Transcript Document

Proven Helicopter Risk Reduction Measures
June 2007
Latin America Regional
International Helicopter Safety Symposium
ABRAPHE International Flight Safety Seminar
Sao Paulo, Brazil
Bob Sheffield
Shell Aircraft Ltd &
IHST Executive Committee
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
1
Overview
• The current problem and the goal for
improvement
• What’s been proven already
• What remains to achieve the goal
• Justifying the necessary risk mitigation
measures
• Conclusions and summing up
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
2
Three Main Points
• The risk of flying in a helicopter is an order of magnitude
greater than in an airliner– we have a problem
• Helicopter safety can be improved significantly – we can fix
it:
– Proven risk mitigations are available for helicopters.
– We need new helicopters built to the latest design standards.
• To be effective at lowest possible cost requires a combined
effort from:
– Regulators
– Manufacturers
– Operators
– Their customers
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
- we need your help
3
Cooperation is Key
• The best safety records come from those
operations where either regulatory oversight or
corporate care is highest.
• Corporate care is usually more expensive and
less effective when the operators serve
customers with different standards.
• If everyone in the industry (manufacturers,
operators, regulators, and their customers) works
together to implement the known, cost-effective
solutions, these risk mitigations will be more
effective and less costly.
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
4
Oversight and Air Safety Performance
Currently Vary Greatly with
the Type of Operation
•
•
•
•
Fatal Accidents/million hrs
Commercial airline
0.6
Commuter airline
2.0
Offshore helicopter transportation
6.2
Helicopter support for seismic operations
23.0
… and across operators within a given type of
operation
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
5
While airline safety trends are
improving,
Helicopter safety trends are not
improving.
GOM Offshore Accident Rate/100K Hours with 3 Year Moving Average
We know we have a problem,
and we are confident that we
know how to fix it.
4.00
3.50
3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
Accidents
3 year moving average)
While this chart shows helicopter accident rates for the U.S. Gulf of Mexico (GOM) the
same trend holds worldwide – the rate is getting worse.
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
6
Opportunities for Safety Improvements
•
The airline industry has made significant improvements in its safety record
over the last 30 yrs through the introduction of:
– Damage tolerant design; system redundancy; improved
reliability/crashworthiness
– Modern flight simulators
– Engine and vibration monitoring systems to identify incipient failures
– Safety Management Systems and Quality Assurance to reduce human
errors
– Flight data monitoring programs (FOQA)
– Disciplined take-off and landing profiles (e.g. stabilised approach)
– EGPWS/TAWS; TCAS
•
All of these are available today for helicopter operations and are being
implemented in some parts of the helicopter industry.
•
However some helicopter industry segments have adopted few of these
measures.
•
We need to apply all these risk reduction measures to all helicopter
operations.
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
7
The Helicopter Safety Goal
• OGP Safety Commitment: “The individual risk
per period of flying exposure for an individual
flying on OGP contracted business should be
no greater than on the average global airline.”
• This goal coincides with IHST’s goal of
reducing the current helicopter accident rate
by 80%.
• This presentation will show you how this goal
can be achieved.
