Transcript HMI Peer Review - Stanford University

HMI00378
HMI Mission Assurance
Edward McFeaters
HMI Mission Assurance Manager
[email protected]
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 1
HMI Mission Assurance – Agenda
•
Mission Assurance Overview – Edward McFeaters
•
Hardware Quality Assurance
•
Software Quality Assurance
•
Materials & Processes
•
Safety
•
EEE Parts
•
Reliability – Dale Wolfe
•
Contamination Control – Syndie Meyer
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 2
HMI Mission Assurance Overview
•
HMI Product Assurance Implementation Plan (PAIP) 2H00021 Rev. A submitted to GSFC
on 15 Oct. 2003.
•
HMI MA Team has been fully integrated into the HMI Program since the start.
– Mission Assurance Manager; Edward McFeaters.
• Quality Engineer; Edward McFeaters.
• Software Quality Engineer; Karen Kao.
• Reliability Engineer; Dale Wolfe.
• Systems Safety Engineer; Zaki Kudiya.
• Materials and Processes Engineer; Chuck Fischer.
• Components Engineer; Ross Yamamoto.
• Contamination Control Engineer; Syndie Meyer.
•
PDR Deliverable MA Data Items per PAIP.
–
Safety Package/System Safety Engineering Assessment.
–
FMEA/Critical Items List/Limited Life List.
–
EEE Parts Stress Analysis.
–
EEE Parts List.
–
Materials & Processes List.
–
Contamination Control Plan.
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 3
HMI Hardware Quality Assurance
Edward McFeaters
Quality Engineer
[email protected]
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 4
HMI Hardware Quality Assurance – Agenda
•
Hardware QA Requirements.
•
ISO 9000:2000 Certification.
•
Controls, Inspection and Test.
•
Quality Records.
•
Material Review Board.
•
Procurement.
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 5
Hardware Quality Assurance
•
Requirements for the HMI Quality Assurance Program flow down from the PAIP,
2H00021 Rev. A
–
LMSSC and ATC are ISO 9000:2000 Registered, BSI Certificate No. FM 36556, 26 Mar. 97
Date of Original Registration..
–
LMSSC and ATC quality procedures and standards are in accordance with the requirements
ISO 9000:2000
–
HMI specific quality procedures and standards are in accordance with the SDO mission and
HMI contract requirements as well as 9000:2000 .
–
Controls, processes, verification equipment, fixtures, production resources and skills needed
to achieve the desired level of HMI quality are in place.
–
Quality control, inspection, and testing techniques are available, and required new
instrumentation is being developed.
–
Quality Records are being prepared and maintained.
–
Material Review Board (MRB) is in place to process any discrepancies.
–
HMI Purchase Requests and Subcontracts are reviewed on an individual basis to ensure
Mission Assurance provisions are flowed down to our suppliers, vendors and subcontractors
as appropriate.
–
The selection of HMI suppliers, vendors and subcontractors, from the LMSSC Directory of
Approved Suppliers, is based on performance history, supplier ratings, etc., to assure the
suitable selection of suppliers who produce reliable products.
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 6
HMI Software Quality Assurance
Karen Kao
Software Quality Engineer
[email protected]
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 7
HMI Software QA – Agenda
•
HMI Software Quality Assurance, Overview.
•
HMI Software Quality Assurance, Software Management Plan (SMP)
Defined Activities.
•
HMI Software Quality Assurance, Standard Activities.
•
HMI Software Quality Assurance, Planned Activities.
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 8
HMI SQA – Overview
•
Software Quality Assurance (SQA) activities flow from the SDO HMI PAIP,
2H00021 Rev. A , and the Software Management Plan (SMP), 2H00005.
•
SQA activities are adapted from the LMSSC SQA Practices and the LMSSC
Standard Software process (SSP).
•
SQA activities related to the HMI Program are performed by the Software
Quality Engineer (SQE) for the Lockheed Martin Advanced Technology Center
(LMATC).
