Transcript Japan and North Korea: Domestic Factors Shaping the GOJ's

The Politics of North
Korea in Japan
Rust M. Deming
Introduction
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The normalization of relations with North Korea
represents one of the two major Japanese foreign policy
issues remaining from WWII. (The other is a peace
treaty with Russia.)
Today I will examine the background of this issue, the
efforts made by Japan to normalize relations with the
North, and current impasse over the abduction, nuclear,
and missile issues.
I will also discuss the current strains between
Washington and Tokyo over approaches to North Korea.
I will conclude with some thoughts about the future
evolution of Japan-North Korean relations.
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The Political Setting In Japan
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Since 1945, the Korean issue has created a deep divide
in Japanese politics
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Cold War polarization
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The Japanese Left attracted to Kim Il Sung’s “Socialist
Paradise”
• ROK US puppet
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Conservative establishment supported ROK
Korean War deepened divide
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Left
• ROK started war
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GOJ
• Still under Occupation so neutrality not an option
– Sent Japanese minesweepers
– Japanese firms provided logistical support
– Korean War contributed to major economic boom
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Divided Interpretations in
Japanese Politics of Japan’s
Korean Legacy
Japanese Left regarded Japan’s 40 - year
occupation of Korea as an example of Japanese
imperialism and exploitation
 Japanese Right defended colonial period as leaving
a largely positive legacy of economic development
and education
 Left/Right divide on treatment of Korean residents
of Japan
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 Left
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supported greater rights for resident Koreans
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Japan’s Korean Community
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Korean community in Japan divided on North/South lines
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Chosen Soren
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Supported North
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Originally about 2/3s of 700,000 Korean community
Schools, well developed social networks
Channeled remittances to Pyongyang
Supported 1959-1984 repatriation to DPRK of 87,000 Koreans
– 6000 Japanese spouses also went to North Korea
Mindan
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Supported ROK
• Originally About 1/3 of Korean Community
• Less structured than Chosen Soren
– Membership less political, more integrated
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GOJ allowed Korean residents to register only as ROK citizens
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Japan’s Normalization with
the ROK
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ROK-Japan relations not normalized until 1965,
reflecting the complex history between Japan and
Korea
First ROK President Syngman Rhee (1948-1960) not
interested in normalizing
 Left in Japan opposed to normalization with ROK,
pushed for normalization with DPRK
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US pushed GOJ to establish diplomatic ties with ROK
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Elements of Japan-ROK
Normalization
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Treaty with apology – “deep remorse”
ROK government “only lawful government,” from UN
resolution language
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Reflected ROK desire to block Japan-DPRK relations
Claims/reparations
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GOJ position: Japan-Korea not at war
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But renounced all claims to property
$1.5 billion “aid package”
Fisheries agreement
Status of 700,000 Koreans in Japan
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Legal residency for those in Japan in 1945 and their children
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GOJ-ROK Relations Developed
Rapidly
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Trade expanded rapidly
Sato agreement to Korea clause at Nixon Sato summit - 1969
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Connected to US agreement to return Okinawa to Japan
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Kim Dae Jung kidnapping by KCIA (1973) set back ties
Nakasone breakthrough - 1982
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Visited ROK right after his assumption of office
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Seen by US as GOJ intent to allow US use of bases to defend ROK
Took with him $4 billion aid package
But still rocky periods
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History
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Fujio statement
Textbooks
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Japan-North Korea
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Normalization with North on Japan’s diplomatic agenda
after 1965
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Balance ties with ROK
Remove source of domestic political tension
Trade incentives (DPRK and ROK economies essentially
equivalent in 1965)
But steady erosion of interest in Japan
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ROK economy took off
US, ROK discouraged GOJ overtures to DPRK
Japan had other priorities
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Okinawa return 1972
China normalization
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Japan-North Korea (2)
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North’s increasingly aberrant behavior added to
problem
North gave sanctuary to Japan Red Army hijackers of
“Yodo” airliner - 1970
 Suspected abduction of Japanese citizens - 1979-83
 Rangoon bombing
 KAL bombing 1987
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GOJ essentially left relations with DPRK to JSP
Part of quiet division of labor under the 1955 system
 Private trade and fisheries agreements but no formal
ties
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Japan -North Korea (3)
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Post Cold War revival of interest
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Roh Tae Woo initiatives toward North (1988) opened door for GOJ