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
8
Overview
• The current problem and the goal for
improvement
• What’s been proven already
• What remains to achieve the goal
• Justifying the necessary risk mitigation
measures
• Conclusions and summing up
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
9
Shell’s Fatal Air Accident Rate
STRATEGIC
SAFETY TARGETS
Safety System
Support
Research
Industry
Influence
20
Safety Performance
Air Contractors
15.1
13.2
13.7
5 Year Moving Average
11.3
12
16
Standards
Development
Airworthiness - Human
Factors - Secondary Safety
Log. (5 Year Moving Average)
Target
2000
8
5.8
Target
2005
5
4
4
2.9
4
4
4.2
2
Target
2008
2
Target '08
01-06
01-05
00-04
99-03
98-02
96-00
95-99
94-98
93-97
92-96
91-95
90-94
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
0
97-01
0
0
Fatal Accident Rate per million flying hrs
Audit/
Advice
10
>10
~2
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
11
Overview
• The current problem and the goal for
improvement
• What’s been proven already
• What remains to achieve the goal
• Justifying the necessary risk mitigation
measures
• Conclusions and summing up
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
12
Shell Aircraft Analysed Accident Data to Evaluate
Potential Risk Mitigations
•
•
•
•
•
•
OGP published data on offshore accidents – GOM and Worldwide
NASA/TM – 2000-209579 – US Civil Helicopter Accidents 1963 – 1997
Individual NTSB/AAIB Accident Reports
Annual Business Turbine Accident Review 1993 through 2003 – Breiling
Associates
Design Reviews
FAA Final Rules – 14CFR Parts 27 and 29 and associated NPRMs
– Amendments 12 through 47 (Part 29)
– Amendments 11 though 40 (Part 27)
•
•
•
•
•
Type Certificate Data Sheets for offshore helicopters
Design certification reviews with Sikorsky and Eurocopter specialists on S76
and AS332
CAA Paper 2003/1 – Helicopter Tail Rotor Failures
UKCAA Mandatory Occurrence Reports for S76 and AS332
SINTEF Helicopter Safety Study 2 – Dec 99
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
13
In Sum - What Have We Learned?
•
Essential Pre-requisites for Safe Operations
–
•
Equipment fit
–
–
•
HUMS/VHM/EVMS
Engine monitoring
Flight Simulator training
Human error in maintenance
–
–
–
•
Helicopter Landing Officer and Helideck Assistant training
Helideck procedures
System failure management
–
–
–
•
Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring (HFDM, also known as HOMP or FOQA)
Flight simulator training in LOFT scenarios emphasising CRM
Helideck performance profiles
Helideck management
–
–
•
Appropriate to the operation
HUMS/EGPWS/TCAS and cabin egress modifications
Pilot procedures
–
–
–
•
Safety culture supported by Quality and Safety Management systems
Human factors training
Duplicate inspections/RIIs
HUMS/VHM/EVMS
All these items are addressed in OGP’s Aircraft Management Guide, and will mitigate
risk, but they are unlikely to achieve the long term safety goal.
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
14
All But The Latest Helicopters Have Significant
Design Gaps
•
•
•
•
•
“Most important issues would be to improve helicopter design and
continuous airworthiness” - SINTEF
“The evidence that tail rotors were … not meeting the spirit of
airworthiness requirements, was stark and compelling” – UK CAA
“ ..This means that the helicopter is not considered airworthy without
HUMS installed and in function.” – Norwegian Committee for Review
of Helicopter Safety
Typical aircraft in common use today - AS-332 Super Puma, Bell 412, and S76 were designed to requirements that are now over 25 years old
Latest design requirements offer:
–
–
–
–
Improved performance with one engine inoperative
Redundant systems with flaw tolerance
Fail safe designs
Digital flight management systems to reduce pilot workload, improve situational
awareness, and help cope with emergencies
– Crashworthy airframe, fuel cells, and passenger/crew seats
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
15
Old Cars & Vans
• How many of you are driving vehicles like these with:
–
–
–
–
No seat belts or shoulder harnesses
No anti-skid braking system (ABS)
No airbags
Low power engines with normally aspirated carburettors
• How many companies would use such vehicles to transport
their workers?
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
16
Old Helicopters
• Yet many helicopter operations still use aircraft such as B212
and AS350 that were designed in a similar era (1960/70’s)
and to equivalent safety standards.
• Whilst certification standards for new design aircraft have
changed, these models have continued to be built to old
certification standards under “grandfather rights.”
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
17
We Have Clear Opportunities for Improvement
•What has the airline industry
done in the intervening years?
