Transcript David Hume (1711=1776) [1]

David Hume (1711-1776)
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[1]
David Hume is widely regarded as:
The greatest English philosopher, and
One of the officially Great Philosophers
Lived a quiet and modest life, including several years at a Roman Catholic academy in France
Failed to get university appointments because of his “atheism”
[the quotation marks are probably unwarranted]
His major works are the Treatise of Human Nature, the Enquiry Concerning the Foundations of
Morals, the Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding, and Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion. Also a six-volume History of England.
David Hume (1711-1776)
[2]
“Of the Original Contract” (1748)
This is Hume’s full-front attack on Locke’s Contractarianism
• - Only Consent could, at first, subject people to any authority
• Accepts Hobbes in general outline
• - But - there is obviously no explicit social contract
• - instead, time gradually produces an habitual, and precarious, acquiescence
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Locke’s claim: “These advantages the sovereign promises him in return; and if he fail
in the execution, he has broken the articles of engagement, and thereby freed his subject
from all obligations to allegiance.”
Acquiescence: where you don’t rebel
David Hume (1711-1776)
[3]
“Of the Original Contract” (1748)
This is Hume’s full-front attack on Locke’s Contractarianism
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Acquiescence: where you don’t rebel
- Still, “philosophers [i.e., Locke] assert not only that government in
its earliest infancy arose from consent” .. but that it still is so based.
1. This idea is unreal:
“But would these reasoners look abroad into the world, they would meet with nothing that, in the
least, corresponds to their ideas, or can warrant so refined and philosophical a system.”
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“Everywhere, princes
(1) claim subjects as their property, and assert
(2) their independent right of sovereignty from conquest or succession
AND
(3) subjects acknowledge this right in their prince
(4) .. always
conceived to be independent of our consent”
[Note: a question: should the subject “acknowledge” this alleged right? Can’t we ask that?]
David Hume
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[4]
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Locke’s alleged counter-Claim: it’s the original contract that counts.
Hume: the original agreements are “obliterated by a thousand changes”
and “cannot now be supposed to retain any authority.”
[Recall Lysander Spooner’s piece]
>> Actual governments have been founded originally on usurpation or conquest - Where is the
voluntary association ( - in America, 1776?)
>> election?
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(1) “a few great men decide for the whole and allow no opposition”; Or
(2) “the fury of a multitude” decides for a “seditious ringleader”
Hume asks: >> “Are these disorderly elections of such mighty authority?”
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The real point: “Nothing more terrible than dissolution of government,
which gives liberty to the multitude.”
-> Every wise man wishes to see a general take charge and give to the
people a master, which they are so unfit to choose for themselves.
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The philosopher’s account is unreal
- Human affairs never admit of this consent - only conquest and usurpation
- in plain terms, force
> consent is a just foundation - but “has seldom had place”
David Hume
[5]
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Perfect Morality would make Anarchy work just fine:
“If all men would totally abstain from the properties of others,”
they would have “for ever remained in a state of absolute liberty, without any
magistrate or political society.”
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>> But this is “a state of perfection, of which human nature is justly deemed incapable”
>> it would be absurd to infer a consent by birth to a certain prince ->
Does a poor peasant or artisan literally have free choice to leave his country?
(We may as well assert that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the
master, though he was carried on board while asleep and must leap in the ocean and perish the
moment he leaves her.)
- New people always coming along
-> stability “requires that the new brood should conform themselves to the established constitution”
Some innovations must happen, and it’s nice if they include reason, liberty and justice
- BUT “violent innovations no individual is entitled to make;
[and it’s] even more dangerous from a legislature:
more ill than good is ever to be expected from them...”
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David Hume
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[6]
2. A “More philosophical refutation”
All moral duties may be divided into two kinds:
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1. impelled by natural instinct - love, gratitude, pity
2. not supported by any original instinct, but performed from a sense
of obligation in view of the necessities of human society
examples:
justice or a regard to the property of others,
fidelity or the observance of promises
Instinct prompts us to “indulge in unlimited freedom or to seek dominion over others”
Reflection suppresses such strong passions to the interests of peace and public order.
Can the duty of allegiance be founded on a promise?
“We are bound to obey our sovereign, it is said, because we have given a tacit promise to that
purpose.
But why are we bound to observe our promise?
>> answer: the commerce and intercourse of mankind can have no security where men pay no regard
to their engagements
>> Similarly with government: “without laws, magistrates and judges to prevent the encroachments
of the strong upon the weak, or the violent upon the just - society would be impossible”
-> Therefore, we gain nothing by resolving the one into the other -The general interests or necessities of society are sufficient to establish both.
David Hume
[7]
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Virtue of Stupidity? To whom is allegiance due?
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“The necessities of human society don’t allow of such an enquiry
-- there is no virtue but may be refined away if we indulge a false philosophy in
scrutinizing it”
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Locke says that absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society,
“What authority any moral reasoning can have, which leads into opinions so wide of the
general practice of mankind in every place but this single kingdom, it is easy to
determine.
- “In Plato’s Crito Socrates builds a tory consequence of passive obedience on a whig
foundation of the original contract.
“.... New discoveries are not to be expected in these matters . . .
Concluding Methodological pointer:
“... though an appeal to general opinion may justly, in the speculative sciences of
metaphysics, natural philosophy, or astronomy, be deemed unfair and inconclusive, yet
in all questions with regard to morals, there is really no other standard by which any
controversy can ever be decided.”