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Led to NK-ROK agreements on reconciliation/denuclearization 1991
ROK normalization with Moscow (1990) and PRC (1992)
• Opened door for ROK/DPRK UN membership (1991)
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Kanemaru-JSP mission (1990)
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Designed to set terms for negotiations on normalization
• Kanemaru (Mr. “Abouto”) poor negotiator
– Japanese delegation agreed to compensate DPRK not only for
colonial period but for post war division - repudiated by GOJ
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But did agree on basic issues to be negotiated
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1) Settlement of basic issues of past with treaty
2) Economics, including “reparations”
3) International issues, N-S, nukes
4) Humanitarian (abductions) - Megumi Yokota
Eight rounds of negotiations with little results
• Disagreement over amount/terms of compensation
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Japan-North Korea (4)
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1990s fluctuations
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1992-94 – cool; nuclear issue erupts
1995-97 - Revitalized
• Jimmy Carter visit - GOJ joins KEDO, contributes $1billion for LWR
• GOJ provides food, humanitarian aid to North
• Resumption of normalization negotiations, return of Japanese spouses
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1997-99 downturn
• Abduction issue – families organized
• Taepodong missile launch over Japan - key event
– Japan developed laws to control funds to DPRK
– GOJ unhappy with muted US response; led to satellite program
• Spy boat intrusion
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Fundamentally hardened Japanese attitudes toward North Korea
• Even long-time supporters on Left backed away from DPRK
• Support in Korean community greatly weakened
– New generation less political
– Increased integration of Korean community into Japanese society
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The Koizumi Era
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Koizumi visit to Pyongyang in Sept. 2002
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Wanted to make historic breakthrough
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Settle one of last pending WW II issues
Give Japan greater diplomatic leverage, flexibility
Speculation that Bush’s tough approach to NK may have led
Pyongyang to soften toward Japan
Secret negotiations kept from US
Visit produced mixed results
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NK revealed 13 abductions, eight dead
Included one person GOJ was unaware of
North apologized
• Allowed five survivors to visit Japan
• Koizumi demanded full explanation
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But revelations produced backlash in Japan
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Suspicions became confirmed reality
Almost complete erosion of public support in Japan for North Korea
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The Koizumi Era (2)
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Visit did produce some positive results
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North agreed to:
–would stand by agreements
 Long-range missiles – continue moratorium on tests
 Normalization
 Nuclear
• Accepted Murayama statement as basis for apology
• Accepted ROK formula for reparations
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Breakdown of negotiations
 Oct.
2002
• GOJ did not return five survivors visiting Japan
• North accused Japan of breaking agreement
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Koizumi Era (3)
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Second summit May 2004
North allowed family members to leave
 Promised further investigations of abductions
 But remains of Megumi Yokota did not match DNA
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Comprehensive talks 2006
 DPRK
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stiffed Japan on further investigations
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Japan’s Response to Nuclear
North Korea - Oct. 2006
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July 4-5 2006 missile tests by DPRK led to sanctions
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Oct. nuclear test -Japan’s reaction strong but measured
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Ban on port calls by weekly ferry linking Niigata-Wonson,
charter flights, remittances for groups linked to WMD
GOJ played lead role at UNSC on resolution condemning DPRK
Japan banned all North Korean ships from Japanese ports impact on fund transfers - and all DPRK imports
Reinforced public support for missile defense
Net result:
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Further hardening of Japanese public attitudes toward the North
Reinforced when Abe became PM in late Sept. 2006
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Abe’s popularity largely a result of hard stance on DPRK
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The Gap Between the US and
Japan on North Korea after
North’s tests
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Tokyo and Washington had been the hardliners
among the Six Parties
Some ambivalence in Tokyo about refusal of Bush
administration to engage directly with North
 But happy with Washington’s strong support on
abduction issue
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 Bush
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meeting with families
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US-Japan Gap (2)
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US shift on North Korea not clearly signaled to
Tokyo
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Complex policy and bureaucratic background
 Nuclear
test changed stakes for US
 Rumsfeld, Bolton departures
• Hardliners weakened
 Sec.
Rice, Chris Hill got President’s support for
engagement
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Hill’s Berlin meeting alarmed GOJ
 Agreement
on terms of Banco Delta Asia settlement
cleared way for resumption of Six Party talks
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Feb. 13, 2007 Beijing Six Party
Denuclearization Action Plan
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Implementation of Sept. 2005 Six Party Agreement
Five parallel actions agreed on:
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DPRK shuts down Yongbyon, invites IAEA back
DPRK to list all its nuclear programs, including separated
Pu
US-DPRK normalization talks - removal of DPRK from
terrorism list, etc.