–Damage tolerant design,
system redundancy,
improved reliability
–Modern flight simulators
–Engine and vibration
monitoring systems to
identify incipient failures
–Safety Management Systems
to reduce human errors
–Flight data monitoring
programs (FOQA)
–Disciplined take-off and
landing profiles (e.g.
stabilised approach)
–EGPWS/TAWS; TCAS
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
•Helicopter mitigation available
now or in the near future:
–Damage tolerant design,
improved handling qualities,
glass cockpit
–High fidelity simulators +
LOFT with CRM
–HUMS/VHM/EVMS –
resourced and managed
–Quality/SMS, Ops Controls,
Helideck Management
–HOMP/HFDM – resourced and
managed
–Performance Class1/2e &
helideck operating profiles
–EGPWS/TCAS
18
New Types
EC 135
Sikorsky S92
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
Agusta Westland 139
EC 225
19
Overview
• The current problem and the goal for
improvement
• What’s been proven already
• What remains to achieve the goal
• Justifying the necessary risk mitigation
measures
• Conclusions and summing up
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
20
Percentage of Accidents Reported in NASA Study
Preventable by Individual Mitigation Measures
Latest Design Standards
Simulator Training + CRM/LOFT
Measures
Quality/SMS/Ops Controls
HUMS/VHM
Seven Key
Initiatives
Flight Data Monitoring
Disciplined T/O & Ldg Profiles
EGPWS/TCAS
Requires development work
Tail Rotor Impact Warning
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
0.0
5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0
Percentage accidents prevented
21
Proving That Risk Reduction
Measures are Justified
• Use a layered defence model in Microsoft Excel as
a predictive tool to calculate the incremental risk
reduction for a given measure.
• Apply the risk reduction in question to the
expected exposure; i.e., number of helicopters,
flying hours per year, and number of passengers
per flight.
• Use the incremental cost to calculate the implied
cost of avoiding a fatality (ICAF) and the
individual risk of fatality per annum (IRPA).
• Compare these outcomes to your company’s risk
management guidelines; e.g., ICAF of $50 million,
IRPA of 1 in 10,000.
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
22
Mitigation Potential – NASA Data for Generic Twin
1 Pilot related (in air)
%
Level 1
Mitigation
In flight collision with object
14.3
Airport/helipad/fence
5.7 IW
Wire
4.3 EGPWS/TCAS
Other-trees, brush, acft
4.3 EGPWS/TCAS
Loss of control
14.7
Handling
6.3 DR/HQ
Loss of reference/disorientation
3.0 Training
System deficiency
2.3 DR
Misc/undetermined
3.0 Training
In flight collision with terrain
5.7 EGPWS/TCAS
Weather
4.0 Training
On ground/water collision with object
3.3 IW
Hard landing
2.7 Training
Mid air collision
2.0 EGPWS/TCAS
Rollover/Noseover
1.3 HOMP
Subtotal %
48.0 %
2 Technical
Loss of engine power
13.0
Engine structure
5.0
Fuel system related
5.7
Other
2.3
Airframe component/system 29.6
Main rotor
6.3