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David Hume
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[8]
Hume’s Treatise, part III: Of Morals
Reason is wholly inactive
- can never be “the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of
morals.” ..
Reason influences conduct in only two ways:
1) informing us of the existence of things we’re interested in, or
2) of ways to acquire those
The distinction of good and evil can’t be made by reason
“Take Wilful murder: examine it in detail
- where’s the wrongness? - You won’t find it (in the corpse, say)
You must look for this into your own breast
- where a sentiment of disapprobation is to be found
David Hume
[9]
Hume’s Treatise, part III: Of Morals
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“is” and “ought” :
“the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a
God, or makes observations concerning human affairs
“when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that
instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not,
I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.
This change is of the last consequence
- and shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and a reason should be given,
for what seems altogether inconceivable
- how this new relation can be a deduction from others, - “which are entirely different from it.”
But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers;
and am persuaded, that this small attention wou’d subvert all the vulgar systems of morality,
the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d
by reason.
David Hume
[10]
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Hume and the “naturalistic fallacy”
This famous passage forms the background for much of 20th century moral philosophy
It seems to assert a general split:
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between descriptive and
It raises many questions
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Especially, about the feasibility of Naturalism in moral theory
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Naturalism: the view that claims about what is right and wrong, or ought or ought not to be done,
can be deduced from statements solely of fact or of “relations of ideas”
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Why? Hume says it is because
“Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood” [Here he means “theoretical” rather than “practical”
reason, clearly]
Sentences are true when they “agree” with the facts
Facts as such do not “move the passions.”
The way I feel isn’t “confirmed” by “agreeing with reality”
Passions etc are “original realities, compleat in themselves”
- so, they themselves are neither true nor false
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normative language
David Hume
[11]
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The “naturalistic fallacy”
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Where does this leave us if we are trying to establish foundations for moral
and political thinking??
Hume everywhere points to facts about the way people are, the way they think,
and feel
He evidently thinks that those facts provide resources for us theorists
- How do they do so?
- We must keep that in mind as we go along in Hume’s work...
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David Hume
[12]
Hume’s Treatise, part III: Of Morals
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Hume on Justice
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[compare with the account in the Inquiry, which we’ll consider later in this lecture]
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Is it a Natural or an Artificial virtue?
Answer: Artificial.
[Why not Natural? - Again, compare with his later writing - end of this lecture]
-its motive is via a convention
it characteristically requires actions contrary to private interest
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(like Hobbes, Hume sees that our various interests aren’t directly conducive to
upholding justice:)
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“no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind, as such” public benevolence
cannot be the “original motive to justice” rules of justice are artificial, but not arbitrary
The rules of justice are uniform, inflexible, general, precise Our passions are variable,
particular, and vague
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David Hume
[13]
Hume’s Treatise, part III: Of Morals
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Society
- is absolutely fundamental:
“’Tis by society alone he is able to supply his defects, and raise himself
up to an equality with his fellow-creatures, and even acquire a superiority
above them.”
By society all his infirmities are compensated; and
tho’ in that situation his wants multiply every moment upon him,
yet his abilities are still more augmented, and
leave him in every respect more satisfied and happy,
than ’tis possible for him, in his savage and solitary condition, ever to
become.”
David Hume - Treatise III
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Property
Like Locke, Hume virtually identifies justice with property rights
(in Locke’s broader sense)
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Three sort of goods:
1) internal to the mind
2) “external advantages of the body”
3) external possessions
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type (3) are the problem:
a) vulnerable to the violence of others,
b) transferable without loss or alteration
c) scarce in relation to demand
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Only a “convention” can remedy this problem
[ see also p. 89., Enquiry, App. III]
[14]
David Hume - Treatise III
[15]
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Our passions become directed at the maintenance of the convention,
rather than only at the particular things we’re interested in
“The remedy, then, is
not deriv’d from nature, but from artifice
or, more properly speaking:
nature provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding
for what is irregular and incommodious in the affections.”
Note: modern writers speak of “intuitions”....
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Inclination & necessities, lead us to combine
- which is impossible where each governs himself by no rule and pays no regard to the
possessions of others. [cf. Hobbes’ “state of nature”]
From this, the sentiment of justice has had place, to
some degree or other, in every individual of the human species.
This may justly be esteemed natural.”
David Hume - Treatise III
• Property
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nothing but those goods, whose constant possession
is establish’d by the laws of society;
that is, by the laws of justice.
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Property
Who sees not, for instance, that whatever is produced or improved by a
man’s art or industry ought forever to be secured to him in order to give
encouragement to such useful habits and accomplishments?
[answer: the NDP, the Liberals, and the Tories?]
>> all questions of property are subordinate to the authority of civil
laws, which extend, restrain, modify, and alter the rules of natural justice
according to the particular convenience of each community. [!]
[16]
David Hume - Treatise III
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[17]
• Hume on the “State of Nature”
to be regarded as a mere fiction,
not unlike that of the golden age, which poets have invented;
only with this difference, that
the former is describ’d as full of war, violence and injustice;
whereas the latter is painted out to us, as the most charming and most
peaceable condition, that can possibly be imagin’d.
Hobbesian attitude on the “state of nature”:
“yet I assert not, that it was allowable, in such a state, to violate the
property of others.
I only maintain, that there was no such thing as property; and
consequently cou’d be no such thing as justice or injustice.”
