Transcript Migration and Inequalities - Serwis o rekrutacji na

Projekt współfinansowany ze środków Unii Europejskiej w ramach
Europejskiego Funduszu Społecznego
Migration and Inequalities
Marek Nowak PhD
[email protected]
Institute of Sociology AMU
On the base on: (Post)transformational Migration. Inequalities, Welfare State
and Horizontal Mobility (M. Nowak, M. Nowosielski ed.)
Why emigrate the: banal answer…
„The role of economic scarcity in fostering
migration was especially underlined by the
neoclassic theory of push factors and pull
factors. Perceived inequalities, such as the
lack of a proper job (in relation to others) or
bad living conditions (more generally), can
play the role of push factors that make people
migrate (Lee 1966)”.
What does ‘push factor’ mean?
„… focus more on relative
deprivation, exacerbated by
inequality, as a basic
determinant of people’s
mobility”
GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in PPS
(Purchasing Power Standard) Index in
2011 (EU-27 = 100)
GDP (gross domestic product) is an indicator for a nation´s economic situation. It reflects the
total value of all goods and services produced less the value of goods and services used for
intermediate consumption in their production. Expressing GDP in PPS (purchasing power
standards) eliminates differences in price levels between countries, and calculations on a per
head basis allows for the comparison of economies significantly different in absolute size.
What does ‘pull factors’ means?
Attracting selected groups of
the labor force because of
local/regional economic
demand.
What can sociologists suggest?
“Structural conditions” are only a part of the
story of migration, particularly because
differences and inequalities are social facts,
elements of the shape of modern open
societies”.
„From one side, inequality can be seen as a
basic element of competitive society (a sine
qua non of capitalist maximalization). From
another, it can call up pictures of barriers
developing between people—as a
consequence of the vertical division of labour,
and with the consequence that vertical
mobility tends to decrease as result of social
barriers—and of a gulf between the “top” and
the “bottom” of the society”.
What could influence the migration
behavior?
1. The politics which could decrease or increase
the tension to emigrate;
2. The construction of welfare relation (the
welfare policy);
3. Past experiences related to horizontal mobility
(as the cultural framework of mobility generally).
4. Acceptability of migrations a strategy (which is
a part of the social context)
5. The intensity of social change - deregulation (in
the 90s and the first decade of the 21st century).
Situational context of Central European
migration…
The system’s transformation within
the context of increasing push factors
in Central and Eastern Europe.
“the governments of Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, and Slovakia were each spending on
average about 10–15 percent of their GDP
annually on pensions and other social security
benefits [...]. This level of expenditure matched or
even exceeded that of the more developed
western countries, many of which had been
struggling to control government spending and to
reform their social security systems for more than
two decades” (Inglot 2008).
The key moment of the Polish transformation
process could be the second part of the 90s of
the 20th century (1998), where began the fast
reorientation of the Polish system of production
towards the west European direction (the so
called: Russian crisis ).
This could be an important moment for explaining
the factors of the mass emigration in the years
2006-8.
Subsidiarisation as a context of
inequalities and migration
„In some cases there was even a kind of a social
engineering effort to build the democratic
state’s new institutions from the top down,
rather than from the bottom up. In both the
east and the west, the key notion in this
process may be described as an aspect of
liberal subsidiarization processes. Which
means, it’s worth repeating, bringing
responsibility for functions down to a lower
level of authority and to the local community”.
„In the Polish case, and less so in the case of the
Czech Republic, the darker sides of the […]
transformation included the dynamic growth
of unemployment (in Poland in the first
decade of the twenty-first century, ten years
after the start of the transformation, more
than 20% of labour force was unemployed),
and growing differentiation (asymmetric
increases in different social segments, and in
different positions in class structure)
(Tomescu-Dubrow 2007). ”
„Looking at the basic indicator of social
inequality—the Gini coefficient—at the
beginning of the twenty-first century, it is
clear that the processes of social
transformation did not have the same
trajectories and consequences in all the
involved countries and societies. Although
states such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland
now have a relatively high Gini coefficient […]
far above the European average, the position
of the Czech Republic is different”.
Finally,
we observed the different
trajectories of „social polarization”
(inequalities)
in consequence of the deregulation and
marketisation in different national/social
contexts. These tend to affect the different
scale of international labor flow (hipotesis).
