Transcript The Opening of Philosophical Investigations: What’s the Point?

The Opening of Philosophical Investigations: What’s the Point?
[a]“When they (my elders) named some object and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and
grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention
was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the
face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses
our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used
in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and
after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.” (Augustine,
Confessions, I.8)
[b]These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the
individual words in language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names.—In this picture of
language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. The meaning is correlated with
the word. It is the object for which the word stands.
[c]Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of word. If you describe the
learning of language in this way you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like “table,” “chair,” “bread,”
and of people’s names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the
remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself.
World’s Weirdest Grocer
[d]Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I give him
a slip marked “five red apples.” He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the
drawer marked “apples”; then he looks up the word “red” in a table and finds a
colour sample opposite it; then he says a series of cardinal numbers—I assume that
he knows them by heart—up to the word “five” and for each number he takes an
apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer.—It is in this and similar
ways that one operates with words.—“But how does he know where and how he is
to look up the word ‘red’ and what he is to do with the word ‘five’?”—Well I assume
that he acts as I have described. Explanations come to an end somewhere.—But
what is the meaning of the word “five”?—No such thing was in question here, only
how the word “five” is used.
(PI, §1)
Baker-&-Hacker’s Elucidatory Reading
Now, the ‘standard’ reading of PI § 1 reads it as purely an attack on the Augustinian picture of
language. This picture of language is said to provide the paradigm within which Frege (in
Foundations of Arithmetic), Russell (in Principles of Mathematics), and Wittgenstein (in the
Tractatus) were alleged to operate. Baker-&-Hacker write: “[Wittgenstein] is concerned only
with the points explicit in the quotation in [a]. (iv) Words signify or name objects. (v) Sentences
are combinations of words. (vi) That a word signifies a given object consists in the intention with
which the word is used. (vii) The intention with which a word is used (i.e. the intention to mean
that object) can be seen in behaviour, bodily movement, facial expression, tone of voice, etc.”
(61).
The trip to the grocer in paragraph [d] is taken, by Baker-&-Hacker, to illustrate “different types
of words” (63; our emphasis). “The example is designed to stress the fact that the contention
that the three words are of different types rests on the differences in the operations carried out
in each case, and on the ordering of the operations” (63; our emphasis).
An Alternative Reading
•
We suggest that Baker-&-Hacker underplay the significance, and are thus
apt to mislead as to the purpose, of PI § 1:[d]. In what follows, I will
outline a reading of [d] that we contend captures much better the
subtlety and nuance, not to mention the philosophical import, of the
example.
•
There is something of a conundrum presented to all who pick up
Wittgenstein’s PI, particularly for those who read the opening as Baker&-Hacker do.
•
Why did Wittgenstein choose a passage from the biographical sections of
Augustine’s Confessions and not an overtly philosophical passage from a
recognised work in the philosophical canon?
•
Furthermore, why is the example of the trip to the grocer so eccentric?
Two Suggested Answers
1.
Part of what is wrong with seeing PI 1 purely as an (alleged) attack on a
particular picture of the nature of language or of language-world relations
is, we think, this: (part of) what interests Wittgenstein, in the Augustine
quotation, is surely the speed and ‘naturalness’ of Augustine’s leap. His
leap to conclusions. The ‘automatic’ element in his thinking here. And;
2.
Insight can be gained by working through for oneself why Wittgenstein
chose to illustrate the limitations of the picture he identifies at play in the
quote from Augustine with a rather eccentric depiction of a trip to the
grocer? The shopper appears to be dumb, and the (rather mechanical)
grocer keeps apples in drawers and counts them out individually after
matching the colour to a colour chart. The eccentricity has purpose.
More on answer one: unwarranted inference
So: one key part of the answer to the question as to why Wittgenstein chose a
passage from Augustine’s Confessions and not one from a recognised work in
the philosophical canon is connected directly with the observation that
Wittgenstein was interested to take a passage which is not merely a instance
of a philosopher theorising, but the kind of theorising that we are all likely to
(or are maybe guilty of) fall(ing) into all too easily, naturally and hubristically.
All of us (me, you, and Wittgenstein himself, included).
This, Wittgenstein thinks, is a very widespread assumption or presumption
that has become yet more dominant in our culture. He means to challenge it in
the broadest possible way, returning us to some sanity of sociality and
community.
Answer one’s therapeutic import
• In other words, this section (PI §1) is already an
ethical moment and a therapeutic moment in
Wittgenstein’s philosophising, and Augustine is
already an exemplar of the very attitude that
quintessentially requires therapeutic treatment.