[Hume agrees with Hobbes that ‘justice has there no place’ - but for a somewhat
different reason: notion of property is not defined there.]
- [We will return to his later thought on this toward the end of this session when we look
closely at the Inquiry]
David Hume - Treatise III
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[18]
Justice and Selfishness
•“No one can doubt, that the convention for the distinction of property, and for the stability of
possession, is of all circumstances the most necessary to the establishment of human society,
• after the agreement for the fixing and observing of this rule, there remains little or nothing to
be done towards settling a perfect harmony and concord.
• All the other passions, beside this of interest, are either easily restrain’d, or are not of such
pernicious consequence, when indulg’d:
Vanity, Pity, love are “social passions”
• envy and revenge, tho’ pernicious, operate only by intervals, and are directed against
particular persons, whom we consider as our superiors or enemies.
This avidity alone, of acquiring goods and possessions for ourselves and our nearest
friends, is insatiable, perpetual, universal, and directly destructive of society.
There scarce is any one, who is not actuated by it; and there is no one, who has not reason to
fear from it, when it acts without any restraint, and gives way to its first and most natural
movements.
So that upon the whole,
we are to esteem the difficulties in the establishment of society, to be greater or less,
according to those we encounter in regulating and restraining this passion.
David Hume - Treatise III
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[19]
Justice and Selfishness
’Tis certain, that no affection of the human mind has both a sufficient force, and a proper
direction to counter-balance the love of gain, and render men fit members of society, by
making them abstain from the possessions of others.
• Benevolence to strangers is too weak
• the other passions rather inflame this avidity, when we observe, that the larger our possessions
are, the more ability we have of gratifying all our appetites.
• Using Selfishness to counter selfishness ...
• There is no passion, therefore, capable of controlling the interested affection, but the
very affection itself, by an alteration of its direction.
• ’tis evident, that the passion is much better satisfy’d by its restraint, than by its liberty
• in preserving society, we make much greater advances in the acquiring possessions, than in
the solitary and forlorn condition, which must follow upon violence and an universal licence.
• It is irrelevant whether we think self-interest good or bad:
• For whether the passion of self-interest be esteemed vicious or virtuous, ’tis all a case;
since itself alone restrains it...
David Hume - Treatise III
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[20]
Justice and Selfishness
•Property
•the establishment of the rule, concerning the stability of possession, is not only useful, but even absolutely necessary to human
society,
•but - it can never serve to any purpose. while it remains in such general terms.”
•Some method must be shewn, by which we may distinguish what particular goods are to be assign’d to ea”ch particular
person, while the rest of mankind are excluded from their possession and enjoyment.
•Our next business, then, must be to discover the reasons which modify this general rule, and fit it to the common use
and practice of the world.
•Those reasons are not deriv’d from any utility or advantage, which either the particular person or the public may reap
from his enjoyment of any particular goods, beyond what wou’d result from the possession of them by any other person.
•’Twere better, no doubt, that every one were possess’d of what is most suitable to him, and proper for his use:
•But this relation of fitness may be common to several at once,
•and is “liable to so many controversies, and men are so partial and passionate in judging of these controversies, that
such a loose and uncertain rule wou’d be absolutely incompatible with the peace of human society.”
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David Hume - Treatise III
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[21]
Justice and Selfishness
•Property
• Property
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convention concerning the stability of possession is enter’d into, in order to cut off
all occasions of discord and contention
• this end wou’d never be attain’d, were we allow’d to apply this rule differently in every
particular case, according to every particular utility, which might be discover’d in such an
application.
• Justice, in her decisions, never regards the fitness or unfitness of objects to particular
persons, but conducts herself by more extensive views.
• Whether a man be generous, or a miser, he is equally well receiv’d by her, and obtains
with the same facility a decision in his favour, even for what is entirely useless to him.
David Hume - Treatise III
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Getting Property Going:
1. Present Possession
the first difficulty after the general convention for the establishment of society
is, how to separate their possessions, and assign to each his particular
portion, which he must for the future inalterably enjoy.
This difficulty will not detain them long;
it must immediately occur to them, as the most natural expedient, that
every one continue to enjoy what he is at present master of
property or constant possession be conjoin’d to the immediate
possession.
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[i.e., first possession is the rule... ]
question: what exactly is “possession”?
e. g. we possess a certain animal if we make it impossible for it to escape - but
what is “impossible”?
also, the “title of first possession becomes obscure through time”
David Hume - Treatise III
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[23]
Custom
Such is the effect of custom, that it not only reconciles us to any thing
we have long enjoy’d,
but even gives us an affection for it, and makes us prefer it to other
objects, which may be more valuable, but are less known to us.
but [we] can easily live without possessions, which we never have
enjoy’d, and are not accustom’d to.
’Tis evident, therefore, that men wou’d easily acquiesce in this expedient,
that every one continue to enjoy what he is at present possess’d of;
this is the reason, why they wou’d so naturally agree in preferring it.
- self-defense takes precedence over all
David Hume - Treatise III
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Limitation of present possession:
“its utility extends not beyond the first formation of society
nor wou’d any thing be more pernicious, than the constant observance of it
- restitution wou’d be excluded, and every injustice wou’d be authoriz’d and rewarded.
We must, therefore, seek for
some other circumstance, that may give rise to property after society is once establish’d
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four principles of property:
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Occupation - getting there first, just being there
Prescription - long-term use or occupancy [we leave and return to it...]
Accession - connected to things we already own (as in fruits of trees)
Succession - passing on to one’s children (or whoever??)