•
SQE support for HMI began at program inception and continues through
program completion.
•
The primary goal of the ATC SQE is to ensure that ATC program software is
reliable and verifiably exhibits the characteristics specified in program software
requirements.
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 9
HMI SQA – SMP Defined Activities
•
SQE software process activities :
–
Software Development Planning – support SMP development, review and sign-off
prior to release.
–
Project Tracking and Oversight – attend program status, software staff, and other
meetings to monitor development progress.
–
Software Engineering Environment – audit to ensure adequacy of resource and
support for software development.
–
Software Management Indicators – surveillance of definition and use of software
progress and quality indicators.
–
Software Analysis and Design – monitor software analysis and design by auditing
related processes and products.
–
Software Testing – review and sign off test related documents and witness formal
testing of final integrated software items.
–
Corrective Action – CA completion verification throughout software life cycle.
–
Software Configuration Management – member of SCCB, review and monitor CM
process for adequate product control.
–
Software Peer Review – attend peer reviews and ensure appropriate records are
kept.
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 10
HMI SQA – Standard Activities
•
Compose ATC SQE Weekly Activity Report including all ATC SQE supported
programs.
•
Attend Bi-Weekly HMI Software Status Meetings.
•
Attend HMI Program Team Meetings and other HMI software related meetings.
•
Perform Software Process Audits in accordance to LMSSC SSP and archive
audit reports.
•
Assist in Developing the SMP and Updates.
•
Review and Approve Software Documents.
•
Support Customer Reviews.
•
Attend Software Peer Reviews.
•
Provide Software Process and Product Consultation.
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 11
HMI SQA – Planned Activities
•
Continue Current Regularly Scheduled Meetings.
•
Continue Monthly Software Process Audits.
•
Audit All Software Test Documentation.
Verify HMI S/W Test Programs Addresses All Software
Requirements.
•
Support Customer Reviews.
•
Attend Software Peer Reviews.
•
Monitor CM Process and attend SCCB meetings.
•
Surveillance of software progress & quality indicators.
•
Participate in the Corrective Action Process.
Review all Software Anomaly Reports.
Developer Anomaly and Improvement (DAI).
Instrument Anomaly Report (IAR).
•
Witness Software Acceptance Testing.
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 12
HMI Materials and Processes
Chuck Fischer
Materials and Processes Engineer
[email protected]
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 13
HMI Materials & Processes – Agenda
•
Materials and Processes Requirements
•
Materials and Processes Control Board
•
Program M & P List
•
Electronics Fabrication Support
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 14
Materials and Processes Requirements
•
Requirements flow from SDO HMI PAIP, 2H00021 Rev. A
– Requires the control of materials and processes to various NASA and Lockheed Martin
documents through the use of an M & P Control Board.
– Requires M & P List as a deliverable item.
•
M & P Control Board to be established
– Chaired by LMSSC M & P Engineer.
– Membership: LMSSC HMI Program Office, Engineering, Reliability Engineering, Contamination
Control Engineering, Quality Engineering, and NASA GSFC SDO M & P Engineering.
•
Program M & P List
– Draft submitted 20 June 2003, updated for PDR, and updated as the HMI design matures.
– Heritage M & P - prior usage on Program D hardware (plus Program C, MDI, TRACE).
– Living document - will capture design changes for MPCB approval.
•
Electronics Fabrication Support
– Printed Wiring Boards
• Polyimide construction - LMSSC material specification, approved suppliers, coupons tested
by GSFC.
– Printed Wiring Assemblies fabbed by LMSSC
• LMSSC assembly process specs: Plated Thru Hole, Surface Mount, Uralane conformal
coating.
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 15
HMI Safety
Zaki Kudiya
Safety Engineer
[email protected]
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 16
HMI Safety – Agenda
•
Safety Requirements.
•
Preliminary Hazards List.