Main rotor drive train
4.3
Main rotor control system 3.7
Tail rotor
3.3
Tail rotor drive train
6.3
Tail rotor control system 2.3
Other airframe
3.3
Fire/explosion
1.7
Gear collapsed
2.0
Subtotal %
46.3
3 Other
Rotor contact -person
Misc/other
Subtotal %
2.7
3.0
5.7
MF1
Level 2
Mitigation
MF2
Level 3
Mitigation
MF3
Overall
MF
0.50
0.75
0.75
SMS/QA/OC
SMS/QA/OC
IW
0.43
0.43
0.43
HOMP
HOMP
Training
0.38
0.38
0.34
Accidents
prevented
%
0.82
4.65
0.91
3.94
0.90
3.92
0.60
0.45
0.50
0.45
0.75
0.45
0.50
0.45
0.75
0.50
HOMP
DR/HQ
HOMP
HOMP
HOMP
SMS/QA/OC
SMS/QA/OC
PC 1/2e
Training
DR/HQ
0.43
0.51
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.55
0.38
0.51
Training
HOMP
Training
PC 1/2e
Training
PC 1/2e
Training
DR/HQ
HOMP
Training
0.34
0.38
0.34
0.49
0.34
0.49
0.34
0.45
0.38
0.34
0.85
0.83
0.81
0.84
0.90
0.84
0.81
0.86
0.90
0.84
0.00
5.37
2.49
1.89
2.51
5.12
3.35
2.70
2.30
1.81
1.11
41.16
DR
PC 1/2e
PC 1/2e
0.50
0.65
0.65
PC 1/2e
DR
DR
0.55
0.43
0.43
HUMS
0.49
SMS/QA/OC 0.38
HUMS
0.49
0.89
0.87
0.90
4.43
4.95
2.09
DR
DR
DR
DR/HQ
DR/HQ
DR/HQ
DR
DR
DR
%
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.60
0.60
0.60
0.50
0.50
0.50
HUMS
HUMS
HUMS
HUMS
HUMS
HUMS
SMS/QA/OC
SMS/QA/OC
SMS/QA/OC
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.43
0.43
0.43
SMS/QA/OC
Training
Training
SMS/QA/OC
Training
Training
Training
Training
Training
0.38
0.34
0.34
0.38
0.34
0.34
0.34
0.34
0.34
0.86
0.85
0.85
0.89
0.88
0.88
0.81
0.81
0.81
5.44
3.69
3.12
2.96
5.58
2.05
2.70
1.34
1.62
38.36
SMS/QA/OC
HOMP
%
0.50
0.50
SMS/QA/OC
Training
0.43
0.38
Training
0.34
SMS/QA/OC 0.38
0.81
0.81
2.16
2.42
4.58
Factor
0.85
Factor
0.75
Total accidents prevented (= % effectivity of mitigation measures)
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
Effectiveness of mitigation measures %
84.10
Key
Risk mitigation measures applied to accident causes with 3 levels of diminishing efficacy.
23
Example: Old vs. New Design
1 Pilot related (in air)
%
Level 1 Mitigation
In f l i g h t co l l i si o n w i th 14.3
o b j ect
Airport/helipad/fence
5.7 IW
Wire
4.3 EGPW S/ TCA S
Other-trees, brush, acft 4.3 EGPW S/ TCA S
Lo ss o f co n tr o l
14.7
Handling
6.3 DR/ HQ
Loss of reference/disorientation
3.0 Tr a i n i n g
System deficiency
2.3 DR
Misc/undetermined
3.0 Tr a i n i n g
In f l i g h t co l l i si o n w i th ter
in
S/ TCA S
5.7 r aEGPW
W ea th er
4.0 Tr a i n i n g
On g r o u n d / w a ter co l l i si
w i th o b j ect
3.3o n IW
Ha r d l a n d i n g
2.7 Tr a i n i n g
M i d a i r co l l i si o n
2.0 EGPW S/ TCA S
Ro l l o ver / N o seo ver
1.3 HOM P
Subtotal %
MF1
Level 2
Mitigation
MF2
Level 3
Mitigation
MF3
Overall Accidents
MF
prevented
%
0 .0 0
0 .3 8
0 .3 8
SM S/ QA / OC
SM S/ QA / OC
IW
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
0 .0 0
HOM P
HOM P
Tr a i n i n g
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .3 4
0 .4 3
0 .6 4
0 .5 9
2 .4 1
2 .7 7
2 .5 4
0 .0 0
0 .4 5
0 .0 0
0 .4 5
0 .3 8
0 .4 5
0 .0 0
0 .4 5
0 .3 8
0 .0 0
HOM P
DR/ HQ
HOM P
HOM P