The Polish case
Migration ‘before’ accession to the UE
Before accession, in the terminology of GrabowskaLusińska and Okólski, there was an “incomplete
migration” which was invisible from one side, and
which from the other side represented a sort of
“refrigerator” of a segment of labour power
endangered by unemployment (GrabowskaLusińska, Okólski 2009, pp. 39). They mentioned
three main types of migration: (a) circulation
migrations; (b) a short period migration; (c) long
term migration (emigration in formal
nomenclature).
Polish migration ‘after’ the
accession to the EU
The migration and emigration (more than 12
months abroad) was much more often, much
longer, much more legal, much more
common…
The ‘typical’ Polish migrant to the
UK or Ireland [after 2004]:
Polish migrant to the UK or Ireland [after 2004]:
relatively young (based on Polish legal
statistics, BAEL/OBM data), having in the case
of pre-accession migration an average age of
32 years, or in later waves a little more than
31 years; more likely to be a man than a
woman (183 men to every 100 women);
possessing greater experience in the labour
market (relative to the demographic structure
of Polish society) than that of the average 20–
29 year-old (Grabowska-Lusińska, Okólski
2009, pp. 97).”
The reality of migration processes in different
countries of the region seemed to be
different.
Finally…
The migration factors seems to not belong to the one
simple „scheme” of social reaction, which suggests
both: social and cultural answers (than just simply the
material deprivation picture).
Reconceptualisation tends to move from „structural
condition” (of the differences in income) to the
„processual” relations based on socio-cultural facts.
Possible elements of an explanation might consider the
questions of how market-oriented were particular post
communist societies, and how successful was the
“gestalt switch”. As we know from social surveys,
respondents’ orientations are sometimes very
different, and may change over time.
The way in which we could
conceptualized motives of
emigration…
We can describe two aspects which may have an
influence on the social mobility:
1) the personal aspect, which relates to individual
rationality, individual motives, the individual condition
of the person, as well as the person’s social attitudes,
education, life expectations, and so on; and
2) the structural aspect (i.e. what are called “push
factors” in the theory of migration behaviour), which in
the case of Central and Eastern Europe can be very
close to the concept of Durkheim-Merton anomy, or
Sztompka’s transformational sociocultural trauma
(Sztompka 2000), and which describes common labour
relations, typical social mobility patterns, and
institutional design.
The Eurequal project
“The purpose of Eurequal was to create and
disseminate knowledge that would facilitate
the achievement of greater social equality
between individuals, social cohesiveness in
societies, democratic and market
development, and the broader integration of
Europe”.
http://eurequal.politics.ox.ac.uk/
The main questions of Eurequal
• How can we adequately measure the
multifaceted character of social inequality?
• What are the factors at the individual level
that are most associated with the patterns of
social inequality?
• What characteristics of the economic,
political and institutional arrangements of
nations have the greatest positive and
negative impact on social inequality?
• What are the consequences of social
inequality for individual and household
economic behaviour, in particular for intra
and inter-generational social mobility?
• What are the consequences of social
inequality for political attitudes, especially
towards other social groups, and for political
behaviour?
• What are the consequences of social
inequality for economic growth, democratic
consolidation and international integration?
Table 2. Average answers to the
question of the acceptability of
emigration
(five point Likert scale, from “definitely accepted” to “definitely not accepted”).
Country/ descriptive
statistics
Pearson correlation*
Average
Standard deviation
Belarus
2.73
1.776
0.386**
Bulgaria
2.47
1.479
0.236**
Czech Republic
2.21
1.282
0.115**
Estonia
2.26
1.318
0.258**
Hungary
2.82
1.443
0.386**
Latria
2.21
1.204
0.250**
Lithuania
2.51
1.419
0.269**
Moldova
2.37
1.424
0.116**
Poland
2.09
1.139
0.185**
Romania
2.32
1.018
0.364**
Russia
2.81
1.751
0.326**
Slovakia
3.62
1.224
0.208**
Ukraine
2.16
1.347
0.352**
Answer to the question: have you ever
worked abroad? (N, and in %)
Country
Yes
Belarus
58
5.8%
Bulgaria
63
6.4%
Czech Rep.
