Transcript Presentation Slides - Edmonton

Financial Executives
International
When the taps run dry: getting things done
during a credit crunch
November 24, 2008
Current State of the Capital Markets
FEI: Managing Funding Requirements
November 2008
Ernst & Young Orenda Corporate Finance Inc.
Brian Allard
Table of Contents
►
►
►
►
►
►
Current Market Conditions – Subprime Impact
Market Stabilization – Money Market Indicators
Canadian Perspective
Availability of Financing
Treasury – Focus on Short Term Liquidity
Financing Today – Conclusion
2
Current Market Conditions –
Subprime Impact
3
Where We Are Today
►
Despite repeated efforts by Congress and the Federal Reserve, including
the passing of the $700 billion bailout and the takeover of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac and the reduction in the benchmark rate, the U.S. economy
continues to slide towards recession
►
►
Consumers continue to face enormous pressure to cut spending due to an
uncertain housing market and weak job market
According to Moody’s Economy.com, of the 75.5 million U.S. households that
own their homes, 12 million, or 16%, owe more than their homes are worth
4
Where We Are Today (cont’d)
►
►
In an effort to stimulate lending in a concerted effort, the Fed, together with
the European Central Bank, the Bank of Canada and 3 other central
banks, cut benchmark rates on October 8, 2008
Despite these efforts, the International Monetary Fund states that the
global economy is headed for a recession in 2009 and estimates losses
from the financial crisis to be $1.4 trillion (worldwide losses are currently
just below the $1 trillion mark)
5
Subprime Related Losses
►
►
The following chart illustrates the $920 billion of asset write-downs and
credit losses by financial institutions (including insurance companies), of
which $695 billion are from more than 100 of the world’s largest banks and
securities firms
To date,
approximately
$825 billion has
been raised to
meet these losses
of which approx.
$710 billion has
been raised by
banks and
securities firms
Worldwide Subprime-Relat ed Losses t o Dat e
$1,000
$900
U.S.
Eur ope
Asia
$800
$700
$600
$500
$400
$300
$200
$100
$0
Losses
Capital Raised
Banks
Losses
Capital Raised
All Financial Institutions
Source: Bloomberg
6
Subprime’s Impact on Financial Services
►
The impact of the increasing defaults in the subprime market began to
trickle into the financial services sector in late 2006 and early 2007
►
►
In July 2007, credit rating agencies began to downgrade certain mortgage
backed securities resulting in the evaporation of the subprime market
Financial institutions were forced to write-down the book value of the securities
held as assets on their books
► According to Bloomberg, banks’ losses from the U.S. subprime crisis and
ensuing credit crunch stand at approximately $695 billion as of November
11, 2008
► Some of the highest losses have been incurred by U.S. banks such as
Citigroup ($68B), Merrill Lynch ($56B), UBS ($44B) and Wachovia ($97B)
► Canadian banks CIBC and RBC have also had writedowns
7
Subprime’s Impact on Financial Services
(cont’d)
►
As a result of these write-downs which began in the summer of 2007,
lenders further tightened borrowing terms to preserve their remaining
capital
►
►
►
Covenant lite loans disappeared while the use of PIKs became heavily
restricted
The subprime crisis came to a dramatic head when the Federal Reserve
facilitated the purchase of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan in the spring of
2008
And credit markets, which began seizing up after BNP Paribas SA halted
withdrawals on three funds in August 2007, froze after Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc. collapsed on September 15 2008, negatively impacting
lenders’ confidence of repayment
8
Funding Scarcity
The fallout of the credit crisis has been a scarcity of capital as the lender
base continues to shrink and remaining banks look to governments for
help in repairing their balance sheets
U.S. loan issuance, particularly leveraged and investment grade loans, have
significantly declined since the credit crunch took hold in the summer of 2007
U.S. Loan Issuance
$600
$500
$400
$300
$200
$100
Lever age
Investment Gr ade
3Q08
2Q08
1Q08
4Q07
3Q07
2Q07
1Q07
4Q06
3Q06
2Q06
1Q06
4Q05
3Q05
2Q05
1Q05
4Q04
3Q04
2Q04
1Q04
4Q03
3Q03
2Q03
1Q03
4Q02
3Q02
2Q02
1Q02
4Q01
3Q01
2Q01
1Q01
4Q00
3Q00
$0
2Q00
►
1Q00
►
Other
Source: Reuters LPC/Deal Scan
9
Funding Scarcity (cont’d)
Avg. bid (%of par )
95