HOM P
SM S/ QA / OC
SM S/ QA / OC
PC 1 / 2 e
Tr a i n i n g
DR/ HQ
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
0 .0 0
0 .3 8
0 .0 0
Tr a i n i n g
HOM P
Tr a i n i n g
PC 1 / 2 e
Tr a i n i n g
PC 1 / 2 e
Tr a i n i n g
DR/ HQ
HOM P
Tr a i n i n g
0 .3 4
0 .0 0
0 .3 4
0 .0 0
0 .3 4
0 .0 0
0 .3 4
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .3 4
0 .3 4
0 .4 5
0 .3 4
0 .4 5
0 .5 9
0 .6 8
0 .6 2
0 .4 5
0 .6 1
0 .3 4
2 .1 4
1 .3 5
0 .7 9
1 .3 5
3 .3 2
2 .7 4
2 .0 6
1 .2 0
1 .2 3
0 .4 5
48.0 %
0 .0 0
24.33
2 Technical
DR
Fuel system related
5.7 PC 1 / 2 e
Other
2.3 PC 1 / 2 e
A i r f r a m e co m p o n en t/ sy
stem
29.6
Main rotor
6.3 DR
Main rotor drive train
4.3 DR
Main rotor control system 3.7 DR
Tail rotor
3.3 DR/ HQ
Tail rotor drive train
6.3 DR/ HQ
Tail rotor control system 2.3 DR/ HQ
Other airframe
3.3 DR
Fire/explosion
1.7 DR
Gear collapsed
2.0 DR
Subtotal %
5.0
%
Level 1 Mitigation
In f l i g h t co l l i si o n w i th 14.3
o b j ect
Airport/helipad/fence
5.7 IW
Wire
4.3 EGPW S/ TCA S
Other-trees, brush, acft 4.3 EGPW S/ TCA S
Lo ss o f co n tr o l
14.7
Handling
6.3 DR/ HQ
Loss of reference/disorientation
3.0 Tr a i n i n g
System deficiency
2.3 DR
Misc/undetermined
3.0 Tr a i n i n g
In f l i g h t co l l i si o n w i th ter
in
S/ TCA S
5.7 r aEGPW
W ea th er
4.0 Tr a i n i n g
On g r o u n d / w a ter co l l i si
w i th o b j ect
3.3o n IW
Ha r d l a n d i n g
2.7 Tr a i n i n g
M i d a i r co l l i si o n
2.0 EGPW S/ TCA S
Ro l l o ver / N o seo ver
1.3 HOM P
Subtotal %
MF1
Level 2
Mitigation
MF2
Level 3
Mitigation
MF3
Overall Accidents
MF
prevented
0 .0 0
0 .7 5
0 .7 5
SM S/ QA / OC
SM S/ QA / OC
IW
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
0 .0 0
HOM P
HOM P
Tr a i n i n g
0 .3 8
0 .3 8
0 .3 4
0 .6 4
0 .9 1
0 .8 3
3 .6 3
3 .9 4
3 .6 1
0 .6 0
0 .4 5
0 .5 0
0 .4 5
0 .7 5
0 .4 5
0 .0 0
0 .4 5
0 .7 5
0 .5 0
HOM P
DR/ HQ
HOM P
HOM P
HOM P
SM S/ QA / OC
SM S/ QA / OC
PC 1 / 2 e
Tr a i n i n g
DR/ HQ
0 .4 3
0 .5 1
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
0 .5 5
0 .3 8
0 .5 1
Tr a i n i n g
HOM P
Tr a i n i n g
PC 1 / 2 e
Tr a i n i n g
PC 1 / 2 e
Tr a i n i n g
DR/ HQ
HOM P
Tr a i n i n g
0 .3 4
0 .3 8
0 .3 4
0 .4 9
0 .3 4
0 .4 9
0 .3 4
0 .4 5
0 .3 8
0 .3 4
0 .8 5
0 .8 3
0 .8 1
0 .8 4
0 .9 0
0 .8 4
0 .6 2
0 .8 6
0 .9 0
0 .8 4
5 .3 7
2 .4 9
1 .8 9
2 .5 1
5 .1 2
3 .3 5
2 .0 6
2 .3 0
1 .8 1
1 .1 1
%
48.0 %
0 .0 0
39.20
2 Technical
Lo ss o f en g i n e p o w er 13.0
Engine structure
1 Pilot related (in air)
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
PC 1 / 2 e
DR
DR
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
HUM S
SM S/ QA / OC
HUM S
0 .4 9
0 .3 8
0 .4 9
0 .4 9
0 .3 8
0 .4 9
2 .4 4
2 .1 3
1 .1 4
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
HUM S
HUM S
HUM S
HUM S
HUM S
HUM S
SM S/ QA / OC
SM S/ QA / OC
SM S/ QA / OC
0 .5 5
0 .5 5
0 .5 5
0 .5 5
0 .5 5
0 .5 5
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
SM S/ QA / OC
Tr a i n i n g
Tr a i n i n g
SM S/ QA / OC
