Transcript ｽﾗｲﾄﾞ ﾀｲﾄﾙなし

Safety operation
of production facilities
Masaki Nakagawa
Mitsubishi Chemical Group
Science and Technology Research Center, INC.
Safety Engineering
and Environmental Integrity Lab.
1,Toho-cho, Yokkaichi,
Mie 510-8530 JAPAN
Objectives
1. To introduce effort to address disaster prevention
of Mitsubishi Chemical Corporation group.
2. To explain safety assessment methodology HAZchart.
Corporate Philosophy
Good “Chemistry”
for Tomorrow
Motto of the Mitsubishi Chemical group
WAVES OF CHANGE!
MAKING CHANGES WORK!
With our customers, for our customers , … and for ourselves
Much faster and more
dynamic ACTION
Much wider and deeper
COMMUNICATION
Much more creative and
passionate INNOVATION
Corporate social
responsibility
Quality
assurance
Disaster
prevention
Occupational
health
and safety
Environmental
conservation
Chemical
safety
Disaster prevention in MCC
Super Stable Identification of Improvement of
Operation
latent hazards Safety technology
Change
control
Safety
Education
Daily safety
control
Technical studies
About Process,
facility maintenance
SR
Super stable
operation
technologies
Substantial preliminary
safety evaluation
Collection and use of
disaster information
The culture of
keeping fundamentals
Substantial daily check
Contents
Safety technology
meeting
HAZchart analysis
Exchange of views
meeting
Ｓ
Ｓ
Ｏ
Ｔ
Priority policies
Technical tradition DB
Training of
maintenance engineer
Safety seminar
Safety
information DB
Safety assessment of
plant /department
HAZchart analysis
Ｓ
Ｓ
Ｍ
Ｔ
Organization Chart for Manufacturing Technologies
in MCC and MCRC
Plants
Maintenance & Engi G
Production Ｇ
Process Safety
Technology G
Maintenance & Engineering
Coodination G
Manufacturing
ManagementＧ
MEC Corp
Environment,Safety & Quality
Technology
Process Manufacturing
Technology
Optimization Ｇ
Process Control Ｇ
Safety Engineering Labo.
Process Development
& Design Labo.
Process Modeling Labo.
Property Labo.
Laboratories
ＰＳＥ
・・・
Ｒ＆ＴＤ
Analytical
Technology &
Production Center
Group Science & Technology
Research Center Inc. (MCRC)
What is
ＳＳＴ ？
Super Stable Technology
Technology to Predict & Prevent Events Interfering
with Stable Operation
O:Operation
Ｓ
Ｓ
Ｏ
Ｔ
M:maintenance
Control/Automation
System Safety
Substance Safety
Human Error
Facility Management
Fatigue/Embrittlement
Vibration
Quality（Discoloration/Composition）
Fouling/Clogging
corrosion
Corrosion
１２
Deployment.
Deployment.
Mixed Failure
Catalyst Deactivation
Foaming
Drift
Shape/Foreign Matter
Ｓ
Ｓ
Ｍ
Ｔ
27
What is SR?
Safety Review
Activity of process overhaul to re-check,
re-review and re-assess process safety.
(whack-a-mole-game)
Implementation
Cause unfolding
of measures
Previous approach
Disasters occur
Disaster A
New approach
SR existing plant
Disaster B
Disaster C
Communicating lessons
throughout MCC Gr.
Disaster D
Identification of latent hazards in shop floor
and implementation of measures
Identification of
Latent hazards
Implementation
of measures
Disasters prevention
before it occur
Spiral of SR Activity
SR activities are joined not only by operators and shop-floor
supervisors who are familiar with routine operation
but also by those from other functions
Exchange of views in
Manufacturing Depertment
Exchange of
views in plant
Re-recognition of hazards
Education of safety technologies
and their transfer to next generation.
Group activities
Line
Managers
Office
Workers
Operators
Companywide
Instructors
RC staff
Exchange of
Views
Designers
Facility
Maniteance
Staff
R&D
Researchers
Safety analysis
support
Risk analysis tool
Plant facilities
< SR (Safety Review) >
Identification of latent hazards
in existing plant
and implementation of measures
HAZchart analysis
< SA (Safety Assessment) >
Systematic management of safety for
building new manufacturing lines
of new products
and modifying existing manufacturing lines
The scope of the analysis is
related to applications where
The results are presented
at the safety technology meeting the reaction is highly exothermic,
toxic gases are handled,
and communicated through
furnaces operated.
the departments in MCC-Gr.
What is HAZchart analysis?
HAZard chart
Quantitative risk analysis tool
Disaster
probability
10-2/year
The tool for Identification of latent hazards
Standardization of scenario modeling procedure
Querying three situations repeatedly
Finding phenomenon
Recovery action
Consecutive phenomena
The probability of accident can be calculated easily.
Risk improved by
1/10,000
10-6/year
HAZchart analysis forces us to consider
the worst cases scenario
HAZchart analysis can be applied to improve
the safety of the plant.