90
85
80
75
J an-00
J an-01
J an-02
J an-03
J an-04
J an-05
J an-06
J an-07
J an-08
U.S. and European Bid/ Ask Spreads
300
U.S. liquid lo ans
250
Euro pean liquid lo ans
200
150
100
50
10
Oct-08
Sep-08
J ul-08
Source: Reuters LPC/Deal Scan
Aug-08
J un-08
May-08
Apr -08
Feb-08
Mar -08
J an-08
Dec-07
Oct-07
Nov-07
Sep-07
Aug-07
J ul-07
J un-07
Apr -07
May-07
0
Mar -07
►
100
Feb-07
►
Hist oric Average Bid Prices
J an-07
►
In the secondary market, the
average bid for multi-quote term
loans is at its lowest point ever
at 75.44 suggesting that loans
may be purchased for just over
75 cents on the dollar
As of October 2008, it appeared
that the bailout had not stopped
the downhill trend in bid prices
The bid/ask spreads for both
U.S. and European loans also
indicates lower levels of liquidity
As of October 2008, spreads
were 219 basis points in the
U.S. and 266 basis points in
Europe
Bid/ ask spr ead (bps)
►
Defaults in the Global Bond Markets
A year ago, the leveraged loan default rate was 1.2%
Number of U.S. Speculat ive Grade Default s
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Sep-08
Aug-08
J ul-08
J un-08
May-08
Apr -08
Mar -08
Feb-08
J an-08
Dec-07
Nov-07
Oct-07
Sep-07
Aug-07
J ul-07
J un-07
May-07
Apr -07
0
Mar -07
►
Feb-07
►
The amount of defaults are expected to increase with Moody’s forecasting
default rates to climb to 6.3% globally and 7.2% in the U.S.
As the number of defaults climbs, so too does the U.S. speculative grade
default rate which ended at 3.4% in Q308, up from 2.5% in Q208
J an-07
►
Source: Moody’s Investors Service
11
Market Stabilization –
Money Market Indicators
12
Market Indicators
►
Although LIBOR has come down significantly from its high of 4.81% on
October 10, 2008, credit conditions remain tight
►
►
3-month U.S. LIBOR is currently at levels not seen since October 2004
The cause for the decline is primarily due to the provision of virtually unlimited
funding from central banks as well as government offered bailouts and
guarantees to financial institutions
3-Month U.S. LIBOR
5.00%
4.50%
4.00%
3.50%
3.00%
2.50%
2.00%
September
1, 2008
September
15, 2008
September
29, 2008
October
13, 2008
3-Month LIBOR
13
October
27, 2008
November
10, 2008
Source: BBA, Bloomberg
Market Indicators (cont’d)
►
►
►
Prior to the credit crunch which set in towards the middle of last year, the
average spread between the 3-month U.S. LIBOR rate and the effective
Federal funds rate was approximately 12 basis points
On October 10th, 3-month U.S. LIBOR peaked at 4.82% representing a
spread over the effective FFR of over 4.00% — LIBOR is currently on a
downward trend
LIBOR vs U.S. Federal Funds Rate
A narrowing of this
spread to 25 basis
points would be
positive however
forward markets
indicate that this
will not happen
until the middle of
2010
7.00%
6.00%
5.00%
4.00%
3.00%
2.00%
1.00%
0.00%
Jan-98
Jan-99
Jan-00
Jan-01
Jan-02
Jan-03
Jan-04
Jan-05
Feder al Funds Rate
14
Jan-06
Jan-07
Jan-08
3-Month LIBOR
Source: The Federal Reserve, Bloomberg
Market Indicators (cont’d)
Federal Funds Effect ive Rat e
7.00%
6.00%
5.00%
4.00%
3.00%
2.00%
1.00%
TECH BUBBLE
LOW INTEREST RATES
HOUSING BUBBLE
SUBPRIME CRISIS
0.00%
Jan-98
►
Jan-99
Jan-00
Jan-01
Jan-02
Jan-03
Jan-04
Jan-05
Jan-06
Jan-07
Jan-08
The daily effective federal funds rate is a volume-weighted average of rates on trades
arranged by major brokers and is calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Source: The Federal Reserve, Standard & Poor’s via “Demystifying the Credit Crunch” Arthur D. Little
15
Market Indicators (cont’d)
A key indicator of credit conditions is the LIBOR-OIS spread
►
►
►
The LIBOR-OIS spread is a comparison between 3-month U.S. LIBOR and the
overnight index swap (OIS) rate
A widening spread indicates that banks believe other banks to which they are
lending have a higher risk of default so they charge a higher interest rate to
offset this risk
LIBOR - OIS Spread
6.0%
4.0%
3.5%
5.0%
3.0%
4.0%
2.5%
3.0%
2.0%
Spr ead
The spread,
currently around
170 bps, compares
with 87 bps on the
last trading day
before Lehman
declared
bankruptcy, and an
average of 11 bps in
the five years prior
to the financial
crisis
Rate
►
1.5%
2.0%
1.0%
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%
0.0%
September
October 1,
November
1, 2008
2008
1, 2008
OIS Rate
3-Month LIBOR
LIBOR spr ead over OIS
Source: BBA, Bloomberg
16
Canadian Perspective
17
Canadian Perspective
The Canadian market has also been impacted by the financial crisis which
gripped the U.S.