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 17
Safety Requirements
•
Requirements flow from SDO HMI PAIP, 2H00021 Rev. A.
–
System Safety Implementation Plan is included in the PAIP Meets the requirements of DID 3.1
“Safety Planning”.
• The Safety Engineer is the single point of contact for program personnel, LMSSC ATC, and
GSFC for safety-related matters.
• A Hazard Analysis is Presented for Each Major Program Review.
•
Safety Concerns Are In Two Categories
–
–
•
Protection of HMI and its components from damage due to hazards during manufacturing,
assembly, test, transport, and pre-launch integration with the SDO.
Protection of personnel who will be working with the HMI Instrument from potential hazards
originating from the HMI and associated support equipment during the above operations.
Safety Package/System Safety Engineering Assessment has been issued for PDR
–
Safety Package/System Engineering Assessment meets the requirements of DID 3.1.
–
Safety Package describes the the different aspects of the system.
–
A Preliminary Hazard Analysis has been presented as the System Safety Engineering
Assessment.
–
Seven Preliminary Hazards have been identified.
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 18
Preliminary Hazards List
•
The Preliminary Hazards List for HMI at PDR Contains:
–
HMI is dropped while encased in shipping container.
–
Exposure to hazardous materials.
–
HMI is dropped during fabrication/assembly.
–
Launch vibrational loads.
–
Electrostatic Discharge.
–
HMI components exposed to excessive temperatures.
–
Power Surge.
•
Controls for hazard risk mitigation to be completely identified by CDR.
•
Hazards will be closed by PSR.
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 19
HMI EEE Parts
Ross Yamamoto
Components Engineer
[email protected]
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 20
HMI EEE Parts – Agenda
•
Parts Requirements
•
EEE Parts Control Board
•
Parts Identification List (PIL)
•
As-Built Parts List (ABPL)
•
Electronics Support
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 21
EEE Parts Requirements
•
•
•
•
Requirements flow from Performance Assurance Implementation Plan, 2H00021
– Requires the control of EEE Parts to various NASA, Military, and Lockheed Martin documents
through the use of an Parts Control Board.
– Requires a Parts Identification List (PIL) and an As-Built Parts List (ABPL) as deliverable items
Parts Control Board
– Chaired by LMSSC Parts Engineer
– Membership: LMSSC HMI Program Office, Engineering, Reliability Engineering, Quality
Engineering, and NASA GSFC SDO Parts Engineering.
Program PIL
– Draft submitted 11 June 2003
– Updated 27 October 2003 (Revision A)
Program ABPL
– Reflects as-built condition of hardware
•
•
Generated after flight hardware is built
Electronics Support
– Assist designers in the selection of EEE parts
– Coordinate part procurements
– Oversee DPA and PIND testing
– Ensure requirements defined in EEE-INST-002 are met
– Review all GIDEP’s and NASA Advisories for impact
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 22
EEE Parts Screening
•
Parts screened to the requirements defined in EEE-INST-002. Derating
requirements also defined in this document.
•
Standard Parts
•
–
Microcircuits – when an SMD is available will be procured to Class Q requirements with the
addition of PIND testing.
–
Hybrids – when an SMD is available will be procured to Class H requirements with the
addition of PIND testing.
–
Semiconductors – procured to TXV level as a minimum
–
Passive Devices – procured to failure rate level R as a minimum
Non-Standard Parts
–
Microcircuits – procured either to a LM SCD or vendor specification to an equivalent Class Q
or B level, as a minimum, with the addition of PIND testing. DPA will also be required.
–
Hybrids – procured either to a LM SCD or vendor specification to an equivalent Class K or S
level, as a minimum, with the addition of PIND testing. Pre-cap and DPA will also be required.
–
Semiconductors - procured either to a LM SCD or vendor specification to an equivalent JTXV
or JANS level, as a minimum, with the addition of PIND testing. DPA will also be required.