Features of HAZchart
＜HAZchart Procedure＞
Modeling
accident scenario
by three queries
of three situations
Selection
of the fault mode
of the equipment
<Example of FT>
Transformation
to the FT
And
Calculation
frequencies
Reactor explosion
Pressure rise
Temperature rise
～
Examining
consequences
associated with
fault mode
of equipment.
Safety valve failure
Interlock failure
Temperature restoration
failure
Branches are broken down
up to some level in which
there are reliability data
or human error data.
Risk Matrix
High
＞
UNACCEPTABLE
＞
ACCEPTABLE
Medium
Low
Negligible
Consequence Level
High
１
Medium ２
Low
３
Extremely４
Low
A
B
C
Incredible Extremely Low
Low
D
E
Medium High
Probability Level
Application
-Existing process XX analysisPurpose: To study existing plant safety level
Area : Whole existing XX process
Procedure
１．Training of the Plant staff
２．Plant staff trained his operators
to be able to execute HAZchart analysis
Support
byS.E.E.Lab
Plant Staff
３．All cases were spread to operators
and they executedHAZchart analysis
by themselves
Operators
４．Results were checked and reviewed
by plant staff
High
Application
Medium
Low
-Existing process XX analysis-
Consequence Level
High
＞
UNACCEPTABLE
＞
ACCEPTABLE
Negligible
１
Medium ２
Low
３
Extremely４
Low
A
B
C
Incredible Extremely Low
Low
D
E
Medium High
Probability Level
☆Safe for high consequence level incident
☆Further study for stable operation
Application
-Modefied process YY analysisPurpose: Quantitative safety analysis
for modification project
Area : Modified part of the process
Procedure
１．Training of the plant staff
２．HAZchart execution by plant staff
３．Process modification study
about highly risky part
４．Check and review
by S.E.E.Lab staff
Support
by S.E.E.Lab
Plant Staffs
Line
Managers
Maintenance
Staffs
Designers
Application
High
Medium
-Modefied process YY analysis-
Low
＞
UNACCEPTABLE
＞
ACCEPTABLE
Negligible
Consequence Level
Lower the probability
High
１
Medium ２
Low
Lower the probability
３
Extremely４
Low
A
B
C
Incredible Extremely Low
Low
D
E
Medium High
Probability Level
☆Process modification, Addition of Interlock system
Hardware modification 1oo1→2oo3
Application example
by HAZchart analysis
1.Redundancy of instruments
( 1 out of 1→ 2 out of 3)
2.Correction of control valve sizing
3.Addition of interlock system
4.Addition of monitoring system
5.Redundancy of shut off valve
6.Addition of nitrogen gas feed system
( dilution of combustible gas)
Application
-MCC’s Actual Record of HAZchart AnalysisSite 1
Site 2
Site 3
Mizushima
Plant 1
Plant 2
Plant 3
Plant 4
Plant 5
Plant 6
Plant 7
Plant 8
Plant 9
☆Process A existing process safety analysis
☆Process B existing / new process safety analysis
・Process C new process safety analysis
☆Existing full process analysis
・New attachment process analysis
・Modification project SA
・New process D SA
・Existing process safety analysis
・Existing process safety analysis
in case of Instrument Air failure
・Analysis of actual incidents
・Modified process interlock system analysis
・New process E SA
☆Existing process safety analysis
・Existing process safety analysis
・New process F SA
・New process G SA
☆Existing full process analysis
☆Existing full process analysis
☆Expansion project SA
・Existing process safety analysis
・Pilot plant SA
☆Existing process safety analysis
・Interlock system analysis
・Modification project SA
・Modification project SA
- SA / TTA
- Existing process
☆ Under study
50 cases
Software
HAZchart analysis method is packaged as a computer program
that can reduce the time required for analysis.
「PHA_Organizer」 is sold by Mitsubishi Research Institute
Application
<PHA_Organizer User>
Asahi Glass, Asahi Kasei Chemicals, Chiba Institute
of science, Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute
Kaneka, Kobe Steel, Mitsubishi Gas Chemical, Mitsui Chemicals
Nippon Petroleum Refining, Okayama University, Showa Denko,
TOSHO, ZEON
<Training performance>
Nippon Petroleum Refining, Asahi Kasei Chemicals,
Mitsubishi Gas Chemical, Kaneka
<Conference>
The study meeting of HAZchart analysis was held at Mizushima
industrial complex area security disaster
Prevention conference.(2003 – 2004)
Conference member :
Asahi Kasei Chemicals, Kurare, ZEON, Mitsubishi Gas chemical
Nippon Petroleum RefiningJapan energy,
Arakawa Chemical, Mitsubishi Chemical
The staffs comment
The scenario which had not been considered can be
visualized by HAZchart analysis.
It is helpful to understand of a plant.
Since an evaluation result is expressed numerically,
selection of systems can be performed easily.
It had not considered that an interlock system might break.
HAZchart is an effective tool for staff training.
Conclusions
1. Safety Review activity is effective for
identification of latent hazards in existing plant
and implementation of measures
2. HAZchart analysis methodology is applicable for
plant design, existing chemical plant safety
reviews, studies of protection systems for
process modification.