Transcript Slide 1

VEMW Energy Lunch
EU Emissions Trading Scheme: Much Progress, But
Not Yet A Blueprint For The World
Woerden, Netherlands, 24 May 2013
Vianney Schyns, Utility Support Group
www.ifieceurope.org & www.usgbv.com for publications
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Contents
1.
Major problems EU Climate and Energy field
2.
The EU ETS for phase 3 (2013-2020)
–
3.
What were the aims of free allocation? – regulatory framework
EU ETS: short term issues
–
Cross-sectoral correction factor (CSF), financial compensation, split of GHG
permit into more GHG installations
–
Carbon Leakage List 2015-2019 (see other presentation)
4.
Theory methods of allocation – EU ETS progress: industry benchmarks
5.
Theory activity factor: absolute or relative or “hybrid”
6.
Fundamental problems EU ETS in phase 3 (2013-2020)
7.
Carbon leakage – EU Commission – academia
8.
Fundamental solutions for the Structural Reform
9.
Some references
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1. Major problems EU Climate and Energy field
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Natural gas and feedstock
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Natural gas prices are amongst the highest in the world (next to Japan)
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Unconventional gas causes a huge disadvantage for Europe versus esp. USA;
potentially also big reserves in e.g. China
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Electricity
–
•
Electricity prices are amongst the highest in the world (next to Japan)
Climate package is not (yet) geared to competitiveness
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Inefficient overlap with EED (Energy Efficiency Directive)
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High RES costs (subsidies) for generation, upcoming issue is “capacity
mechanisms” with also high cost. Energy Intensive Industry (EII) is not shielded
from RES costs in all MSs (NL: yes, so far; Germany: to a large part). Increasing
pressure that EII must pay also (a part).
–
Present EU ETS is likely to cause significant investment & production carbon
leakage
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2.1. EU ETS: the aims of free allocation?
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Globally
–
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Avoid carbon leakage (e.g. recital 24, statements Barroso, EP, Council)
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Production leakage (lower production, import product & unemployment)
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Investment leakage
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Protect competitiveness as good as possible (recital 25)
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Good global competitiveness = good resistance to energy and carbon leakage
Within Europe: avoid distortions, improve effectiveness
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“Harmonised ETS is imperative to avoid distortions in the internal
market” (recital 8) through “Community-wide and fully-harmonised
implementing measures” (Art. 10a(1))
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Environmental effectiveness (recital 20 old, Art. 1, Art. 10a, etc.): move
away from historical grandfathering
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2.2. EU ETS: regulatory framework 2013-2020
1. EU ETS Directive of 2003
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Revised, 23 April 2009 (published OJ 5 June 2009), legally binding
2. Commission Decision on Benchmarks and Allocation Rules
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Adopted 27 April 2011 (OJ 17 May 2011), legally binding (the “CIMs” *)
3. Guidance Documents on Benchmarks and Allocation Rules
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Adopted 14 April 2011 and later, not legally binding
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(1) General guidance, (2) allocation methodologies, (3) data collection, (4)
verification NIMs baseline data reports, (5) carbon leakage, (6) cross boundary
heat flows, (7) new entrants / closure rules, (8) waste gases, (9) sector specific
guidance, PLUS guidance methodology report + Q&As (together 500+ pages)
4. State aid guidelines for EU ETS financial compensation
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Adopted 22 May 2012 and 13 December 2012, legally binding
*) CIMs: Community-wide and fully-harmonised Implementation Measures
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3.1. Cross-sectoral correction factor (CSF)
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CSF might be early: perhaps < 1.0 in 2013? Causes would be:
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Heat allocation from electricity generators to ETS installations
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Allocation for waste gases (esp. steel) emitted by electricity generators
However, the present (too ambitious) top 10% benchmarks
deliver  21% reduction versus Weighted Average Efficiency
(WAE)
•
Alliance of Energy Intensive Industries (AEII) letter to Mr Jos
Delbeke on 12 December 2012
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3.2. EU ETS financial compensation (1)
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Achieved: not average but marginal power plant
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CWE (Germany, Austria, France, Benelux): 0.76 ton CO2/MWh
Eligible a.o.
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Aluminium, lead, zinc, tin, copper, basic iron and steel and ferro-alloys,
man-made and cotton-type fibres, paper and paperboard and
mechanical pulp, fertilisers and nitrogen compounds, other organic and
