Transcript WEEK #8 THE THEORY OF FORMS (Phaedo) (3-1-04)

WEEK #8
THE THEORY OF FORMS
(Phaedo, Symposium, Phaedrus)
(3-7-06)
Agenda
• Does Plato have a Theory of Forms?
– Theory?
– Existence of Forms?
• Evidence for a Theory of Forms
– Passages which refer to Forms
– Motivations for Forms
– Arguments for Forms
•
•
•
•
Arguments for Forms
Motivations for Forms
Two Competing Models of Forms
Passages in the Phaedo, Symposium, Phaedrus
Does Plato Have a Theory of Forms
•
•
•
•
Annas 1981
Is Plato committed to Forms?
What is it to be so committed?
Aristotle
– Eidos/idea
– Genos
– Ousia
Metaphysics XIII.4 1078b17-1079a4
The theory of Forms occurred to those who enunciated it because
they were convinced as to the true nature of reality by the doctrine
of Heraclitus, that all sensible things are always in a state of flux;
so that if there is to be any knowledge or thought about anything,
there must be certain other entities, besides sensible ones, which
persist. For there can be no knowledge of that which is in flux.
Now Socrates devoted his attention to the moral virtues, and was
the first to seek a general definition of these [20] (…); and he
naturally inquired into the essence of things; for he was trying to
reason logically, and the starting-point of all logical reasoning is
the essence. … There are two innovations which, may fairly be
ascribed to Socrates: inductive reasoning and general definition.
Both of these are associated with the starting-point of scientific
knowledge. But whereas Socrates regarded neither universals nor
definitions as existing in separation, the Idealists gave them a
separate existence, and to these universals and definitions of
existing things they gave the name of Ideas.
Continued
Hence on their view it followed by virtually the same
argument that there are Ideas of all terms which are
predicated universally; and the result was very nearly
the same as if a man who wishes to count a number of
things were to suppose that he could not do so when
they are few, and yet were to try to count them when
he has added to them. For it is hardly an exaggeration
to say that there are more Forms than there are
particular sensible things (in seeking for whose causes
these thinkers were led on from particulars to Ideas);
because corresponding to each thing there is a
synonymous entity, apart from the substances (and in
the case of non-substantial things there is a One over
the Many) both in our everyday world and in the
realm of eternal entities.
Metaphysics XIII.9 1086a30-b14
… but as for those who speak of the Ideas, we can observe at the same
time their way of thinking and the difficulties which befall them. For they
not only treat the Ideas as universal substances, but also as separable and
particular. … The reason why those who hold substances to be universal
combined these two views was that they did not identify substances with
sensible things. They considered that the particulars in the sensible world
are in a state of flux, and that none of them persists, but that the universal
exists besides them and is something distinct from them. This theory, as
we have said in an earlier passage, was initiated by Socrates as a result of
his definitions, but he did not separate universals from particulars; and he
was right in not separating them. This is evident from the facts; for
without the universal we cannot acquire knowledge, and the separation of
the universal is the cause of the difficulties which we find in the Ideal
theory. Others, regarding it as necessary, if there are to be any substances
besides those which are sensible and transitory, that they should be
separable, and having no other substances, assigned separate existence to
those which are universally predicated; thus it followed that universals and
particulars are practically the same kind of thing.
Metaphysics I.6 987a29-b13
The philosophies described above were succeeded by the system of Plato,
which in most respects accorded with them, but contained also certain peculiar
features distinct from the philosophy of the Italians. In his youth Plato first
became acquainted with Cratylus and the Heraclitean doctrines -- that the
whole sensible world is always in a state of flux, and that there is no scientific
knowledge of it -- and in after years he still held these opinions. And when
Socrates, disregarding the physical universe and confining his study to moral
questions, sought in this sphere for the universal and was the first to
concentrate upon definition, Plato followed him and assumed that the problem
of definition is concerned not with any sensible thing but with entities of
another kind; for the reason that there can be no general definition of sensible
things which are always changing. These entities he called “Ideas,” and held
that all sensible things are named after them sensible and in virtue of their
relation to them; for the plurality of things which bear the same name as the
Forms exist by participation in them. (With regard to the “participation,” it was
only the term that he changed; for whereas the Pythagoreans say that things
exist by imitation of numbers, Plato says that they exist by participation -merely a change of term. As to what this “participation” or “imitation” may be,
they left this an open question.)
Evidence
• Passages which presuppose the theory of
Forms
• Motivations for the theory of Forms
(Cherniss)
• Arguments for the theory of Forms
Arguments for the Theory of
Forms
• Phaedo 74a9-c5 – The Equality Argument
• Republic 475d-476b – The Argument from
Opposites
• Republic 596a5-b4 – The One Over Many
Argument
• Timaeus 51d3-e6 – The Argument from
Knowledge
The One Over Many Argument
Do you want us to begin our examination,
then, by adopting our usual procedure? As you know,
we customarily hypothesize a single form in
connection with each of the many things to which we
apply the same name. Or don't you understand?
