Transcript NDIA EWD 2-13-07

Expeditionary Operations
in the 21st Century
Jim Strock
Director, Seabasing Integration Division
Capabilities Development Directorate
1
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134
703-784-6094
[email protected]
B.L.U.F.
 We are in a Long War with an adaptive enemy
 We are continuously evolving with changing
character of war:
 Meeting guidance from QDR—shifting focus to both IW and
maintaining conventional competencies
 Learning from ongoing operations
 Anticipating who, where and how we will fight in the future
 Future naval capabilities will provide CoCom’s with
flexible capabilities via innovative concepts
 Exploiting operational maneuver from global commons
 Phase 0: Contributing to maritime security and cooperation
 Phases 3 and 4: Decisive Ops and SASO
 Industry input vital to bring these capabilities to fruition ASAP and
at reasonable costs
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Understanding the Future
• How to keep our Naval forces relevant and able to
 Threaten an asymmetrical enemy
 While maintaining dominance for the conventional fight
• Phase 0 requirements
 CONPLAN GWOT demands
 Naval emphasis in area denial and anti access environments
 Temporal nature of the battlespace
• World-wide deployment support structure is on the decline
 Forward Staging Bases: 38 to 12
 Strat Airlift: declining fleet numbers: 160 fewer than 1989; projected
down to 250 by 2010
• Flexible, adaptable, self-sufficient, DO capable, seabased forces a
must
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Strategic Guidance
Naval forces need to establish
steady state capability: Active
Partnering and Tailored
Shaping
Must contribute to Long War &
transnational/ regional
deterrence
Build Partner Capacity
Deter or Prevail in Conventional
Campaigns
4
CMC Planning Guidance
“Working closely with our Navy and
Coast Guard partners, we will
advance the amphibious and
expeditionary capabilities the
Combatant Commanders rely
upon to meet their emerging
challenges.”
CMC Planning Guidance
5
Traditional Naval Ethos
Well Tailored for Non-Traditional Missions
• Naval in character
• “Packaged” command, ground combat, aviation,
CSS capabilities in any size (not just ARG/MEUs)
• Commander designation is mission dependent
• Joint, Coalition, Interagency friendly in
composition
• Comfortable and adaptable on non-traditional
platforms
• Motherships can lighten the maneuver element
– Add or subtract “specialists” based on the mission
– Aviation and Combat Service Support lily-pad as far
forward as required on all ships/crafts afloat
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Adjusting Our Aim
Security Challenges …
Rebalanced
Capabilities