other inorganic chemicals, selected polymers: ldPE, lldPe, hdPE, PP,
PVC and Polycarbonate (PC)
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Reduction factors (wrongly: incentive electricity efficiency and move
from “grey” to “green”)
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Aid intensity: 85% in 2013-2015, 80% in 2016-2018, 75% in 2019-2020
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Products without product benchmark: 80%
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3.2. EU ETS financial compensation (2)
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Product benchmarks
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Primary aluminium, alumina, basic oxygen steel, EAF carbon steel, EAF
high alloy steel, FeSi, FeMnHC, SiMn, Cl2 (chlorine), Si metal, hyperpure
polysilicon, SiC, HVC (crackers), aromatics, carbon black, styrene,
EO/EG, zinc electrolysis, ammonia
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Production-consumption baseline (most MSs wanted actual!)
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7-year period 2005-2011, allowed minus one year
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Significant capacity extension (reduction): physical change & 10%
capacity increase (legally not required: 2 highest months in 3 or 6
months after start-up = “start of normal operations”)
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Germany: actual production (max), banking if actual < baseline!
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3.2. EU ETS financial compensation (3)
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Applicable EUA forward price
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“The simple average of the daily one-year forward EUA prices (closing offer
prices) for delivery in December of the year for which the aid is granted, as
observed in a given EU carbon exchange from 1 January to 31 December of the
year preceding the year for which the aid is granted.”
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“For example, for aid granted for 2016, it is the simple average of the December
2016 EUA closing offer prices observed from 1 January 2015 to 31 December
2015 in a given EU carbon exchange.”
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Eligible volume NL
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 17 TWh ( 17% of total electricity use), 33% of auction revenues (may
rise to e.g. 37% after a possible set-aside)
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This financial compensation is maximum (MS can do less)
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3.3. Split GHG permit into more GHG installations
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Allowed by Commission, less distortions versus other
Member States
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Optimisation of baseline years (median 2005-2008 or median 2009-2010)
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Much easier to get allowances for significant capacity extensions;
criteria: 10% extension or 50,000 allowances and at least 5% extension
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4. Theory: methods of allocation (1)
1. Auctioning
2. Free allocation, historical grandfathering (basis historical
emissions), like EU ETS phase 1 (2005-2007), phase 2 (2008-2012)
3. Free allocation, benchmark based
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Static benchmarking: allocation = benchmark x historical production
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Dynamic benchmarking: allocation = benchmark x actual production
4. Hybrids, like EU ETS phase 3 (2013-2020):
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Auctioning for electricity production, static benchmarking for direct
emissions of industry, possible financial compensation for the
indirect (electricity) emissions (restricted, inherently unstable)
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4. Theory: methods of allocation (2)
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Auctioning: only if applied globally (otherwise carbon leakage)
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Generally regarded as ideal system: most effective & efficient
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Production & product carbon price signal
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Production: incentive to reduce emissions for manufacturing installations
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Product: carbon cost fully in variable costs of each product
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Higher product price  lower market demand (price elasticity of demand)
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Inter-product competition  lower carbon products win market share
Note, dynamic benchmarking: same production carbon price signal
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Carbon costs also variable costs, carbon cost difference between 2
manufacturing plants: same as for auctioning (unlike static systems)
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Auctioning & dynamic BM: same in following of market dynamics: win/lose
market share, growth and shrinkage on firm level (unlike static systems)
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4. Theory: methods of allocation (3)
•
•
Free allocation, historical grandfathering
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EU ETS, phase 1 (2005-2007) and phase 2 (2008-2012)
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Considered in the 7 Chinese ETS pilots
EU ETS experience: historical grandfathering was a failure

