Transcript ENTRY MODES

ENTRY MODES
Eugene Jaffe
‫תשע"ה‬/‫אב‬/'‫א‬
1
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION CONCEPT




THE OUTWARD MOVEMENT IN A FIRM’S
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS.
A PROCESS IN WHICH SPECIFIC ATTITUDES OR
“ORIENTATIONS” ARE ASSOCIATED WITH
SUCCESSIVE STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS.
THE PROCESS OF INCREASING INVOLVEMENT IN
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS.
THE PROCESS OF ADAPTING FIRMS’
OPERATIONS (STRATEGY, STRUCTURE,
RESOURCES) TO INTERNATIONAL
2

THE PROCESS OF ADAPTING EXCHANGE
TRANSACTION MODALITY TO INTERNATIONAL
MARKETS.
3
INTERNATIONALIZATION DECISION
 DOMESTIC
VS. FOREIGN GROWTH
4
MARKET SELECTION
 WHICH
MARKETS
 HOW MANY MARKETS
5
MARKET ENTRY MODE
 EXPORT
 LICENSE
 JV
 DIRECT
INVESTMENT
 STRATEGIC ALLIANCE
 ETC.
6
MARKETING OPERATING DECISIONS
 PRODUCT
 PRICE
 PROMOTION
 PLACE
7
ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL
 EXPORT
DEPARTMENT
 INTERNATIONAL DIVISION
 ORGANIZATION BY AREA
 MATRIX
8
ENTRY MODE FRAMEWORKS
STAGES
TRANSACTION
COST
ECLECTIC
ORGANIZATIONAL
CAPABILITY
BASIC THEORY
RESOURCE
BASED
TRANSACTION
COST
RESOURCE
BASED
UNIT OF
ANALYSIS
FIRM
TRANSACTION
TRANSACTION
COST, TRADE
THEORY,
RESOURCE
BASED
FIRM
EXPLANATORY
VARIABLES
EXPERIENTAL
KNOWLEDGE
TRANSACTION
CHARACTERISTICS
OLI
FIRM’S
CAPABILITIES
BEHAVIORIAL
ASSUMPTIONS
BOUNDED
RATIONALITY
TRADE-OFFS
BETWEEN
GROWTH & RISK
ENTRY MODES
STAGES
BOUNDED
RATIONALITY &
OPPORTUNISM
TRADE OFFS
BETWEEN
RETURN, RISK,
CONTROL &
RESOURCES
SEVERAL, e.g.,
INDEPENDENT,
COOPERATIVE,
INTEGRATED
BOUNDED
RATIONALITY
DECISION
CRITERIA
BOUNDED
RATIONALITY &
OPPORTUNISM
TRANSACTION
COST MINIMIZATION
SEVERAL, e.g.,
CONTRACTUAL
TRANSFER, JV, FDI
FIRM
TRADE OFFS
BETWEEN VALUE
AND COST
INTERNALIZATION
VS.
COLLABORATION
9
RESOURCE DIMENSIONS OF ENTRY MODE CHOICE
RESOURCES RESOURCES
HELD BY
REQUIRED
LOCAL
FIRMS
FOR
STRATEGIC RESOURCES
HELD BY
OBJECTIVES
THE
INVESTOR
RESOURCES
AVAILABLE
ON THE
MARKET
Source: Meyer and Estrin, “Entry Mode Choice in Emerging Markets”, October 16, 1998.
MARKET VALUATION OF
LOCAL FIRMS
 TECHNOLOGY
 INDUSTRY
CONCENTRATION
 INDUSTRY GROWTH
TRANSFERABLE
KNOWLEDGE
MANAGERIAL SERVICES
FINANCIAL CAPITAL
REAL ESTATE
MANAGERIAL STAFF
OPERATION PERMITS
10
LOCUS OF
CONTROL
EXPORT LICENSE FRANCHISE MANAGEMENT
CONTRACT
little to
little to
moderate
moderate
moderate moderate
MOTIVATION
TIME
STRATEGIC
FLEXIBILITY
RESOURCE
COMMITMENT
11
SUBSIDIARY
LOCUS OF
CONTROL
JV
STRATEGIC
ALLIANCE
CONTRACT
MANUFACT.
highest
MOTIVATION
TIME
STRATEGIC
FLEXIBILITY
RESOURCE
COMMITMENT
12
ENTRY CHOICE = ƒ (CULTURAL HARACTERISTICS,
FIRM VARIABLES, INDUSTRY VARIABLES).
13
FIRM LEVEL VARIABLES