• Leaping to conclusion—unwarranted inference—is
not merely a logical error, an error of cognition or
psychological pathology (as someone like Eugen
Fischer claims). It is an ethical problem. Or it might
be more perspicuous to say, it can serve as the root
of many ethical problems.
More on answer two: weird grocers
Another key to understanding PI § 1 is in reading the passage as a whole,
being sensitive to its eccentricity, and paying particular attention to the
remark, towards the end, made by Wittgenstein’s interlocutor, and the way
Wittgenstein responds. Recall, in response to Wittgenstein’s story, the
interlocutor says, and Wittgenstein responds, as follows:
“But how does he [the grocer] know where and how he is to look up the
word ‘red’ and what he is to do with the word ‘five’?”—Well I assume that he
acts as I have described. Explanations come to an end somewhere.—But
what is the meaning of the word “five”?—No such thing was in question
here, only how the word “five” is used.” (italicisation mine)
Weird Grocers and Weird Philosophers: internalist prejudice
The interlocutor’s question invokes the notion of “meaning” coming from an inner mental
process. The interlocutor is not satisfied with the explanation being given only with reference to
outward criteria, or behaviour; the use of colour samples and the counting out of the apples
one by one leaves her still wanting to know more about from where meaning might come. To
Mulhall, “the cast of her [the interlocutor’s] questions rather takes it for granted that nothing
behavioural can settle the issue of understanding even in principle; only a transition to the
entirely separate realm of the inner can give her the reassurance she craves” (2001a, 44).
Following Mulhall’s remarks above, we contend that the grocer example in PI § 1 is analogous (a
more profound precursor) to John Searle’s (1980) Chinese Room thought experiment (or
“intuition pump,” in Daniel Dennett’s depiction). However, rather than serving as an argument
against strong artificial intelligence, Wittgenstein’s scenario serves to bring to light the
underlying prejudices that can lead one to both behaviourism and dualism (including varieties of
cognitivism).
Internalist temptations
Wittgenstein’s imaginary scenario is designed to tempt us into positing inner mental processes of
some sort, which is what Wittgenstein’s interlocutor does. However, this is only to begin to
understand the reach of the imaginary scenario. For when we reflect upon what such an (inner)
process might be, we find that we want to describe something very similar to the (external) behaviour
that Wittgenstein’s grocer exhibits.
Consider: A note is passed to him—data are entered. The words on the note are related to objects—
the input data are related to inner mental items (samples). More precisely: the word “apple” is
matched to the object “apple”—the apple-data are related to a mental image of an apple (or the
psychosemantic “concept”: “apple”); the word “red” is matched to a colour sample—the colour-data
are related to a mental image of red (or the psychosemantic “concept”: “red.”) Then, having
ascertained what “a red apple” “means”—having related the data with the correct mental image of
what we call “a red apple”—we count five of them—we mentally mark-off the lines in the five-bar
gate, or mentally slide the beads of the abacus across. The data are thus processed. The grocer
retrieves five red apples and hands them to the note-bearer—he “understands” the request.
Understanding the Point of the Eccentricity
The trip to the grocer is structured to mirror the form of a dominant picture of “inner mental
processes.” In tempting the interlocutor to ask for more, so that she might be satisfied that the
grocer has understood, Wittgenstein tempts the interlocutor into undermining her own
prejudices. Mulhall writes: “If the public, externalised versions of such procedures were not in
themselves enough to establish the presence of understanding to the interlocutor’s satisfaction,
why should their inner counterparts?” (2001a, 45). Is it because they are inner? Surely, this is
not enough.
Things don’t stop there.
For, as Mulhall notes, “If Wittgenstein’s shopkeeper’s way with words strikes us as surreal and
oddly mechanical, to the point at which we want to question the nature and even the reality of
his inner life, and yet his public behaviour amounts to an externalised replica of the way we
imagine the inner life of all ordinary, comprehending language-users, then our picture of the
inner must be as surreal, as oddly mechanical, as Wittgenstein’s depiction of the outer” (46)
To Sum Up – looking back at PI §1
1.
Wittgenstein sees an ethical import in bringing to consciousness Augustine’s propensity to
inferential hubris. Inferential hubris is a vice; we might say that it is a child-like vice.
2.
Wittgenstein’s depiction of a trip to the grocer is eccentric for a purpose. It is designed to
bring to consciousness our temptation to internalism and our concomitant prejudice
against external processes.
3.
It is also designed to bring to consciousness the overlooked eccentricity, and thus implicit
limitations, of cognitivist explanations.
4.
This has ethical import too: we mechanise human being in committing ourselves to
cognitivist depictions of human consciousness and thinking.
5.
What motivates Wittgenstein is the desire—the deeply ethical desire—to therapeutically
liberate us (and himself) from this hubristic propensity to negate our own humanity.
