Transcript GLOBAL NUCLEAR SAFETY (AND SECURITY) REGIME

GLOBAL NUCLEAR
SAFETY AND SECURITY
REGIME
TASAM Conference on World Outlook in Nuclear
Technology: Generation III and III+ NPPs
27 – 28 March 2008, Istanbul
Aybars Gürpınar, Independent Consultant (Ret. DirNSNI, IAEA)
Definitions (informal)
 Nuclear Safety: Prevent accidents in nuclear
installations and mitigate consequences should they
occur (CNS)
 Nuclear Security: Prevent theft of nuclear and other
radioactive material; prevent acts of sabotage to
nuclear installations (and transport) and mitigate
consequences should they occur (CPPNM + others)
 Nuclear Safeguards: State accountancy and control
of nuclear material and its independent verification to
ensure that it is not used for other than peaceful
purposes (NPT + AP)
Foreword
(summary result of a recent brainstorming session)
 Nuclear energy is needed in the energy mix
of industrialized countries to ensure the
security of energy supply
 Nuclear energy will be a sustainable
alternative only if nuclear safety and nuclear
security are assured.
 Therefore for the security of energy supply to
be assured, nuclear safety and security is
needed.
Contents
 1970s – the golden age of nuclear energy
 TMI and aftermath
 1980s and Chernobyl – the role of the IAEA in
the post Chernobyl world – the
“rapprochement”
 RBMKs and WWERs
 1990s - Consensus Building and the CNS
 Safety standards, safety services, safety
culture
Contents
 2000 – consolidation of the global nuclear
safety regime – CNS, standards/services top
down approach
 9/11 – security concerns – another round of
consensus building (safety/security)
 Lesser known dates 12/24 and 7/16
 The Nobel Peace Prize
 General optimism for nuclear renaissance
 Remaining issues
1970s – the golden age of nuclear
energy
 Nuclear power plants built and planned all
over the world – also because of the OPEC
crisis
 Nuclear industry brings a new dimension to
quality assurance and safety
 IAEA starts work on the NUSS (NUclear
Safety Standards) program – Siting, Design,
Operation, Governmental Organization and
Quality Assurance
TMI (1979) and aftermath
 First major (severe) accident in a commercial NPP.
 Beginning of 1980s witnesses the end of the OPEC
crisis (oil prices stabilize)
 Sharp downturn (especially in the USA) for new NPP
orders
 Two outcomes of the TMI event – look at severe
accidents seriously (design fixes and/or accident
management) and a proof that DiD actually works,
although a severe accident occurred no offsite
consequences due to the containment
1980s and Chernobyl – the role of the IAEA in the post
Chernobyl world – polarization and “rapprochement”
 (mid-1980s) Signs of socio-political changes
in Eastern Europe and the USSR (Perestroika
and Glasnost)
 April 1986: Chernobyl accident – the worst
nuclear accident with major offsite
consequences
 August 1986 – Conference in Vienna (IAEA)
on Chernobyl
Chernobyl Aftermath
1980s and Chernobyl – the role of the IAEA in the post
Chernobyl world – polarization and “rapprochement”
 (Vienna Conference, August 1986) –
 USSR delegation view: human error → will be
fixed, responsibles are punished → will not
be allowed to happen again.
 Western view: design error (although design
of RBMKs was not well known in the West) →
therefore cannot happen in the West
 Cold war approach to the problem – polarized
and political. However, some major technical
points surface during discussion.
RBMKs and WWERs
 Rapid evolution of events until 1990 – public
associates Soviet designed NPPs (RBMKs and
WWERs thought to be similar by the public) push
Eastern European countries for safety review of
WWERs
 German unification forces WWER in East Germany
to shut down
 In USSR itself, the first design review (1989) by the
IAEA to Gorky NPP (a district heating plant –
completed but never operated). Sakharov was
interned in Gorky at the time and IAEA team was the
first foreign group to visit to the “closed” city.
1990s - Consensus Building and the CNS
 General agreement on the “why”s of
Chernobyl – Design/analysis shortcomings
led to the result that human errors caused a
catastrophic failure – i.e. design was not
“forgiving” of human errors. DiD did not
consider beyond design basis events.
 The term “safety culture” used for the first
time (by INSAG chairman, Edmondson) –
“having the safety requirements and
complying with them voluntarily”
Safety standards, safety services,
safety culture
 Two major projects on safety of WWERs and
RBMKs started early 1990s at the IAEA
 Consensus building consolidated – IAEA SS
revised (ad hoc) taking into account the
lessons learned (from TMI and Chernobyl)
 Safety Fundamentals (for nuclear installation
safety) issued
 First steps for the Convention on Nuclear
safety (CNS) using the IAEA Safety
Fundamentals as basis
Safety standards, safety services,
safety culture
 Boom in IAEA Safety Review Services
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Operational safety review teams (OSARTs)
Design Reviews (mainly for operating
WWERs)
Site/seismic reviews
Plans for regulatory reviews (IRRTs)
 First review meeting of the CNS in Vienna
(1999)
2000 – consolidation of the global nuclear safety regime –
CNS, standards/services top down approach
 Beginning to mid-2000s – top down approach to
safety standards – logical structure (thematic and
facility specific standards), integrating nuclear
installation safety with radiation safety, waste safety
and transport safety.
 IAEA SS become the foremost reference to the
regulations of major countries (UK, France, China,
WENRA, Japan, Korea, Russia, ..)