Irregular &
Traditional
VULNERABILITY

Irregular
Phase 0

Naval emphasis

Temporal nature

Requires selfsufficiency early on
Higher
 Non-state and state actors employing
“unconventional” methods to counter
stronger state opponents—terrorism,
insurgency, etc. (erode our power)
our power)
(e.g., terrorism, insurgency, civil war, and emerging concepts like
“unrestricted warfare”)
Lower
Catastrophic
 Terrorist or rogue state employment of
WMD or methods producing WMD-like
effects against American interests. (paralyze
(e.g., attack on homeland, global markets, or key ally that would
generate a state of shock and preclude normal behavior)
Traditional
Disruptive
 States employing military forces in wellknown forms of military competition and
conflict. (challenge our power)
(e.g., conventional air, sea, and land forces, and nuclear forces of
established nuclear powers)
Irregular
Catastrophic
Traditional
Disruptive
Higher
 Competitors employing technology or
methods that might counter or cancel our
current military advantages. (capsize our power)
(e.g., technological – bio, cyber, or space war, ultra miniaturization,
directed-energy, other – diplomatic blackmail, cultural or economic war)
Lower
LIKELIHOOD
“ …our national strategy calls for more widely dispersed forces to
provide increased forward presence, security cooperation, and
global response to crises…”
The Naval Operations Concept, 2006
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The Naval Security Environment
Across the Entire Range of National Security Strategy
• 21 Forcible Entry Operations
• 10 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
• 6 Amphibious Assaults
• 3 Amphibious Raids
• 2 Peace Operations
“Arc of
Instability”
“Islamic
Caliphate”
Naval Operations 1982-1989 (15X)
Naval Operations 1990-1999 (40X)
Naval Operations 2000-2005 (21X)
76 Amphibious Operations in 23 Years
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Crises and Conflicts
Sunni
Insurgency
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
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
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Micro-nationalist
Insurgencies
Shia
Insurgency
Stability and Support Operations
Small Wars and Counterinsurgency
Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief and Nation Building
Peace Operations
Combating Terrorism
Counter-Proliferation
Combating Drug Trafficking and Crime
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
#2
#3
#1
#X
Piracy
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Contributors To Crises
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?
10
8
6
3 ? 2
4
1 5
?
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?
>20% Population
Undernourished
>35% Population
Undernourished
High Earthquake Risk
10 Top Ten Proven Oil Reserves 2004
<50% Population Have
Access to Clean Water
? Known Reserves
Crises Are Certain
Nuclear
Armed States
Significant
Drug Regions
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Recent Examples
Date
Unit
Location
Mission
Dec 01
15th & 26th MEUs
Afghanistan
Operation
Enduring Freedom
Fall 04
22nd MEU
Afghanistan
COIN ops
Dec 04/Jan 05
15th MEU
Sri Lanka/
Indonesia
Tsunami relief
.
June 05
24th MEU
New Orleans, LA
Hurricane Katrina
relief
July 06
24th MEU
Beirut, Lebanon
NEO
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Naval Response Patterns
(By platform type and by decade)
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Source: CNA Study, US Naval Response to Situations 1970-2000, Dec. 2000
Number of Responses
25
20
CV
SC
ARG
15
10
5
0
1970s
1980s
1990s
If anything, this demand signal for versatile, expeditionary
response has been extended even greater since 2001
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Increasing Forward Presence
Well Beyond Today’s ESGs and MEUs
SPMAGTF
ESG
Distributed
Ops
SPMAGTF
SPMAGTF
ESG
Distributed
Ops
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What Do We Need to Do?
GWOT Operational Tasks

Conduct Expeditionary Ops

Provide Operational Air and Missile Defense

Conduct NEO
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Conduct Civil Affairs
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Conduct Information Ops
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Conduct ISR
Provide Law Enforcement and prisoner
handling

Conduct Maritime Interdiction

Provide staging for joint and combined forces

Conduct Maritime Security Ops


Conduct coalition, interagency and NGO
coordination and support
Conduct Strike/Power Projection


Provide Humanitarian Aid
Conduct Special Ops

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Conduct Maritime Domain Awareness
Conduct Command And Control

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Share intelligence information
Maintain SLOCs

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Provide support for Homeland Security
Provide Consequence Management