81
8.2%
Estonia
149
14.2%
Hungary
48
4.7%
Latvia
Lithuania
106
No
942 Moldova
94.2%
914 Poland
93.6%
910 Romania
91.8%
903 Russia
85.8%
982 Slovakia
95.3%
895 Ukraine
10.6%
89.4%
111
889
11.1%
88.9%
Country
Yes
184
858
17.7%
82.3%
213
1268
14.4%
85.6%
126
1366
8.4%
91.6%
70
1930
3.5%
96.5%
159
873
15.4%
84.6%
85
1299
6.1%
93.9%
Have you ever worked abroad? (N, and
in percentages)
Moldova
male
> 25
26–37
38–49
50–61
62 <
N gen.
Poland
all
17
female
10
27
16
female
10
26
17
female
20
all
37
% age
63.0
37.0
100.0
61.5
38.5
100.0
45.9
54.1
100.0
% sex
15.6
13.3
14.7
11.1
14.5
12.2
21.3
25.3
23.3
% all
9.2
5.4
14.7
7.5
4.7
12.2
10.7
12.6
23.3
N
37
27
64
42
21
63
24
43
67
% age
57.8
42.2
100.0
66.7
33.3
100.0
35.8
64.2
100.0
% sex
33.9
36.0
34.8
29.2
30.4
29.6
30.0
54.4
42.1
% all
20.1
14.7
34.8
19.7
9.9
29.6
15.1
27.0
42.1
25
23
48
35
15
50
26
11
37
% age
52.1
47.9
100.0
70.0
30.0
100.0
70.3
29.7
100.0
% sex
22.9
30.7
26.1
24.3
21.7
23.5
32.5
13.9
23.3
% all
13.6
12.5
26.1
16.4
7.0
23.5
16.4
6.9
23.3
N
N
N
male
Slovakia
all
male
23
12
35
31
10
41
12
2
14
% age
65.7
34.3
100.0
75.6
24.4
100.0
85.7
14.3
100.0
% sex
21.1
16.0
19.0
21.5
14.5
19.2
15.0
2.5
8.8
All
12.5
6.5
19.0
14.6
4.7
19.2
7.5
1.3
8.8
7
3
10
20
13
33
1
3
4
% age
70.0
30.0
100.0
60.6
39.4
100.0
25.0
75.0
100.0
% sex
6.4
4.0
5.4
13.9
18.8
15.5
1.3
3.8
2.5
% all
3.8
1.6
5.4
9.4
6.1
15.5
.6
1.9
2.5
109
75
184
144
69
213
80
79
159
59.2
40.8
100.0
67.6
32.4
100.0
50.3
49.7
100.0
N
% all
Table 8. Standard deviation and average answers (Likert
Scale from 1 (agreement) to 5 (disagreement)) to
questions on expected government intervention (“What in
your opinion is a duty of the state?”) in 13 European
countries (the five lowest values of standard deviation are
indicated by the numbers in brackets, 1 being the lowest).
Country code
Belarus (average)
Standard deviation
Bulgaria (average)
Standard deviation
Czech Rep. (average)
Standard deviation
Estonia (average)
Standard deviation
Hungary (average)
Standard deviation
Latvia (average)
Standard deviation
Lithuania (average)
Standard deviation
Moldova (average)
Standard deviation
Poland (average)
Standard deviation
Romania (average)
Standard deviation
Russia (average)
Standard deviation
Slovakia (average)
Standard deviation
Ukraine (average)
Standard deviation
Gov.
/Job
Gov.
/health care
Gov.
/old people
Gov.
/unemployed
Gov.
/housing
Gov.
