Transcript Document

The Not-So-Civil Service:
Power Resources and the Relationship
Between Ministers and their Senior Civil
Servants
October 17th, 2006
Resources – Senior Bureaucratic
Officials

expertise
– policy
– process

person-power
 relationship with other departments
 relationship with clientele
Resources -- Ministers

political legitimacy
 expertise
– political



ability to manage relationship



vis-a-vis public
vis-a-vis cabinet
outside expertise
competing lines of advice
relationship with cabinet, PM
 relationship with public/media
Resources -- Ministers

political legitimacy
 expertise
– political



ability to manage relationship



vis-a-vis public
vis-a-vis cabinet
outside expertise
competing lines of advice
relationship with cabinet, PM
 relationship with public/media
Ministerial Resources and Public
Opinion Polling

exponential rise in the growth of public
opinion polling by government departments
– revolution in computer technology
 costs of public opinion polling have dropped

the role of the minister as the political
antenna of the department may be becoming
obsolete
– senior bureaucrats probably have a better read
of public opinion on a given policy issue
Resources -- Ministers

political legitimacy
 expertise
– political



ability to manage relationship



vis-a-vis public
vis-a-vis cabinet
outside expertise
competing lines of advice
relationship with cabinet, PM
 relationship with public/media
The Tenure of Ministers (the
Constant)

“ministerial musical chairs”
– move often and frequency has increased

effects on ministerial power
– the traditional view
 ministerial musical chairs weakens the power of
minister
– the counter-traditional view
 avoids ministerial capture
The Tenure of Senior Public
Servants (the change!)

the revolving deputy ministerial door
– move often and frequency has increased

effects on deputy ministerial power
– the traditional view

equalizes the relationship between DMs and ministers – both
are short-term departmental residents
– an alternative view


strengthens the Centre (e.g PCO)
DM becomes representative of the Centre (e.g. PCO)
The Tenure of Ministers and their
Senior Public Servants

changing patterns in the tenure of ministers and
deputy ministers...




effects are ambiguous/contradictory
complex interaction between both patterns
power of ministers/DM in new environment is an open
empirical question
HOWEVER...


relationships are changing
both changes are important in terms of relationships between
departments and The Centre
Governing from The Centre
October 17th, 2006
Centralized Accountability:
Collective Ministerial
Responsibility

what is “responsible government”?
– the executive must maintain the confidence of
Parliament

what is collective ministerial responsibility?
– all ministers must resign if the cabinet loses the
confidence of Parliament

what constitutes having the confidence of Parliament?
– what pre-conditions would the operation of
collective cabinet ministerial responsibility require?
Centralized Accountability:
Collective Ministerial
Responsibility

requirements (enforced by PM)
– cabinet solidarity
– cabinet secrecy
 cabinet documents exempt from Freedom of Information
 the problem of leaks

why would cabinet ministers agree?


price of being in cabinet
collective self-interest
Centralized Accountability (Collective
Ministerial Responsibility) and Diffuse
Accountability (Individual Ministerial
Responsibility)

cabinet/departmental link



minister represents department in cabinet
minister represents cabinet to the department
the individual minister and cabinet

collective vs. individual ministerial paradox
– ministers interest in maximizing their own latitude from cabinet
control
• the conundrum of cabinet solidarity/cabinet secrecy and
individual ministerial responsibility
– ministers interested in maximizing cabinet’s ability to direct
other ministries
The Structure of Government:
Centralized and Diffuse Accountability

structure of government is an attempt to balance
between collective ministerial responsibility
(centralized accountability) and individual
ministerial responsibility (diffuse accountability)
 Prime Ministerial/Cabinet government is an
attempt to ensure political control...
– from the centre of government (Prime Minister and
Cabinet)
– AND over individual departments (Ministers)
The Structure of Government: The
Balance of Centralized and Diffuse
Accountability

cabinet structure and operation
 balance between central agencies and line
departments
 role of the Deputy Minister
The Structure of Government: The
Balance of Centralized and Diffuse
Accountability