–
Passive Devices – procured either to a LM SCD or vendor specification. Screening to the
appropriate section of EEE-INST-002 will be required. DPA will also be required.
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 23
Radiation
•
Radiation environment specified in the Radiation Requirements for the Solar
Dynamics Observatory (Michael A. Xapsos & Janet L. Barth dated June 2003)
–
•
•
Total Dose
–
All parts selected for 100Krads
–
Part parametric deratings after radiation supplied to designers
–
Low dose rate taken in account for bipolar linear IC’s
Protons
–
•
Degradation of optocouplers accommodated by derating CTR
SEU
–
•
LM designed electronics shielded with at least 160 mils of aluminum
After initial review of the preliminary parts list by Sunnyvale Survivability, single even
transients defined to designers for assessment
Latch-Up
–
The plan is that no parts are to be procured that are susceptible to single event latch-up.
However, should an SEL susceptible part have to be used, protective circuitry shall be added
to eliminate the possibility of damage.
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 24
HMI Reliability
Dale Wolfe
Reliability Engineer
[email protected]
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 25
HMI Reliability – Agenda
•
Reliability Requirements
•
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis and Critical Items List
•
EEE Parts Stress Analysis
•
Reliability Prediction
–
•
Reliability Block Diagram
Limited Life Items
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 26
Reliability Requirements
•
Requirements for HMI Reliability are derived from the SDO HMI PAIP, 2H00021 Rev.
A.
•
The following HMI reliability analyses are SDO MAR related deliverables covered by
DID 4.2
–
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis and Critical Items List (reference PAIP 4.3.1)
•
–
EE Parts Stress Analysis (reference PAIP 4.3.2)
•
–
–
Utilizes procedures from MIL-STD-1629, “Procedures for Performing an FMEA”
EEE-INST-002 derating guidelines are applied to calculated stresses
Reliability Prediction (reference PAIP 4.3.3)
•
Uses guidelines in MIL-STD-756, “Reliability Modeling and Prediction”
•
Failure rates are derived from MIL-HDBK 217 and life testing where applicable.
Limited-Life Items (reference PAIP 4.3.4)
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 27
FMEA and Critical Items List
•
An FMEA is a procedure by which the ways an item or function can fail (failure
modes) are identified and the effects of the failures on performance (failure
effects) and mission objectives (severity) are evaluated.
•
The following severity categories are used in the FMEA for each failure mode.
Category
Severity
1
Catastrophic
Description
Failure modes that could result in serious injury, loss of life, or total loss of mission.
1R
Failure modes of identical or equivalent redundant hardware items that, if all failed,
could result in category 1 effects.
1S
Failure in a safety or hazard monitoring system that could cause the system to fail to
detect a hazardous condition or fail to operate during such condition and lead to Sev.
Cat. 1 consequences.
2
Critical
2R
Failure modes that could result in loss of one or more minimum mission objectives as
defined by the GSFC project office.
Failure modes of identical or equivalent redundant hardware items that could result
in Category 2 effects if all failed.
3
Significant
Failure modes that could cause degradation to full mission objectives and still meet a
minimum mission.
4
Minor
Failure modes that could result in insignificant or no loss to mission objectives.
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 28
FMEA and Critical Items List
•
Failure modes that affect the SDO or HMI mission adversely, category 1, 1R, 1S
and 2 are identified on a Critical Items List.
•
The critical items list is maintained within the FMEA where a risk mitigation
approach is listed for each item.
•
The FMEA and Critical Items list is documented in HMI document 2H00229.
•
The following is the only identified HMI critical item to-date.
Critical Item
Mitigation approach
Optics/Optics signal
path
The optics are set up, aligned and tested on an optical
bench prior to being installed in the optics package.
Environmental testing will include vibration testing and
thermal cycling at qualification temperatures. Testing,
handling and operation to be contamination and
environmentally controlled.
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 29
EEE Parts Stress Analysis
•
A stress analysis will be performed when design schematics become available.