►
The spread between the 3-month Canadian T-bills and 3-month BAs widened
significantly in Q2 and Q3 of 2008 as stock markets plunge by historic amounts
and central banks worldwide attempt to unfreeze the credit markets
3-Mont h BAs over 3-Mont h Canadian Treasuries
6.0%
3.0%
5.0%
2.5%
4.0%
2.0%
3.0%
1.5%
2.0%
1.0%
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%
Jul-07
Spr ead
Rate
►
0.0%
A ug-07
Sep-07 Oct-07 No v-07 Dec-07 Jan-08
Feb-08 M ar-08
3-Month Tr easur y Bills
A pr-08 M ay-08 Jun-08
3-Month BAs
Jul-08
A ug-08
Sep-08 Oct-08 No v-08
Spr ead
Source: Bank of Canada
18
Canadian Perspective (cont’d)
►
On September 5th, Canadian banking executives met for roundtable
discussions and the overall view is that the subprime mortgage crisis
and credit crunch will significantly impact global banking
►
►
►
CEO of Royal Bank of Canada Gord Nixon said that credit spreads and
financing costs will remain high, “The days of cheap money are over, and
credit spreads across the board have, and will continue to significantly
increase the cost of financing.”
Rick Waugh, CEO of Bank of Nova Scotia said that it needs to be determined
which regulators will oversee financial companies in the U.S. and that
process could last a year or more
Overall, the banking industry is facing more transparency and scrutiny of
their balance sheets and the expectation is that regulatory capital
requirements will be increased
19
Canadian Perspective (cont’d)
►
►
►
►
On October 8th, the Bank of Canada, Federal Reserve, European Central
Bank and 3 other central banks lowered interest rates in an
unprecedented coordinated effort to ease the economic effects of the
credit crisis
The BoC cut the overnight rate by 50 bps to 2.5%, however, Canada’s
major banks did not initially follow suit and only lowered their prime rates
by 25 bps to 4.5% citing high borrowing costs in global credit markets
On October 21, the BoC cut the overnight rate again by 25 bps to 2.25%
Canadian banks followed suit resulting in a Canadian prime rate of 4.0%
“Three major interrelated developments are having a profound impact on the Canadian
economy. First, the intensification of the global financial crisis has led to severe strains in
financial markets. The associated need for the global banking sector to continue to reduce
leverage will restrain growth for some time. Second, the global economy appears to be
heading into a mild recession, led by a U.S. economy already in recession. Third, there have
been sharp declines in many commodity prices. The outlook for growth and inflation in
Canada is now more uncertain than usual.”