cabinet structure and operation
– size
SIZE OF MINISTERIAL CABINETS, 1965-2006
Sec. State
Ministers
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1965
1970
1975
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2006
The Canadian Ministry (in order of precedence), December 2005
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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The Right Honourable Paul Martin, Prime Minister
The Honourable Jacob Austin
Leader of the Government in the Senate
The Honourable David Anderson, Environment
The Honourable Ralph E. Goodale, Finance
The Honourable Anne McLellan, Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Public Safety
The Honourable Lucienne Robillard, Industry
The Honourable Pierre S. Pettigrew, Health,
Intergovernmental Affairs, and Official Languages
The Honourable James Scott Peterson, Trade
The Honourable Andrew Mitchell, Indian Affairs
The Honourable Claudette Bradshaw, Labour and
Minister responsible for Homelessness
The Honourable Denis Coderre
President of the Queen’s Privy Council for
Canada
The Honourable Rey D. Pagtakhan, Western
Economic Diversification
The Honourable John McCallum, Veterans Affairs
The Honourable Stephen Owen, Public Works and
Government Services
The Honourable William Graham, Foreign Affairs
The Honourable Stan Kazmierczak Keyes,
National Revenue
The Honourable Robert Speller, Agriculture
The Honourable Giuseppe (Joseph) Volpe, Human
Resources and Skills Development
19. The Honourable Reginald B. Alcock
20.
21.
22.
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25.
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27.
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31.
President of the Treasury Board and
Minister responsible for the Canadian
Wheat Board
The Honourable Geoff Regan, Fisheries
and Oceans
The Honourable Tony Valeri, Transport
The Honourable David Pratt, National
Defence
The Honourable Jacques Saada,
Democratic Reform
The Honourable Irwin Cotler, Justice
The Honourable Judy Sgro, Citizenship
and Immigration
The Honourable Hélène Chalifour
Scherrer,
Canadian Heritage
The Honourable Ruben John Efford,
Natural Resources
The Honourable Liza Frulla, Social
Development
The Honourable Joseph McGuire
Minister of Atlantic Canada
Opportunities Agency
The Honourable Mauril Bélanger
Deputy Leader of the Government in the
House of Commons
The Honourable M. Aileen Carroll,
International Cooperation
The Canadian Ministry (in order of precedence), February 2006
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Harper, Stephen (Right Hon.)Prime Minister
Nicholson, Rob (Hon.)Leader of the
Government in the House of
CommonsMinister for Democratic Reform
Emerson, David (Hon.)Minister of
International TradeMinister for the Pacific
Gateway and the Vancouver-Whistler
Olympics
Blackburn, Jean-Pierre (Hon.)Minister of
LabourMinister of the Economic
Development Agency of Canada for the
Regions of Quebec
Thompson, Greg (Hon.)Minister of Veterans
AffairsLeBreton, Marjory (Hon.)Leader of the
Government in the Senate
Solberg, Monte (Hon.)Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration
Strahl, Chuck (Hon.)Minister of Agriculture
and Agri-FoodMinister for the Canadian
Wheat Board
Lunn, Gary (Hon.)Minister of Natural
Resources
MacKay, Peter (Hon.)Minister of Foreign
AffairsMinister of the Atlantic Canada
Opportunities Agency
Hearn, Loyola (Hon.)Minister of Fisheries
and Oceans
Day, Stockwell (Hon.)Minister of Public
Safety
Skelton, Carol (Hon.)Minister of National
RevenueMinister of Western Economic
Diversification
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25.
26.
Toews, Vic (Hon.)Minister of JusticeAttorney
General of Canada
Ambrose, Rona (Hon.)Minister of the Environment
Chong, Michael (Hon.)President of the Queen’s
Privy Council for CanadaMinister of
Intergovernmental AffairsMinister for Sport
Finley, Diane (Hon.)Minister of Human Resources
and Social Development
O'Connor, Gordon (Hon.)Minister of National
Defence
Oda, Bev (Hon.)Minister of Canadian Heritage and
Status of Women
Prentice, Jim (Hon.)Minister of Indian Affairs and
Northern DevelopmentFederal Interlocutor for
Métis and Non-Status Indians
Baird, John (Hon.)President of the Treasury Board
Bernier, Maxime (Hon.)Minister of Industry
Cannon, Lawrence (Hon.)Minister of Transport,
Infrastructure and Communities
Clement, Tony (Hon.)Minister of HealthMinister for
the Federal Economic Development Initiative for
Northern Ontario
Flaherty, Jim (Hon.)Minister of Finance
Verner, Josée (Hon.)Minister of International
CooperationMinister for la Francophonie and
Official Languages
Fortier, Michael (Hon.)Minister of Public Works
and Government Services
The Structure of Government: The
Balance of Centralized and Diffuse
Accountability

