Transcript CICERO - Embajada de Noruega en Argentina

Latin-America and the G-77
before COP-15: Opportunities,
positions and the impacts of
climate chage
Sjur Kasa, PhD, Senior Research Fellow,
CICERO, University of Oslo
Presentation overview
• CICERO
• G77 and developing countries in climate
negotiations, traditional positions
• New developments; B(R)ICs emerging, new
concerns for the impacts of climate change
• Changing developing country positions around
Bali meeting (2007)
• Current deadlock: Economic problems in the
North and demands from the South
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First a little about CICERO…
• An independent research center associated
with the University of Oslo
• Founded in 1990 by the Norwegian
government as a private foundation under the
University of Oslo
• Twofold mandate:
– conduct research, and
– provide information about issues of climate
change
• Research Council of Norway/EU main source of
funding
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Interdisciplinary research
in four areas
1. Scientific basis
2. Mitigation and costs
3. Impacts, vulnerability and adaptation
4. International agreements and policy
instruments
A staff of 70 people, mainly funded by project
funding from EU, Norwegian Research Council
Crossdisciplinary: Natural science, economics,
social science
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And now to the topic…the group
of developing countries (G77) in
the climate negotiations
• Established during first UNCTAD (1964)
• Main organization for developing countries in
the UN system, loosely organized
• Leadership circulated between Latin-America,
Africa, Asia (presently Sudan)
• China is ”associated member”, hence the
concept ”G77 and China.”
• Today: More than 130 countries
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G77 – a heterogeneous group
• AOSIS – 39 low lying island states very
vulnerable to climate change (sea-level rise)
• Least developed countries (mainly poor
countries in Africa, Asia)
• OPEC
• Large and rapidly growing developing
countries: Brazil, South-Africa, China, India
(G20)
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Very important for emissions of
greenhouse gases (now 50%!)
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But of course low per capita
emissions (industrial/energy)
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Traditional positions in the
climate negotiations
• Article 3.1 in UNFCCC: ”Common but
differentiated responsibilities”
• Means: The industrial countries must accept
strong commitments and pay for mitigation
and adaptation in the South.
• Traditionally trong resistance to commitments
by developing countries
• Strongest proponent in Latin-America: Brazil
(Argentina and Mexico more cooperative)
• No obligations under Kyoto, but reporting and
CDM participation.
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New development 1: B(R)IC
growing more important
• In G77, China, India and Brazil emerge as
major world powers during the 2000s.
• Sustaining increasingly independent policies,
less emphasis on extracting aid and benefits
from the North, more focused on trade,
financial flows and market access (G20)
• Recently: Brazil, China and India have better
public finances and less damage from the
current devastating financial crisis.
• Increasingly aware of vulnerability to climate
change and benefits from cuts-supported Bali
Plan
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Strongest warming will emerge
in the South (”bus. as usual”
2090-2099)
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Increasing worries over climate
impacts - Cline: Agriculture 2080
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Loss of productive potential in
agriculture 2080 (Cline, 2007)
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Latin-America: Agriculture in
Brazil 2020(Pinto, UNICAMP,
Best temperature scencario
2008)
21 % less land for soya
29% fall in soya exports
Decline in production of rice,
coffee, beans, manioc, maize
And:
Dramatic increases of drought
and poverty in North-East
Cuts in hydropower production
But also:
Increase in bioethanol
productivity (CO2fertilization)
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Biosystems and social systems
perspectives on vulnerability in LAmerca
• Major problems in the Amazon region (Jones
et al., Nature Geoscience, 2009):
- 2 degrees warming – 20-40% of the Amazon
rain forest goes
- 3-4 degrees warming – 75-85% of the forest
destroyed
- comes in addition to other drivers of
deforestation
- massive consequences for global climate and
regional ecosystems and agriculture
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One crucial social vulnerability:
Inequality in Latin America
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But also enormous potential
benefits: Biofuels
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Global biofuel potentials 2050
(FAO, 2008)
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Other BRICs also vulnerable
India – uniquely vulnerable in agriculture, also
vulnerable to glacier melting in the Himalayas,
China – perhaps less vulnerable than India, but
very concerned about agriculture and sea-level
rise as well as glacier melting in the
Himalayas. Massive drought in North China
2009.
LDCs – large impacts and often low adaptive
capacity to climate change due to poverty
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Reasons to be optimistic: BRICs
climate plans and targets
• China 2007: Climate action plan:
- better energy efficiency
- 15% of all energy use renewable in 2020,
also more nuclear energy (seeking leadership
in clear energy technologies, e.g. solar)
- adaptation in agriculture; e.g. new rice
species
- adaptation in coastal areas
- afforestation/reforestation
- recently also moving towards carbon
efficiency targets!!
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Brazil – moving in a (much)
more cooperative direction
• Brazil 2008: Climate plan with a promise to
achieve 80% cuts in Amazonian deforestation.
- Lula now pondering MMA proposal of
40% cuts in emissions by 2020. To be
reached by using more biofuels, forest
planting for charcoal and better farming
practices (50%) and cutting emissions from
deforestation (50%)
- Weaker resistance from Itamaraty and
Ministry of Science and Tech., Ministry of the
Environment stronger, strong civil society
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Even India…
• 2008 Plan: ”National missions”
- strong solar energy development
- increasing energy efficiency
- increasing water efficiency
- protecting the Himalayas
- afforestation
- sustainable agriculture: Resilient crops,
agricultural practices
- more research
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However, the demands on the
North remain
• G77 demand: Credible, rapid and strong
emissions cuts in the North (at least 40% by
2020)
• Funding for adaptation and mitigation
measures in the South
(Adaptation fund to be filled by CDM-tax and
donations almost empty in spite of promises,
Bali: USD 80 billion/year needed)
• Transfer of energy and other technologies.
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EU losing its leadership in
climate policy, US still vague
• Last EU-meeting on climate: Half-hearted
promises on funding for developing country
mitigation/adaptation (20% cuts in 2020)
• US more progressive under Obama, but clearly
not willing to pay what developing countries
want, mired in health reform politics and crisis
(and – Senate Plan: Only 20% cuts in 2020)
• The financial crisis and ageing population is
looming: Making Eastern- & Southern Europe
as well as coal-dependent US states concerned
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Emerging crisis in the
negotiations?
• Barcelona, November 3, the ”Africa Group” of
G77 threatens to retreat from the
negotiations, protesting against weak
promises on cutting emissions and failure to
live up to Kyoto, sympathy from other
developing countries.
• However, also some progress on technology
transfer and adaptation funding mechanisms
as well as REDD.
• Most likely not a deal in Copenhagen, perhaps
next year?
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