Transcript Слайд 1 - Post-Crisis World Institute

RECONSTRUCTION
OF EUROPE
AND NEW TYPE
OF STATE MANAGEMENT
CRISIS
April, 2011
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
This presentation is based on three global explorations, which were undertaken by
the Post-Crisis World Institute
 THE FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE OF THE POSTCRISIS WORLD: EFFICIENCY OF SOLUTIONS
 April – May, 2009,
223 experts from 51 countries
 POST-CRISIS DEVELOPMENT MODELS: GLOBAL  November, 2009 – January, 2010,
WAR OR A NEW CONSENSUS
247 experts from 53 countries
 REMODELING EUROPE: COMPETITION,
SECURITY, EXPANSION
 July – September, 2010,
247 experts from 53 countries
 Economists, financial analysts, owners and top managers of leading companies,
journalists covering economic and political topics, academics, politicians and
government employees, who live and work in states of CIS, Western and Eastern
Europe, Asia, Middle East, Africa, Latin America as well in USA, Canada, Australia and
Japan participated in the survey.
The Post-Crisis World Institute Foundation is an independent analytical centre established
in Moscow in early 2009, at the initiative of several well-known Russian organizations, including
the Public Opinion Foundation (www.fom.ru), Stock Market Development Centre (www.crfr.ru),
the non-commercial partnership “Business Solidarity” (www.kapitalisty.ru) and others.
The Institute's activities aim to foster dialogue among representatives of expert community,
business circles, civil society and government structures in order to support efficient anti-crisis
and post-crisis decision-making, at the first place concerning generation of favorable
environment for successful small and medium business activity. Current project is the fourth
international exploration of the Institute.
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THERE WERE SUCH PERSONS AMONG RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS…
 ANSALONE Gianluca, Italy, Advisor of the President of the Italian Republic
 BENAYON Adriano, Brazil, Professor of Economics at the University of Brasilia, author
of Globalization versus Development
 BRADFORD Colin I., USA, non-resident senior fellow, expert on the global economy and
development, Brookings Institution
 HEYETS Valeriy, Ukraine, Academician of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Director
of the Institute for Economics and Forecasting of NAS of Ukraine
 GRINBERG Ruslan, Russia, Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director
of the Institute of Economics at RAS
 DAVIDSON Paul, USA, Editor of The Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Professor of Economics
in the Bernard Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis
 EEDLE Simon, UK, Head of Islamic Banking at the Credit Agricole CIB
 INOTAI András, Hungary, General Director of the Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences
 PETRAKOV Nikolay, Russia, Academician of Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the
Institute of Market Issues of RAS
 PINEDA Mikka D., USA, Analyst at Roubini Global Economics LLC
 PRADIER Pierre-Charles, France, Jr. Vice President of Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne;
President of Conference of the Deans of Economics and Management Departments
 RAHR Alexander, Germany, Director of the Berthold Beitz Centre at the German Council on
Foreign Relations
 URBAN Waltraut, Austria, Professor of Economics at the Vienna Institute for International
Economic Studies
 HARDOUVELIS Gikas, Greece, Chief Economist and Head of economic research at Eurobank EFG
and many others…
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GLOBAL UNDERESTIMATION OF THE RISKS
The new risk of the 21st Century – for both investors and politicians –
is the failure of the traditional system of forecasting itself
 Global economic
crisis of 2007-2010
and beyond
 Global crisis
developing into a
crisis of states
 European crisis of
2010 and beyond
 Revolutions in the
Arab world 2011
 In 2007 people “overlooked” it; they couldn’t grasp its
global scale; at the start of 2010 they declared it was over.
 It was considered essentially “financial”, while the
world’s non-financial problems were growing.
 Finances are considered separately from politics, while
geopolitical conflicts are increasing.
 Defined as strictly “Greek” for a long time.
 Its systemic nature and the ensuing risks for other
countries are still underestimated.
 Trends weren’t foreseen (Davos World Economic Forum
report “Global Risks 2011”).
 Seen as a purely Arab phenomenon, outside the context
of the global economic-political crisis.
 Fukushima 2011:
 Seen as a “local” problem, not linked to the change of
earthquake, tsunami,
technological mode in the global energy industry.
nuclear power plant
disaster
“Old forecasting” doesn’t work, because it is designed for
linear “extrapolation of trends that already exist”
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CRISIS OF EMPIRICAL POLITICAL SCIENCE
Not a single regime fall was predicted in advance
 Kyrgyzstan: 76% of the
electorate voted for Bakiyev in
2009.