I do.
Then let's now take any of the manys you like.
For example, there are many beds and tables.
Of course.
But there are only two forms of such furniture,
one of the bed and one of the table. (Republic
596a5-b4; Grube/Reeve trans.]
The Argument
1. If there is a plurality of F-things, then
there is a Form to which we apply the
same name (F-ness.)
2. There is a plurality of beds
3. So, there is the Form, Bed-ness
The Argument from Knowledge
If understanding and true opinion are distinct, then these "by
themselves" things definitely exist-these Forms, the objects not of
our sense perception, but of our understanding only. But if-as some
people think-true opinion does not differ in any way from
understanding, then all the things we perceive through our bodily
senses must be assumed to be the most stable things there are. But
we do have to speak of understanding and true opinion as distinct,
of course, because we can come to have one without the other, and
the one is not like the other. It is through instruction that we come
to have understanding, and through persuasion that we come to
have true belief. Understanding always involves a true account
while true belief lacks any account. And while understanding
remains unmoved by persuasion, true belief gives in to persuasion.
And of true belief, it must be said, all men have a share, but of
understanding, only the gods and a small group of people do.
(Timaeus 51d3-e6; Zeyl trans.)
The Argument
1. If nous ≠ true belief, then there are Forms
2. Nous becomes through instruction; true belief
through persuasion
3. Nous involves a true logos; true belief is alogon
4. Nous is unmoved by persuasion; true belief is not
5. Nous is possessed by few; true belief by many
6. So, nous ≠ true belief
7. So, there are Forms
The Equality Argument
Do not equal stones and sticks sometimes, while
remaining the same, appear to one to be equal and to
another to be unequal? - Certainly they do.
But what of the equals themselves? Have they ever
appeared unequal to you, or Equality to be
Inequality?
Never, Socrates.
These equal things and the Equal itself are therefore
not the same? [Phaedo 74b7-c5; Grube trans.]
The Argument
1. The equals seems unequal to A
2. The Equals themselves do not seem unequal to
A, nor does Equality seem to be Inequality to A
3. So, the equals ≠ the equal itself
Apparent Form
1. A is p
2. B is not-p
3. So, A ≠ B
Frege & Superman
1. The evening star seems to me to be romantic.
2. The morning star does not seem to me to be
romantic
3. So, the evening star ≠ the morning star.
4. CK seems to Lois to be a nerd
5. SM does not seem to be a nerd
6. So, CK ≠ SM
De Re & De Dicto
•
Ralph believes that someone is a spy
–
–
1.
2.
3.
4.
There is someone whom R believes is a spy (de re)
R believes that there are spies (de dicto)
Lois believes that CK is a nerd
CK = SM
So, SM is the man that Lois believes is a nerd
But not, Lois believes that SM is a nerd
Motivations for the Theory of
Forms
• TF accounts for objectivity in ethics
(Cherniss)
• TF accounts for the distinction between
knowledge and sensation/opinion (Cherniss)
• TF accounts for the instability in the
phenomena (Cherniss)
• TF accounts for how words get their
meaning (White)
Motivations from the Elenctic
Dialogues
• TF may provide substance to Socratic
Eudaemonism
• TF may account for the possibility of
inquiry (and knowledge in general)
• TF may provide a justification for the
Socratic concern with definition
Basic Motivation: Sample
Expressions
• “Socrates is virtuous”
• “Euthyphro’s prosecution of his father for murder
is pious”
• “Martha is strong”
• “My shirt is blue”
• “If anything else is beautiful besides the beautiful
itself, it is beautiful for no other reason at all other
than that it participates in that beautiful; and the
same goes for all of them.” [Phaedo 100c4-6;
Gallop trans.]
Secondary Expressions
• “Piety is good”
• “Virtue is teachable”
• “Yellow is a color”
• F-ness is G
• X is F
Three Components of Analysans
1. the ordinary objects - Euthyphro’s prosecution,
Socrates, Martha, my shirt
2. the Form - virtue/the virtuous itself, piety/the
pious itself, strength/the strong itself, and
yellowness/the yellow itself
3. a relationship that holds or fails to hold between
the ordinary object and the Form; when the
ordinary object stands in this relation to the
Form, the sentence is true, and when it does not
the sentence is false.
[R] ‘a is F’ iff [Ex] ‘a’ refers to x, [EF] ‘F’ refers to
F, and x is appropriately related F.
Two Models
Paradigm Model
[P] ‘a is F’ iff [Ex] ‘a’ refers to x, [EF] ‘F’ names F and F
is a paradigmatic example, and x resembles
(sufficiently) F.