•
The stress analysis will be performed at the most stressful part parameters that
can result from the specified performance and environmental requirements.
•
Stress analysis results will be documented and compared to EEE-INST-002
derating guidelines.
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 30
Reliability Prediction
•
The reliability prediction calculates the probability of success for the HMI
instrument over the 5-year mission.
–
•
The HMI reliability Prediction and Reliability Block Diagram are documented in HMI document
2H00032
Current failure rate calculations are based on heritage equipment and/or similar
equipment from prior programs.
–
Reliability prediction updates using HMI parts lists will be performed as the design matures
Minimum
Mission
Full
Mission
Camera and Camera Electronics
(Includes Camera I/F electronics)
0.9933
0.8430
HMI Electronics
0.9982
0.9428
Mechanisms & Mech. Controllers
0.9968
0.9825
Oven/Optics
0.9990
0.9990
Total (5 years)
0.9773
0.7800
Subsystem
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 31
Reliability Prediction
•
HMI Reliability Block Diagram (full mission)
x2
Camera #1 / 2
CCD
Camera #1 High Rate Interface
x2
Camera #1 / 2 Interface electronics
Mechanism
Controller
1&2
Shutter
Motor
LVDS
Camera I/F
Data Compress /
Buffer
High Rate
I/F
Data Compress/
Buffer
High Rate
I/F
Buffer
Memory
Camera #2 High Rate Interface
Power
Converter
Power
Converter
PCI / Local
Bus Bridge/
1553 I/F
Central
Processor /
EEPROM
PCI / Local
Bus Bridge/
1553 I/F
Central
Processor /
EEPROM
Oven
Controller Bd
ISS
Limb tracker
ISS
PZT Driver
HK Data
Acquisistion
Optics
Oven
Controller Bd
Mechan
1 Tunin
1 Polar
1 calibr
1 shutte
Mechanism
Controller 1
Tuning
Motor
Mechanism
Controller 2
Tuning
Motor
Mechanism
Controller 3
Tuning
Motor
Mechanism
Controller 4
Tuning
Motor
Mechanism
Controller
1
Polarization
Selector
Motor
Mechanism
Controller
2
Polarization
Selector
Motor
Mechanism
Controller
3
Polarization
Selector
Motor
Mechan
1 Tunin
1 Polar
Mechanism
Controller
3
Aperture
Door
Motor
Mechanism
Controller
1
Calibration /
Focus
Wheel Motor
Mechanism
Controller
3
Alignment
Leg
Stepper
Mechanism
Controller
4
Aperture
Door
Motor
Mechanism
Controller
2
Calibration /
Focus
Wheel Motor
Mechanism
Controller
4
Alignment
Leg
Stepper
1 of 2 required
2 of 2 required
2 of 2 required
2 of 3 required
3 of 4 required
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 32
1 calibr
1 shutte
Reliability Prediction
•
HMI Reliability Block Diagram (minimum mission)
Camera #1
Camera #1 Interface electronics
Camera #2 High Rate Interface
Mechanism
Controller 1
Shutter
Motor
LVDS
Camera I/F
CCD
Buffer
Memory
Data Compress/
Buffer
High Rate
I/F
Mechanism
Controller 2
Shutter
Motor
LVDS
Camera I/F
CCD
Buffer
Memory
Data Compress/
Buffer
High Rate
I/F
Camera #2
Power
Converter
Power
Converter
Camera #2 Interface electronics
PCI / Local
Bus Bridge/
1553 I/F
Central
Processor /
EEPROM
PCI / Local
Bus Bridge/
1553 I/F
Central
Processor /
EEPROM
Mechanism
Controller 1
Tuning
Motor
Mechanism
Controller 2
Tuning
Motor
Mechanism
Controller 3
Tuning
Motor
Mechanism
Controller 4
Tuning
Motor
Mechanism
Controller 1
Mechanism
Controller 2
Mechanism
Controller 3
Camera #2 High rate Interface
Oven
Controller Bd
ISS
Limb tracker
ISS
PZT Driver
HK Data
Acquisistion
Optics
Oven
Controller Bd
not required
Polarization
Selector
Motor
Polarization
Selector
Motor
Polarization
Selector
Motor
2 of 3 required
not required
not required
Mechanism
Controller 3
Aperture
Door
Motor
Mechanism
Controller 4
Aperture
Door
Motor
1 of 2 required
Mechanism
Controller 1
Calibration
/ Focus
Wheel
Mechanism
Controller 3
Alignment
Leg
Stepper
Mechanism
Controller 2
Calibration
/ Focus
Wheel
Mechanism
Controller 4
Alignment
Leg
Stepper
0 of 2 required
0 of 2 required
Not required
3 of 4 required
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 33
Limited Life Items
•
Limited Life items are defined as those items that are time or cycling sensitive
•
The limited life items are maintained in the HMI FMEA, document 2H00229
•
Mitigation actions are identified in the limited life items list to minimize potential
risk in meeting mission requirements and provide confidence in their use for the
duration of the HMI mission.
