Transcript FSC MS B AoA - Cranfield University

Future Combat System (FCS)
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA)
Metrics for Transformation
20th ISMOR
COL Jeff Appleget
TRAC-WSMR
28 August 2003
Agenda
• Background
– Army Transformation
– FCS and Objective Force
– Analysis of Alternatives (AoA)
• FCS AoA
– Challenges
– FCS AoA Metrics
– Selected Results
• Conclusion
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The Army Transformation
• Responsiveness
• Deployability
• Versatility
• Agility
• Lethality
• Survivability
• Sustainability
These three reasons mandate Army transformation:
– First – a future operational environment that poses complex, adaptive and
asymmetric threats equipped with advanced technologies.
– Second is the requirement to employ land forces that are decisive at every
point on the spectrum of operations, in any terrain - in all weather.
– Finally, the Army must be far less reliant on forward stationing and prepositioned stocks. Rather, it must be capable of deploying anywhere in
the world on little or no notice to fight and win.
Quality of firsts: See First, Understand First, Act First , Finish Decisively.
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FCS and Objective Force
• FCS is the networked system of systems that will serve as
the core building block within all Objective Force Units of
Action (UAs).
• The UA is comprised of a family of advanced, networked
space-, air- and ground-based maneuver, maneuver
support and sustainment systems that will include manned
and unmanned platforms.
•
The hallmarks of Objective Force operations will be:
– developing situations out of contact,
– maneuvering to positions of advantage,
– engaging enemy forces beyond the range of their
weapons,
– destroying them with precision fires and maneuver, and
– decisively assaulting enemy capabilities or locations at
times and places of our choosing.
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Analysis of Alternatives
• AoA and the Acquisition Process
A
B
Concept &
Technology
Development
(Program
Initiation)
C
IOC
Production &
Deployment
System Development
& Demonstration
Pre -Systems
Acquisition
OT&E
FRP
Decision
Review
Systems Acquisition
FOC
Operations &
Support
Sustainment
• “Typical” AoAs:
• Replace M1 with M1A1.
• Replace M113 with M2.
• Replace “old” M109 with Paladin.
• Typical Alternatives
• Keep what we have (M1).
• Buy the new one (M1A1).
• Improve what we have (Product-improvement Program, or “PiP).
• FCS AoA
• Purpose - Compare the Cost and Operational Effectiveness of the FCS UA to the
alternatives.
• Alternatives: Current [Legacy] light, heavy, SBCT, PiP’d SBCT, FCS Block I, FCS Block
II, FCS Increment 1] (7 total).
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Some FCS AoA Challenges
• The Unit of Action (UA - an FCS-equipped Brigade) will
replace: Legacy light, heavy, and SBCT brigades, all with
different missions.
• Several weapon system platforms will be replaced with a
“system of systems” intertwined with existing and
proposed non-FCS acquisition programs.
• Senior decision makers very comfortable with conventional
MOE/MOP (LER, SER, FER). Three reasons for shift from
exchange ratios:
– Operational Environment – Threat is asymmetric &
adaptive.
– The UA will fight differently than its predecessors
(Operational and Organizational (O&O) concepts &
TTPs).
– Shift from platform-centric to network-centric
operations.
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FCS AoA Metrics
• Most “traditional” metrics we have previously used are
platform-centric, such as LERs, SERs and FERs.
• Argues for greater reliance on qualitative metrics at
force level (for effectiveness) balanced with quantitative
metrics at system level (for performance) to establish
causality.
• Some new Measures:
– Size of Area of Operations.
– Size of Force used to successfully accomplish
mission.
– Time to complete mission.
– Kills at standoff (NLOS/BLOS vs LOS).
– Acquiring and Understanding Earlier.
– Acquiring and Killing High Payoff Targets (HPTs).
– [Lethality-Enhanced] Survivability of Infantry.
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Brigade/UA Area of Operations
• Increment 1's enhanced SA/SU, freedom of maneuver, and more responsive
and lethal fires resulted in an AO almost 3 times that of Legacy Heavy and
was able to neutralize enemy long-range fires and complete the mission.
• The Legacy and SBCT PiP'd forces did not neutralize enemy long range fires
and were forced into a hasty defense before mission completion.
INC 1 AO BLK I AO
Legacy AO
1
21 hours, did
not complete
mission
1
3 2
3
4
2
12 hours – INC 1 and 10
hours – Block I, mission
completed
6
4 4
4
7 7
6
3
2
3
SBCT PiP'D AO
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5 5
12 hours, did not
complete mission
2
Legacy
SBCT PiP'D
1
Starbursts
indicate multiple
dilemmas (nearsimultaneous
engagements)
presented to the
Threat
3 3
1
INC 1
BLK I
8
Force Comparison
4.5
Dismounted Infantry Ratios
Ratio (Leg or SBCT/INC 1)
4
3.5
3
2.5
INC 1
2
• Increment 1 was more successful
than Legacy Heavy and SBCT in
accomplishing the mission.
1.5
1
0.5
0
Attack
(dismtd)
3.5
Attack
(mtd)
Recon
Assault
Attack
Attack
(Bde)
Combat Vehicle Ratios
– Lost fewer forces.
– Killed more Threat.
– Completed the mission earlier.