Baseline years include crisis years, shut downs, expansions

High polluters are rewarded (high allocation), disadvantage for modern
efficient plants (no reward of early action) as scarcity increases

Uncertainty for expansions, complex rules, barriers & risks for growth

Huge windfall profits for electricity producers (opportunity costs)

“Update” problem: investment to reduce emission  lower allocation
later, so operators delay abatement (discount of carbon price signal)
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4. Theory: methods of allocation (4)
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Free allocation, static benchmarking
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For industry, EU ETS, phase 3 (2013-2020)
EU ETS experience: progress, but still huge problems

Baseline years for historical production include crisis years, shut downs,
expansions: historical production tells nothing about the future

Uncertainty for expansions, complex rules, barriers & risks for growth
(see reference 4)

The important “update” problem: disappeared, problem solved
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4. EU ETS achievement: industry benchmarks
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The European Union achieved benchmarks for phase 3
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Leading support role by Ecofys/Fraunhofer and industry federations
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52 benchmarks: chemicals (15), Paper & pulp (11), ceramics incl.
plaster/gypsum/plasterboard (7), steel industry (6), cement industry incl.
lime/dolime (5), glass (4) aluminium (2), refineries & aromatics (2)
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EU ETS lessons
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A correct technical definition is feasible in a reasonable time
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Stringency of the benchmark is an important framework choice
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EU ETS: “top 10%” benchmarks (average of 10% best installations)
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Australian ETS: weighted average benchmarks, better for competitiveness
More stringent benchmarks: not better for the environment, to the
contrary: higher incentive carbon leakage  lower overall efficiency
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5. Theory: absolute or relative or “hybrid” (1)
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Introduction names & concepts: absolute, relative, hybrid
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Absolute schemes, cap & trade in narrow sense
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Permit trading (environmental economists’ literature), ex-ante fixed caps per
firm or auctioning; includes static benchmarking (see reference 5)
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Aims: certainty environmental outcome, they claim as most efficient system
because of (product) carbon price signal – price elasticity of demand
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Relative schemes
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Credit trading (environmental economists’ literature), ex-post to actual
production; other names: baseline-and-credit, performance standard rate
(PSR), rate-, intensity-, output-based; includes dynamic benchmarking
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Our claim: auctioning = “relative” (BM x actual production, BM = 0)
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Aims: avoid carbon leakage, avoid competitive distortions (winning/losing
market share), avoid barriers & risks for growth (see references 2 & 3)
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A hybrid: relative for firms, absolute cap for total (see references 2 & 3)
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5. Theory: absolute or relative or “hybrid” (2)
•
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What is best? Difficult subject, analyse via “elimination”
Level 1: absolute caps give certainty of environmental
outcome, relative caps do not; often expressed
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E.g. by Koutstaal et al (CATEP, 2002), EU Commission e.g. in
Decision (2003) on Dutch NOx ETS, EU ETS Directive demands
“absolute” for linking trading schemes (but: position is softening)
–
–
However “absolute” is no guarantee, some targets “can’t be done”:
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Who could have foreseen the immense Chinese growth 10 years ago?
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If absolute would be guaranteed: why not set -85% for 2020, or for 2025?
Canada (2007): “World Resources Institute noted in a 2006 report, ‘for environmental
performance, what matters overall is that targets are set at reasonably stringent levels
and subsequently are met. This may be achieved with absolute or intensity targets.’”
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5. Theory: absolute or relative or “hybrid” (3)
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Level 1: issues about ex-ante absolute caps
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Illusion: supply-demand balance predictable for e.g. 10 years ahead?
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Will Europe recover from the crisis? Or remain depressed for 10
years? Or something in between?
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Or: what will happen if Europe recovers from the crisis and economic
growth becomes much higher than expectation? (explosion to very
high carbon price)
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5. Theory: absolute or relative or “hybrid” (4)
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Level 2: carbon price signal – carbon leakage – windfalls
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Climate Strategies / Carbon Trust, Öko-Institut and many other
environmental economists: actual production is solution to avoid
carbon leakage, but not acceptable because of loss of carbon price
signal (meant: product carbon price signal), “with relative caps
product prices are inefficient” (Koutstaal) – price elasticity of demand
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However: avoidance of carbon leakage and avoidance of possibility
of windfall profits (ref. CE Delft) and maintenance of product carbon
price signal are conflicting objectives, mutually exclusive
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Carbon leakage >> elasticity profit (Carbon Trust)
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Carbon leakage is inefficient, total loss for the environment
(see reference 3, Trilogy Study)
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5. Theory: absolute or relative or “hybrid” (5)
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Level 3, hybrid, combining absolute with relative: ex-ante
absolute cap for total, relative (actual production, ex-post
correction 1 or 2 years later) for individual operator *)
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Examples: (1) Australian ETS (average benchmark incl. indirect (electricity)
allocation, ‘true-up’ to actual production), (2) Waxman-Markey bill (with
strategic reserve for growth/shrinkage and with price collar)
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“Ex-post” with guarantee of total cap is easy in present EU ETS:
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New entrants’ reserve (NER): allowances for growth, allowances flow back if
production is lower than assumed (certainty for growth)
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NER to be refilled from auction volume, if NER is depleted