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 34
Limited Life Items
Limited
Life Item
Expected
life
Required
life
Mechanisms
Polarization
Selector
mechanism
hollow core
motor
160+
million
operations
Mechanisms
Michelson
Interferomet
er (Tunable
Filter)
mechanism
hollow core
motor
Mechanisms
Shutter
Motor and
Bearings
Subsystem
Failure Impact
Risk Mitigation
80 million
operations
Modulator does not rotate
resulting in a loss of
instrument data due to
inability to make spectropolarimetric measurements
and produce 3-dimensional
vector magnetographs.
Redundancy (2 of 3 motors
required) has been incorporated.
Life test is planned Life test
planned. Testing will include
vibration and thermal cycling at
qualification temperatures. No
history of failure with similar
mechanisms used in life tests and
on orbit for prior programs.
160+
million
operations
80 million
operations
Filter does not rotate
resulting in the loss of
ability to orient filter and
capture images at very
specific wavelengths of
light: degradation of
instrument data
Redundancy (3 of 4 motors
required) has been incorporated.
Life test planned. Testing will
include vibration and thermal
cycling at qualification
temperatures. No history of failure
with similar mechanisms used in
life tests and on orbit for prior
programs.
80+
million
exposures
40 million
exposures
Shutter fails: loss of
instrument data.
Life test planned. Similar shutter
mechanisms are qualified, including
life testing. Similar shutters used
on the MDI and TRACE with no
problems after many millions of
operations.
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 35
HMI Contamination Control
Syndie Meyer
Contamination Control Engineer
[email protected]
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 36
HMI Contamination Control – Agenda
•
HMI Contamination Control Plan
•
Contamination Control Requirements and Flow-down
•
Design Features for Contamination Control
•
Cleanliness Inspection and Verification
•
Facilities (Assembly and Test)
•
Shipping and Handling
•
Integration and Test (Spacecraft)
•
Launch and On Orbit Operations
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 37
Contamination Control Plan
•
Requirements flow from SDO HMI PAIP, 2H00021 Rev. A.
– PAIP requirements for Contamination Control Plan (Section 11 of PAIP)
• Instrument shall meet performance requirements without unacceptable degradation due to contamination
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
–
Contamination Control Plan shall maintain instrument cleanliness through end of life on orbit
Materials selection and outgassing requirements are per Section 10 of the PAIP
Cleanliness verification required prior to delivery to GSFC
Caps, covers, protective measures and red-tag cover lists shall be in the HMI CCP
Ascent vent (ascent depressurization) and on-orbit molecular venting shall meet instrument safety and performance
requirements
Bakeouts and outgassing verification shall be performed to meet the instrument performance requirements
Shall meet requirements of SDO CCP 464-SYS-PLAN-0002 for non-cross contamination of SDO instruments
Science and Other Performance requirements (degradation allocations: HMI CCP Section 3.1.2)
• Pixel Outage: <0.01% (300 pixels) pixel outage allowance for contamination (about 37 particles <100mm). HMI is
relatively insensitive to pixel outage due to the relatively large number of pixels in the array (4096 x 4096).