[passing goods on to children “naturally presents itself to the mind”]
David Hume - Treatise III
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Limitation of present possession:
“its utility extends not beyond the first formation of society
nor wou’d any thing be more pernicious, than the constant observance of it
- restitution wou’d be excluded, and every injustice wou’d be authoriz’d and rewarded.
We must, therefore, seek for
some other circumstance, that may give rise to property after society is once establish’d
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four principles of property:
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Occupation - getting there first, just being there
Prescription - long-term use or occupancy [we leave and return to it...]
Accession - connected to things we already own (as in fruits of trees)
[calves born of our previously owned cattle; cattle found on the land we acquired ...]
Succession - passing on to “those who are dearest to them” - such as one’s children (or whoever??)
[passing goods on to children “naturally presents itself to the mind”]
David Hume - Treatise III
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Transference of Property by Consent
“fitness or suitability ought never to enter into consideration”
- too much “doubt and uncertainty” affects this rule.
[so,] we must govern ourselves by rules, which are more general in their application, and more free from doubt
and uncertainty.
Of this kind is present possession upon the first establishment of society; and afterwards occupation, prescription,
accession, and succession.
As these depend very much on chance, they must frequently prove contradictory both to men’s wants and desires; and
persons and possessions must often be very ill adjusted.
This is a grand inconvenience, which calls for a remedy.
To allow every man to seize by violence what he judges to be fit for him, wou’d destroy society;
Ther obvious one: that possession and property shou’d always be stable, except when the proprietor consents to
bestow them on some other person.
This rule can have no ill consequence, in occasioning wars and dissentions; since the proprietor’s consent, who
alone is concern’d, is taken along in the alienation:
And it may serve to many good purposes in adjusting property to persons.
Different parts of the earth produce different commodities; and not only so, but different men both are by nature fitted
for different employments, and attain to greater perfection in any one, when they confine themselves to it alone.
All this requires a mutual exchange and commerce; for which reason the translation of property by consent is
founded on a law of nature, as well as its stability without such a consent.
David Hume - Treatise III
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Promises
not “naturally intelligible”
what is the act of promising?
- not a desire to do the thing (we often don’t desire to do the t hing we promise to do)
nor a sentiment: we can change the content of promises easily, but not of our sentiments
- so, there is no “peculiar act of the mind” involved, nor could it yield an obligation
Therefore: it is an invention, “founded on the necessities and interests of society”
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viz.: men are naturally (rather) selfish
“hence I learn to do a service to another, without bearing him any real kindness; because I foresee that he will
return my service ...
And, after I have serv’d him, he is in possession of the advantage arrsing from my action,, he is induced to
perform his part, a foreeseeing the consequences of his refusal”
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“When a man says he promises he in effect expresses a resolution of perfvorming it, and subjects himself to the
penalty of never being trusted again in case of failure”
David Hume - Treatise III
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[sect. VI] further reflexions:
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The three fundamental laws of nature: stability of possession, of its transference by consent, and of the performance of promises.
Society is absolutely necessary for the well-being of men; and these are as necessary to the support of society.
Whatever restraint they may impose on the passions of men, they are the real offspring of those passions, and are only a more artful and
more refin’d way of satisfying them.
Nothing is more vigilant and inventive than our passions; and nothing is more obvious, than the convention for the observance of these
rules.
Our native instincts wouldn’t work to good ends without them
a review of the preceding reasonings may draw some new arguments, to prove that those laws, however necessary, are entirely artificial, and
of human invention; and
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consequently that justice is an artificial, and not a natural virtue.
1. the quality of ‘property’ would be indiscernible without human conventions
2. virtues and vices “run insensibly into each other”, but justice is precise and definite
3. all of our motives are particular; when general, they are rough. So the “universal and inflexible
laws” of justice can’t be natural
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“On the whole, then,it’s the voluntary convention and artifice of men which makes the first
interest (rules);
the sense of moralilty follows naturally: augmented by “the public instructions of politicians
and the private education of parents”
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David Hume -
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Origin of Government:
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The “universal and inflexible observance of the rules of justice” is extremely
advantageous to all
- since only by them do we escape that wretched and savage condition, the state of
nature.
[and you have to be a real dummy to think otherwise...]
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So, why are we ever unjust?
- because the evils of injustice are “remote”, while gains from it may be near at hand...
When viewed in general and abstractly, we prefer justice
on a “nearer approach”, short-run interests set in
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This won’t be corrected without “correcting this propensity” So we set up agencies with
“no interest in injustice” “Here, then, is the origin of civil government and society” also
act as judges as well as executants
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David Hume -
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Why government works ...
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“Magistrates find an immediate interest in the interest of any considerable part of their subjects.
They need consult no body but themselves to form any scheme for the
promoting of that interest.
And as the failure of any one piece in the execution is connected, tho’ not immediately, with the
failure of the whole, they prevent that failure,
- because they find no interest in it, either immediate or remote.
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Thus bridges are built; harbours open’d; ramparts rais’d; canals form’d;
fleets equip’d; and armies disciplin’d; every where, by the care of government,
which, tho’ compos’d of men subject to all human infirmities,
becomes, by one of the finest and most subtle inventions imaginable,
a composition ... in some measure, exempted from all these infirmities”
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[uh, huh ....!]
David Hume -
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Allegiance (sect VIII)
North American Indians manage to live
”in concord and amity” w/o government
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The old theory [i.c. Locke’s...]