- Bank of Canada press release dated October 21, 2008
20
Availability of Financing
21
Availability of Financing
►
►
Credit markets in Canada are changing daily
Many international and U.S. institutions have pulled away from the
Canadian market or are in a state of uncertainty:
►
►
►
►
►
►
CIT
GMAC
Wachovia
GE Capital
Deutsche Bank
Remaining institutions may be “open for business” but there is
effectively no secondary market to syndicate or sell down exposure
►
Lending institutions are focused on optimizing the allocation of scarce
capital
22
Availability of Financing (cont’d)
►
Capital that may be made available for new funding has changed
dramatically, as illustrated below:
Rat e
Rat e
EBITDA
Pre-Credit Crunch
Post -Credit Crunch
(Mult iple)
Senior Debt
Tradit ional / Asset Based Loans
BA + 150bps
BA + 300bps
2.5x - 3.0x
Second Lien
Loans
BA + 500bps
BA + 1,000bps
3.0x - 4.0x
Subordinated / Mezzanine
Debt
12%- 14%
15%- 20%
3.0x - 4.0x
Equity
< 20%
> 25%
23
Availability of Financing (cont’d)
►
Lending is being governed by greater discipline as underwriting
standards have become more stringent resulting in lower multiples,
higher pricing and tighter covenants
►
►
►
►
The impact of the credit crunch to senior cash flow lending has resulted in
lower debt to EBITDA multiples which are currently in the 2.5 – 3.0x range
with up to 1.5x incrementally available from mezzanine lenders
Moreover, subjective “addbacks”, “adjustments” or “normalizing entries” to
earnings are also coming under greater scrutiny
Borrowers are being faced with increased due diligence from an ever
shrinking base of lenders resulting in elongated deal timetables
“Fully underwritten” transactions are history
►
Borrowers are being forced to piece together club deals to meet capital needs
24
Availability of Financing (cont’d)
Debt/EBITDA multiples have decreased significantly in the large corporate
market (EBITDA > $50MM) going from 4.9x in 2007 to 3.7x in Q3 2008
►
The virtual disappearance of second lien loans and the reduction in the availability
of traditional senior debt financing are the primary causes for the decline
►
While subordinated debt has increased as a portion of the overall capital
structure in the middle market (EBITDA < $50MM), second lien loans have
virtually disappeared
►
Average Debt Multiples of Large Corporate Loans
Average Debt Multiples of Middle Market Loans
(EBITDA > $50M)
(EBITDA < $50M)
8x
8x
5.4x
5.0x
4.6x
4.9x
4.2x
4.0x
4.0x
4.1x
4.3x
4.3x
4.8x
4.4x
3.8x
4x
3.7x
4.1x
4.0x
4x
0x
3.6x
3.8x
3.9x
4.1x
4.3x
4.4x
4.8x
4.3x
4.6x
FLD/EBITDA
SLD/EBITDA
Other Sr Debt/EBITDA
FLD/EBITDA
Sub Debt/EBITDA
SLD/EBITDA
Other Sr Debt/EBITDA
3Q
08
20
07
1Q
-3
Q
08
20
06
20
05
20
04
20
03
20
02
20
01
20
00
19
99
19
98
19
97
08
3Q
-3
Q
08
20
07
1Q
20
06
20
05
20
04
20
03
20
02
20
01
20
00
19
99
0x
19
98
19
97
4.6x
Sub Debt/EBITDA
Source: Standard & Poor’s, LPC
25
What Can Get Done?
►
Asset based loans are becoming increasingly attractive to certain
borrowers
►
►
►
►
Loans > $30MM pose a syndication risk
Market flex risk on terms, structure, pricing, etc.
Spreads in the range of 300 bps
Cashflow loans to borrowers of “strategic relevance” to lenders
►
►
►
►
Leverage < 3.0x
Industry specific
Sponsor makes deal “easier”
Spreads in the range of 400 bps
26
Treasury –
Focus on Short Term Liquidity
27
Treasury –
Focus on Short Term Liquidity
►
►
Current market dislocations require Treasurers to more closely focus on
short term liquidity
A more disciplined approach is in order ►
►
Stronger focus on quality of investments
Better understanding of organizations liquidity requirements
28
Treasury –
Focus on Short Term Liquidity (cont’d)
►
A portfolio approach to manage risk makes sense:
►
►
►
►
Understand the liabilities, i.e. the liquidity needs of the company
Measurement/forecasting needs to be done on a weekly if not daily basis
Manage investments or borrowings to meet that liability stream
Manage portfolio to:
1.
2.