• Throughput Loss due to hydrocarbon film and particle obscuration: Allow 20%loss (TBC) at 6000Å wavelength.
Visible-light throughput relatively insensitive to moderate levels of hydrocarbon film and particle contamination.
• Scatter and stray light. HMI is not sensitive to scatter and stray-light before the shutter, and is relatively insensitive to
moderate levels of particle contamination between the shutters and the CCD detectors.
•
•
Thermal control all thermal control surfaces on HMI are relatively insensitive to visible levels of contamination, except
the aperture door area which is insensitive to moderate levels of contamination
• Where required, quantified contamination allowances are being derived
HMI Contamination Control Plan, 2H00045, Status
– Draft submitted to GSFC for comment as apart of CSR (July 03)
– Draft CCP accepted in GSFC review and comments received
– Preliminary CCP provided at PDR
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 38
Contamination Control Requirements
•
Preliminary Contamination Budget (Section and Surface Cleanliness
Requirements -- Derived from Performance Requirements (all requirements per Mil-Std
1246C or JSC-SN-C 0005) HMI CCP Section 3.2.1 and Tables 3.2.1.1-1 and 3.2.2-1
–
–
–
–
–
–
•
Outgassing Requirements
–
–
•
(PAIP Section 10, HMI CCP Section 3.2.2)
Materials Screening to meet JSC-SN-C 0022/ 1.00%TML 0.10% CVCM per ASTM E595
Bakeout of major sub-assemblies and Integrated Instrument
Cleanroom Requirements
–
–
•
Hardware components: Interior 300A; Exterior 500A
CCD and interior of CCD housing at assembly: 100A
Instrument at delivery to spacecraft: Exterior VC-HS / 500A
Radiators and MLI at delivery to spacecraft; VC-HS / 500A
At delivery to orbit:Thermal control surfaces VC-HS / 750A
End of Life on Orbit: Thermal control surfaces 750C / VC1
(HMI CCP Section 3.4.1 and 4.4.1)
Class 100 for CCD detector assembly
Class 10,000, or better, for Structure, Optics, Telescope, Instrument Exterior, and Thermal
Control Surfaces through Assembly, test and environmental test.
Nitrogen Purge Requirements
–
(HMI CCP Section 3.7 and 4.3.3)
No purge required for HMI Optics if environment is Class 1000 or better and humidity is <50%,
but purge may be use as an additional protective measure.
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 39
Design Features
for Contamination Control
•
Materials and configuration
–
•
•
•
(PAIP Section 10, HMI CCP Sections 3.1.3, 4.3.1, 4.3.2)
to reduce sources where possible, cleanable materials and configuration, materials screening
Enclosed areas, Compartments, Covers, and Housings (HMI CCP Sections 1, 3.4.2, 3.4.4)
–
Aperture door to cover telescope window
–
Telescope optics isolated from environment
–
Enclosed Optical Package with other interior spaces
–
Enclosed, Isolated, and separately assembled CCD housing and assembly
–
Michelsons and Lyot Filter enclosed in oven
Temperature control (HMI CCP Section 1, 3.4.2, and 4.3.4)
–
Warm optics, especially Michelsons and Lyot Filter warmed in temperature controlled oven.
