Transcript RAL Template - International Muon Ionization Cooling

Hydrogen R&D system
HAZOP
Yury Ivanyushenkov
for
Elwyn Baynham, Tom Bradshaw, Mike Courthold,
Matthew Hills and Tony Jones
MICE Hydrogen system HAZOP
MICE Hydrogen system HAZOP
R&D Hydrogen delivery system:
- Preliminary HAZOP at the internal review – November 2005
Review panel recommended that “A full HAZOP study carried out
with the aid of an external specialist, should be completed as a
priority”.
- R&D system HAZOP study at RAL by SERCO experts – May
2006
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HAZOP at RAL
Mike Selway
Andrew White
HAZOP Chairman (Serco)
HAZOP Secretary (Serco)
Gary Allen
Tom Bradshaw
Mike Courthold
Matthew Hills
Yury Ivanyushenkov
Tony Jones
Chris Nelson
Jane Vickers
Target Station Controler (RAL)
Project Manager (RAL)
Controls Engineer (RAL)
Mechanical Engineer (RAL)
Research Engineer (RAL)
Mechanical Engineer (RAL)
Project Engineer (RAL)
ISIS Safety Officer (RAL)
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MICE Hydrogen R&D System
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HAZOP: Nodes
1. Metal Hydride Storage Unit
(Including Heater/Chiller Unit)
2. Hydrogen Bottle and line to Buffer Volume
(Including lines through HA-PV05, HA-RV06 & HA-PV07)
3. Purge/Fill Helium Cylinder and line through HA-PV18
4. Buffer Tank
(Including lines through HA-PV08, HA-BD09 & HA-RV10 to Vent)
5. Lines from Buffer Tank to Cryostat
6. Absorber Volume and Condensing Pot
7. Test Cryostat and Mass Spectrometer Port to Vent and exhaust Vent
(Including coolant lines)
8. Nitrogen System - Jacket and Ventilation Purge
(Including nitrogen cylinder and lines through HA-PV11, HA-BD12 & HAPV13))
9. Gas Panel
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MICE Hydrogen R&D System
Node 8
Node 3
Node 1
Node 5
Node 4
Node 7
Node 6
Node 6
Node 9
Node 2
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HAZOP Keywords
Keywords
Level
Flow
Pressure
Temperature
Composition
Concentration
Instrumentation
Operator Action
Structural Failure
Corrosion / Erosion
Contamination
Impact
Ventilation
Loss Of Services
Effluent / Waste / Residue
Sampling
External Hazards
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HAZOP Node 1
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HAZOP Recommendations
Index
Node 1: Metal Hydride Storage Unit, Parameter: Flow
Node 1: Metal Hydride Storage Unit, Parameter: Temperature
Node 1: Metal Hydride Storage Unit, Parameter: Operator Action
Node 2: Hydrogen Bottle and line to the Buffer Volume, Parameter: Pressure
Node 2: Hydrogen Bottle and line to the Buffer Volume, Parameter: Contamination
Node 2: Hydrogen Bottle and line to the Buffer Volume, Parameter: Effluent / Waste / Residue
Node 4: Buffer Tank, Parameter: Pressure
Node 4: Buffer Tank, Parameter: Operator Action
Node 5: Lines from Buffer Tank to Cryostat, Parameter: Flow
Node 6: Absorber Volume and Condensing Pot, Parameter: Instrumentation
Node 6: Absorber Volume and Condensing Pot, Parameter: Operator Action
Node 6: Absorber Volume and Condensing Pot, Parameter: Structural Failure
Node 6: Absorber Volume and Condensing Pot, Parameter: External Hazards
Node 7: Test Cryostat and Mass Spectrometer Port to Vent and Exhaust Vent, Parameter: Pressure
Node 8: Nitrogen System - Jacket and vent purge, Parameter: Flow
Node 8: Nitrogen System - Jacket and vent purge, Parameter: Impact
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HAZOP Recommendations
HAZOP Recommendations
Node 1 (Metal Hydride Storage Unit):
1. Look at pressure of hydride bed "on a hot day" i.e. high ambient temperature
MC
(Failure of heater/chiller pump -> Increase of pressure in system)
2. Consider a chiller pump failure alarm for the hydride bed unit
MC
(As above)
3. Review consequences of a glycol release (leak) onto plant items from the chiller
AJ
(Leak in pipework -> Ehylene glycol dripping onto plant/equipment)
4. Review appropriate methods of crane operating areas to reduce risk of damage
to plant from impact/dropped loads
AJ
(Dropped load from crane -> Damage to plant/equipment e.g. ruptured pipework)
5. Consider linking temperature monitor with heater chiller operation to avoid
overheating in the event of thermostat failure
MC
(Failure of thermostat in heating unit -> Temperature >30C causing rise in pressure)
6. Consider automation of hydride bed hand valve
MC
(As above)
7. Assess ignition sources around the hydrogen generation unit to reduce possibility
of fire in the MICE hall
CN
(External fire in the MICE hall -> Possible flame impingement on metal hydride unit)