However, EU ETS cap >> 2020 is problem in case of no global ETS by 2020
*) Fischer (Resources of the Future), Quirion (CIRED a.o.), Loske / Schyns (see reference 2 & 3)
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5. Theory: absolute or relative or “hybrid” (6)
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Wide agreement on ideal system long-term
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Auctioning, but then also global rules: what (not) to do with revenues
(otherwise allocation problems are reintroduced via backdoor)
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Global cap, one single carbon price
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Probably also: some supply response – e.g. with carbon banks, auction
reserve price, maximum price
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Same & clever ETS coverage, avoid incentive lack by “ETS borders”
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Example: full bio-based manufacturing plant should not be ‘non-ETS’ (such
as now in the EU ETS), this removes the incentive
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6. Fundamental problems EU ETS (1)
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Fundamental problems EU ETS of the ex-ante allocation
1.
Under-allocation: major barriers and risks for growth, likelihood of
investment carbon leakage, neglected by advocates of permit trading
2.
Incentive for production carbon leakage (49%, partial cessation rules),
neglected by advocates of permit trading
3.
Possibility of windfall profits (but permit trading advocates state: there
must be windfall profits (carbon price signal), efficiency of the scheme)
4.
The big debate for 3 years in Europe: over-supply during crisis (EU ETS
only commodity market without supply response) – backloading / setaside is conceptually questionable, no structural solution
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6. Fundamental problems EU ETS (2) – killers
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Carbon Leakage List, assessments each 5 years: uncertainty
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NER limited (sufficient for 1.2% annual growth), (yet) no NER for after 2020
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Unstable, unpredictable and restricted financial compensation: restricted in
terms of (1) coverage of sectors and (2) with reduction factors
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The too stringent “top 10%” immediately in 2013, moves down with crosssectoral correction factor CSF (when?) and for new investments with linear reduction
factor LRF, both with 1.74% points per year (70.4% in 2030, 53.0% in 2040)
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6. Fundamental problems EU ETS (3)
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Various kinds of production carbon leakage by “ex-ante”
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Structural incumbent production carbon leakage: selling allowances
creates more value than Gross Value Added (GVA)
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GVA w/o ETS moves up and down (tight – less tight supply-demand ratio)
•
Problem increases over time (CSF), moves from quartile 4 to quartile 3 to
WAE plants and so forth
•
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CO2 break-even prices generally in the range of € 40-80/ton
Arbitrage production carbon leakage: a producer arbitrages between
producing in Europe and producing outside Europe while covering
transportation costs into Europe by sales of allowances
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CO2 break-even prices: generally € 25-35/ton until as low as € 15-25/ton
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Also rather low break-even prices for new plants: investment carbon leakage
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7.1. Carbon leakage – European Commission
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Error in Impact Assessment (23-1-2008) of EU ETS Directive,
“free allocation does the trick”
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Analysis of allocation options (pages 120-122): (1) harmonised
grandfathering, (2) fully harmonised benchmarking, (3) Hybrid approach:
harmonised benchmarking only for large emitters, (3) relative performance
benchmarking, the latter with the addition “This option does not mean that
allocations will be adjusted to actual production (ex-post adjustments)”.
–
Wrong conclusion (page 122): “Since the number of allowances to be
allocated for free is rather determined according to the option chosen as set
out in the preceding section, all options have similar effects as regards
environmental effectiveness and their potential to avoid carbon leakage.”
•
Ex-ante allocation is in fact an inbuilt incentive for carbon leakage
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7.2. Carbon leakage – Climate Strategies, Öko-Institut - 2008
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Argue until 2008 in European Parliament, there are 3
remedies for carbon leakage
•
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Ex-post allocation
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Border adjustments
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Global sectorial agreements, global carbon market
But …
–
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Ex-post allocation rejected, as it destroys the (product) carbon price signal