/childcare
1.55
1.40
1.39
2.55
2.68
1.72
1.079
.997
1.059
1.646
1.934
1.275
1.58
1.23
1.21
1.72
1.99
1.69
.925
.594 (4)
.584
1.050 (2)
1.326
1.236
1.68
1.22
1.33
2.68
2.54
1.49
1.116
0.548 (3)
.791
1.605
1.631
.874
1.81
1.26
1.27
2.15
2.19
1.64
1.152
.654 (5)
.692
1.459
1.587
1.278
1.49
1.29
1.33
1.99
2.09
1.38
.806 (2)
.659
.766
1.199
1.292
.803
1.51
1.19
1.21
2.01
1.62
1.39
.956
.544 (2)
.649
1.299
1.040
.895
1.72
1.36
1.44
1.97
2.25
1.85
1.058
.721
.892
1.468
1.777
1.426
1.43
1.39
1.42
1.59
1.65
1.54
.899 (5)
.837
.872
1.021 (1)
1.003
1.024
1.48
1.25
1.29
2.14
2.09
1.60
.888 (4)
.583 (3)
.639
1.541
1.562
1.124
1.46
1.24
1.24
1.57
1.69
1.50
.821 (3)
.745
.788
1.071 (4)
1.152
1.048
1.47
1.29
1.25
2.24
2.16
1.56
1.002
.751
.713
1.665
1.772
1.178
1.52
1.21
1.25
1.98
2.00
1.46
.925
.613
.694
1.068 (3)
1.296
.934
1.21
1.16
1.15
1.91
2.00
1.36
.487 (1)
.433 (1)
.459
1.470
1.674
.788
Final statement
I.
As we know (based on the EUREQUAL data), in
postcommunist countries the role of the state in
relation to problems of employment, healthcare,
and the care of old people being a more active
one is relatively commonly accepted.
Expectations sometimes tend to construct a
whole complex etatist syndrome (as in Hungary,
for example), or sometimes it may split into a
different vision when the problems of
employment, healthcare, or (as in the Polish case)
pensions play the crucial role.
“welfare policy arguments and institutions
exacerbate or ameliorate existing social
cleavages and conflicts” (Glass, MarquartPyatt, 2007), which in my interpretation may
in certain social environments result in more
or less high migration tendencies”.
II.
„Inappropriate solutions in the welfare regime
may be one of important factors which can
increase structural pressure, but at the same
time there are no universal rules, and there
are—in my opinion—more conditions which
distinguish the positions of the citizens of, say,
Estonia (where migration is still at a low level),
from its neighbour Latvia, where the level of
migration is significantly higher”.
III.
“The second important factor relates to the more
conscious aspects, an element of the comparison
of the chances that the whole system will make
“progress” (that is, will in the future result in
improved conditions for the individual), with the
possibilities of misfortunes in the local
community where potential migrants live, all of
which may—once again—strengthen or weaken
the “push” (to migrate)”.
III.
The third aspect is related
to the cultural process
of internalizing the “exit”
strategy [not „voice” in
Hirschman view] as an element of
universal ideology which creates visions and
gives the tools to solve individual problems
outside of the context of one society. This is
strong in Poland.
This third aspect could be either analysed as a
much more longue durée factor, and in this
sense reinforces the more general atmosphere
of emigration as a solution in the way of the
“diffusion of innovations”, where migration
experiences are collected in individual
histories, and become an element of the
culture. This third element is in my opinion
relatively significant”.
Politics or policy reasons for
emigration
(Iveta Ķešāne, Emigration as a Strategy of Everyday Politics: the Case of Latvian Labour Emigrants
in Ireland)
„The free movement of labour gave a legal
opportunity to many Latvians to go abroad in
order to earn their livelihood, to provide for
their families, and also to find self-esteem and
fulfilment”.
„ An analysis of the post-Soviet societies by
Sztompka (2004) demonstrates that the period
following transition shows that much was
unexpected about the change, and that the
society was not prepared for it. This is despite the
fact that Latvians largely welcomed the collapse
of the socialist regime and the transition towards
the west. In reference to Durkheim, Sztompka
refers to this condition as the “anomie of
success” (Sztompka, 2004; 157, 158)”
The politics/policy way of
conceptualising emigration
the question of governance becomes the
question of self-governance in the discourse
and technique of emigration.
Understanding of power and self
relation to the power
(governmentality) …
„‘governmentality’ implies the relation of the
self to itself, and I intend this concept of
‘governmentality’ to cover the whole range of
practices that constitute, define, organize, and
instrumentalize the strategies that individuals
in their freedom can use... (Foucault, 2003:
41)” From the 1984 interview, “Concordia”, Revisita internacional de
filosophia 6.
Interviews
I gave birth to my youngest daughter when I was
forty... she finished Gaujienas Secondary School,
and then I understood that there’s nothing she
can do in Alūksne. There’s nothing to do
anywhere (HYAN)
I had a good marriage, good education, the children
were growing. We were hoping that we would
graduate from university and have better salaries.