“The consent of men, in establishing government, imposes on them a new
obligation, unknown to the laws of nature.
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This conclusion, however, is entirely erroneous;
the obligation quickly takes root of itself ... independent of all contracts.
David Hume -
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Hume on “the laws of nature”
These philosophers observe, that society is as ancient as the human species, and
those three fundamental laws of nature as ancient as society:
1) stability of possession
2) transference by consent
3) performance of promises]
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Evolution of a useful illusion:
So that taking advantage of the antiquity, and obscure origin of these laws, they first deny them to be
artificial and voluntary inventions of men
and then seek to ingraft on them those other duties, which are more plainly artificial.
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But being once undeceiv’d in this particular, and having found that natural, as well as civil justice,
derives its origin from human conventions, we see
“how fruitless it is to resolve the one into the other, and seek, in the laws of nature, a stronger
foundation for our political duties than interest, and human conventions;
while these laws themselves are built on the very same foundation.
men see that the rules are sufficient to maintain any society
but it’s impossible to observe them without enforcement
So: government .... [Note the similarity to Hobbes and Hume...]
David Hume -
[33]
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There’s a separate interest in
(1) promises and in
(2) obeying government
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“keeping promises is requisite to mutual trust in common offices of life
“obeying the civil magistrate is requisite to preserve order and concord;
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So, “the ends, as well as the means, are perfectly distinct, nor is the one subordinate to the other.”
[Note: that seems wrong to me. The end of “civil peace” is prior;
breaking agreements is wrong because it amounts to aggression - just as Hobbes in effect says.]
But, yes: the basis of obligation is the same in both cases.
•
“A regard to property is not more necessary to natural society, than obedience is to civil society or
government; nor is the former society more necessary to the being of mankind, than the latter to
their well-being and happiness.”
In short, if the performance of promises be advantageous, so is obedience to government:
If the former interest be general, so is the latter:
If the one interest be obvious and avow’d, so is the other.
And as these two rules are founded on like obligations of interest, each of
them must have a peculiar authority, independent of the other
[??]
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David Hume •
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[34]
Authority:
.. the opinions of men, in this case,... are, in a great measure, infallible.
The distinction of moral good and evil is founded on the pleasure or pain,
which results from the view of any sentiment, or character;
and as that pleasure or pain cannot be unknown to the person who feels it, it follows,
that there is just so much vice or virtue in any character, as every one places in it, and that ’tis
impossible in this particular we can ever be mistaken.
[?]
A man, who acknowledges himself to be bound to another, for a certain sum, must certainly know
whether it be by his own bond, or that of his father; whether it be of his mere goodwill, or for money
lent him; and under what conditions, and for what purposes he has bound himself.
In like manner, it being certain, that there is a moral obligation to submit to government, because
every one thinks so; it must be as certain, that this obligation arises not from a promise;
since no one, whose judgment has not been led astray by too strict adherence to a system of
philosophy, has ever yet dreamt of ascribing it to that origin.
“Neither magistrates nor subjects have form’d this idea of our civil duties.”
To which we may add, that a man living under an absolute government, wou’d owe it no allegiance;
since, by its very nature, it depends not on consent. But as that is as natural and common a
government as any, it must certainly occasion some obligation ...
Question:
Is Hume right, that what is generally thought to be obligatory is obligatory?
David Hume •
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[35]
Whoever proposes to draw any profit from our submission, must engage himself, either expressly or
tacitly, to make us reap some advantage from his authority;
nor ought he to expect, that without the performance of his part we will ever continue in obedience.
I perceive, that a promise itself arises entirely from human conventions, and is invented with a view
to a certain interest.
I seek, therefore, some such interest more immediately connected with government, and which may
be at once the original motive to its institution, and the source of our obedience to it.
This interest I find to consist in the security and protection, which we enjoy in political society,
and which we can never attain, when perfectly free and independent.
David Hume •
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[36]
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Hume agrees that governments can go way too far:
“men submit to the authority of others, ’to procure themselves some security against the wickedness
and injustice of men
- as this imperfection is inherent in human nature ... it must attend men ... whom we chuse for rulers
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What we expect from them depends not on a change of their nature but of their situation
-- they acquire a more immediate interest in the preservation of order and the execution of justice.
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we may often expect ... that they will neglect even this immediate interest, and be transported by their
passions into all the excesses of cruelty and ambition.
All these causes must induce us to open the door to exceptions, and must make us conclude,
that we may resist the more violent effects of supreme power, without any crime or injustice.
‘Government is a mere human invention for the interest of society. Where the tyranny of the governor
removes this interest, it also removes the natural obligation to obedience.”
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[so, where does that leave us?]
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“in the ordinary course of human affairs, nothing can be more pernicious and criminal [than
rebellion]
“government is useless without exact obedience”
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David Hume -
[37]
- When, if ever, do we Rebel?
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We always should weigh the advantages of authority against its disadvantages
these are normally great
the same convention that establishes government establishes this particular
government
but by and by it ceases to matter who in particular governs
[nations have been tolerably governed even by George Bush and Paul Martin!]
first principle in founding the right of magistracy: long possession in any one form
of government, or succession of princes
though founded on rebellion, “time alone gives solidity to their right”
Where the public good doesn’t demand a change, what we’ve got should be taken as
“sacred and inviolable”
“tis certainly impossible for the laws, or even for philosophy, to establish any
particular rules, by which we may know when resistance is lawful.” ....