Property Model
[U] “a is F” iff [Ex] ‘a’ refers to x, [EF] ‘F’ refers to F
and F is a property, and x has or instantiates F.
Phaedo 65d4-66a10
Well now, what about things of this sort, Simmias? Do we say that there
is something just, or nothing? …
And again, something beautiful and good? …
Now did you ever yet see any such with your eyes? …
Well did you grasp them with any other bodily sense-perception? And I’m
talking about them all - about largeness, health, and strength, for example,
- and, in short, about the Being of all other such things, what each one
actually is; is it through the body that their truest element is viewed, or
isn’t it rather thus: whoever of us is prepared to think most fully and
minutely of each object of his inquiry, in itself, will come closest to
knowledge of each? …
Then would that be achieved most purely by the man who approached
each object with the intellect alone as far as possible, neither adducing
sight in his thinking, nor dragging in any other sense to accompany his
reasoning; rather using his intellect alone by itself and unsullied, he would
undertake the hunt for each of the things that are, each alone by itself and
unsullied ; he would be separated as far as possible from his eyes and ears,
and virtually from his whole body, on the ground that it confuses the soul,
and doesn’t allow it to gain truth and wisdom when in partnership with it:
isn’t it this man, Simmias, who will attain that which is, if anyone will? …
[Phaedo 65d4-66a10; Gallop trans.]
Data Set 1
• Examples:
– The just itself
– The beautiful
– The good
– Largeness
– Health
– Strength
• A General statement: “in short, about the Being of all other
such things, what each one actually is” (ton allon heni logoi
hapanton tes ousias ho tugxanei hekaston on) [Phaedo 65d13e1; Gallop trans.]
• Properties of Forms:
– epistemological access through reason alone (dianoia &
logimos)
– alone by themselves and unsullied (auto kath’ hauto
eilikrines)
Second Argument
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
“if anyone is to be reminded of a thing, he must have known that thing at
some time previously.” [73c1-2; Gallop trans.]
“if someone, on seeing a thing, or hearing it, or getting any other senseperception of it, [a] not only recognizes that thing, but also thinks of
something else, [b] which is the object not of the same knowledge but of
another, don’t we then rightly say that he’s been ‘reminded’ of the object of
which he has got the thought?” [73c6-d1; Gallop trans.]
There is equality (74a9-b1)
We know what it is (74b2-3)
We got this knowledge of equality by perceiving equal things (74b4-7)
Equality is distinct from equal things (74b8-74c6) – [2b]
We learn equality by perceiving equal things by noticing the latter’s
deficiency to the former (74c7-75a10) – [2a]
So, we knew equality before noticing this deficiency (75b1-c6)
Generalized to all forms (75c7-d5)
But, we have not always had this knowledge (75d6-76d6)
So, TR <-> Forms (76d7-77a5)
Data Set 2
• Examples
– The equal itself, equality
– Beauty
– Justice
– Holiness
– Goodness
• A General statement: “it concerns everything on which we set this seal
‘what it is’ (to auto ho esti), in the questions we ask and in the answers
we give.” [Phaedo 75d1-3; Gallop trans.]
• Properties of Forms
– distinct from sensibles/ordinary objects
– superior to sensibles/ordinary objects
– Sensibles/ordinary objects resemble Forms, but are in some way
deficient
– Forms are known prior to birth
– Perception stimulates knowledge of Forms
Phaedo 78c10-79a7
Let us then return to those same things with which we were dealing
earlier, to that reality of whose existence we are giving an account in our
questions and answers; are they ever the same and in the same state, or do
they vary from one time to another; can the Equal itself, the Beautiful
itself, each thing in itself, the real, ever be affected by any change
whatever? Or does each of them that real is, being uniform by itself,
remain the same and never in any way tolerate any change whatever?
It must remain the same, said Cebes, and in the same state, Socrates.
What of the many beautiful particulars, be they men, horses, clothes, or
other such things, or the many equal particulars, and all those which bear
the same name as those others? Do they remain the same or in total
contrast to those other realities, one might say, never in any way remain
the same as themselves or in relation to each other?
The latter is the case, they are never in the same state
These latter you could touch and see and perceive with the other senses,
but those that always remain the same can only be grasped by the
reasoning power of the mind? They are not seen but are invisible?
That is altogether true, he said.
Do you then want us to assume two kinds of existences the visible and the
invisible? (Grube trans.)