DIVERSIFICATION. Firms following diversification
strategies are more likely to choose acquisition over
greenfield.
COUNTRY EXPERIENCE. More experience of the
local environment leads to acquisition.
MULTINATIONAL EXPERIENCE. A firm with greater
multinational experience is able to bear the risk of an
acquisition and to integrate subsidiaries of diverse
managerial nationality.
ASSET SIZE. The larger the investing firm, the greater
its ability to acquire.
14
FIRM LEVEL VARIABLES

MARKETING KNOWLEDGE. Firms can acquire local,
established brand names and combine them with their
firm-specific marketing skills.
15
THE IMPACT OF CULTURE ON STRATEGY


NATIONAL CHARACTER THEORY. MNC subsidiary
ownership policies will reflect the characteristics of the
countries in which they are domiciled. Managers of
MNCs based in high power distance and high
uncertainty avoidance countries are more likely to
prefer wholly owned subsidiaries over shared-equity.
CULTURAL DISTANCE. High cultural distance
between the home base of the investor and the target
market will lead, everything else constant, to sharedequity ventures.
16
SHARED EQUITY
 LACK
OF KNOWLEDGE OF LOCAL
MARKET.
 LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF HOW TO
OPERATE IN A GIVEN INDUSTRY.
 R&D INTENSITY.
 EXPERIENCE IN THE TARGET
MARKET.
17
GREENFIELD VS. ACQUISITION
VARIABLE
ACQ
GF
Lower,
Less
uncertain
-
+
NS
Market Concentration
+
-
NA
NS
--
Divers.of Parent
+
-
.001
NS
NS
Host country’s
GNP/POP (develop)
High growth in host
market4
Mkt diff. Of Parent’s
Prime Product Line
+
-
.05
--
.01
-
+
.05
.01
--
+
-
NS
.01
NS
Rate of Return
Int’l Exp of Parent
Zejan Hennart Cho
(1990)1 & Park (1995)3
(1993)2
NS
1
Swedish MNE’s expansion into 35 countries
Japanese MNE’s entry into the USA.
3
Japanese Manufacturing FDIs in 45 countries, 1969-1991.
4
Zejan=growth of production; Hennart=growth of demand.
2
18
GREENFIELD VS. ACQUISITION
VARIABLE
Size of Host Market
ACQ GF Zejan Hennart Cho
(1990)1 & Park (1995)3
(1993)2
?
NS
---
R & D Intensity
-
+
--
.01
.05
Stronger Value of ¥/$
Lower US/Japanese
Stock Mkt Prices
Market Follower
+
-
--
NS
--
+
-
--
Opp sign
--
Experience in Host
Market
Low Endownment of
Human Resources
Rel. Size:
Subsidiary/Parent
Cultural Distance
+
-
--
NS
NS
+
-
--
--
+
-
--
Opp
Sign
.01
.10
.05
19
STRATEGIC VARIABLES
ENVIRONMENTAL
VARIABLES
•COUNTRY RISK
•LOCATION
FAMILIARITY
•DEMAND CONDITIONS
•VOLATILITY OF
COMPETITION
•EXTENT OF NATIONAL
DIFFERNCES
•EXTENT OF SCALE
DIFFERENCES
•GLOBAL
CONCENTRATION
ENTRY MODE
DECISION
TRANSACTION VARIABLES
•VALUE OF FIRM-SPECIFIC
KNOW-HOW
•TACIT NATURE OF KNOWHOW
Source: Hill, Hwang & Kim, 1990.
20
ENTRY MODE DECISIONS
STRATEGIC VARIABLES
 MULTI-DOMESTIC
STRATEGY
 GLOBAL STRATEGY
 NEED FOR GLOBAL
STRATEGIC
COORDINATION
ENVIROMENTAL VARIABLES
 HIGH COUNTRY RISK
 HIGH PSYCHOLOGICAL
DISTANCE
 UNCERTAIN DEMAND
 VOLATILE COMPETITION
TRANSACTION-SPECIFIC
VARIABLES
 HIGH DISSEMINATION RISK
OF TACIT (INCOME
GENERATING)