 Tunisia: 89.62% voted for Ben
Ali in 2009.
 Egypt: 88.6% voted for Hosni
Mubarak in 2005. Even after the
unrest started, CIA analysts said
regime change wouldn’t happen.
 Traditional survey methodologies miss latent
protest potential.
 A positivist approach dominates in the
evaluation of trends.
 The “epidemic” nature of “social viruses” is not
taken into account.
 The absence of an organized opposition is seen
categorically as “anti-revolution insurance”.
The sociology of a stable society doesn’t apply in the age of instability
 Non-linear forecasting is needed: the age of “formal majority democracy” is
over; the age of “advanced groups democracy” has come.
 The “Arab revolutions” are a manifestation of a more general and global process
of states in crisis, affecting both democracies and authoritarian systems.
STUDY OF
EXPECTATIONS
The “global survey of experts” method makes it possible
to spot current trends in the worldview of elites and
predict how events will develop in the near future
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GLOBAL RECONFIGURATION
Diagram 1. Continents most likely to see
outbreak of conflict
(November 2009 – January 2010)
Мировой конфликт
Global conflict Региональный
Regionalконфликт
conflict
46,3
Азия
Asia
Европа
Europe
Africa
Африка
76,0
6,0
11,0
40,3
6,8
NorthАмерика
America
Северная
1,8
5,7
SouthАмерика
America
Южная
5,6
0,5
 “Domino effect” in countries of the Arab world
since December 2010.
 “Crater of instability” will grow, taking in Asia.
 Growing threat of political crises along the EU
border, including in the former Soviet Union.
NEW FACTORS OF INSTABILITY
IN THE WORLD
 Uncontrolled transition to
multi-polarity: generally accepted
rules of behaviour and adequate
international institutions are lacking
 Crises of states: “gap” between
the old world order which is already
failing (accumulated disparities and
aggregate national debts) and the
new world order which is not
working yet
 Crisis of legitimacy: the
international legal system for
ensuring the legitimacy of states
does not work
 Frailty of previous
mechanisms for maintaining
stability: economic (GDP growth,
etc) and geopolitical (US support)
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A NEW KIND OF SOCIAL REVOLUTION
GENERAL FEATURES
 Revolutions without leaders or an opposition.
There is no dominant political force leading the protests,
there are no particular organizers, there is no conspicuous
religious or nationalist component.
 Conflicts of the masses, not conflicts of class.
Young people take to the streets, then the middle class
joins them. A political agenda appears at the second stage
and is often superimposed.
 Spontaneous but instantaneous “eruption”.
Events began with protests by an initiative group. Then local
unrest quickly grew into a popular spontaneous uprising.
 Role of social networks to mobilize the masses.
Active use of Facebook, Twitter, and the Flickr video hosting
system.
 The opposition joins in
after the start of the
unrest
 Unrest ends in regime
change without system
change
 Television acts as an
effect multiplier
 The internet
demonstrates its
political effectiveness
POST-SOVIET COUNTRIES
RISING RISK
OF IMPORTED
REVOLUTIONS
 Middle strata becoming active, young people becoming politicized
 “Webification” of politics and the self-organization of citizens
 Rise of nationalism in politics and the common consciousness
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MIDDLE STRATA IN POST-SOVIET COUNTRIES
“PENDULUM EFFECT”
 The middle class is the guarantor of
stability in society and the engine of
economic growth, as the main consumer
of technical innovations and services
 Following the global economic crisis at the
start of the 21st Century, economists hope for
a new middle class in developing countries
(above all, in Asia)
“PROTO-MIDDLE CLASS” IN THE FORMER
SOVIET UNION
 Not the dominant section of the population
 High level of economic uncertainty, and
consequently, anxiety (“the unhappy group”)
 Ready to sacrifice some traditional liberal
ideals for the sake of economic prosperity
Catalyst
 The middle class initiates the
emergence of totalitarian regimes
at times when its situation is
deteriorating
 In developing countries the middle
strata are an unpredictable and unstable
group, which may initiate large-scale
protests itself
PREREQUISITES OF REVOLUTION
 Motive– to avoid slipping into the
lower classes
 Goal– anti-corruption reforms,
protection of private property,
accessibility of education etc
 Opportunity– intellect, education
and ability to self-organize
 Agflation and new outbreaks of economic crisis
Recipe for  Representatives of this stratum making mass transition
stability
to a higher stratum, i.e. the category of property owners
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GENERATION NEXT AND SOCIAL NETWORKS
POST-SOVIET YOUTH: POLITICIZED IN THE COURSE OF SOCIALIZATION
 A generation socialized after the end of the USSR
is reaching political age. A generational gap of
values and motivation is emerging.
