Transcript Document
Energy Security: The Role for Nuclear Energy Jor-Shan Choi Professor, G-COE Project Nuclear Engineering & Management Department Tokyo University, Japan 81-3-5841-2954 Choi@lnuclear .jp 3rd Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Energy Security News Plaza Hotel, Beijing, China March 25-26, 2008 Presentation Outline • Current Status • What will the Nuclear Future be? • Key Issues for nuclear power development • The situation Today • A New Vision – Toward a New Nuclear Regime • Where we might go Current status* 439 nuclear power plants 35 under construction USA 104 (1**), 787.2 TWh France 59, 418.6 TWh Japan 55 (1), 266.4*** TWh Russia 31 (7), 147.8 TWh China 11**** (6), 62.6 TWh India 17 (6), 15.6 TWh (Parenthesis) = (# of unit under construction) * Taken from Power Reactor Information system, IAEA As of 31 December 2007 ** Watts Bar 2 construction resumed on 15 Oct. 2007 *** Lower than last year due to shutdown of 16 BWRs **** Will have nuclear capacity of 40 GWs by 2020 Nuclear share of electricity (2006) in the world* * Taken from Power Reactor Information system, IAEA Expansion mainly in Asia* New connections Under construction 0 5 10 All other * Taken from Power Reactor Information system, IAEA 15 20 25 Far East & S. Asia 30 35 What will the Nuclear Future (20-40 years) be? I don’t know and neither do you Need to look out 50+ years Some rather certain trends: Population will grow – 6 billion to at least 7.5 billion in 2020 World primary energy needs will grow and electricity will grow faster Fossil fuels in energy production and use will account for vast amount of carbon emissions U.S. plants (nuclear and fossil) will age, and some will retire (38GW nuclear and 71GW fossil by 2015 (EIA)) 320GW of new U.S. capacity by 2015; 1/3 of new domestic electricity plants through 2015 are needed simply as replacements Life extension of nuclear can be advantageous Future energy growth 1) Increased energy demand 2) Environmental concerns Carbon concentration Temperatures Key Issues for Nuclear Energy Development Economics/Financing Nuclear safety Security and proliferation concerns Spent fuel and waste management, environment PLUS Acceptability Infrastructure “It’s the economics” Nuclear is expensive to build, cheap to run Comparison of Energy Density: New nuclear most attractive where 1 kWh 3 kWh 4 kWh 50,000 kWh 6 million kWh energy demand growth is rapid alternative resources are scarce energy supply security a priority reducing air pollution and GHGs a priority financing can look longer-term low risk premium 60 sq.m sun light 1 kg coal 1 kg gasoline 1 kg nat. uranium 1 kg plutonium 1 kg plutonium = sun light from ½ surface area of Singapore GEN III Reactors: Areva EPR Westinghouse AP1000 General Electric ABWR AECL Candu ACR1000 Others Competitiveness of new nuclear plant* For new nuclear plant to be economically competitive with combined-cycle natural-gas plants, the capital costs must be reduced, or natural gas price be increased, or both ALWR capital cost, $/KWe Electricity generation cost, $/MWhr Natural gas price to CCGT, $/MMBTU 1,000 41.5 3.8 1,100 44.5 4.2 1,200 47.5 4.8 1,300 50.5 5.1 1,400 53.5 5.5 1,500 55.5 5.8 1,600 58.5 6.2 * Taken from “Atoms for Peace after 50 years: The new challenges and opportunities,” CGSR, LLNL, December 2003. Comparison of electricity generating costs Nuclear Safety Nuclear power generation has an excellent safe-operation record (as demonstrated by the high availability factor) However, the nuclear industry also experienced two major accidents in its operating history (Three-Mile Island in 1979, and Chernobyl in 1986) Can these accidents happen again? How can a good safety culture be in-forced world-wide? Security and Proliferation Issues: Physical protection of nuclear installation Transportation of nuclear materials IAEA safeguards Spread of sensitive technologies (enrichment/reprocessing) Requirement for underground repository The Situation Today Growing interest on nuclear power Spread of sensitive fuel-cycle technologies Research reactor fuel No operating HLW/SNF repositories Growth of SNF >230,000 MT worldwide, inventory grows at ~ 10,000 MT/yr >45,000 MT in the U.S., inventory grows at ~ 2,500 MT/yr