers
like Aquinas and Tillich try to show how our
language might relate to God.
Aquinas: Why Analogy?
A famous analogy is William
Paley’s watchmaker analogy
(we studied this last year).
He explains the teleology
(purpose) of the universe by
comparing its design to an
intricate mechanism. So, he
argued, God is a bit like a
watchmaker. For Aquinas,
such comparisons were
needed for all talk of God.
• Thomas Aquinas was concerned by the
problem of explaining God in human
language; God is supposedly perfect and
infinite, so he might defy description.
• Aquinas stated that we could not speak of
God ‘univocally’ (with our language being
applied to him with the same meaning), but
nor could we speak of him ‘equivocally’
(with our language being applied with a
different meaning). This left Aquinas
needing to find a way of using language as
an indirect description of God.
• For this he turned to ‘analogy’. An analogy
is an attempt to explain the meaning of
something by comparison with an example
more familiar to us.
UNIVOCAL LANGUAGE
EQUIVOCAL LANGUAGE
Language meaning exactly the same
thing in all situations.
Language meaning different things in
different situations.
Black cat, black hat, black mat: for all
these, ‘black’ means the same thing.
Gay can mean very different things:
‘happy’, ‘homosexual’, or (among
some students) ‘not very good’.
Problem: If we say ‘that lesson was
good’ then ‘good’ means something
different from saying ‘God is good’,
since God is perfect and infinite.
Problem: If we say that ‘God is good’
means something completely different
from any other ‘good’ then God would
be
unintelligible
(we
couldn’t
understand him).
So, Aquinas argues, we cannot speak
of God univocally.
So, Aquinas argues, we cannot speak
of God equivocally.
Aquinas thought that analogy would
be a good compromise, because it
would avoid the difficulties of
univocal and equivocal language.
To make an analogy (a comparison),
we would be saying that God is not
just like us, but nor is he nothing like
us and our world. By finding
appropriate analogical language,
Aquinas thought we could say
broadly what God is like. This would
give us partial but justifiable
knowledge of God.
To understand this theory, though,
we must realise that it works within
theism. In other words, Aquinas
assumes that God exists; his theory
is only helpful if we take that for
granted.
Analogy of Attribution
• There are three forms of analogy described by
Aquinas: attribution, proper proportion, and improper
proportion. The first of these (attribution) is dead easy.
• Aquinas thought that we could gain understanding of
God by considering his role as creator. Simply, if God
made the world then we could expect the world to
reflect God in some way. So, we would be justified in
drawing analogies between the world and God.
• Aquinas also explains this by the example of a bull
and its urine. The health of the animal is present in its
urine; we can tell that the bull is healthy by studying
this. However, the health of the bull is only complete in
the bull itself. So, what the urine tells us is indirect and
incomplete. So too with God: what the world tells us of
his goodness is meaningful, but it is also limited.
• That gives us the order of reference – God’s
goodness is foremost, because he is the source of this
quality. The world has goodness only in a secondary
respect.
The world contains a
measure of goodness,
being God’s creation. So,
this goodness is an analogy
of God’s goodness.
Analogy of Proper Proportion
• Here, John Hick takes on and develops Aquinas’ views.
The basic idea is that humans possess God’s qualities
because we are created in his image (Genesis 2). Yet,
because God is perfect, we have his qualities in a
lesser proportion.
• Hick explains this by giving the example of faithfulness.
Humans can be faithful to each other, in speech and
behaviour, and so on. Dogs too can be faithful, but
there is a great difference between this quality in a
person and in an animal. Yet, there has to be a
reasonable similarity, or we would not recognise dogs
as faithful. So, there is “a dim and imperfect likeness” in
the dog, as there is between us and God.
• An analogy which is just a metaphor and does not
really deal with proportionate qualities would be one of
improper proportion. For instance, ‘God is a rock’.
This ignores essential differences in qualities for the
sake of a loose comparison.
Criticisms of Analogy
• We could criticise Aquinas’ claims about proportionate analogy,
since we may dispute whether humans really were created “in
the image and likeness of God”. This is challenged by Darwin’s
theory of evolution and rejected by atheist Richard Dawkins.
• We might wonder whether the evil in our world is also an
analogy to God – this might make a perfectly good God
impossible. However, a theodicy (such as Augustine’s) could
resolve this problem.
• We could also criticise analogy from the standpoint of
verification, since the object we are drawing an analogy to
(God) cannot be verified. However, for this we can refer back to
criticisms of verification.
• Richard Swinburne criticises Aquinas for producing an
unnecessary theory. He claims that we can speak of God and
humans as ‘good’ univocally, it is just that God and humans
possess goodness in different ways. It is still the same essential
quality, even though God is perfect and humans are not.
Religious Language as Symbolic
• Theologian Paul Tillich took a different approach in
attempting to show that religious language can be
meaningful. He focused on the manner in which symbols
may effect humans.
• Tillich’s first main point is that symbols are not signs.
Both of these point to something beyond themselves, but
only symbols ‘participate’ in what they point to. For
instance, a road sign just points to a fact about a road,
whereas a symbolic flag participates in the power of the
king or the nation.
• Tillich goes on to number four key features of symbols:
(a) They point to something beyond themselves, (b) They
participate in that to which they point, (c) They open up
levels of reality which otherwise are closed to us, and (d)
They open up dimensions of the soul which correspond to
those aspects of reality.