 For many, the economic crisis was a crisis of life
and career plans.
 The “digital generation” possesses official and
non-official information to an equal degree (the
young internet).
 Proportion of young people
aged 16-25 with interest in
politics has been steadily growing
in the past 2 years
 Two vectors of young people’s
political socialization: a search
for “vertical lifts” and genuine
politicization
DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGING GLOBAL SOCIETY
 The field of available information, and thus the
field of choice, is expanding significantly
 New evaluation criteria are forming, alternatives
to the official ones.
 The “social virus” effect is emerging
Social networks:
 are becoming an important tool
for decision-making
 are creating conditions for rapid
mobilization of citizens.
In post-Soviet countries, the trend towards “parallel” self-organization by citizens
is being superimposed on a deficit of mobilizing and unifying ideologies.
Europe remains the model for democracy and a modern economy, and the
reference point for quality of life. Its condition is an important indicator of where
the world is heading
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EUROPE’S “BORDER CONDITION”
Diagram 2.
How the EU’s
position changed
during the crisis
Regarding the economy
12 14
Regarding politics
19
Усилились
74
Diagram 3. A metaphor:
Symbol of today’s Europe
34
33
47
Regarding advanced
innovations
Не изменились
10
Ослабли
Regarding culture
9
69
82
Crisis of growth
21
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 Trend of “bad expectations”:
Europeans predominate among optimists;
representatives of the rest of the world
predominate among pessimists.
 Deterioration of the EU’s economic and
political position, while civilizational potential
is maintained
 Europe remains a model for social order, but
at the same time, a “litmus test” of problems
shared by the world
23
Conflict of interests
17
Aging civilization
15
Crisis of genre
12
Political weakness
10
“DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS”
Diagram 4. Main problems of the EU
(summer 2010)
56
50
42
29
21
17
Budget deficits
Conflict of interests between
strong and weak states
Lack of agreed
development strategy
Decline in the
competitiveness of
European economies
Demographic crisis
Insufficient political will among
governments
 The main issue is a strategy for Europe’s
future development. The lack of strategy is
the primary cause of the “illness”, while other
problems (competitiveness, conflicts of
interest, debts) are just the outward
symptoms.
Limitation of the resources of the
previous model of European unity
 Ratings agencies are threatening a new
wave of lower ratings for peripheral
countries.
 Europe is at risk of energy shortages due
to events in the Middle East.
 Three outstanding economists – Paul
Krugman, Joseph Stiglitz and Nouriel Roubini
– say that the EU’s financial problems will not
disappear in 2011, and the measures taken
so far will only slow economic recovery.
 Crisis in the EU’s ethnic policy: Germany,
France and the UK have acknowledged the
failure of the multicultural project.
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RE-BOOT OF THE EUROPEAN PROJECT
Diagram 6. How events are likely to develop in the EU up to 2020
52
«Conservation»
 Sensible measure
THREE SCENARIOS
 Way to stagnation
Conservation – keeping the
status quo; dangerous if
protracted.
 Removal of weak countries
30
«Polarization»
27
«German  Donations in exchange for
supremacy» “correct organization of the
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 Review of countries’ “weight”
economy”
«New  EU– Beijing
axis»  EU– Moscow
Split– separation of strong nucleus
or uncontrolled disintegration; will
launch new integration processes
on different grounds.
Consolidation and further EU
integration – tightening control over
budget discipline of member-states,
strengthening of supra-national
institutions.
 In March 2011 the Libyan issue once again demonstrated a split in the
positions of countries within the EU, including in the “nucleus” (France–
Germany). On the other hand, the Germany-BRIC axis strengthened.
 Meanwhile, elements of a single economic government are effectively being
introduced. In exchange for adopting a tough set of measures, the “Euro-plus
pact”, France and Germany agreed to expand the EU stabilization fund (creation
of the ESM).
