Transcript Slide 1
Swissair 111: Where Do We Go From Here? Henry Wright, Board Member Transportation Safety Board of Canada Royal Aeronautical Society Flight Operations Group Meeting London, England October 22, 2008 Presentation Outline • About the TSB • Recommendation process • Swissair accident, TSB investigation and recommendations themes • Call for action 2 About the TSB • Independent organization investigating marine, pipeline, rail and air occurrences • Finds out what happened and why • Makes recommendations to address safety deficiencies • Not a regulator or a court 3 TSB’s Methodology • 1900 aviation occurrences reported each year • Decision to investigate hinges on potential to reduce risks and/or increase safety • SYSTEMATIC, THOROUGH, and UNBIASED investigations • Important safety information made public immediately • Recommendations for safety deficiencies involving significant risk and requiring immediate action 4 Follow-up to Recommendations • Regulator and industry take action to mitigate risks • TSB tracks action taken and evaluates progress on recommendations • Canadian Minister of Transport has 90 days to respond to a recommendation • Assessment based on extent to which action completed or planned will mitigate risks 5 Swissair Flight 111 Halifax International Airport Pilots declare an emergency Comm and Nav radios and other systems lost 1024PM ADT 1025 PM ADT Water impact 1031 PM ADT 1015PM ADT Pilots decided to divert to Halifax 1011PM ADT Pilots smell an abnormal odour in the cockpit 6 Swissair Flight 111 (cont.) 7 TSB’s Investigation – 1998 Swissair Accident 8 Swissair 111 Recommendations 23 recommendations in regards to: - on-board recorders - circuit breaker resetting procedures - supplemental type certification process - material flammability - in-flight firefighting 9 8 Flammability Recommendations 10 Flammability – Action Taken • Directives mandated removal of MPET insulation • New flammability test criteria established • Guidance material developed for more accurate and consistent interpretation of test standards 11 Flammability – Outstanding Action Materials • Removal of MPET from all aircraft • Comprehensive review of remaining types of insulation • Quantification and mitigation of risks associated with all materials that failed the Radiant Panel Test 12 Flammability – Outstanding Action Electrical issues – Establishment of test regime to evaluate aircraft electrical wire failure characteristics – Evaluation of how aircraft systems and their components could exacerbate existing fire In-flight entertainment network power supply unit cable segments 13 Recorders • Aviation leads the way with requirements for FDRs and CVRs • The FAA published its final rule on FDR/CVR: – CVR two-hour recording capacity and independent power supply providing 10 minutes of electrical power – power redundancy in that any single electrical failure must not result in disabling both the CVR and the FDR (flight data recorder) 14 Recorders – Outstanding Action • Independent power supply for 2-hr CVRs • Separate buses for CVRs and FDRs • Protecting confidentiality of CVR or image recording systems for accident investigation purposes • Harmonization with new FAA flight data recorder regulations 15 In-Flight Firefighting Area where fire originated – occurrence aircraft 16 In-flight Firefighting – Action Taken • Emergency procedures direct crews to prepare to land the aircraft without delay • International Air Transport Association (IATA) workshop developed guidance material on smoke and fire cockpit checklist procedures • Aircraft manufacturers improved their aircraft flight manuals • Action plan established to improve current in-flight firefighting standards 17 In-flight Firefighting – Outstanding Action • Review of methodology for establishing designated fire zones • Provision of improved fire-detection and fire suppression capabilities • Continued adoption of emergency checklist by manufacturers and operators • Assessment of inter-relationships between individual firefighting measures 18 Conclusion • We rely on collaboration with operators and regulators when conducting investigations • While improvements have been made since Swissair, more action still required on 18/23 recommendations • Change for the better can be made over and above regulatory requirements by operators and manufacturers 19 In Memory Of 20 Call for Action • Mandatory international adoption of checklist templates • Adoption of a more systematic approach to in-flight firefighting • International harmonization of the protection afforded to cockpit voice and image recordings 21 www.tsb.gc.ca Swissair 111 1998 - 2008 22