Looking forward to PI §2-6
• Wittgenstein introduces us to two builders, who
employ a very simple language, seemingly
consisting of only a few names.
• Before doing so, however, it is crucial to see how §2
opens with the following sentence:
– “The philosophical notion of meaning is at home in a
primitive understanding of the way language functions”
• If we read this with an eye to our summing up of
our reading of §1 (on the previous slide) it will help
us understand better what is going on here in the
opening of PI
Philosophical Notions and Primitivity
•
Wittgenstein’s interest in Augustine is based in his providing for us a clear example of the
sort of inferential hubris we are wont to exhibit, not only as philosophers but in general
(whether for reasons of cognitive bias or for cultural reasons). This is a logical failing, but
also, more importantly, a moral failing.
•
When we do philosophical work, how might such inferential hubris manifest itself?
•
As we have seen, it might manifest itself in a propensity to represent human interaction in a
distinctly non-human, mechanistic, way: depicting our lives with others as like that of
symbol-processors (computers) interacting. Understanding seems absent.
•
And indeed, this propensity runs so deep that when we see that understanding seems
absent and we try to correct this, all we do is hide the symbol-processors “in the head”.
•
Rather than bring our commitment to this picture (of humans as mechanistic symbol
processors) to consciousness, we theoretically construct a safe in which to hide away the
processor.
Primitive Language or Primitive Signalling?
• The second sentence of §2 then comments on or
suggests an alternative to the first:
– “But one might instead say that it is the idea of a
language more primitive than ours.”
• So, the idea is to explore this possibility. Let’s see if
we can give adequate sense to such a primitive
language, as one might extrapolate from
Augustine.
• This is the ‘language’ of the builders (the scare
quotes are crucial: the status of the builders’ vocal
interactions are hovering before us here.)
Philosophical Investigations §§2 – 6: §2
2. That philosophical notion of meaning is at home in a primitive idea of the way
language functions. But one might instead say that it is the idea of a language more
primitive than ours. Let us imagine a language for which the description given by
Augustine is right: the language is meant to serve for communication between a
builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building stones: there are blocks,
pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass him the stones and to do so in the order in
which A needs them. For this purpose they make use of a language consisting of
the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “beam”. A calls them out; B brings the stone
which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. —– Conceive of this as a
complete primitive language.
Linguistic Communication vs Vocal Signalling
or
verbalising vs vocalising
• Pay attention to the last sentence of §2. In what
idiom should one read this?
• Let us take it as an invitation (not as a command)
to “Conceive of this as a complete primitive
language”
– Can you?
• This is what is explored as we work through the
following remarks to the end of §6.
• Does what the builders do here amount to
something we want to call language, are they
communicating? Or are they merely signalling?
What is at stake here?
• Well, think back again to the Grocer. What seemed
wrong there was the mechanistic nature of the
interaction. It was like two symbol processors
interacting. It was not human.
• To communicate is to commune through language;
it is to join together in some sense which is more
than just stimulus and response.
• One obvious thing that is introduced into the
interaction of the builders that was not present in
the grocer scenario is that of vocalisation. Does
this in any meaningful way amount to
verbalisation?
The Path to the End of §6
• In these remarks, Wittgenstein now explores the
necessary conditions for the ‘language’ of the
builders.
• Now, it might appear less question-begging to simply
say “interaction of the builders”, but this would be to
load the question in the other direction, as it were.
• The point is, we need to work through this for
ourselves. We need to explore the extent to which
we can or cannot give adequate sense to the
‘language’ of the builders as something we would be
satisfied to conceive as a language.
Two Options?
1. The Builders are operating with their words, and do so as part of
a larger linguistic community, such as ours. Here “The
philosophical notion of meaning is at home in a primitive
understanding of the way language functions” and is as partial as
and account of the functioning of language as is the ‘language’ of
the builders as an account of the language of the whole
community. Or,
2. The builders ‘language’ is the complete language; there is nothing
outside their putative primitive ‘language’. Here we are “instead
say[ing] that it [i.e. the philosophical notion of meaning] is the
idea of a language more primitive than ours.”
• So, what does our reading through §§2-6 lead us to believe about
our response to Wittgenstein’s invitation at the end of §2? Can we
accept the invitation and conceive of this as a complete primitive
Well…
• If we push the thought that this can be the
complete primitive language of the whole
tribe, then we find ourselves unable to depict
it as anything other than signals, we lose the
resources that enable the differentiation
between, sound and word, vocalising and
verbalising, signalling and communicating.
We, again fall back on an account of human
interaction which would just as well depict
two symbol processors interacting.