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NEW CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN SECURITY
Diagram 5. Main threats to
European security
51
40
31
31
30
Loss of economic competitiveness
Paralysis of EU’s supranational bodies
Influx of
migrants
Terrorism
Explosion of radical
separatism
16
Rise of popular neoNazism
15
Natural and man-made
disasters
 The main threats are not military in
nature
 The main threat to the EU is loss of
competitiveness
 In a multi-polar world, competition
between economies is competition between
civilizations. Europe’s competitiveness is an
issue of Western civilization’s role in the
future world.
 Europe’s own resources for increasing
competitiveness are limited, while expansion
includes new factors of development.
It is impossible for the EU to maintain its
leading positions within the framework
of an inert “limited” model:
losses will be more significant
and resources more limited.
But expansion is accompanied by new
geopolitical risks.
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EASTERN VECTOR OF THE EU
Diagram 7. Prospects for EU
accession (in 5-7 years)
24
Ukraine
22
Moldova
7
Belarus
6
Russia
2 Kazakhstan
51
None
 60% of European experts do
not believe the new post-Soviet
countries will join the EU in the
near future.
 In the eyes of Russian experts
themselves, there is no prospect
of Russia becoming an EU member.
Possible areas of “crisis-type”
European expansion: Moldova,
Belarus and Ukraine.
 The former USSR has passed an historic
boundary: Estonia has joined the Euro-zone,
Kyrgyzstan has joined the “failed states”. In the
crisis of future self-determination, attitude
towards the EU becomes a key issue.
 Indicator– The EU’s policy towards Turkey. If
Turkey becomes a fully-fledged EU participant,
this will open “the gates to the East”, above all
for further expansion in the post-Soviet space.
FORMATS OF INTEGRATION AND COOPERATION
ALONG THE EAST-WEST LINE
 Russia and Kazakhstan cannot be integrated into
the EU and included in the Euro-zone according
to the model of the Baltic states and the small
states of Eastern Europe.
 Future economic vector: technologies in
exchange for energy resources (in light of the
EU’s energy crisis).
 Future political vector: joint security systems,
including against non-military threats.
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CUSTOMS UNION OF RUSSIA, KAZAKHSTAN AND BELARUS
Diagram 8. Will the Customs Union
develop into a Eurasian economic union?
Yes, in the
short term
11
27
Diagram 9. Customs Union’s
effect on integration with Europe
49
62
18
No, never
It has no
effect
33
Only in the
long term
It helps
It hinders
 Europeans take the Customs Union’s
Diagram10. Nature of Customs
prospects more seriously than others
 The post-Soviet space will become a field of
competition: the SCO is strengthening and
expansion of European policy to the East is
inevitable.
 The Customs Union commission starts working as
a supra-national body of the CES from 1 Jan 2012.
 To successfully construct the CES, countries’
macroeconomic policies need to be coordinated on
the basis of a common development strategy.
Union
Reintegration of postSoviet countries
35
Reciprocal strengthening
of two similar economies
33
Russia’s Asian
integration
22
The EU’s role in Eurasian integration projects needs to
be defined.
In future, a symbiosis of the EU and CES is possible,
based on strong partners complementing each other.
5 Utopia
5
Economic expansion
of rising Kazakhstan
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RUSSIA: IN THE DANGER ZONE
Diagram 11. Is Russia part of
European civilization?
Source of energy resources
90
and raw materials
Equal partner 22
Security buffer 15
Source of instability 15
Transit country 13
Europe’s strategic
12
competitor
Testing ground for
8
innovations
!
Diagram 12. What hinders Russia’s
European modernization?
55
Corruption
Lack of strategic planning
45
 Corruption and lack
of strategic planning
are the main obstacles
to the development of
Russia’s middle class.
Vulnerability of private
property
32
 Russia can remain a
“mere raw materials
supplier” to the West, or use
its energy resources to
modernize its own economy.
 The main slogan of the new social revolutions is
“Down with corruption!”
 The proto-middle class and educated young people
are at a crossroads of future possibilities: break
into the bourgeois or slip into the lower classes
24
Ineffective state
governance
24
Weak management
culture
18
Lack of protection for
human rights
17
“Natural resources
curse”
17
Anti-Western
prejudices
16
Anti-Russian prejudices in
the West
16
CURRENT TASKS FOR CIS COUNTRIES
ESSENSE OF CRISES
Models of state management created in the 20th
Century cannot meet the challenges of the 21st
Century.
COMMON FRONT OF
STATE CRISES
Greece and the whole European periphery;
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Ukraine and possibly other CIS
states; the Arab world and possibly Asia.