Japan-DPRK normalization talks
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Resolve “unfortunate past” and “outstanding issues of
concern”
Economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance for DPRK
– 50,000 tons of fuel oil in 60 days
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GOJ reluctantly went along but did not join supply of oil
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Oct. 3, 2007: “Second
Phase Actions” to
Implement Joint Statement
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Spelled out details and timetable for declaration,
disablement by end of 2007
DPRK commitment not to transfer nuclear material
and technology
US reaffirmed its intent to remove DPRK from
terrorism list, tied to declaration, disabling of
reactor, reprocessing, fabrication facilities
Japan, DPRK to make “sincere efforts”to normalize
Reaffirmed aid, oil, to DPRK
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GOJ - US Tensions
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GOJ unhappy with USG de-linkage of abduction issue
from the removal of DPRK from US list of state sponsors
of terrorism
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Seen as a “betrayal” and undercutting GOJ leverage with
North
US unhappy with GOJ’s “parochial” perspective
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De-nuclear DPRK highest priority for US, Japan, region,
world
Delisting one of few carrots US has to offer
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US terrorism list relates only to recent actions
PM Fukuda appears to be looking for greater flexibility
but has little room to maneuver
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Separate abductions from nuclear issue
Tie abduction resolution to final normalization
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Recent Developments
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US-DPRK Singapore meeting - March 2008
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US seeking promised full declaration of all DPRK nuclear
programs, including clarification of the uranium enrichment
issue, that was due at end of 2007
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US also seeking clarification of Syrian connection
US also made clear that it will remove NK from US terrorism
list if it produces declaration/clarifications
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Form of clarifications unclear - Shanghai formula?
On-going discussions within USG and with DPRK to flesh out
the deal
On-going USG-GOJ discussions on coordination
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Indication that earlier DPRK declaration inadequate
Deputy Secretary Negroponte’s May 9 visit to Tokyo
Continuing major source of tension in relations
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Other Lurking US-Japan
Differences on the DPRK
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Differing end-game priorities
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For US
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Non-proliferation is real red line
• Syrian connection very troubling
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For GOJ
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Accounting and removal of plutonium essential
Explanation of uranium enrichment program
Abductions - resolution is highest political priority
Plutonium - insists on accounting/removal of all material
Missiles - continued moratorium
HEU - important but less central to GOJ concerns
Non-proliferation - important but Syrian connection less central
Potential for differing US and GOJ bottom lines
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Conclusion - Whither Japan
and North Korea?
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Japan-North Korean normalization essential element of
long-term solution of the “Korean Issue”
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Strategic
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Economic
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Japanese aid, investment one of the keys to NK
development
Humanitarian
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Remove a lingering source of tension in East Asia
Resolve one of last WW II issues
Family reunifications
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Barriers to Normalization
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Abduction Issue
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Extremely difficult to resolve
 GOJ
demand:
• Return all living victims to Japan
• Provide a full accounting of all victims
• Hand over those responsible for the abductions
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DPRK may be unable or unwilling to comply
 Most
sensitive, and embarrassing, aspects of
North Korean behavior are involved
• Tied to both Kims
 How
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do you prove a negative?
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Barriers to Normalization (2)
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Nuclear Issue
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Represents direct threat to Japan
Normalization conditioned on “resolution” of nuclear issue
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Freeze, disablement, dismantlement of Yongbyon
Accounting for and export of all separated plutonium
Missile Issue
 Taepodong poses unique threat to Japan
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Not a threat to ROK
Not a credible threat to US given US nukes
Tied to credibility of US nuclear umbrella
Continued moratorium on tests essential condition of
normalization
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Barriers to Normalization (3)
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Dynamics of Japanese politics and public opinion
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Hardened attitudes toward DPRK in LDP
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Abe, Aso representative of uncompromising attitude
• Appeal to right wing in LDP
• Disinclined to follow Koizumi’s example
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Pro-DPRK lobby has essentially dried up
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Japan becoming more nationalist, less apologetic about the past
• Reduced tolerance of North Korean polemics
• “Politics of guilt” no longer works in Japan
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Lack of informal “pipes” between Japan and North Korea
Economic disincentives
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GOJ budget deficits, reduced support for ODA
Little interest in Japanese business community
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DPRK represents unattractive trade and investment target
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Barriers to Normalization (4)
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North Korean attitudes toward Japan
Pyongyang giving little apparent priority to ties
with Tokyo after Koizumi visits
Some Japanese believe that Pyongyang is
convinced that isolating Tokyo is the best
strategy
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 Belief
that if US moves toward DPRK, Japan will
inevitably follow
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Requirements for
a Breakthrough
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A nuclear deal of some kind
Continued missile test moratorium
Some DPRK “give” on info about abductees
Political will on both sides to make it happen
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Now apparently lacking in both Tokyo and Pyongyang
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