“Those who would respect our free government, yet deny the right of resistance, do
not merit a serious answer”
David Hume -
[38]
When, if ever, do we Rebel? [historical aside]
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Reflections from the English revolution:
First: the offspring of the monarch are not automatically entitled to the throne
Second: Princes can acquire a right from their successors as well as their
ancestors - William of Orange was retroactively confirmed as the king ...
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XI - laws of nations
The three fundamental rules
[stability of property; transference by consent; obligation of promises]
are duties of princes as well as subjects.
- and for the same reasons
David Hume -
[39]
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Hume on Asymmetric Sexual Mores
- An interesting explanation of one familiar moral belief:
Women are (were?) held to a higher standard of sexual fidelity than men
Explanation:
1. People are out to reproduce themselves
2. In the case of the woman, there is no problem determining that the child
is hers; but in the case of the man, “an error may easily take place”
3. “From this trivial and anatomical observation is deriv’d that vast
difference betwixt the education and duties of the two sexes.”
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(- one of the first sociobiological explanations)
“As to the obligations which the male sex lie under, with regard to chastity, we may observe, that
according to the general notions of the world, they bear nearly the same proportion to the obligations
of women, as the obligations of the law of nations do to those of the law of nature.”
’Tis contrary to the interest of civil society, that men shou’d have an entire liberty of indulging their
appetites in venereal enjoyment: But as this interest is weaker than in the case of the female sex, the
moral obligation,
arising from it, must be proportionably weaker. And to prove this we need only appeal to the practice
and sentiments of all nations and ages.”
[This is a remarkable example of explanation in the social sciences.]
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David Hume - Inquiry
[40]
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Hume’s Inquiry [also spelled ‘Enquiry’], Ch. III - Of Justice
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Thesis: "That
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- “ reflections
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Argument:
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(1a): First, he asks us to suppose extreme "abundance of all external conveniences”
1a. - without any effort at all, "every individual finds himself fully provided with whatever his most
voracious appetites can want".
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Why, in such a circumstance, would anybody bother to create distinctions of
"mine" and "thine"?
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(Note that this consists in reversing the Hobbesian postulate of Scarcity, in one direction.
We can vary this version and deny a different Hobbesian postulate:
(1b): [reversing Hobbes’ assumption of Limited Altruism] imagine
"the mind is so enlarged with friendship and generosity that every man has the
public utility is the sole origin of Justice,
on the beneficial consequences of this virtue are the sole foundations of its merit."
a famous thought experiment, in two parts.
utmost tenderness for every man"...
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Again, "It seems evident that the use of Justice would be suspended, nor would property and
obligation have ever been thought of."
David Hume - Inquiry
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[41]
Second Part of the experiment: Deny the Hobbesian postulate in the opposite direction. Instead of
no scarcity, we are imagining unrectifiable scarcity. [viz., that natural scarcity can be improved by
human cooperation]
(2a) “physical” version: "Suppose a society to fall into such want of all common necessaries that
the utmost frugality and industry cannot preserve the greater number from perishing”
it will readily, I believe, be admitted that the strict laws of justice are suspended in such a pressing
emergency and give place to the stronger motives of necessity and self-preservation."
Again, the utility of having any such notion as justice falls to zero.
(2b): the “Moral” version
imagine that it is "a virtuous man's fate to fall into the society of ruffians, remote from the protection
of laws and government, what conduct must he embrace?
... He can have no other expedient than to arm himself, to make provision of all means of defense and
security.”
(The question of citizens' rights to arm themselves is a case in point – in central Detroit, we are not
far from being in that situation; in Hebron, we are right in the midst of it!)
The general conclusion is that "the rules of equity or justice depend entirely on the particular state
and condition in which men are placed, and owe their origin and existence to that utility which results
to the public from their strict and regular observance."
- No need to bother with "original conditions" and "social contracts".
David Hume - Inquiry
[42]
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[Reflections on the foregoing:
Why is it “useful” to people to have such institutions as contracts and property rights?
Consider two more of Hume's discussions.
Animals
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"Imagine a species of creatures intermingled with men which, though rational, were
possessed of such inferior strength, both of body and mind, that they were incapable
of all resistance and could never make us feel the effects of their resentment,
the necessary consequence, I think, is that
“we should be bound by the laws of humanity to give gentle usage to these creatures,
but should not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard to them,
nor could they possess any right or property."
And he immediately notes that "This is plainly the situation of men with regard to
animals."
The point being that the obligations we have to animals can only be of the kind
prompted by natural sentiment, such as it is. That is how most people have regarded and
still do regard it, one might note.
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David Hume - Inquiry
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[43]
Property, again
"Suppose that a creature possessed of reason, but unacquainted with human nature,
deliberates with himself what rules of justice or property would best promote public
interest and establish peace and security among mankind".
(1) Distribute according to “Virtue”
"his most obvious thought would be to assign the largest possessions to the most
extensive virtue"
– and then notes that while this would be fine in a "perfect theocracy",
- it isn't so fine when we get to real people, who would simply fall to quarreling
about who was "virtuous" and who wasn't.
David Hume - Inquiry
[44]
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(2) Equality
His next thought would be like that of the levellers
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[mid 17th century English political movement, who came to prominence during the English Civil
Wars. They were not a political party in the modern sense of the word, and did not all conform to
any specific manifesto. They are remembered for their beliefs in popular sovereignty, an extended
franchise, equality before the law, and religious toleration, all of which were expressed in the
Agreement of the People.”]
