Transcript Diapositiva 1

COMMENTS TO THE SOUTH-WEST
EUROPE ELECTRICITY REGIONAL
ENERGY MARKET
Draft detailed action plan version 1, 22 June 2007
AGENDA
• MIBEL, Results since July 1-2007
• Comments to the south-west
electricity regional energy market
Europe
• INTRADAY Market Coupling / Continuous
trading Proposal
MIBEL. Results since July 1 2007
MIBEL, Since July 1 2007
• Market Splitting in the Day ahead and in the 6 intraday
market sessions
 Different prices for the Spanish and Portuguese systems in case of
congestions
 Similar to other market splitting implementations
• Unilateral market splitting in the other borders continue
operational
 In the French Interconnection, participants with acquired rights have
priority
 All agents from the other systems pay/receive the Spanish price
• Intraday market coupling works as day ahead market
coupling but in an adjustment mode over the day ahead
plus bilateral contracts results
MIBEL results since July 1 2007
MIBEL results since July 1 2007
MIBEL results since July 1 2007
PERÍODO DEL 01/06/2007 AL 19/07/2007
cEur/kWh
MWh
16
15
14
13
1.400.000
Precio medio aritmético de la energía en el mercado diario de electricidad
Periodo
Precio España
Precio Portugal
01/06/2007 19/07/2007
3,768 cEur/kWh
4,890 cEur/kWh
1.300.000
1.200.000
1.100.000
12
1.000.000
11
10
900.000
9
800.000
8
700.000
7
600.000
6
500.000
5
400.000
4
300.000
3
Precio máximo MIBEL
Precio medio aritmético sistema eléctrico portugués
Precio medio aritméticosistema eléctrico español
Precio mínimo MIBEL
Energía casada en el mercado diario
Energía casada en el mercado diario + Ejecutada en bilaterales físicos
19/07/07
17/07/07
15/07/07
13/07/07
11/07/07
09/07/07
07/07/07
05/07/07
03/07/07
01/07/07
29/06/07
27/06/07
25/06/07
23/06/07
21/06/07
19/06/07
17/06/07
15/06/07
13/06/07
11/06/07
0
09/06/07
0
07/06/07
100.000
05/06/07
1
03/06/07
200.000
01/06/07
2
Fechas
MIBEL results since July 1 2007
MIBEL results since July 1 2007
MIBEL results since July 1 2007
MIBEL results since July 1 2007
MIBEL results since July 1 2007
COMMENTS TO THE SOUTH-WEST EUROPE
ELECTRICITY REGIONAL ENERGY MARKET.
point 3.
Comments to point 3.III.4
• Intraday explicit capacity auctions of OPTIONS to use the
cross border capacity is not a good solution
 The intraday time frame makes them very difficult to manage by
agents and SO
 Although the integration of intraday explicit auctions with MIBEL
intraday market coupling is working it is not widely use by agents
 Implicit auctions are more adequate for intraday markets also.
 Increasing the number of intraday explicit auction sessions will
aggravate the operational problems instead of solving them
• ELBAS is not a “mechanism”, it is a market operated by a
market operator
• To study the proposal for integrating the CW REM target
market with the current MIBEL intraday auction markets.
They are compatible and can coexist without any problem
Comments to point 3.III.5
• Under the current situation in Central Europe, the coupling
of the MIBEL market should be made with the TLC market
rather than with France, as stated in 3.III.5
• Similar solution as the one that will be given to the TLCNordpool coupling
COMMENTS TO THE SOUTH-WEST EUROPE
ELECTRICITY REGIONAL ENERGY MARKET.
point 4.1
Comments to point 4.1
• The commercial capacity increase between the Iberian
Peninsula and France is very important in order to close the
gap between the MIBEL electricity prices and the Central
Europe prices
• The interconnection needs, status and actions to be taken
are well defined while the paper presents the situation in an
undefined situation
• The actions should go in the direction of supporting the
currently established steps rather than initiating a parallel
process
COMMENTS TO THE SOUTH-WEST EUROPE
ELECTRICITY REGIONAL ENERGY MARKET.
point 4.2
Comments to point 4.2
• The actions to implement the transparency requirements in
the SW REM need to include the market operator, and
should not be based only on SO as indicate don the last
paragraph of point 4.2.