Many countries planning on SNF disposal What are the concerns? What are the opportunities? A New Vision - A New Nuclear Regime Proposals IAEA Director General M. ElBaradei (Economist, 10/16/03) US President G. Bush (Speech at NDU, 2/11/04) IAEA Multinational Approach (MNA) to nuclear fuel cycle (2/22/05) Others 1. J. S. Choi and T. Isaacs, “Toward a new nuclear regime,” ICAPP 03 Proceedings, Apr. 2003 2. V. Reis, M. Crozat, J. S. Choi, and R. Hill, “Nuclear fuel leasing, recycling and proliferation: Modeling a global view,” Nuclear Technology, vol. 150, no.2, May 2005 3. E. Moniz, et. al, “Making the world safe for nuclear energy.”, a MIT paper. 4. Putin, System of International Fuel Cycle Center 5. World Nuclear Association, Ensuring Security of Supply of the International Fuel Cycle 6. Intergovernmental Working Group, Assurance of Fuel Supply through Multilateral mechanism 7. Japan, IAEA Standby Arrangements System for Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply 8. Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 50M$ LEU Fuel Bank, under IAEA Auspices 9. Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) Forming a global network of nuclear fuel cycle facilities* Reducing non-proliferation and waste burden Natural U Spent Fuel Storage PWR Spent fuel Spent fuel Conversion U Fuel reprocessing Enrichment Depleted U LEU fuel Fabrication Spent fuel fissile material s U fuel Fabrication HLW Pu TRU DUPIC fuel Fabrication MOX fuel Fabrication Repository Repro. U Fast Rx fuel Fabrication Fresh fuel transport Member Country 1 Member Country 2 Member Country 3 Member Country 4 …. Spent fuel transport • J. S. Choi, “An innovative fuel cycle concept with nonproliferation and waste considerations for small and medium sized reactors,” International Seminar on Status and Prospects for Small and Medium Sized Reactors, Cairo Egypt, May 27-31, 2001 A Global Network of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities • Is not necessarily a regional nuclear fuel cycle center • Does not need to be within a national boundary • Could be formed by framework of contractual agreements among companies (and countries in which companies are operating) • Is intended to provide a cradle-to-grave fuel cycle services to countries wanting only nuclear electricity generation • Nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the network must comply with international safety standards and safeguards requirements Most fuel-cycle services are provided today except for spent fuel storage and waste disposal. Bilateral/multilateral cooperation are needed to complete the network Some Elements of a Vision Countries have access to nuclear power at market prices Nuclear fuel supplies are assured at competitive prices Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is returned to appropriate countries for management and disposal under international control Spread of sensitive fuel cycle technologies (Enrichment/reprocessing) reduced or eliminated The Crucial Role of Waste Management Provide a secure home for - Excess weapons materials - Spent Nuclear Fuel Regional/international solutions driven by security considerations Repositories and storage become instruments of security, more than utility dumping grounds Can a Spent Fuel Take-Back Initiative Work? Some Caveats Costs and Capacity Public acceptance Legal considerations Opportunities? Currently taking back research reactor spent fuel from countries receiving US-origin fresh fuel Could it help the acceptance of repositories if take-back contributes to important national security and international stability dimensions? Where We Might Go A new view on repository success Shared fuel cycle facilities Fresh fuel assurances Spent fuel take-back or take-away Regional repositories GNEP ? Challenges What are the security risks for repositories? What is the role of IAEA? Should assurances be provided to avoid the spread of enrichment/reprocessing? How to deal with concept of take-back or take-away? Is there a new bargain? Can we live in a nuclear have/have not world? Tokyo University: Global COE Program Nuclear Non-Proliferation • To coexist with the peaceful use of nuclear energy • To identify the technological and systematic problems