INTELLECTUAL AND
POLITICAL TASK
Development of models for an effective state in the
face of the threat of new state crises.
SOLVING THE “GENERIC PROBLEMS” OF THE POST-SOVIET STATES
 Strategic planning and ethnic policy. In the USSR these functions were within the
remit of the political centre. Most CIS countries that evolved from the Soviet republics still
have not acquired them.
 Creating a mass class of property owners. An effective structure of property has
not been created in the post-Soviet countries. All the privatization projects conducted in
the course of 20 years have not solved the task of democratizing property ownership.
 Creating a fully-fledged political class. There is a political elite in the post-Soviet
countries, but there is not a large “political class” to unite the elite and politicized strata
of the middle class. Therefore, states “stall” when systemic changes are demanded.
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NATIONALISM IN POLITICS
Crises of states inevitably lead to
the political strengthening of mobilizing ideologies
POST-SOCIALIST
NATIONALISM
NATIONALISM AT THE DAWN OF
THE INDUSTRIAL AGE
 Mobilizing ideology: linked to strengthening of
states and development of capitalism; unites various
social strata, irrespective of conflicting class
interests.
 Bourgeois idea: ensures sales markets for national
corporations, which guarantees profit for the national
bourgeoisie and employment for the working class.
 Socio-cultural phenomenon: has a lot in common
with ideology and religion, to a significant degree
defines the contours of one’s worldview, allows an
individual to feel protected in the world of historical
traditions.
TRANSFORMATION
OF SOCIAL
DISSATISFACTION
 Fulfils the same mobilizing
functions as early bourgeois
nationalism in developed
countries.
 Ethnic rather than civil
nationalism predominates; this
is a perfect filler for an
ideological vacuum.
 Often acquires extreme forms
of expression, fraught with the
risk of extremist and separatist
tendencies
 Christian countries: rise of
uncontrollable xenophobia
 Muslim countries: rise of
radical Islam
Alternative selforganization
(jamaats, right-wing
Slavic associations)
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EUROPE: STRIVING FOR PROGRESS
Diagram 13. Values being lost
Diagram 14. Values for the future
Other countries, including Russia
National sovereignty 55
Europe
32
Rationalism and
science
23
Freedom of
entrepreneurship 15
31
Human rights
26
Rationalism and 15
science
27
Striving for progress 16
Democracy 13
Human rights 13
Supremacy of the law 9
None 8
 In 2010
Europe was still
demonstrating
willingness to
sacrifice national
sovereignty for
the sake of
integration
 The slogan “Liberty! Equality!
Fraternity!” is still relevant.
Supremacy of the
23
law
Freedom of
26 entrepreneurship 18
24
Democracy
26
17
Striving for
progress
30
10
National
sovereignty
10
6
None
2
Formation of a new cultural-civilizational code on the basis of striving for
progress is interpreted by European elites as Europe’s traditional historical
mission on a global scale.
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SEARCH FOR NEW IDEOLOGIES
Political risks –
leading to a new
stage in history
An ideological
crisis has struck
both the former
USSR and Europe
 There are no “ready examples” of ideal model states.
 There are no reliable international systems to ensure the
security of states.
 Traditional political battles are being overtaken by a battle of
values.
 The Soviet idea has left the former USSR, and there is no
replacement state platform for the brotherhood of nations.
 In Europe the failure of the multicultural project is leading to a
rise in nationalism. There is still no new platform for integration.
THE WORLD AND ISLAM: DIALOGUE INEVITABLE
 By 2030 the global Muslim population will reach 2.2
billion, against 1.6 billion in 2010; i.e. it will rise by
over 35 per cent.
 The fall in GDP per capita and exacerbation of the
employment problem in the Arab world will prompt a
new wave of migration.
 Within the Muslim world, a progressive force for
development has arisen: it advocates democracy and
social justice while still adhering to the Islamic identity.
 Islamic civilization is
capable of making a leap
towards development,
if the №1 problem is solved:
the problem of security
 The most important
political task is to establish
inter-faith relations with
moderate Islam
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THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!
The Post-Crisis World Institute Foundation
117447, Russia, Moscow,
B. Cheremushkinskaya, 13, bld. 4
Phone: +7(499)789-0134, +7(495)926-5188
Fax: +7(499)789-0148
www.postcrisisworld.org
[email protected]
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