–
Warmable CCD detector recessed within a cold-tube isolator that acts as a collecting surface
for molecular material
Red-Tag Covers
–
(HMI CCP Sections 3.4.3, 3.4.4)
Sections of Optical Structure with separate covers for protection during assembly and test
•
Baffles, labyrinths, and filters at vents
•
GN2 purge port (HMI CCP Sections 3.7, 4.3.3)
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
(HMI CCP Section 1 and,4.3.3)
[Mission Assurance] Page 40
Cleaning and Verification
•
•
•
•
Cleaning and verification plan (HMI CCP Section 3.9, 4.6.1)
–
Piece part precision cleaning and verification of hardware (Section 4.6.1, methods 4.5.2 & 4.6)
–
Periodic cleaning and re-verification of Optic Package during assembly and test
–
Final cleaning and inspection of Optic Package at delivery (Section 4.6.1 per 3.2.2 req'ts)
Bakeout of selected sub-assemblies (HMI CCP Section 3.2.2, and 4.9)
–
Mechanisms, cable harnesses, MLI, electronics boxes, etc.
–
Certified vacuum chamber for thermal vacuum testing
Certifications, Witness Samples, and Monitoring
(HMI CCP Section 3.9 summarizes)
–
Cleanroom monitoring and Certification (section 4.4)
–
Vacuum chamber certification (section 4.9)
–
Witness sampling (Section 3.9 plan, 4.9 vacuum chamber, 4.3.5 hardware)
Performance testing during instrument and s/c I&T for verification
–
Actual instrument performance used to verify cleanliness when possible
–
Through-put, image quality and distortion measurable.
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 41
Facilities, Shipping and Handling
•
Facilities (HMI CCP Section 4.4)
–
Parts cleaning facility in Vertical Flow Class 100 cleanroom. B/202 2B28
–
CCD assembly in Class 100 Laminar Flow Bench in Clean area(Room 140)
–
Bakeout chambers B/252 Rm 107 dedicated to LMSAL Bakeout and thermal cycling
operations
–
Class 1000 Laminar Flow Bench in clean enclosure in Rm 107 for chamber loading and
unloading operations
–
Class 10,000 Vertical Laminar Flow Tent (Program D tent) for instrument assembly and test
(removable panel to allow testing with heliostat) B/252 Rm 110
–
Clean Tent with HEPA filtration, capable of Class 10,000 particle counts enclosing Thermal
Vacuum chamber. Rocket Chamber (Programs C and D) B/252 Rm 116 high bay
•
Packaging and covering between activities
•
Shipping and Transportation
(HMI CCP Section 3.9, 4.10)
(HMI CCP Sections 3.4.5, 3.8, 3.9, 4.10, 4.11)
–
Cleaned and verified shipping and storage containers, cleanroom compatible
–
GN2 Backfill
–
Cleaned and verified prior to use
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 42
Purge, GSE, Interface Control
•
•
•
•
GN2 Purge (HMI CCP Section 3.9)
–
Active for Optical Structure interior and vacuum chamber
–
Backfill for storage containers and shipping (Section 4.10, 4.11)
GSE
–
GSE cleanroom compatible
–
Cleaned and verified (VC-HS, or better, as required) prior to use with clean flight hardware
Flow-down of Cleanliness Requirements to Sub-contractors
–
Specifications and Statement of Work
–
Sub-contract contamination control plans
Spacecraft Integration, Test, and Launch operations
–
HMI CCP input to Spacecraft interface control document contam section
–
Comments and input to SDO CCP
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 43
Spacecraft I&T, Launch, On-orbit
•
ICD contains HMI requirements and CCP elements
•
SDO CCP contains HMI requirements and implementation plans
•
Instrument enclosed, covered, and with GN2 purge during s/c I&T and prior to
final faring closeout
•
Aperture door closed during launch
•
Instrument ascent vents baffled or labyrinth path for depressurization venting
•
Protective covers and witness samples removed prior to final faring closeout
•
Instrument venting during on-orbit outgassing period
•
CCD warm during on-orbit outgassing period
•
Maintain optical bench warm during operation
•
Capability for periodic warming of CCD to decontaminate is available if required
HMI Preliminary Design Review – Nov. 18 &19, 2003
[Mission Assurance] Page 44