And then everything went to rack and ruin (SLRH)
and other…
We paid an employment agency to find a job. But it
was all totally wrong. In our rural area, where we
used to live, two big fish processing factories
went bankrupt. That was just because there were
no cheaters with golden necklaces there, for
example, investors, shareholders, the ones able to
subordinate. A lot of money has been lost,
everyone suffered financial losses. Maybe that is
the reason why...There were practically no ways
out anymore... (LMNF)
…
„ I had entered the Polytechnic Institute and
graduated from the Technical University [the
name of institution was changed after Latvia
regained independence]. That was the last year
that people studied for five years [...] And we
were the last graduates who were neither
bachelors nor masters. Also there were no
appointments to jobs, nothing—look for a job
yourself! And at that moment nobody needed
anything anymore and it was like the Russians
used to say, kupi i praday [buy and sell]. The most
important thing was to trade, to launder money,
and at that moment nobody thought about
specialists anymore (KGFC)”
…
I was working in the fish processing factories as a
head engineer. I had a disagreement with the
employer. It was an issue with a lawyer and
all...There was nowhere to complain. There was
just one solution: to find a job somewhere else;
back at that time I went to Riga to look for a job
somewhere. [...] In Riga, they told me that I’m too
old and they can’t take me. We need young,
forward looking people! Then they told me that
they didn’t need me (LMNF)
Finally
„… labour emigration from Latvia, at the time of
the transition, was for some of the emigrants
a type of protest against these new ways of
living and the way they were articulated in
Latvia, and that emigration provided a mode
of “exit” for these people. Moses (2007) ”.
“The analysis of emigrants’ selfproblematization at the time of their decision
demonstrates that it is a strategy of everyday
politics for the reason that it attempts to
resists and evade limitations set by the mode
of state governance and instead increasingly
relying on self government”.
…
Emigration and inequalities in the
destination country (
Guglielmo Meardi, Labour mobility, union
immobility? Trade unions & migration in the EU)
Inequalities and migration in the EU labour
market - is it a problem?
“In debates on the liberalization of the
movement of services in the EU (the so-called
Bolkenstein Directive), on freedom of
movement, and in legal cases concerning
“social dumping” in the European Court of
Justice, migrants from the new EU member
states are often portrayed as a threat to
established worker rights in Western Europe”.
The case of trade unions
The context of perceivd
inequalities
“Current debates on labour markets are frequently
framed within an ‘insider-outsider’ model.
Typically, insiders would be middle-aged male local
workers belonging to the ethnic majority, with no
disability, while the most typical outsiders are
migrants. To guarantee the perpetuation of their
advantageous position, insiders have a number of
institutional devices—the most typical of which,
it is argued, is the trade union”.
The diagnosis from the past
“The insider-outsider idea of migration is rooted in
structuralist conceptions of the labour market of
Piore (1979), who argued that capitalist
economies require continuous flows of new
migrants in order to maintain occupational
hierarchies, that is to provide labour for lowprestige occupations (marginal jobs). Without
migrants, employers would have to pay local
workers considerably higher salaries to take these
positions, which in turn would have caused
demands for higher pay from workers in
mainstream jobs, who would not accept being
paid as little as those in marginal jobs”.
Migrants are necessary for “keeping”
salaries low, and balancing the costs of
the labor market
Should trade unions be against
migrants (from local labour
perspectives)?
“The distinction between insiders and outsiders
varies by country, and among industrialized
economies it is assumed to be strongest in
“Southern European” and “Continental”
welfare states, especially Germany (Ferrera,
Hemerijck, and Rhodes 2000), and Austria”.
but there is the opposite tendency...
The pressure of the illegal
economy… Why labour union help
migrant workers
Watts (2002) reiterates the point on
internationalization in the case of the shifts of
French, Spanish, and Italian unions towards
open migration policies. She also adds two
more factors: the importance of the illegal
economy (especially in Italy and Spain), with
the consequent union interest in channelling
migrants towards legal status; and
organizational needs in the face of declining
membership
Restriction policy
“Although they did not formally take a position
against enlargement or against the principle of
freedom of movement, some western trade
unions, especially the German and Austrian
ones, supported the introduction of transition
periods as protection for the host country
labor markets”.
