Transcript Slide 1

SOCIAL CAPITAL AND CORRUPTION:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE
INTERVENING ROLE OF GOOD
GOVERNANCE
Riccardo Ferraresso
Bryce Peterson
Daiwon Lee
John Jay College of Criminal Justice/CUNY Graduate Center
Presentation Outline
I.
II.
III.
Intro
Present Study
Methods
i.
ii.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
Data
Analytic Strategy
Hypotheses
Results of Analyses
Conclusions
Implications
Intro
• Social Capital  Corruption (-)
Intro
• Social Capital  Corruption (-)
• Social Capital  Governance Performance (+)
Intro
• Social Capital  Corruption (-)
• Social Capital  Governance Performance (+)
• Governance Performance Corruption (-)
Present Study
• Goal: of the study is to examine the paths
between social capital, governance performance,
and corruption.
• Contributions
1. Clarify the role social capital plays in reducing
corruption
2. Examine the direct and intervening role of governance
in explaining the level of corruption
3. Cross-national study with large sample of countries
4. Potential research implications
6
Hypotheses
Governance
Social
Capital
Controls
•Gini Index
•GDP
•Mean Education
•# Years Democracy
H1 -
Corruption
7
Data
◦ World Values Survey (1996-2008)
◦ World Bank – Governance Indicators (2002-2006)
◦ 192 countries
◦ Transparency International – Corruption Perception Index
◦ UNDP – Human Development Index (1983-2002)
◦ 126 countries
◦ World Development Indicators (2002-2005)
◦ 178 countries
◦ Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation – University of
Washington (2002)
◦ 174 countries
◦ Treisman, 2007 (2000)
◦ 173 countries
8
Variables
Variables
Mean
Min/Max
Alpha
5.4271
0.3/8.8
-
30.6957
.2650
21.37/35.40
.04/.74
.884
-
13.6261
4.84/21.66
.955
8.5780
0.90/13.65
226.24/63686.
68
0/70
24.40/59.30
-
Corruption
Perception of Corruption (n=86)
Social Capital
Civism (n=86)
Interpersonal Trust (n=86)
Governance
Quality of Governance(n=86)
Controls
Education (n=84)
GDP (n=83)
Years Democratic (n=84)
Gini Index (n=81)
13295.58
25.19
37.2741
-
9
Analytic Strategy
• Path Analysis
– Four-step process
• Step 1: Social Capital  Corruption
• Step 2: Social Capital  Governance
• Step 3: Governance  Corruption
• Step 4: Full Model
10
Findings – Hypothesis One
Social Capital  Corruption
Social Capital
Civicism
-.005 (.055)
Interpersonal
Trust
-.138* (.961)
Controls
Education
-.033 (.05)
Years
Democratic
GDP
Gini
-.194*(.009) -.653** (0) -.037(.016)
11
Note:Coefficients are standardized;Standard errors are in parentheses. **p< .001, *p<.05, two-tailed
Findings – Hypothesis Two
Social Capital  Governance
Social Capital
Controls
Civicism
Interpersonal
Trust
Education
Years
Democratic
GDP
Gini
-.059 (.119)
.024 (2.066)
.156* (.108)
.119(.019)
.655** (0)
-.047(.035)
12
Note:Coefficients are standardized;Standard errors are in parentheses. **p< .001, *p< .05, two-tailed
Findings – Hypothesis Three
Governance  Corruption
Controls
Governance
Education
Years
Democratic
GDP
Gini
-.548**(.045)
.068(.042)
-.190*(.007)
-.296** (0)
-.010(.013)
13
Note:Coefficients are standardized;Standard errors are in parentheses. **p< .001, *p< .05, two-tailed
Findings – Hypothesis Four
Full Model
Social Capital
Governance
Civism
-.553**(.044) -.038 (.045)
Interpersonal
Trust
Controls
Education
Years
Democratic
-.125* (.779) .054(.042) -.128† (.007)
GDP
Gini
-.29* (0)
.063(.013)
14
Note:Coefficients are standardized;Standard errors are in parentheses. **p< .001, *p< .05, †p< .10, two-tailed
Discussion
• Only generalized trust is a good predictor of lower levels of
corruption
• Social capital does not impact the quality of governance
– Cross national application
• Both social capital and good governance contribute to lower levels
of corruption
– But governance is particularly important
15
Implications & Future Research
• Test different ways to construct social capital
• Include more developing countries
• Test mediation at country level
• Use multi-level modeling to test the full model
16
Contact Information
Riccardo Ferraresso - [email protected]
Daiwon Lee - [email protected]
Bryce Peterson - [email protected]
17