cabinet structure and operation
– size
The Structure of Government: The
Balance of Centralized and Diffuse
Accountability

cabinet structure and operation
– size
– cabinet committees
 number and function
– Clark and the Envelope System
• Inner and Outer Cabinet
• 12 Cabinet Committees
• envelope system
– Chretien
• 4 cabinet committees
• reliance on full cabinet
– Harper
• six cabinet committees (Priorities and Planning, Operations,
Treasury Board, Social Affairs, Economic Affairs, Foreign Affairs
and National Security)
The Structure of Government: The
Balance of Centralized and Diffuse
Accountability

balance between central agencies and line
departments
– line departments – e.g. HRSDC, DFO, Agriculture

structural heretics
– regulatory agencies
– Crown Corporations
– non-departmental agencies
– central agencies




PCO
PMO
Finance
Treasury Board
The Structure of Government: The
Balance of Centralized and Diffuse
Accountability
 various agencies (departments, agencies) which
have radically different organizational purposes


–
line departments -- provide services/programs
central agencies – coordinate line departments
potential for conflict inherent in structure



central agency mandate for horizontal coordination
reinforces centripetal tendencies
line department resistance reinforces centrifugal tendencies
these tendencies become institutionalized
– even if the circumstances/concerns which give rise to
these tendencies fade, the tendencies may persist
The Structure of Government: The
Balance of Centralized and Diffuse
Accountability

role of the Deputy Minister
– balance in roles of DM
 technically accountable to minister
 appointed by PM
– receives direction from PCO
– changing balance resulting from shifts in tenure of DMs
Channels of Political Control
October 19th, 2006
Channels of Central Political
Control

outward at political level from PM to
Ministers and then downward to
bureaucratic level (Deputy Ministers)
Channels of Central Political Control
Ministers
Deputy Ministers
Prime Minister, PMO,
Min.Finance, TBP
Channels of Central Political
Control

outward at political level from PM to
Ministers and then downward to
bureaucratic level (Deputy Ministers)
 downward from political level (PM/PMO)
to bureaucratic level (PCO) and then
outward at bureaucratic level (Deputy
Ministers)
Channels of Central Political Control
Prime Minister, PMO,
Min.Finance, TBP
Clerk of the Privy
Council, PCO, TBS
Deputy Ministers
Channels of Central Political
Control

outward at political level from PM to Ministers
and then downward to bureaucratic level (Deputy
Ministers)
 downward from political level (PM/PMO) to
bureaucratic level (PCO) and then outward at
bureaucratic level (Deputy Ministers)
 downward and outward from political level (PM)
to bureaucratic level (DMs)
Channels of Central Political Control
Prime Minister, PMO,
Min.Finance, TBP
Deputy Ministers
Channels of Central Political
Control

outward at political level from PM to Ministers
and then downward to bureaucratic level (Deputy
Ministers)
 downward from political level (PM/PMO) to
bureaucratic level (PCO) and then outward at
bureaucratic level (Deputy Ministers)
 downward and outward from political level (PM)
to bureaucratic level (DMs)
Channels of Central Political Control
Ministers
Prime Minister, PMO,
Min.Finance, TBP
Clerk of the Privy
Council, PCO, TBS
Deputy Ministers
Channels of Central Political
Control

unique role of the DM
– receives political direction from...
 Minister
 PCO and Clerk
 PM
– indirectly through appointment
Channels of Bureaucratic
Influence