However, Trilogy Study (Loske-Schyns)
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Argument is inconsistent, there is either loss of product carbon price signal
or there is carbon leakage
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7.3. Carbon leakage – Climate Strategies, Öko-Institut - 2009
•
•
As from 2009, the same 3 remedies for carbon leakage apply
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Ex-post allocation now recommended, next to (preferably)
–
Border adjustments
–
And of course: global sectorial agreements, global carbon market
E.g. Climate Strategies– Dröge (2009), page 42
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“Thus, if free allocation of allowances is used to address carbon leakage
under a cap and trade system, it has to be linked to the existence,
availability or production of the installation. …”
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E.g. Grantham-CCCEP (2013) (incl. Öko-Institut), page 42
–
“the impact on leakage of production … to non-EU regions is less under
output-based allocation”
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8. Fundamental solutions EU ETS (1)
•
Avoid carbon leakage = ensure global competitiveness = support Europe
2020 Strategy for Growth and Jobs (industry from 16% to 20% of GDP)
1.
Rethink total cap and allocation to industry if by or soon after 2020
there is no global participation with equal carbon burdens
2.
Unstable, unpredictable restricted financial compensation, move to
unrestricted indirect allocation, complementary to direct allocation
3.
Carbon Leakage List: assessments each 5 years, move to more
certainty: e.g. by comparison electricity, gas and feedstocks and
comparison EU ETS with ETSs outside EU
4.
NER: define for after 2020 and guarantee to refill from auction
volume if depleted, no auctioning of left overs
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8. Fundamental solutions EU ETS (2)
•
Avoid carbon leakage = ensure global competitiveness = support Europe
2020 Strategy for Growth and Jobs (industry from 16% to 20% of GDP)
5.
Stringent “top 10%” immediately in 2013, move to Weighted
Average Efficiency (WAE) benchmarks
6.
CSF and LRF to be replaced by a realistic ILRF (Industry Linear
Reduction Factor) of e.g. 0.8% points per year (‘sliding path’
allocation taking into account technological possibilities, stringent
targets need time & resources)
–
7.
Fallbacks: no ILRF but state-of-the art technology! (until … CCS, etc.)
Ex-ante allocation, move to ex-post, eliminates barriers & risks for
growth, creates recession-proof system
•
Abandon Guidance Docs, move to legally binding rules, simplify rules
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8. Fundamental solutions EU ETS (3)
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Operational details ex-post allocation per installation
1.
Initial allocation = benchmark x historical production median 20052008 or 2009-2010
2.
If actual production < historical, surplus flows to NER
3.
If actual production > historical, shortage taken from NER
4.
Surplus NER end trading period is not auctioned but kept in reserve
for future industrial growth
5.
Any shortage of the NER is refilled from the auction volume
•
The ex-post correction is also applicable for the “fallback”
benchmarks (heat, fuel, process emissions)
•
The ex-post correction can be done in year n+1 or n+2
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8. Fundamental solutions EU ETS (4)
•
Ex-post – last worry of the Commission, DG Climate Action
 Director General Jos Delbeke concluded on the stakeholder meeting
of 19 April 2013 that a supply response will indeed be considered, but
that “ex-post” on installation level is not doable because that would
require huge efforts and time to scrutinise and approve the allocation
annually, as is now being undertaken
 However, this worry is taken into account
 CIMs Art. 23 requires stepwise ex-post adjustments (-50% for 50%-
75% production shrinkage, etc.), while initial allocation is untouched
 The proposed (advanced) approach requires ex-post adjustments to
any (higher or lower) production level, while initial allocation is also
untouched
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7. Some References
1.
“Climate change challenges and the search for a sustainable policy”, Schyns (2005),
a.o. about absolute or relative targets
2.
“The IFIEC method for the allocation of CO2 allowances in the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme”, by Ecofys (2008), a.o. electricity benchmark as alternative for auctioning
3.
Trilogy Study: “The benefits and feasibility of an ETS based on benchmarks and
actual production”, Loske, Schyns (2008), about ensuring the total cap in an intensity
based scheme & carbon leakage, possible windfall profits and the product- and the
production carbon price signal
4.
“A reality check of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme; Does it allow growth – the
major objective of the EU industry policy?”, Brouwers, Stalmans, Schyns (2012),
detailed study of CIMs & Guidance Documents: major barriers & risks for growth
5.
“Tradable Permits versus Tradable Credits: A Survey and Analysis”, Nentjes,
Woerdman (2012), a comprehensive ETS history & a comparison of ex-ante
(absolute) fixed emission caps per firm with (relative) ex-post systems
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