ENTRY MODE
LOW CONTROL
HIGH CONTROL
HIGH CONTROL

LOW RESOURCE COMMITMENT
LOW RESOURCE COMMITMENT
LOW RESOURCE COMMITMENT
LOW RESOURCE COMMITMENT

HIGH CONTROL



21
JOINT VENTURE OBJECTIVES

Establish strategic objectives
and specify time period for
achieving them.
22
COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS

Evaluate advantages and
disadvantages of JV compared
to alternative modes of entry:
 financial commitment
 management commitment
 risk reduction
 control
 long-run market penetration
23
SELECTING PARTNER(S)




Profile of desired candidates
Identify/screening of candidates
Initial contact/discussions
Choice of partner
24
DEVELOP BUSINESS PLAN








Partner’s inputs.
Venture outputs.
Management decision making
processes.
Performance evaluation system.
Marketing mix.
Production and procurement
policies.
Personnel policies.
R&D policy.
25
NEGOTIATION OF JV AGREEMENT

Final agreement on business
plan.
26
CONTRACT WRITING








PURPOSE AND CHARACTER OF JV.
CONTRIBUTIONS OF EACH PARTNER.
RESPONSIBILTIES AND OBLIGATIONS.
EQUITY OWNERSHIP.
CAPITAL STRUCTURE.
MANAGEMENT AND MANAGERIAL POLICIES.
ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES.
27
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

Establish control systems for
measuring venture performance.
28
GOODYEAR - SUMITOMO
JOINT VENTURE
S.Afr.
Phil
..
Buys 1.3% of Goodyear stock
Pol
India
Buys 10% of Sumitomo stock;
pays Sumitomo $936 million for difference in
equity value that both contribute to JV
%50 %50 %75
%75
%25
14 plants
in W.
Europe
%75
%50
29
WORLD TIRE SHARES BEFORE JV (1998)

Bridgeton
Michelin
Goodyear
Sumitomo
Others

TOTAL SALES $75 BILLION




18.6%
18.3
17.1
5.5
41.5
30
GOODYEAR-SOMITOMO JV
LEVEL OF CONTROL
 Goodyear
controls
European and USA
operations of
Somitomo
 Somitomo controls
JV in Japan
31
GOODYEAR-SOMITOMO JV
MOTIVATION



Strengthens Goodyear in North
America and Europe against
Michelin
Heavy debts of Somitomo
because of Dunlop operation
and the recession in Japan
Savings of $300 million (starting
at end of 3rd year) in R&D and
purchasing costs
32
CORNING-VITRO JOINT VENTURE - 1991
$130 million
CORNING
VITRO
51%
49%
49%
51%
33
CORNING VITRO JV - MOTIVATION



Joint Risk Reduction
Exchange of complementary
technologies and patents
Forward Integration
 Share facilities, distribution
and brand recognition in
those markets where one
partner is not the leader.
34
MOTIVATION

Glass raw material in Mexico
less expensive than in the
U.S. Corning gains access to
less expensive products
made in Mexico.
35
MOTIVATION


Co-opting competition (Anchor
in Mexico)
Rationalization
 Corning strong in the U.S.,
Europe and Asia.
 Vitro strong in Mexico, South
and Central America.
36
LOCUS OF CONTROL



Merging of consumer
housewares division - including
research, manufacturing,
marketing and distribution into
two separate entities, one based
in Mexico, the other in the U.S.
Selected the 51-49 ratio to
comply with existing Mexican
restrictions on foreign
ownership.
Give the agreement greater
agility by conferring primary
responsibility and control to the
local partner.
37
THE RESTRUCTURE (JAN.1994)





Too many decision layers.
Heightened competition during start-up
period.
Impact of Asian imports into Mexico.
Slowing U.S. economy.
Lower Mexican tariff barriers.
38
THE CROSS-DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENT



Cross-supply of products.
Corning sales in Mexico
increased from less than $1
million to $52 million.
Vitro product sales in the U.S.
were $140 million.
39
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES

BENEFITS
 Economies of
scale
 Technology
development
 Risk reduction
 Shaping
competition
 New market
opportunities

RISKS
 Imbalance of
benefits
 Imbalance in
commitment &
motivation
 Communication
problems
 Conflict between
partners
40
TYPES OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES

TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT
COALITIONS

OPERATIONS
AND LOGISTICS
COALITIONS


Co-operation aimed at
reducing the costs and
sharing the risks
associated with technology
development; the pooling
of R&D transfer from
“leaders” to “followers”.
Improving
manufacturing/production
efficiency through scale
and/or learning benefits;
transferring manufacturing
know-how.
41
TYPES OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES



MARKETING,
SALES AND
LOGISTICS
COALITIONS
MULTIPLEACTIVITY
COALITIONS
SINGLECOUNTRY AND
MULTICOUNTRY
COALITIONS

Motivated by the need for
market access.

Cooperation that involves
some combination of the
above.
Refers to the geographical
scope of the coalition.

42
TYPES OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES

X AND Y
COALITIONS

Refers to the value activities
undertaken by each partner.
In X coalitions, value
activities are divided (e.g.,
one partner manufactures,
the other markets). In Y
coalitions, the partners
share the performance of
one or more activities.
43
44
COUNTRY STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE/COMPETITIVE
STRENGTH MATRIX
DANGER/FIX
HI
e.g., Japan
AVOID/RAID
MAINTAIN/
ENHANCE/
PREEMPT
e.g., United States,
Germany
DEFEND
LO
e.g., Australia
e.g., Brazil
HI
LO
COMPETITIVE STRENGTH OF BUSINESS IN COUNTRY
45
CONVENIENCE PORTFOLIO MATRIX
Quadrant II
(emulating/latent
countries)
High convenience
orientation
Israel
Spain
Greece, Russia
Ability to Turkey, Hungary
pay - low Pakistan
Bangladesh
Sudan
Somalia
Afghanistan
USA
Japan
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Germany
France
Ability to
UK
pay - high
Switzerland
Denmark
Sweden
Norway
Australia
New Zealand
Low convenience
orientation
Source: Luqmani, et al, 1994.
Quadrant III
(Traditional countries)
Quadrant I
(Innovator/leader
countries)
Quadrant IV
(Utopian countries)
46
NIKE EUROPE
WEAK
“MOLES”
GERMANY
AUSTRIA
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
FINALND
“RESISTANCE”
STRONG
BENELUX
GREECE
SWITZERLAND
STRONG
MARKET POTENTIAL
WEAK
47
BUSINESS GROWTH/COMPETITIVE
STRENGTH MATRIX
HI
¥
WILDCAT COUNTRIES
STAR COUNTRIES
e.g., Italy
e.g., Japan, Spain, Hungary
L
$
DOG COUNTRIES
LO
£
CASH COW COUNTRIES
e.g., United States,
United Kingdom
LO
HI
COMPETITIVE STRENGTH OF BUSINESS IN COUNTRY
48
Multiple factor index and political activity index
Country
USA
Canada
Bahamas
Jamaica
Puerto Rico
Sweden
UK
France
W. Germany
Switzerland
Mexico
Libya
Italy
Australia
Japan
P15 a
.081
.090
.129
.138
.111
.063
.072
.075
.075
.069
.138
.132
.072
.087
.072
APGb
.016
.024
.092
.030
.028
.006
.006
.012
.000
.020
.066
.062
.014
.038
.024
GNP/N c
.428
.333
.207
.060
.149
.364
.204
.279
.264
.299
.060
.159
.158
.254
.173
EAI d
.288
.267
.039
.007
.086
.225
.228
.219
.240
.093
3065
.024
.186
.255
.258
MFI e
.813
.714
.467
.235
.374
.658
.510
.585
.579
.481
.329
.377
.480
.634
.527
PAIf
.800
.793
.218
.384
.712
.697
.789
.668
.706
.728
.408
.002
.441
.702
.742
49
50
Political Risk