 SO should publish the information of the process that they manage
 MO should publish the information of the markets that they manage
COMMENTS TO THE SOUTH-WEST EUROPE
ELECTRICITY REGIONAL ENERGY MARKET.
point 4.3
Comments to point 4.3 (I)
• The steps mentioned at the beginning of point 4.3 are very reasonable,
but the deliverables do not follow the steps in some cases.
• Deliverable III.1
 enquires when the activation of redispatching costs is coordinated between
both TSO’s when, in our opinion, there should not be relation between the
redispatching costs of one system and the other, since theses redispatchs
should be combined with the rest of internal problems, and all of them
solved together, leading to totally unrelated costs.
 Capacity allocation to different time frames should not be related to
capacity calculation.
• Deliverable III.2
 Implementation of “use-it-or-sell-it” mechanism is already part of the phase
3 agreement and this is what should be implemented as soon as possible.
 Under this deliverable the creation of balancing perimeters in Spain is
mentioned.
• The way in which the Spanish system handles deviations right now (a single
perimeter managed by an independent SO) is, in our view, better for promoting
the entrance of new agents and to decrease market power exercise possibilities.
• This is an internal subject that is unrelated with cross-border trade
Comments to point 4.3 (II)
• Deliverable III.3
 The deliverable should be a clear route towards implementing phase
3 of the regulators agreement. The initial phase of coordintaing the
market closing hours is obvious and does not mean any progress
towards the real integration.
 If no clear view of how to achieve phase 3 is foreseen, alternatives
measures should be taken going back to the initial steps of the
process
• Deliverable III.4
 Instead of trying to improve the current intraday explicit auctuions
of options over the capacity, an implicit intraday market coupling
solution, combined with a continuous “first come first served”
procedure for the last hours should be investigated.
 Implementing intraday markets is referred in this deliverable as a
TSO business when, at least in Iberia, it is a Power Exchange
market, carried out under the limitations impose by the TSOs).
Comments to point 4.3 (III)
• Deliverable III.5
 Cross border balancing markets should be implemented as the last
resort for solving problems after the cross border intraday markets
are fully operational
INTRADAY Market Coupling /
Continuous trading Proposal
Description
• The proposal is to run six times a day (one every four hours
as an example) auction intraday markets based on market
splitting/coupling to deal with cross-border congestions,
trading all the hours remaining of the day ahead, and to
allocate spare cross-border capacity, for the hours where
there will not be another auction intraday market running, in
a continuous intraday market that allocates the crossborder capacity on a coordinated “first come first served
basis”.
MARKET ORGANIZATION
AUCTION MARKETS
LAST HOURS INTRADAY
ALLOCATION
RESULTS
DAY-AHEAD MARKET
+
Day-Ahead
Market Result
Market
Splitting/Coupling
6 INTRADAY MARKETS
INTRADAY FIRST COME FIRST
SERVED CONTINUOUS
COORDINATED ALLOCATION
Intraday auction
Market Result
+
Market
Splitting/Coupling
First come first served
allocation results
EXAMPLE OF FIRST AUCTION INTRADAY TIMING
FIRST INTRADAY MARKET
HOURS NEGOTIATED
BID RECEPTION FINISHES
First Intraday Auction Market (28 Hours)
BID RECEPTION STARTS
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 00
EXAMPLE OF FIRST COME FIRST SERVED
ALLOCATION OPEN HOURS PRIOR TO THE FIRST
INTRADAY AUCTION MARKET
FIRST COME FIRST SERVED PERIOD (representing hours after 16 hours)
HOURS AVAILABLE FOR FIRST
COME FIRST SERVED
CONTINUOUS COORDINATED
ALLOCATION
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 00
EXAMPLE OF FIRST COME FIRST SERVED
ALLOCATION OPEN HOURS AFTER TO THE FIRST
INTRADAY AUCTION MARKET
FIRST COME FIRST SERVED PERIOD
HOURS AVAILABLE FOR FIRST
COME FIRST SERVED
CONTINUOUS COORDINATED
ALLOCATION
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 00
EXAMPLE OF SIX AUCTION INTRADAY
NEGOTIATING HOURS
First intraday market (28 hours)
Second intraday market 2 (24 hours)
Third intraday market (20 h.)