Understand degree of counterparty risk
► Review investment policy
Align maturities with requirements
► Limit exposure to any single point in time
► Ladder portfolio to reduce exposure to short term market dislocations
29
Treasury –
Focus on Short Term Liquidity (cont’d)
►
Manage counterparty risk
►
►
►
Traditional approach of heavy reliance on debt ratings needs review
Additional due diligence required
Clearly define goal of investment policy: income generation, or secure
and efficient store of liquidity
►
Increase requirement for lower yielding but more secure investments
► Governments
► BAs from Canadian chartered banks
► Careful review of money market funds
30
Financing Today –
Conclusion
31
Financing Today –
Conclusion
►
►
►
►
To obtain financing in today’s market, businesses need to be cognisant of
the supply and demand constraints with which they are faced
Transactions are subject to more scrutiny and aggressive due diligence
requirements
The terms under which different lending institutions are willing to lend may
vary significantly
To succeed in this market, businesses must recognize that the path to
funding starts significantly ahead of the formal financing process
32
Financing Today –
Conclusion (cont’d)
►
Plan early to deal with debt maturities
►
►
►
►
Expect increased pricing and tighter covenants
Expect a reduction in unutilized credit availability/carve back of acquisition and
expenditure accommodations
In large syndicates, plan for fall-out of fringe participants
Review short to mid-term capital needs and strive to preserve capital
►
►
►
Review working capital cycle
Capital expenditures
Sale of non-core/redundant assets
33
Turning adversity
into opportunity
Aroon Sequeira
Stress Pendulum
Cash flow
Cash burn
Depending on your company’s financial strength,
the current environment presents both opportunities and risk.
35
3 Components of An Organization
“Core”
Operations
and Activities
“Non-Core”
Operations and
Activities
Core:
►
Those operations, assets, and people (OAPs) who
are critical to the operating company.
Non-Core:
►
Those OAPs who individually or collectively
represent a valued asset not core to the company,
but could be monetized to generate capital for the
ongoing entity.
Redundant:
“Redundant”
Operations and Activities
►
36
Those OAPs who represent a critical drain
on limited capital and should be eliminated
in an orderly or immediate fashion.
Corporate Hygiene
►
Cost management
►
Head count management
►
Capital expenditure management
Be Proactive with Scenario Analysis
37
Assess Counter Party Risk
►
Capital sources
►
Supply chain
►
Customers
►
“Insurance”
Ongoing Due Diligence is a Must
38
Manage Cash
►
Liberate cash from working capital
►
Weekly rolling cash flow
►
Review dividends and share buy back programs
►
Sell viable non-core divisions
►
Liquidate non-viable or excess assets
►
Sale lease back arrangements
Cash is King
39
If There’s Trouble on the Horizon…
►
Proactively manage lender relationships
►
Proactively assess divestiture opportunities
►
Consider risk theory
Time is of the Essence
40
Carpe Diem
►
Opportunistic Acquisitions
► EBITDA assumptions
► Multiples
► Balance sheet
► Increased due diligence
► Increased orphaned public companies
► Increased creative structures
►
Opportunistic hires
There Will Be Many Opportunities for Bold Moves
41
Valuation in Today’s Economic
Environment
Al Burant
Valuation Challenges
►
Fair Value standard refers to values in an Active market and assumption of a
Willing seller of a control position
►
Current market capitalizations often not determinative of value, including:
► Reference to own stock price
► Reference to comparable public companies
►
Reduced number of market transactions as reference points
► Some transaction multiples may reflect distressed sale
►
Limited number of analyst reports and updated financial forecasts
43
What We Have Seen
►
Reliance on Discounted Cash Flow models
►
Impact on Cash Flow Projections
►
Revenue assumptions
►
Timing of cash flows
►
Margin assumptions
►
Working capital assumptions
►
Capex assumptions
►
Impact on Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)
►
Cost of debt
►
Cost of equity
►
Leverage assumptions
►
Dealing with Uncertainty: Scenario Analysis and Sensitivity Analysis
►
Use of independent specialists
44
Potential Impacts on Financial Reporting
►
Annual Goodwill Impairment Test
►
Interim Goodwill Impairment Test
►
Long-Lived Asset Impairment Tests
45
Considerations in Current Market
►
Going Private Transactions
► Formal Valuation
► Fairness opinion
►
Responding to Takeover Bids
►
Share Repurchase
46
Conclusion
Can’t paint all scenarios with a broad brush – need to review
the facts and circumstances relative to each Company and
to each Reporting Unit in today’s economic environment.