Polish plumber is coming to the stage
“The mythical figure of the ‘Polish plumber’ was
a crucial factor in the French rejection of the
European Constitution in the referendum of
May 2005. Real tensions emerged in the
transport sector, and major disputes occurred
in both transport and construction (sectors
where labour mobility is a normal
occurrence)”.
Strategy ‘exit’ or ‘voice’. The results of
the policy of the open labour market
Even if the “voice” of employees in the new
member states has remained feeble, their
massive exit has forced employers, and to a
lesser extent governments, to introduce
important concessions, leading to higher than
expected wage growth and some
improvements in employment conditions.
The ‘exit’
and
the ‘voice’ is back…
The integration perspective
“innovative practices such as cooperation with
ethnic associations (e.g. with the Polish Catholic
Association in Birmingham) and the setting up of
Polish-language sections (in Southampton and
Glasgow)”
“focused on two particularly important antidotes to
migrant exploitation: provision of information on
employment rights, and skills—including
recognition qualifications and English language
skills”.
“The most significant activity has been the
cooperation with eastern European trade
unions (mostly Polish, given the “critical mass”
of Polish migration), leading to the posting of
organizers from the Polish trade unions
Solidarity and OPZZ to UK and Ireland, which
in turn facilitated the recruitment of activists
and organizers among migrants.”
“Most notably, major developments have
occurred in cross-border cooperation,
especially in the border regions, through the
Interregional Trade Union Councils (seven of
them involve Austrian or German trade unions
and partners from the new member states). In
2006, for instance, DGB, Ver.di and Solidarity
jointly protested in the border region against a
megastore that was violating worker rights
(Szewczyk and Unterschütz 2009). In May
2009, a Polish-German trade union forum was
launched in Gdańsk.”
A different situations exists in
services…
Final statement
“Migration provides more opportunities than
just the movement of services. In particular,
migration seems to make it easier for trade
unions to “humanize” foreign workers and
develop solidarities with them, than does the
simple existence of remote foreign
subsidiaries. Regarding the freedom of
movement of services, the opportunities for
socialization are minimal, and the only
positive effects come indirectly from broader
European labour socialization, in which
nationalism tends to be sidelined.
Supplement:
another beginning by Ettore Recchi
Cross-state mobility in the EU, “European
Societies” nr 2, 2008.
Start…
1951 the decision about free movements for
coal and steel workers;
… to 2004, and 2007 enlargement to the EU
correlated with the policy of opening labour
markets.
“That is, the original and revolutionary
programme of the founding fathers toward
the creation of a truly supra-national
economic, social and political space”.
And cross-boarder mobility
increase
From 1987 to 2004
From 14.4 millions to 21.4 millions
Why in theory people migrate (in the
perspectives of the author):
“If a national economy does not grow, work
opportunities shrink; if wages are higher
abroad, people have an increase motivation to
leave”.
Inflows of EU non-nationals (from
country to country before
enlargement).
The highest inflows (amount of
inhabitants)…
“Leader” of inflows: Germany (314 thousands)
Spain (178 thousands);
the UK (162 thousands);
Italy (56 thousands).
The traditional direction: south
north
is disputed
What are the destinations
preferred by Germans, Brits,
French?
The highest amount of
Germans emigrated to the UK, Spain and
Austria;
Britons emigrated to Spain;
The French preferred Germany and the UK.
And the East-Central part of
Europe
Where did Polish inhabitants
emigrated before accession
(2003)?
1.
Germany (79 thousands);
2.
Spain (4 thousands);
3.
Austria (3 thousands);
4. The Nederland (3 thousands).
We could noticed increase…
… in number of workers from the UE countries in
comparison with 80s, and 90s of the 20th
century. But still the tension from outside the
UE is higher (till 2008).
Generally: (1) technological changes and
innovations increase knowledge and activate
mobility (people collect information about the
quality of life abroad);
(2) the policy of integration increase mobility
which is a part of EU doctrine and ideology
(Erasmus, Marie Curie projects etc.).
Years since 1986 to 2004. The
mobility and other factors
Who emigrated (western
perspective)?