Tr a i n i n g
Tr a i n i n g
Tr a i n i n g
Tr a i n i n g
Tr a i n i n g
0 .3 8
0 .3 4
0 .3 4
0 .3 8
0 .3 4
0 .3 4
0 .3 4
0 .3 4
0 .3 4
0 .7 2
0 .7 0
0 .7 0
0 .7 2
0 .7 0
0 .7 0
0 .6 2
0 .6 2
0 .6 2
4 .5 6
3 .0 5
2 .5 8
2 .4 0
4 .4 5
1 .6 4
2 .0 6
1 .0 3
1 .2 4
46.3 %
27.46
Lo ss o f en g i n e p o w er 13.0
DR
PC 1 / 2 e
Other
2.3 PC 1 / 2 e
A i r f r a m e co m p o n en t/ sy
stem
29.6
Main rotor
6.3 DR
Main rotor drive train
4.3 DR
Main rotor control system 3.7 DR
Tail rotor
3.3 DR/ HQ
Tail rotor drive train
6.3 DR/ HQ
Tail rotor control system 2.3 DR/ HQ
Other airframe
3.3 DR
Fire/explosion
1.7 DR
Gear collapsed
2.0 DR
Engine structure
5.0
Fuel system related
5.7
Subtotal %
0 .5 0
0 .6 5
0 .6 5
PC 1 / 2 e
DR
DR
0 .5 5
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
HUM S
SM S/ QA / OC
HUM S
0 .4 9
0 .3 8
0 .4 9
0 .8 9
0 .8 7
0 .9 0
4 .4 3
4 .9 5
2 .0 9
0 .5 0
0 .5 0
0 .5 0
0 .6 0
0 .6 0
0 .6 0
0 .5 0
0 .5 0
0 .5 0
HUM S
HUM S
HUM S
HUM S
HUM S
HUM S
SM S/ QA / OC
SM S/ QA / OC
SM S/ QA / OC
0 .5 5
0 .5 5
0 .5 5
0 .5 5
0 .5 5
0 .5 5
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
0 .4 3
SM S/ QA / OC
Tr a i n i n g
Tr a i n i n g
SM S/ QA / OC
Tr a i n i n g
Tr a i n i n g
Tr a i n i n g
Tr a i n i n g
Tr a i n i n g
0 .3 8
0 .3 4
0 .3 4
0 .3 8
0 .3 4
0 .3 4
0 .3 4
0 .3 4
0 .3 4
0 .8 6
0 .8 5
0 .8 5
0 .8 9
0 .8 8
0 .8 8
0 .8 1
0 .8 1
0 .8 1
5 .4 4
3 .6 9
3 .1 2
2 .9 6
5 .5 8
2 .0 5
2 .7 0
1 .3 4
1 .6 2
46.3 %
38.36
3 Other
Rotor contact -person
Misc/other
Subtotal %
SM S/ QA / OC
3.0 HOM P
2.7
0 .5 0
0 .5 0
SM S/ QA / OC
Tr a i n i n g
0 .4 3
0 .3 8
Tr a i n i n g
SM S/ QA / OC
0 .3 4
0 .3 8
5.7 %
0 .8 1
0 .8 1
2 .1 6
2 .4 2
4.58
Factor
0.85
Factor
Total accidents prevented (= % effectivity of mitigation measures)
Expected FAR =3.05 per
million flying hours
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
0.75
56.38
3 Other
SM S/ QA / OC
HOM P
Rotor contact -person
2.7
Misc/other
3.0
Subtotal %
5.7 %
0 .5 0
0 .5 0
SM S/ QA / OC
Tr a i n i n g
0 .4 3
0 .3 8
Tr a i n i n g
SM S/ QA / OC
0 .3 4
0 .3 8
Factor
0.85
Factor
0.75
0 .8 1
0 .8 1
2 .1 6
2 .4 2
4.58
82.14
Total accidents prevented (= % effectivity of mitigation measures)
Expected FAR = 1.25 per
million flying hours
24
ICAF and IRPA
• ICAF = Incremental Cost per Annum
divided by the Incremental Lives Saved
per Annum
– Incremental Lives Saved per Annum =
(Incremental Reduction in Fatal Accident
Rate) * (Flying Hours per Annum) *
(Average Number of Occupants) * (Average
Percentage of Occupants Killed in Fatal
Accidents)
• IRPA = (Fatal Accident Rate) *
(Individual Flying Hours per Annum) *
(Average Percentage of Occupants Killed
in Fatal Accidents)
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
25
Shell’s Helicopter Replacement
Plan
Early Model Types
S76 A/B, B212, B214ST,
S61N, AS365N etc
Exposure
Hours
(per annum)
1200 +
Mid-Generation Types
A109 Power, AS332L,
B412EP, S76C etc
As soon as reasonably
practicable, AND no later
than next contract renewal.