• Increment 1 infantry and combat
vehicles were enabled by a highly
reliable communications network,
more numerous aerial sensors, and
long-range precision effects.
3
Ratio (Leg or SBCT/INC 1)
• Legacy Heavy and SBCT forces
required more force, infantry and
combat vehicles, than Increment 1
to conduct the same tactical
mission.
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
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Attack
(dismtd)
Attack
(mtd)
Recon
Attack
Attack
(Bde)
Notes:
1. SBCT and SBCT PiP'd have the same sized forces in
the Balkans and Caspian BDE
2. Caspian Assault does not have any combat vehicles in
the Increment 1 force
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Time to Complete Mission
• Increment 1 completed the mission earlier and with more combat strength
remaining than legacy and interim forces
– 25% to 65% faster in mounted attack and assault operations.
Percent of Legacy/Interim Mission Time
– Dismounted operations take a similar amount of time to complete.
Time to Complete Mission
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Dismounted
Supported by
Mounted
Operation
Legacy Heavy
and SBCT
PiP'd did not
complete the
mission
Attack
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Attack
(Bde)
Assault
INC 1
BLK I
SBCT PiP'd
Attack
(mtd)
Recon
Attack
(dismtd)
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Number of Unique Acquisitions
Increment 1 Acquires & Understands Threat Earlier
BN Cdr's COP Resolution
• Increment 1 acquired Threat earlier
with better resolution than legacy
and Stryker forces.
(CASTFOREM Vignette)
140
120
100
80
1 hour into the
battle, SBCT had
14% less knowledge
of Threat locations
than Increment 1
60
40
20
minutes
0
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
SBCT Unique
INC 1 Unique
BLK I Unique
SBCT FBCB2
INC 1 COP
BLK I COP
Number of Unique Acquisitions
Unique Acquisitions  Recognition
(CASTFOREM Vignette)
140
100
1 hour into the battle,
SBCT had 38% fewer
targetable
acquisitions than
Increment 1
60
40
20
• Seeing better and earlier enabled the
commander to more rapidly
understand Threat's intentions.
minutes
0
0
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• Acquisitions of resolution
"recognition" or "identify" can be
immediately engaged.
• Higher resolution enabled the
commander to shape the battlefield
using precision munitions.
120
80
• Earlier acquisitions enabled the
commander to plan maneuver and
effects before contact (precision
maneuver).
50
100
150
SBCT
200
250
INC 1
300
BLK I
350
400
450
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Increment 1 Acquires & Kills Threat HPTs Earlier
• Increment 1 gains targetable information on HPTs earlier and
more quickly destroys key targets.
• SBCT understands as well as Increment 1 only after the force is
engaged in the close fight.
Unique Acquisitions  Recognition Level and Kills of Threat HPTs
(CASTFOREM Vignette)
Number of Acquisitons
35
SBCT engages in
the close fight
30
25
SBCT - 27
INC 1 - 26
INC 1 - 22
SBCT - 19
20
39 Total HPTs:
10 - HVY MG
10 - APC
4 - Tank
3 - Arty
6 - Mortar
2 – AT Gun
4 - HVY ADA
15
10
5
minutes
0
0
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100
SBCT
200
SBCT Kills
300
INC 1
400
INC 1 Kills
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Lethality-Enhanced Survivability of Infantry
Recon
(~2 hours)
Assault/Breach
(2-2.5 hours)
Clearing
( 1.5-4.5 hours)
• SBCT PiP'd used UAVs and ground recon assets to
find Threat IF quicker than UA alternatives. Cost:
SBCT PiP'd lost twice as many combat vehicles and
infantry as INC 1.
• INC 1 kills Threat's artillery and mortars more quickly
than SBCT.
• INC 1 kills Threat's infantry earlier and at longer
ranges with BLOS/NLOS than SBCT.
Mortars
• SBCT loses 32 infantry to indirect fire, 19 in the last
phase of the battle. Increment 1 lost no infantry in
the last phase.
BLK I
INC 1
PIP
SBCT
BLK I
INC 1
PIP
SBCT
BLK I
INC 1
• At the beginning of the clearing phase of battle, there
are almost twice the number of Threat IF systems
remaining on the battlefield for SBCT than INC 1.
PIP
5
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
SBCT
Number of Kills
Blue Kills of Threat IF Systems
(By Phase and Time)
Artillery
BLOS/NLOS(B/N) and LOS Kills of Threat Infantry
Blue Infantry Losses to Threat LOS and BLOS/NLOS
50
BLOS/NLOS
40
LOS
30
20
10
0
SBCT
B/N
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SBCT
PiP'd
B/N
INC 1
B/N
BLK I
B/N
SBCT
LOS
SBCT
PiP'd
LOS
INC 1
LOS
BLK I
LOS
Number of Losses
Number of Kills
60
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
SBCT
SBCT PIP
Direct Fire
INC 1
BLK I
Indirect Fire
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Conclusion
• FCS AoA has changed the way we do analysis
– System of systems approach.
– Network-centric warfare.
• New Metrics:
– LERs, SERs, FERs no longer carry the day.
– We’ve just scratched the surface with new metrics.
– Much more difficult to quantify and measure:
- System of systems performance.
- C4ISR, the network, robotics performance.
- Information modeling (fusion, decision making).
• FCS KPP analysis beginning for May ’04 MSB update.
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