“Generally speaking, traditional receiving
countries of intra-European migration, like
Germany, Sweden, and France, host a less
educated population of working age EU
movers: those with a tertiary-level degree are
14.4, 22.4 and 25.2 percent, respectively”.
The UK and Germany attract (pull) different
workers. Germany lower educated, the UK
higher…
Answers?
1. It could be the specificity between services
(UK), and production (DE). The core is the
specificity of the economy.
2. The different perspectives could be either
generational (it could answer questions about
direction: North
South). The core is the
specificity of the welfare regime.
How the well-educated emigrated?
“The education of the EU non-nationals has
improved markedly from 1995-2005If in the
mid-1990s only 14 percent of intra-EU movers
had tertiary degree, in 2005 this is the case for
almost a quarter of them”.
We could suggest: “The upgrading of the
education level of UE movers has exceeded
that of the general population. The author
suggest: “UE movers now a positively selected
population in terms of education”.
Three levels of education (comparison
of nationals (N) and non-N)
The periphery perspective of the
immigration in C&E Europe?
The polarization of the service
sector
“… <<service sector>> is distinguished into two
separate categories: a low-level sector (mainly
including personal service activities) and midhigh level sector (in which non-manual
activities are the main role). In the low level
service sector, UE15 non-nationals are more
frequently employed than nationals, but less
than third-country nationals”.
Mobility for what?
The theoretical pictures of migration...
Free movement as employment insurance
(unemployment increase pushes up pressure)
“… the size of migratory response to
unemployment differentials is so low that it
would take more than a decade for
unemployment inequalities to be evened out
by regional or international labor mobility in
the EU”.
…
A different situation was noticed in the 1980s.
Free movement as productivity enhancer (the
mismatch between skills and jobs “is working”
as a push factor)”.
We find in Europe a relatively high level of
unemployment ergo: “European economies
suffer in an incapacity to allocate human
capital efficiently”. A part of this problem
relates to insufficient level of the mobility of
the labor force.
“Unemployment and especially
underemployment are the individual
consequences, and a loss of productivity the
aggregate outcome”.
but is the problem…
There is no scientific evidence, an we should
discus a different perspective of explanation:
“Productivity derives from both general human
capital (gained via education) and specific
human capital (gained via on-the-job training).
The former is fixed, while the latter tends to
grow with job tenure. The more productivity
depends on specific human capital, the more
it profits from immobility”.
Free movement as an innovation trigger (the relation
between geographical mobility and technological
innovation).
“Even when immigration and innovations areas
coincide, this is no proof of a causal link between
the two phenomena.
“A well known-known enthusiast of diversity and city
life as a stimuli of creativity, in fact Florida found no
significant correlation between total immigration
inflow and innovation in American metropolitan
areas. Key to technological progress is rather the
‘density of brains’. The mobility of the highly
qualified is a way to achieve such as density”.
Creative class
Free movement as a EU legitimizing tool
(mobility goes hand by hand with stronger
legitimacy of the EU)
“Cross-state migrants have a much more
positive image of the EU, feel a stronger
attachment to the EU and perceived
themselves as more knowledgeable about
European institutions and policies than people
who stay put in their countries of origin”.
How attached do you feel to the
EU?
Mobility motives
a) “work-driven mobility, which dominated the
European area until the early 1970s, and
increased after the waves of enlargement 2004
and 2007” (I was calling it the ‘structural
motive’ or affect by push factors);
b) “… by the personal and affective relationship (I
was calling it as personal motives or pull
factors);
c) “quality of life motivated mobility, that is the
desire of living in a better social and natural
environment (I was calling it as personal
motives or pull factors).
The contemporary Eurostat
rapport about a discrimination and
migrants
(Special Eurobarometer 393, 2012)
The survey results reveal that the social circles
of Europeans are steadily becoming more
diverse (more open).
But what should be emphasized here is that
there is no such category as migrants as a
discriminated group. I will analyze relation to
nation/ethnic and religion/belifs.
Social environment (how diverse)
How many “outsiders”
Being politicians
Widespread or rare
Outside the work
Ethnic discrimination
Religion, beliefs
By sex, age, education, and politics
By…
Summing up
The level of perceived discrimination is
decreasing with times. There are more divers
experiences within various groups (who
potentially could be discriminated against).
There are perceived factors of discriminations.