Data Set 3
• Examples
– The equal itself
– The beautiful itself
• A General Statement: “each thing in itself, the real” (auto
hekaston ho estin, to on) (78d3-4)
• Properties of forms
–
–
–
–
–
Unchanging
Uniform (moneides)
Independent (auto kath’ hauto)
Invisible
Known by reason
Phaedo 100b1-c2
This, he said, is what I mean. It is nothing new, but what I
have never stopped talking about, both elsewhere and in
the earlier part of our conversation. I am going to try to
show you the kind of cause with which I have concerned
myself. I turn back to those oft-mentioned things and
proceed from them. I assume the existence of a Beautiful,
itself by itself, of a Good and a Great and all the rest. If
you grant me these and agree that they exist, I hope to
show you the cause as a result, and so to find the soul to be
immortal.
Take it that I grant you this, said Cebes, and hasten to your
conclusion. [Grube trans.]
Phaedo 100c3-e7
Consider then, he said, whether you share my opinion as to what
follows, for I think that if there is anything beautiful besides the
Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in
that beautiful, and I say so with everything. …
I no longer understand or recognize those other sophisticated causes,
and if someone tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a bright
colour or shape or any such thing, I ignore these other reasons - for all
these confuse me - but I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to
this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or
the sharing in, or however you may describe is relationship to that
Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of
the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the
Beautiful. That, I think is the safest answer I can give myself or
anyone else. And if I stick to this I think I shall never fall into error.
This is the safe answer for me or anyone else to give, namely, that it is
through Beauty that beautiful things are made beautiful. Or do you not
think so too? …
And it is through Bigness that big things are big and the bigger are
bigger, and that smaller things are made small by Smallness? [Grube
trans.]
Data Set 4
• Examples
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
The beautiful
Largeness
Smallness
Tallness
Shortness
Bigness/numerousness
Duality/twoness
Unity/ Oneness
• Relations between
Forms and ordinary
objects
– Participate (metexei)
– Present in (parousia)
– Associates with
(koinonia)
Continued
General statements:
• “If there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it
is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in
(metexei) that Beautiful, and I say so with everything. Do
you agree to this sort of cause (aitia)?” [Phaedo 100c4-6;
Grube trans.]
• “that nothing else makes it beautiful other than presence of
(parousia), or the sharing in (koinonia), or however you
describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for
I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship,
but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful.”
[100d4-8; Grube trans.]
• “it is through Beauty that beautiful things are made
beautiful.” [100e2-3; Grube trans.]
Symposium 210-211
• it is ever-existent and neither comes to be nor perishes, neither waxes
nor wanes (210e6-211a2)
• it is not beautiful in part and in part ugly, nor is it such at such a time
and other at another, nor in one respect beautiful and in another ugly,
nor so affected by position as to seem beautiful to some and ugly to
others (211a2-5)
• existing (on) ever (aei) in singularity of form (monoeides) independent
(auto kath’ hauto) by itself (meth’ hauto) (211b1-2)
• while all the multitude of beautiful things partake of (metexonta) it in
such wise that, though all of them are coming to be and perishing, it
grows neither greater nor less, and is affected by nothing (211b2-5)
• But tell me, what would happen if one of you had the fortune to look
upon essential beauty (auto to kalon) entire, pure (eilikrines) and
unalloyed (katharon, ameikton); not infected with (anapleon) the flesh
and color of humanity, and ever so much more of mortal trash? What if
he could behold (katidein) the divine beauty itself (auto to theion
kalon), in its unique form (monoeides)? (211e1-4)
Data Set 5
• The Beautiful itself
• Properties:
–
–
–
–
–
–
Immortal
Unchanging
Absolute, i.e. unqualified or non-relative
Independent (auto kath’ hauto meth’ hauto)
Pure (eilikrines, katharon, ameikton, anapleon)
Moneides
• Relation: participation
• Epistemological access: stimulated through ordinary
objects, but directly viewed
Phaedrus 247 & 249
• What is in this place is without color and without shape and without
solidity, a being that really is what it is (ousia ontos ousa), the subject
of all true knowledge, visible only to intelligence, the soul’s steersman.
(247c6-d1; Nehamas/Woodruff trans.)
• On the way around it has view of Justice as it is; it has a view of Selfcontrol; it has a view of Knowledge – not the kind of knowledge that is
close to change, that becomes different as it knows the different things
which we consider real down here. No, it is knowledge of what really
is what it is (ho estin on ontos). (247d5-e4; N/W trans.)
• But a soul that never saw the truth cannot take a human shape, since a
human being must understand speech in terms of general forms (kat’
eidos), proceeding to bring many perceptions (ek pollon ion
aistheseon) together into a reasoned unity (eis hen logismoi). That
process is the recollection of the things our soul saw when it was
traveling with god, when it disregarded the things we now call real and
lifted up its head to what is truly real instead (to on ontos). (249b6-c4;
N/W trans.)
Data Set 6
• Examples
– Justice
– Temperance
– Knowledge
• Properties
–
–
–
–
–
Colorless
Shapeless
Not solid
Visible only to nous
General
• what really is what it is (ho estin on ontos)