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who propose an equal distribution of property.
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(1) - this would be physically possible, says Hume: "nature is so liberal to mankind that, were all
her presents equally divided, every individual would enjoy all the necessaries and even most of the
comforts of life".
(2) What's more, he notes, "It must also be confessed that wherever we depart from this equality
we rob the poor of more satisfaction than we add to the rich, and that the slight gratification of a
frivolous vanity in one individual frequently costs more than bread to many families, and even
provinces.”
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[this is the famous hypothesis of “diminishing marginal utility”]
David Hume - Inquiry
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[45]
Bad Consequences of Egalitarian Rule:
Nevertheless, on reflection, "historians, and even common sense, may inform us that, however
specious these ideas of perfect equality may seem,
they are really at bottom impracticable; and
were they not so, would be extremely pernicious to human society.
(1) Render possessions ever so equal, men's different degrees of art, care, and
industry will immediately break that equality.
(2) Or if you check these virtues, you reduce society to the most extreme indigence
and, instead of preventing want and beggary in a few, render it unavoidable to the
whole community" – sagaciously adding that
(3) The most rigorous inquisition, too, is requisite to watch every inequality on its
first appearance; and the most severe jurisdiction to punish and redress it ... so
much authority must soon degenerate into tyranny ...”
[All these are amply demonstrated in every communist country]
David Hume - Inquiry
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[46]
Hume's conclusion
“ in order to establish laws for the regulation of property we must be acquainted with the nature and
situation of man,
must reject appearances which may be false, though specious; and
must search for those rules which are, on the whole, most useful and beneficial."
In particular, "Who sees not", he asks, "that whatever is produced or improved by a man's art or
industry ought forever to be secured to him in order to give encouragement to such useful habits and
accomplishments?
That the property ought also to descend to children and relations, for the same useful purposes?
And that all contracts and promises ought carefully to be fulfilled in order to secure mutual trust and
confidence, by which the general interest of mankind is so much promoted?"
What makes these arrangements useful are precisely the ones that make the rules appear to be quite
other than what one might expect on the assumption that the object of social rules is the "good
of society"!
Diminishing marginal utility prompts equal distribution; but selfishness overrules it.
"Selfishness", though, turns out to be a part of the very thing we are dealing with – "society".
David Hume - Inquiry
[47]
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they are sure to terminate here at last and
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to assign as the ultimate reason for every rule which they establish, the
convenience and necessities of mankind.
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What other reason, indeed, could writers ever give
why this must be mine and that yours, since “uninstructed nature, surely never made any
such distinction?”
Sometimes the interests of society may require a rule in a particular case, but not
determine any particular rule, among several equally beneficial.
[reminder: this is coordination]
In that case the slightest analogies are laid hold of in order to prevent that indifference
and ambiguity which would be the source of perpetual dissension.
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David Hume - Inquiry
[48]
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What is a man’s property?
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Anything which it is lawful for him and for him alone to use.
But what rule have we by which we can distinguish these objects?
Here we must have recourse to statutes, customs, precedents, analogies, and a hundred other
circumstances - some of which are constant and inflexible, some variable and arbitrary
. But the ultimate point in which they all professedly terminate, is the interest and happiness of
human society.
Where this enters not into consideration, nothing can appear more whimsical, unnatural, and even
superstitious than all or most of the laws of justice and property.
Those who ridicule vulgar superstitions have an easy task.
A Syrian would have starved rather than taste pigeons; an Egyptian would not have approached
bacon; but if these species of food be examined, no difference is ever found between them and any
other which may afford a just foundation for the religious passion. A fowl on Thursday is lawful
food; on Friday abominable.
“It may appear to a careless view, that there enters a like superstition in all the sentiments of justice.
I may lawfully nourish myself from this tree; but the fruit of another of the same species, ten paces
off, it is criminal for me to touch. “
But there is this material difference between superstition and justice, that the former is
frivolous, useless, and burdensome;
the latter is absolutely requisite to the well-being of mankind and existence of society.
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David Hume - Inquiry
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[49]
A dilemma : as justice evidently tends to promote public utility, the sentiment of justice is either
(1) derived from our reflecting on that tendency
(2) or, like hunger, arises from a simple original instinct, which nature has implanted for like salutary
purposes.
If (2), then property is also distinguished by a simple, original instinct.
But who is there that ever heard of such an instinct?
But further, in reality we shall find that there are required for that purpose ten thousand different
instincts. For when a definition of property is required, that relation is found to resolve itself into any
possession acquired by occupation, industry, prescription, inheritance, contract, etc.
Can we think that nature, by an original instinct, instructs us in all these methods of acquisition?
Positive laws can certainly transfer property. Is it by another original instinct that we recognize the
authority of kings and senates?
Judges, too, must be allowed to have decisive authority to determine property.
Have we original, innate ideas of chancellors and juries?
Conclusion: Who sees not that all these institutions arise merely from the necessities of human
society?
David Hume - Inquiry
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[50]
Of Political Society
If we all had:
(1) sagacity to perceive at all times the strong interest which binds him to the observance of justice
and equity, and
(2) strength of mind sufficient to persevere in a steady adherence, in opposition to the allurements of
present pleasure and advantage,
Then (3) there had never, in that case, been any such thing as government or political society.
What need of positive law where natural justice itself is a sufficient restraint? Why create magistrates
where there never arises any disorder or iniquity?