Support Proliferation Security Initiative
Provide Force Protection

Provide Log/CSS/Facilities Maint
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“21st Century UNITAS”
The Anti-Access Challenge…
OIF I Turkey: Access Not Granted, Even with $26B Offer
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Enhancing Phase 0-1 Capabilities
Via Expanded Naval Missions
Global Fleet Station
Distributed
Globally Networked
Adaptive force packaging
Aggregate, disaggregate & re-aggregate
Culturally aware
Task focused
Build partner capacity
Cross Fleet Standardization
Sized, shaped, and globally
postured for:
• Forward Naval Presence
• Security Cooperation
• Counterinsurgency (COIN)
• Counterterrorism
• Civil-Military Operations
• Counter-proliferation
• Maritime Security Operations
• Crisis Response
• Deterrence
• Sea Control
• Air and Missile Defense
• Expeditionary Power Projection
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Enhancing Phase 0-2 Capabilities
Via Distributed Ops Capable SPMAGTFs
Employed from platforms like LCS, riverine craft, destroyers…
Forward Presence
Counterproliferation
Deterrence
Counterterrorism
ESG/MEU(SOC)
Air & Missile Defense
Security Cooperation at Sea
COIN
Security
Cooperation
Crisis Response
Maritime
Security
Civil – Military
Operations
…While supported by Amphib motherships
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Enhancing Phase 2-3 Capabilities
By Re-aggregating Naval Forces
Power
Projection
Sea
Control
Forward Postured
CONUS Based
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Marine Corps Amphib & MPF(F)
Shipbuilding Requirements
Shipbuilding Requirements
Capabilities
Amphibious Warfare Ships
• Inherent survivability, self-defense, and Navy crewing
• Maritime forcible entry operations
• Forward presence, deterrence
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F))
• Capable of at-sea arrival and assembly of forces
• Selective offload of equipment sets to meet Seabasing
mission requirements
• Supports forward engagement and forcible entry
• MPF(F) by design is not assault echelon shipping;
therefore, MPF(F) forces are not forcible entry capable
Amphibious Warfare Ships
• 2.0 MEB AE per Strategic Planning Guidance; 15 Ao Ships per MEB AE
• Total 30 operationally available ships
– 10 LHD/LHA(R)
– 10 LPD-17
– 10 LSD-41/49 (or equivalent replacement)
– Average availability is 85% (for planning purposes)
– Minimum 11/11/11 ships to meet 30 Ao requirement
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)
• One squadron (per May 2005 Acting SecNav/CNO/CMC decision)
Legacy Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons
• Retain two squadrons to maintain afloat prepositioned war reserve capacity
MPF(F) Squadron Composition
Notional 15-Ship ATF
Five LHD-1 (Wasp Class)
Five LPD-17 (San Antonio Class)
Five LSD-41 (Whidbey Island Class)
2 LHA(R)
3 MLP
1 LHD
3 T-AKE
3 T-AKR
2 Legacy
T-AK
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Marine Corps JHSV
Shipbuilding Requirements
JHSV Capabilities & Characteristics
• Shallow draft (< 15’), high speed (> 35 kts loaded)
– Ability to enter small, austere/degraded ports unassisted
• Self-deploying between theaters
• 600-700 ST payload, 1200 NM range, 35 kts, Sea State 3
– Smaller payloads = greater range, larger payloads = less range
• Seating for 312 Marines (Co (rein)); berthing for 104 Marines
• 20-22,000 sqft mission deck/cargo bay (M1A2, MTVR compatible)
• Slewing ramp (astern to 40 degrees forward)
• Level I, Class 2 flight deck for H-60s, H-46s, UH-/AH-1 helicopters
– Fuel only, no services
• 20 ST crane for TEU movement, small boat launch & recovery
• Net Ready C4 system (plug and play)
• JHSV is not a combatant, operates in a permissive environment
– MSC standard for ATFP capabilities
Possible JHSV Candidates
JHSV Quantity and Basing
• 8 JHSVs funded (5 Army, 3 Navy)
• Quantity funded does not equal quantity required
• Acquisition objective TBD by MS B (Mar ’08)
– PACOM, AoA, MCCDC studies suggest 16 JHSVs needed across DOD
• 7 JHSV equivalents meet USMC requirements
– Based on MARFOR TSCP, GWOT, intra-theater lift requirements
– Requirement quantified in “vessel days per year” v. specific # of JHSVs
– Assumes 180 days operational availability (Ao) per year per JHSV
– Does not explore overlap between USN, USMC requirements
• Notional basing scheme (JHSVs swing between theaters as needed)
– PACOM = 3 (Hawaii, Guam, Okinawa)
– CENTCOM = 2 (Bahrain)
– EUCOM = 1 (Rota)
– CONUS = 1 (Norfolk)
USMC JHSV CONOPS
(The “Intra-Theater Connector”)
Seabasing
Support
TSCP
FIE
Austal 126
INCAT 112
Sea Base
COBRA GOLD
BALIKITAN
TSL - 140
Adv Base
Austal 105
MDV-300
NSE
MPF
ESG
HA/DR
Self-deploy
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Seabasing Research
and Development
Skin-to-Skin Transfer
High Capacity UNREP
Selective Offload
Stabilized Cranes
Joint Modular
Intermodal Container
(JMIC)
Mobile Landing Platform
Interface
Automated Cargo Handling
At-Sea Arrival, Assembly, Employment, Sustainment
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Other Research and Development
Opportunities

Cultural Awareness and Tactical
Language Training

Responsive Naval and Joint Fires
suitable for Restricted ROE

C4ISR Interoperability and Intel Fusion
Support Technology

Key Equipment Characteristics
 Weight
 Mobility
 Armor
 Power
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Conclusions

Evolving security
environment expands
challenges we face

Blurring character of war
generates premium for agile
forces with adaptive ethos

Security context calls for
greater maritime cooperation
and interoperability
 International and interagency
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Questions?
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