Intraday 4 (17 hours)
Intraday 5 (13 h.)
Intraday 6 (9 h.)
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 00
Justification (I)
• Some systems have a very important percentage of thermal
units and, for them, in order to start a unit during the day
they need a reasonable assurance that they are going to
obtain a viable schedule for the unit.
• The new Combined Cycle Gas Units, among other
characteristics, have a fast startup time (in the order of one
to two hours) which makes them very adequate to solve
intraday energy needs of other participants.
• Wind power production is becoming more and more
important in many systems and the wind predictions are
much more accurate closer to real time. For this kind of
energy having liquid intraday markets is very important to
update (buy or sell) the whole hourly remaining schedule
for the wind farm at a market price.
Justification (II)
• While the day-ahead cross border congestion direction on a border in a
very significant number of hours goes in the same direction as the
explicitly auctioned capacity rights, and other forms of price risk
coverage, intraday normally responds to new system or participant
problems, like thermal plant failures, general mistakes in temperature
predictions, mistakes or updates in wind predictions, etc.. therefore it
can need flows in any direction. Day-ahead coupling mechanism will
normally leave fully occupied the interconnections in the “predicted”
economic direction, leaving the full capacity, and the netted capacity, in
the other direction free to solve intraday participant’s needs that require
it.
• The commercial capacity published by the system operators prior to
day ahead, without a precise knowledge of the power plant schedules,
could possibly be improved after the day-ahead results are available
since then they can rerun the security packages with totally precise
data. The new capacity can be incorporated to the intraday markets.
Justification (III)
• After a number of years of discussions, the “First come first
served” method of allocating the cross border capacity in
the day-ahead horizon, has been abandoned. For intraday
trading it seems to be a better proposal to use the market
splitting/coupling also for some auction sessions during
the day, and to leave the “First come first served” method
of allocating capacity for the last hours, where coordinating
different systems could be impractical.
• The liquidity in the experiences of continuous intraday
markets with “first come first served” cross-border
allocation seems to be bigger in the hours closer the
negotiating moment, with this proposal we can obtain the
advantages of both kinds of markets, a market
splitting/coupling solution for hours not so close to real
time and a continuous intraday market, trading closer to
real time (next 4-6 hours).
Justification (IV)
- The auction intraday markets can be introduced gradually.
The number of sessions does not need to start being six, or
any number, the method can start with a couple of sessions
and add later more intraday auction sessions, according to
participants needs.
Operation (I)
• The matching mechanism will work essentially in the same
way as the day-ahead market, including the
splitting/coupling mechanism.
• Since the market is closer to real time than the day-ahead
market, and taking into account the possible needs of the
participants, it could be advisable to offer the bidders a
more complete set of complex or block conditions to be
used in their bids.
Operation (II)
• It is possible for the same participant to send selling and
buying bids for the same intraday session, if the session is
cheap, he will buy, and if it is expensive he will sell (very
useful for hydro participants)
• In order to be compatible with the secure operation of the
system, and depending on the different systems
characteristics, the possibility of accepting, prior to
receiving the bids for the intraday session from the
participants, limitations to bidders, or groups of bidders,
from the system operator will improve the acceptance by
system operators of the auction intraday markets. This is a
real problem and if it is not handled in the market there will
be a mechanism or procedure established by the system
operator to solve the situation.