By 1 Apr 2008
By 1 Apr 2008
By 1 Apr 2011
By 1 Apr 2011
By 1 Apr 2013
600 < 1200
< 600
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
26
Overview
• The current problem and the goal for
improvement
• What’s been proven already
• What remains to achieve the goal
• Justifying the necessary risk mitigation
measures
• Conclusions and summing up
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
27
How To Achieve the Air Safety Goal
• Customers must commit to the goal and contract for higher
standards.
• Manufacturers must support HUMS/VHM/EVMS, the latest design
standards (FAR 29 - 47) and provide affordable solutions for legacy
aircraft.
• Operators must adopt proven global best practices as their minimum
standard
• Regulators must support proven global best practices.
• All stakeholders must support these initiatives:
– Transition to new aircraft built to the latest design standards on new
contracts.
– Require annual training in flight simulators to practice crew coordination
during emergency procedures.
– Equip all helicopters with Vibration & Health and Engine Monitoring
Systems such as HUMS/VHM/EVMS
– Require operators to implement quality and safety management systems.
– Require operators to implement HFDM (HOMP).
– Require operators to fly profiles that minimize the risks of engine failure.
– Equip all helicopters with EGPWS/TAWS (or AVAD) and TCAS/ACAS
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
28
We have many imperatives to make these
improvements!
• Respect for people – the disparity between helicopter safety and airline safety
•
•
•
•
ALARP – we know what can be done and that the cost is not disproportionate to the benefits to be gained
The Ford Pinto story
The “Red Face” test
Good business sense – safer operations will attract more customers.
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
29
OGP’s Life-Saving Target Set in 2005
• In 10 years of OGP offshore and seismic helicopter operations with
– Fatal accident rate – 6.4 per million hours – 23 per million hours
• 51 fatal accidents – 15 fatal accidents
• 250 fatalities – 40 fatalities
• In 10 years of OGP offshore and seismic helicopter operations with
– Fatal accident rate – 2.0 per million hours (like current North Sea
record)
• 18 fatal accidents – 0.8 fatal accidents
• 78 fatalities – 2.3 fatalities
Lives saved – 172 and 38
• In 10 years of OGP offshore and seismic helicopter operations with
– Fatal accident rate – 1.0 per million hours
• 9 fatal accidents – 0.4 fatal accidents
• 39 fatalities – 1.1 fatalities
Lives saved – 211 and 39
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
30
My Plea To All of You
• Please join the IHST and contribute your
knowledge and data to the process.
• Help us “raise the bar” for all helicopter
operators.
– Make helicopter safety a feature that attracts
customers.
– Make the best risk reduction measures more
affordable.
• Support IHST goal of reducing helicopter
accidents by 80% and by implementing the
risk reduction measures featured in this
presentation.
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
31
Questions?
International Helicopter Safety Team
Latin America Regional - June 2007
32