47
Tax Issues
Peter Stephen
What are we seeing in the marketplace?
►
The current economic climate is a crucial time to leverage tax opportunities to
create and preserve value
►
Tax strategies may need to shift in focus to:
►Releasing cash
►Reducing costs
►Efficient refinancing/restructuring
►
Restructuring may be more complex than ever before given the predominance of
highly geared tax-driven structures
49
Cash
►
Converting tax assets to cash
►
Realizing or securing tax benefits
►
Deferral of Tax
►
Repatriation and Cross Border
50
Cash
►
Factoring receivables
►
Sale and lease back
►
Loss planning
►
Accuracy of forecasts
51
Cash
►
Commodity taxes - Apply a variety of strategies to improve commodity taxes cash
flow:
►
Offsetting payroll remittances
►
Accelerating input tax credit
►
Have early billing date on transactions
►
For significant purchases with GST payable, use a legal entity that is in
a net payable position for the purchase (and re-supply)
►
Where significant amounts of GST are payable, consider use of the
administrative “FAST-TRACK” Process with CRA
►
Use of Leasing Co. for PST purposes
52
Accounting for tax
►
Tax provisions – accuracy; review
►
Impairments – how will they impact tax accounting?
►
Deferred Tax Assets – should they continue to be
recognized?
53
Review of current structure
►
Is the current group / tax structure optimal for
the current downturn?
►
Transfer pricing – is methodology consistently
applied?
►
International Assignment Policy - is it too
expensive?
54
Staying on course
Kent Kaufield
Stay aligned to your business drivers
Keep us out of trouble
Improve reputation and
brand
Do external stakeholders
have a favorable view?
• Strengthen corporate
governance
• Improve risk management and
internal controls
Increase revenue and
market share
How does the
organization grow?
•
•
•
•
•
Successfully enter new markets
Develop new products & services
Improve existing products & services
Acquire new customers
Strategic acquisitions
Improve asset and
capital management
How efficient is the
organization?
Business drivers
Improve earnings and
operating margins
How profitable is
the organization?
• Revenue optimization
• Cost optimization
• Acquisition integration
efficiencies
• Minimize taxes
Make our business better
56
•
•
•
•
Optimize working capital
Improve asset efficiency
Non-core divestitures
Effective capital programs
Companies should take a strategic view in developing
initiatives to manage in the current economic environment
Maintaining business success
Business challenges
Lessons learned
►
Credit environment
►
►
Falling consumer confidence
►
►
Inflation concerns
►
Declining revenue and profits
►
Decreased equity values
►
General uncertainty
►
►
►
Focus on cost and revenue optimization
vs. cost reduction
Improve operations, including execution
of major capital projects
Focus on protecting company brand and
reputation
Prioritize and enhance strategic market
opportunities
Focus on timely and transparent
communication with all major
stakeholders
An effective cost reduction program will
focus on delivering sustainable results
that can be leveraged when economic
conditions change
Results from programs initiated in previous economic downturns suggest that companies should balance short-term results with long-term
business strategies
57
A comprehensive ENTERPRISE COST REDUCTION program
should be implemented – cut with a purpose and a plan
Key ECR program success elements
1
A vision which is fully aligned
with corporate strategy
and wholeheartedly backed
6
2
by executives
An hypothesis driven approach
An effective transition of initial
based on experience
program into sustainable
that focuses efforts on areas
on-going function
with highest benefit potential
Sustainable ECR
Program
5
A robust benefit tracking process
Design a portfolio of initiatives
that is embedded within existing
that creates an integrated
processes to drive accountability
and realization
3
Experienced program
management and
change management
equipped with a robust
methodology and
supporting tools that
4
drive execution
58
Roadmap for change
Q&A
Contact Information
Contact Information
Brian Allard
Senior Vice-President
Ernst & Young Orenda Corporate Finance Inc.
(416)943-2665
[email protected]
Aroon Sequeira
Partner
Ernst & Young Orenda Corporate Finance Inc.
(780) 633-5200
[email protected]
Contact Information
Al Burant
Senior Manager, Valuations
Ernst & Young LLP
(780)412-2385
[email protected]
Kent Kaufield
Partner
Ernst & Young LLP
(403) 206-5378
[email protected]
Contact Information
Peter Stephen
Partner
Ernst & Young LLP
(780)441-2445
[email protected]
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