8. Review hydride bed operational sequencing for inappropriate actions
(Failure of thermostat in cooling unit -> Lower temperature)
MC
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HAZOP Recommendations (2)
Node 2 (Hydrogen Bottle and Line to the Buffer Volume):
9. Review process for filling hydrogen bed for indication that the bed is full (including
the location of bottles during storage and filling)
MC
(Excessive hydrogen delivered to hydride bed -> Higher pressure)
10. Consider back streaming with He during connection to avoid contamination with
air during bottle changes
MC
(Failure to purge hydrogen filling line -> Lower pressure)
11. Review access to roof to avoid exposure to vented hydrogen
CN
(Emergency venting of hydrogen -> Potential explosive atmosphere at roof level)
Node 4 (Buffer Tank):
12. Consider test mechanism to validate (RV10) seal after discharge of cold
Hydrogen
(RV10
MC/MH
operates and discharges cold hydrogen -> Potential to result in failure to reseal)
13. Confirm that control software system conforms with IEC61508
MC
(Operator accidentally opens PV08 via control system -> Air ingress to system)
Node 5 (Lines from Buffer Tank to Cryostat)
14. Identify appropriate procedure in the event of blockage due to condensation of
impurities in buffer tank/cryostat line
MC/TB
(Condensation of impurities -> Pressure rise in the absorber volume)
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HAZOP Recommendations (3)
Node 6 (Absorber Volume and Condensing Pot)
15. Ensure hydrogen sensors on UPS in case of loss of power
MC
(Loss of power -> Inability to monitor state of system)
16. Consider the benefits of having all control system on UPS in the case of loss of
power to prove state of system information
MC
(As above)
17. Ensure that software intervenes when discrepancies are detected with provision
for limited operator intervention
MC
(Operator makes wrong decision -> Cryostat fills with air if, for example, PV25 opened)
18. Consider installation of mass spectrometer (RGA) on PV25 to monitor potential
embrittlement issues
MC
(Hydrogen embrittlement issues -> Leak of hydrogen)
19. Assess ignition sources around the cryostat unit (as for Recommendation 7)
CN
(External fire on the MICE hall -> Possible flame impingement on cryostat and affect internals)
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HAZOP Recommendations (4)
Node 7 (Test Cryostat and Mass Spectrometer Port to Vent and Exhaust Vent)
20. Review capability of bursting disc to withstand scenario of RV10 or RV23
pressure surge
MH
(Activation of RV10 (from buffer volume) or RV23 (hydride bed) -> Disc bursts and hydrogen ingress into cryostat)
21. Confirm whether bursting disc would create ignition source on activation
MH
(As above)
22. Consider the inclusion of a non-return valve downstream of the burst disc to
avoid pressure surge from RV10 or RV23 activation
MH
(As above)
Node 8 (Nitrogen System – Jacket and Vent Purge)
23. Consider installation of flow meter(s) / indication device to alert low/ no flow from
nitrogen bottle around nitrogen jacket circuit
MH
(Empty gas bottle -> Air in ventilation line and cryostat jacket)
24. Consider fitting non-return valve to prevent hydrogen flow into nitrogen system
on activation of RV10 or RV23
MH
(Discharge through RV10 or RV23 -> Hydrogen into nitrogen line)
25. Review need for protection/location of gas bottles to prevent vehicle (or other)
Impacts
AJ
(Vehicle impact with cylinder bottle storage -> Potential rupture of cylinder)
Node 9 (Gas Panel)
26. Review methods to minimise condensation on hydrogen pipework
(High moisture content -> Condensation on hydrogen pipework leading to pools of water on floor)
AJ
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After-HAZOP steps
What’s next:
- Get final report from Serco.
- Examine HAZOP recommendations (being started)
- Implement changes/additions to the system based on HAZOP recommendations
- Decide whether another session of HAZOP is required
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R&D Hydrogen system status and plans
Hardware:
- Implement modifications into the system PID as recommended by HAZOP
- Complete the technical specs package for a manufacturer
- Get quotations from potential manufacturers and select one
- Order the system hardware
( Delivery of hydride bed - last week of June – 1st week of July )
Control system:
- Examine HAZOP recommendations and implement them
- Complete technical spec
- Develop the system
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