 IAEA Revision of Fundamental Safety Principles
published (2006)
SAFETY STANDARDS HIERARCHY
Safety Fundamentals
Safety Requirements
Safety Guides
STRUCTURE OF THE STANDARDS
Safety Fundamentals
Thematic standards
Facilities specific standards
Legal and governmental infrastructure
Nuclear power plants: design
Emergency preparedness and response
Nuclear power plants: operation
Management systems
Research reactors
Assessment and verification
Fuel cycle facilities
Site evaluation
Radiation related facilities and activities
Radiation protection
Waste treatment and disposal facilities
Radioactive waste management
Decommissioning
Remediation of contaminated areas
Transport of radioactive material
General safety (cross-cutting themes)
Safety of nuclear facilities
Radiation protection and safety of radiation sources
Safe management of radioactive waste
Safe transport of radioactive material
2000 – consolidation of the global nuclear safety regime –
CNS, standards/services top down approach
 IAEA Safety Services are cited as assets in
country reports and CNS review meetings –
their absence considered a shortcoming and
criticized.
 IRRT turns to IRRS (Integrated Regulatory
Review Services) covering all NS (not only
installations) – major countries are in queue:
UK, France, Japan, Canada, Spain,
Germany, USA, Russia, China
Pentagon Aftermath
Known Unknowns, etc
Known knowns, known unknowns, unknown
knowns, unknown unknowns (Rumsfeld)
“He who knows and knows he knows is wise, follow him
He who knows and knows not he knows is asleep, wake him
He who knows not and knows he knows not is ignorant, teach him
He who knows not and knows not he knows not is a fool, beware of
him”
“Maturity is the ability to endure uncertainty”
Four Concerns of Nuclear Terrorism
 Theft of a nuclear weapon
 Theft of nuclear material to
make an improvised nuclear
explosive device - IND
 Theft of other radioactive
material for a radioactive
dispersal device - RDD
 Sabotage of a facility or
transport
Inventories – facilities and materials
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Pu
>1.670 tons civil, >155 tons military
HEU
> 175 tons civil, >1720 tons military
>440 operating nuclear power plants in 31 States
>480 research reactors (>70 with HEU)
>100 fuel cycle facilities
> 100.000 Cat I and II radioactive sources
> 1.000.000 Cat III radioactive sources
9/11 – security concerns – another round of
consensus building (safety/security)
 Major impact on nuclear security concerns. For
NPPs, checks for major sabotage events (including
malevolent crash of commercial airliners) – IAEA
starts the only international nuclear security program.
 The IAEA program is very comprehensive – here we
will only touch on the “sabotage protection” related
aspects
 Nuclear Sabotage: Malevolent acts directed to
nuclear installations (and transport) having the
objective of causing uncontrolled dispersion of
radioactive material
9/11 – security concerns – another round of
consensus building (safety/security)
 In 2005 CPPNM is amended to include nuclear
facilities more explicitly
 The suicidal nature of attacks and the sophistication
in planning are new elements in the “threat” to
nuclear installations
 In 2007 (after 5 years of consensus building between
MS as well as between safety/security specialists)
publishes the security series Technical Guidance on
the Engineering Safety Aspects for the Protection of
NPPs against Sabotage
Defense in Depth for Safety/Security of
Nuclear Power Plants
Off-site prevention
of Terrorist Attack
(Off-site administrative
measures)
On-site prevention
of Terrorist Attack
(Site PP Measures)
Prevention of an
Accident in Case of
an Attack (Engin.
Safety Measures)
Mitigation of the
Accident
(Accident Manag.
Measures)
Minimizing
Release
(Containment/
Crisis Man. Measures)
Minimizing
Consequences
(Off-site Emer.
Response Measures)
Protection of Nuclear Facilities Against Sabotage
Threat Assessment
Beyond DBT
Consequences
Extreme
Load
Evaluation
DBT
Sabotage Protection Design & Evaluation
6
Vital Areas Identification
8
•System Design
•Facility Layout
•Safety Measures
•PPS
•Detection
•Delay
•Response/
Recovery
SSC capacity evaluation
6d
SA Crisis management
State’s
Responsibility
Response
10
7
Emergency Response
Acceptable Risk
State’s
Security
Norwegian Nobel Committee Citation
“The… Committee has decided that the Nobel Peace Prize for 2005 is to be
shared… between the IAEA and its Director General… for their efforts to
prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes and to ensure
that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is used in the safest possible
way.”
“ At a time …when there is a danger that nuclear arms will spread both to
states and to terrorists groups, and when nuclear power again appears to
be playing an increasingly significant role, IAEA’s work is of incalculable
importance.”
The Indian Ocean Tsunami 12/24/2004
07/16/2007 Offshore Japan EQ Shuts down the
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP (the world’s biggest)
 The world’s largest nuclear power plant, with 5
BWR-5 units and 2 ABWR units. Total generating
capacity reaches 8,212 MWe.
An example of the damage
<Main exhaust duct> (Seismic Class:C)
- Some gaps occurred in the main exhaust duct.
General optimism for nuclear
renaissance
 22 years after Chernobyl, good (and
improving) track record on safety
 Concerns for global warming and tendency
for technologies that do not contribute to
green house gas emissions
 Increasing and unstable prices in the gas
market – also difficult to store for long periods
 Sharp increase for electricity demand in
emerging economies
Remaining issues
 Overconfidence/complacency – countries
considered to have “good safety culture” keep
having incidents (USA, France, Germany,
Japan, Sweden)
 Gap in knowledge base – retiring generation
not replaced by younger cadres
 Nuclear Power Plants are robust, but are they
resilient??? – The case of K - K NPP
 Public information on nuclear safety,
environmental impact communicated poorly
Nuclear energy and the environment
Public Opinion Understanding
– EU Public opinion survey