But…
• If we push the thought that this is merely a region
of language, that the builders and their exchange
in §2 is merely a suburb of a larger city (the city
we take to be the language as a whole), then we
find ourselves inclined to decline Wittgenstein’s
invitation to conceive of it as complete primitive
language, and in doing so are drawn to question
the philosophical notion of meaning, based in
hubristic inference from particular cases to
general conclusions (about meaning or language).
• Let’s read through §6
PI §6 [i]
• We could imagine that the language of § 2 was the whole
language of A and B; even the whole language of a tribe.
The children are brought up to perform these actions, to use
these words as they do so, and to react in this way to the
language of others. (PI § 6, paragraph i)
• § 6, paragraph i. Wittgenstein asks us to imagine the
language of § 2 as the whole language of a tribe, where
“the children are brought up to perform these actions, to
use these words as they do so, and to react in this way to
the words of others.” And this is indeed one form that our
lives with words can take; words can operate as signals to
which we are trained to respond. But if this is the only way
that words operate, then that marks quite a difference from
what we normally understand by the concept of “word”.
PI §6 [ii]
•
An important part of the training will consist in the teacher’s pointing to the objects, directing the child’s
attention to them, and at the same uttering a word; for instance, the word “slab” as he points to that
shape (I do not want to call this “ostensive definition”, because the child cannot yet ask what the name
is. We will call it “ostensive teaching of words”.―I say that it will form an important part of the training,
because it is so with human beings; not because it could not be imagined otherwise.) This ostensive
teaching of words can be said to establish an association between the word and the thing. But what
does this mean? Well, it may mean various things; but one very likely thinks first of all that a picture of
the object comes before the child’s mind when it hears the word. But now, if this does happen—is it the
purpose of the word?—Yes, it may be the purpose.—I can imagine such a use of words (of series of
sounds). (Uttering a word is like striking a note on the keyboard of the imagination.) But in the language
of § 2 it is not the purpose of the words to evoke images. (It may, of course, be discovered that that helps
to attain the actual purpose.)
•
§ 6, paragraph ii. Wittgenstein begins to meditate on how we might characterise the teaching of such a
use of language. He remarks that “the ostensive teaching of words can be said to establish an
association between the word and the thing.” We are asked what this might mean, and he suggests it is
often thought of as a picture of the object coming before a child’s mind as he says the word, and then
asks if this is the purpose of the word. And while Wittgenstein is happy to acknowledge that this “may
be the purpose” on some occasions in some language-games (we might say), “in the language of § 2 it is
not the purpose of the words to evoke images.” § 6, paragraph ii, then begins to make clear the
limitations of the language of § 2.
PI §6 [iii]
• But if the ostensive teaching has this effect,—am I to
say it effects the understanding of the word? Don’t
you understand the call “slab!” if you act upon it in
such-and-such a way?—Doubtless the ostensive
teaching helped you bring this about; but only
together with a particular training. With different
training the same ostensive teaching of these words
would have effected a quite different understanding.
• § 6, paragraph iii. Here Wittgenstein points out that
while ostensive teaching is involved in the learning of
the language of § 2, it can only be so, effectively, given
a particular form of training. Without a particular
training designed to elicit these effects the
understanding of the child might well be different
with regards to the words of the language in § 2.
PI §6 [iv]
• “I set the brake up by connecting up rod and lever.”—Yes, given the
whole of the rest of the mechanism. Only in conjunction with that
is it a brake-lever, and separated from its support it is not even a
lever; it may be anything, or nothing. (PI § 6, paragraph iv)
• § 6, paragraph iv. Wittgenstein illustrates the thought suggested in
the previous paragraph by analogy with a simple brake
mechanism. Here the understanding of brake-lever is internally
related to its purpose as part of the whole brake mechanism.
Indeed, when disconnected from the mechanism and separated
from its support not only does it no longer seem to make sense to
call it a brake-lever but it makes little sense to call it a lever. This
analogy adds something over and above the discussion in the
previous paragraph by way of not merely illustrating the point
about ostensive teaching and training, but by also suggesting that
the meaning of a word is accorded significance by us in virtue of its
use, or more accurately, its place in our lives.
Goldfarb’s Dog
What Wittgenstein is depicting the philosopher as doing
might perhaps be illustrated in the following joke.
X asks Y, “How does a telephone work?” Y responds, “Think of
it this way. There is a large, long dog with his head in Moscow
and his tail in St Petersburg; when you pat him on his head in
Moscow, his tails wags in St Petersburg, and when you tweak
his tail in St Petersburg, he barks in Moscow.” X says, “Oh, I
see. But tell me, then, how does a radio work?” Y answers,
“It's just the same; but without the dog."