DM influence over Ministers
– from Minister to Cabinet
Channels of Bureaucratic Influence
Ministers
Deputy Ministers
Prime Minister, PMO,
Min.Finance, TBP
Channels of Bureaucratic
Influence

DM influence over Ministers
– from Minister to Cabinet

PCO influence over PM/Min.
Finance/Treasury Board
Channels of Bureaucratic
Influence

DM influence over Ministers
– from Minister to Cabinet

PCO influence over PM/Min.
Finance/Treasury Board
– from PM/Min. Fin./Treasury Board to Cabinet
Channels of Bureaucratic Influence
Ministers
Prime Minister, PMO,
Min.Finance, TBP
Clerk of the Privy
Council, PCO, TBS
Channels of Bureaucratic
Influence

DM influence over Ministers
– from Minister to Cabinet

PCO influence over PM/Min.
Finance/Treasury Board
– from PM/Min. Fin./Treasury Board to Ministers

PCO influence over DM’s
Channels of Bureaucratic
Influence

DM influence over Ministers
– from Minister to Cabinet

PCO influence over PM/Min.
Finance/Treasury Board
– from PM/Min. Fin./Treasury Board to Ministers

PCO influence over DM’s
-DM influence over ministers
Channels of Bureaucratic Influence
Ministers
Clerk of the Privy
Council, PCO, TBS
Deputy Ministers
Channels of Bureaucratic
Influence

DM influence over Ministers
– from Minister to Cabinet

PCO influence over PM/Min.
Finance/Treasury Board
– from PM/Min. Fin./Treasury Board to Cabinet

PCO influence over DM’s
-DM influence over ministers
The Integrated System: Channels
of Political Control and
Bureaucratic Influence

DM influence over Ministers
– from Minister to Cabinet

PCO influence over PM/Min.
Finance/Treasury Board
– from PM/Min. Fin./Treasury Board to Cabinet

PCO influence over DM’s
-DM influence over ministers
Channels of Central Political Control
Ministers
Prime Minister, PMO,
Min.Finance, TBP
Clerk of the Privy
Council, PCO, TBS
Deputy Ministers
Channels of Bureaucratic Influence
Ministers
Prime Minister, PMO,
Min.Finance, TBP
Clerk of the Privy
Council, PCO, TBS
Deputy Ministers
The Political-Bureaucratic System
Political Level
Bureaucratic Level
Implications of the Organizational Structure
1.
political-bureaucratic interface (and
potential for conflict) exists at numerous
sites




PM/PMO and PCO
central agency ministers and central agencies
PM and DMs
line departments ministers and DMs
Implications of the Organizational Structure
2. political-bureaucratic interfaces exist at
numerous sites
 creates potential for complex strategies of political
control or bureaucratic influence
 blockage of one line (political control or bureaucratic
influence) does not mean that control/influence not
exercised
Implications of the Organizational Structure
3. multiple lines of conflict/control
 more simplistic model highlighted democratic
questions; reality is more complex
–
two sets of tendencies to balance (also two
potential axes of conflict)
 political officials vs. public servants
 The Centre vs. the Periphery
Dilemmas of Organizational Structure –
Centripetal and Centrifugal Tendencies

political control vs. impartiality


democratic paradox
central political accountability vs. diffused
political accountability

parliamentary paradox
– accountability/responsibility/answerability
– collective ministerial responsibility – accountability directly to
the electorate
– individual ministerial responsibility – accountability to
parliament

top-down responsiveness vs. bottom- up
responsiveness

bureaucratic paradox
– effectiveness/efficiency
The Centrifugal Tendencies

responsiveness (bottom-up) to
clientele/public/changing circumstances
– effectiveness, efficiency

diffused political accountability
– ability to answer effectively for actions taken within
individual departments

impartiality (vs. political control)
– ability to insulate activities from political interference
The Centripetal Tendencies

top-down responsiveness


centralized political accountability


coherence
collective cabinet responsibility
political control (vs. impartiality)