It is evident that if government were totally useless, it never could have place, and
that the sole foundation of the duty of allegiance is the advantage which it procures to society
by preserving peace and order among mankind.
All politicians will allow, and most philosophers, that reasons of state may, in particular emergencies,
dispense with the rules of justice and invalidate any treaty or alliance, where the strict observance of
it would be prejudicial, in a considerable degree, to either of the contracting parties.
David Hume - Inquiry
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[51]
But nothing less than the most extreme necessity, it is confessed, can justify individuals in a
breach of promise or an invasion of the properties of others.
The long and helpless infancy of man requires the combination of parents for the subsistence of their
young and that combination requires the virtue of chastity or fidelity to the marriage bed.
Without such a utility, it will readily be owned that such a virtue would never have been thought of.
Those who live in the same family have such frequent opportunities of license that nothing could
preserve purity of manners were marriage allowed among the nearest relations or any intercourse of
love between them ratified by law and custom. Incest, therefore, being pernicious in a superior
degree, has also a superior turpitude and moral deformity annexed to it.
To pry into secrets, to open or even read the letters of others, to play the spy upon their words
and looks and actions - what habits more inconvenient in society? What habits, of consequence,
more blamable?
“ it is impossible for men so much as to murder each other without statutes and maxims, and an idea
of justice and honor.
War has its laws as well as peace. Common interest and utility beget infallibly a standard of right and
wrong among the parties concerned.
David Hume - Inquiry
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[52]
Further Considerations with regard to Justice
Restated: the contrast between “natural” and “social” virtues:
(1) Natural: Humanity and benevolence “exert their influence immediately by a direct
instinct”
- they need “no scheme or system”
A parent flies to the relief of his child, transported by natural sympathy.
A generous man cheerfully embraces an opportunity of serving his friend.
(2) Social: justice and fidelity - are different
They are, indeed, absolutely necessary to the well-being of mankind.
But the benefit is not the consequence of every individual act, but from the whole
scheme concurred in by the whole or the greater part of the society.
David Hume - Inquiry
[53]
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The Wall versus the Arch
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The happiness and prosperity of mankind arising from the social virtue of benevolence may be
compared to a wall built by many hands - which still rises by each stone. The same happiness,
raised by the social virtue of justice, may be compared to the building of a vault where each
individual stone would, of itself, fall to the ground; nor is the whole fabric supported but by the
mutual assistance and combination of its corresponding parts.
All the laws of nature which regulate property as well as all civil laws are general and regard alone
some essential circumstances of the case, without taking into consideration the characters, situations,
and connections of the person concerned.
They deprive, without scruple, a beneficent man of all his possessions if acquired by mistake, without
a good title, in order to bestow them on a selfish miser who ha already heaped up immense stores of
superfluous riches.
Public utility requires that property should be regulated by general inflexible rules;
though such rules are adopted as best serve the same end of public utility, it is impossible for them to
prevent all particular hardships or make beneficial consequences result from every individual case.
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David Hume - Inquiry
[54]
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Does justice arise from human convention?
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1) Not promises
If by convention be here meant a promise, nothing can be more absurd.
The observance of promises is itself one of the most considerable parts of justice;
and we are not surely bound to keep our word because we have given our word to keep it.
2) But if by convention be meant a sense of common interest, which .. carries him, in concurrence
with others, into a general plan or system of action which tends to public utility
it must be owned that in this sense justice arises from human conventions.
For if it be allowed (which is indeed evident) that the particular consequences of a particular act
of justice may be hurtful to the public as well as to individuals, it follows that every man, in
embracing that virtue, must have an eye to the whole plan or system and must expect the
concurrence of his fellows in the same conduct and behavior.
Thus two men pull the oars of a boat by common convention, for common interest, without any
promise or contract; thus speech, and words, and language are fixed by human convention and
agreement.
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Public Goods:
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Whatever is advantageous to two or more persons if all perform their part, but what loses all
advantage if only one perform, can arise from no other principle.
David Hume - Inquiry
[55]
• Final thought on whether justice is “natural”:
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The word natural is commonly taken in so many senses, and is of so loose a
signification, that it seems vain to dispute whether justice be natural or not.
If self-love, if benevolence be natural to man, if reason and forethought be also natural,
then may the same epithet be applied to justice, order, fidelity, property, society.
Men’s inclination, their necessities, lead them to combine,
their understanding and experience tell them that this combination is impossible
where each governs himself by no rule and pays no regard to the possessions of
others.
“From these passions and reflections conjoined, the sentiment of justice, throughout all
ages, has infallibly and certainly had place, to some degree or other, in every individual
of the human species.”
In so sagacious an animal, what necessarily arises from the exertion of his intellectual
faculties may justly be esteemed natural.
David Hume - Inquiry
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[56]
Hume restates his general view:
[Thinkers about these matters] are “sure to terminate here at last and to assign as
the ultimate reason for every rule which they establish, the convenience and
necessities of mankind.”
[note: somehow, they don’t all seem to do so!]
“What other reason, indeed, could writers ever give why this must be mine and that
yours, since uninstructed nature, surely never made any such distinction?”
Disputes need to be settled - so fine distinctions need to be made
“Sometimes the interests of society may require a rule in a particular case, but not
determine any particular rule, among several equally beneficial. In that case the slightest
analogies are laid hold of in order to prevent that indifference and ambiguity which
would be the source of perpetual dissension.”
- End of Hume discussions -