• To explain (c) and (d), Tillich compared this symbolic
language to a great work of art …
Firstly, in relation to point (c),
that symbols open up certain
levels of reality, we can see
that art is a bit like this. If
someone were to ask what
the meaning of a great work
of art is, we could give them
a paraphrase. Yet, that would
be useless without them
being familiar with the work
itself. So too for religious
symbols – if we are to open
up their meaning then they
cannot be substituted for
anything else.
Judith Beheading Holofernes (Caravaggio, 1599)
Secondly, in relation to point (d), that symbols open up dimensions of the soul,
we could also say something similar of art. A novel could open up a new
understanding of good and evil, or a painting (like the one above) could speak
to us of determination and courage. There is a kind of personal participation
here, which Tillich sees as an essential feature of religious symbols.
So, to give a religious example, we could
think of the Christian cross. It is not just a
marker for Christianity, but it also makes a
powerful statement. It draws Christians in
to participate in what they see as the reality
of the messiah. It reminds Christians of
Jesus’ sacrifice and the redemption he
brings. Yet, it is also a prompt from prayer,
worship, and meditation. This means that
Christians take an active interest in the
cross, which is what Tillich thought that
symbolism was all about. It is not just a
sign.
There is more detail you could learn on
this. See Hamilton 225 ff.
Criticisms of Tillich and Symbol
• A number of criticisms could be levelled at what Tillich has put
forward. Firstly, John Hick has argued that the idea of
‘participating’ in a symbol is unclear. Take the flag example; in
what sense does this really do something? Is there really a big
difference from signs here?
• William Alston has objected that symbolism means that “there
is no point trying to determine whether the statement is true or
false”. Since Tillich’s symbols are not literally true, Alston feels
that they could have no meaningful impact on us. They could
not send us to heaven or hell, for example.
Wittgenstein and Language Games
• Finally, another area you might be asked
to discuss is that of ‘Language Games’.
• Much later in his career, years after he had
influenced the Logical Positivists, Ludwig
Wittgenstein changed his views on how
language works.
• In
his
Philosophical
Investigations
(published after his death), Wittgenstein
focussed on the uses language can be put
to. Famously, he wrote: “Don’t’ ask me for
the meaning, ask for the use.” So, he was
less concerned with the truth or falsity of
language (contrast the Logical Positivists).
• For religious language, he thought that
function might be more important than
meaning.
Ludwig had some interesting classmates at school …
Language Games
“Philosophical
problems
arise when
language goes
on holiday.”
• Wittgenstein argued that language works through
a series of ‘language games’. That is, meaning
only comes out of context; we have to know what
‘game’ that our terms are participating in.
• He then went on to say that problems in
philosophy may occur through misunderstanding
that words can be used in different language
games.
• For Wittgenstein, meaning is all about observing
convention – just like in a game. There’s a right
way and a wrong way to do things.
• So with religion – there might be conventional or
unconventional ways to talk about God.
Language Games and Religion
• The theory of language games could be
important because of the connection it makes
with the ‘coherence theory of truth’. This is the
view that statements are true if they fit with other
statements and beliefs which are internally
consistent.
• One could argue that the ‘game’ of religious
language cannot be criticised because internally
it is coherent and intelligible. Religious views fit
with other religious views. Perhaps religion is just
a ‘language game’, and it will all make sense if
we just participate.
• The danger of this is that it could be too
relativistic, allowing that any claims are equally
valid. It also doesn’t explain how we could
challenge truth claims.
• Also, it’s not quite clear whether Wittgenstein
thought of religion as a ‘language game’. He had
a certain respect for religion, but wrote little
about it himself.
The Religious Language Game: D.Z. Phillips
“If a philosopher
wants to give an
account of religion,
he must pay
attention to what
religious believers
do and say … It is
not the task of a
philosopher to
decide whether there
is a God or not, but
to ask what it means
to affirm or deny the
existence of God.”
• One philosopher who has applied Wittgenstein’s
theory to religious belief is D.Z. Phillips.
• Phillips takes on the idea that religion is a
language game, extending this to the claim that
religion cannot be either grounded or criticised
in reason – it is a system all of its own.
• For Phillips, the ‘reality’ of God or religion does
not lie in the abstract issue of whether God
exists, but instead is located in the words and
practice of religion. What God is, is defined by
the language game of faith.
• Just as in the general games of life, we do not
require an abstract justification to work out ‘what
they are all about’, so too with religion: we have
to take part to find out.
Criticisms of Wittgenstein / Phillips
• Wittgenstein’s views on language are controversial, as
they reject the popular view that language can be objective
and scientific. He implies that our language can never
convey truth in an absolute sense – can we agree with that
conclusion?
• Wittgenstein’s theory implies that there could be no
progress in philosophical debates, which are based on
misunderstandings of language. Might this opinion be
unduly negative?
• Phillips claims Wittgenstein to support his view of religion,
but arguably this leads to irrationalism and blind faith. Why
should believers be allowed to say that the game of
religious language requires no justification? This could be
used to justify extremism or superstition.
Some points to think about:
• Does language work in a game? Can you give examples?
• Are Wittgenstein and/or Phillips comparable to Aquinas or Tillich?
• Is Phillips justified in seeing religion another ‘language game’?
• Is Wittgenstein’s later view right: is the use of language more
fundamental than meaning?