Transcript Slide 1

Deepening the understanding of
the several key issues in the
upcoming UNFCCC negotiations
ACP Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change
7 to 9 November 2012, ACP Secretariat
Briefing on current key issues in the
UNFCCC negotiations and on the
positions of various negotiating
groups
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Contents
I.
Introduction: General overview
1. Background
2. The three core processes
II. The AWG-KP
III. The AWG-LCA
IV. The ADP
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I.1 Background
The UNFCCC Executive Secretary has stated in the
Ministerial meeting on climate change, which took place in
Seoul in October 2012, that in Doha, Parties have the
opportunity to show the world that the intergovernmental
climate change process:
 has built a firm response which now goes into
implementation;
 continues to build further in order to keep with
fairness; and
 increased ambition in order to keep within the
two degree temperature limit.
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I.1 Background
The UNFCCC Executive Secretary has also stated that in
Doha, Parties:
 Can move the second commitment period of the Kyoto
Protocol from lengthy negotiations to implementation
as of January 1, 2013.
 Can move the broad infrastructure of support which
they have been building under the AWG-LCA into firm
implementation, while deciding where to handle still
outstanding issues.
 In Doha, you can decide how you will implement the
commitment of financial support to developing
countries.
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I.1 Background
In accordance with decision 1/CP.17, Doha should attend
to three key processes:
1.Doha amendment (s) to the Kyoto Protocol to deliver a
second commitment period
2.Closure of AWG-LCA
3.Launch of the work of the ADP with a view towards a new
legal regime by 2015 to be implemented beginning in 2020
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I.1 Background
 A successful launch of the ADP will necessarily depend on
the outcome of the first two processes – which many see
as the real deliverables for Doha.
 In turn, the work in and beyond Doha could be better
advanced if a work plan with concrete milestones is agreed
under the ADP.
 In any case, a positive outcome on these processes will
depend on an interrelated set of issues
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I.2 The three core processes
For the AWG-KP:
 legal certainty of the second commitment period
 eligibility on the use of the Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility
mechanisms
 how to deal with excess units from the first commitment
period
 length of the commitment period, in light of the new
regime launched by the ADP to be implemented in
2020.
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I.2 The three core processes
For the AWG-LCA:
 How to terminate its work and distribute pending matters.
In principle, relevant issues not solved in Doha can be
forwarded to the permanent Subsidiary Bodies or the
COP.
 However, views diverge on the extent to which work
pursuant to the Bali Action Plan has been accomplished
and on which, where and how key issues under the
AWG-LCA should continue to be addressed
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I.2 The three core processes
For the ADP:
New body meant to launch “a process to develop a
protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed
outcome with legal force applicable to all parties” by
2015 to come into effect from 2020 onwards.
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I.2 The three core processes
The ADP:
Sets up two work streams:
1. matters related to paragraphs 2-6 of Decision
1/CP.17 (post-2020 regime); and
2. those related to paragraphs 7-8 (enhancing
mitigation ambition during the pre-2020
timeframe).
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II. The AWG-KP
The AWG-KP agenda for DOHA addresses issues
related to:
Amendments to the Kyoto Protocol and its Annex B,
including policy issues, and technical and legal issues,
including:
1. Second commitment period
2. QELRO definition
3. Length of the second commitment period
4. Continuity between commitment periods
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II. The AWG-KP: context
 The Protocol’s first commitment period concludes on
31 December 2012, therefore formal adoption of a
second commitment period cannot be postponed if a
gap in the continuity of the regime has to be ensured.
 In Durban, COP/MOP 7 adopted Decision 1/CMP.7
and agreed to “decide that the second commitment
period under the Kyoto Protocol shall begin on 1
January 2013.” COP/MOP 7 mandated some specific
work for narrowing down technical aspects required for
adopting a second commitment period in Doha.
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II. The AWG-KP: what is at stake
 Developing countries support having a “robust”
second commitment period and want to ensure the
environmental integrity of the Kyoto Protocol, as they
see it as the only international treaty that legally
binds developed countries to lower emissions.
 Developing countries prefer keeping the rules and
the top-down system that the Protocol represents, as
under the Convention the pledges presented by
countries since Copenhagen are voluntary in nature,
subject to conditions and not subject to common
accountability rules.
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II. The AWG-KP: QELROs
 Quantified emission limitation or reduction objectives
(QELROs) or commitments by Annex I parties are
critical for the establishment of the second commitment
period.
 An amendment to Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol will be
necessary for their adoption.
 For developing countries the adoption of high targets to
achieve real CO2 emissions reductions is key, given the
increased risks that they have to counter act.
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II. The AWG-KP: QELROs
 Parties communicated in 1/CMP.7 their quantified
economy-wide emission reduction targets and the
intention of converting these targets to QELROs for the
second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol.
 Thus, Decision 1/CMP.7 invited Annex I parties to
submit information on their QELROs for the second
commitment period by 1 May 2012, in order to enable
the AWG-KP to “deliver the results of its work on
QELROs” in Doha.
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II. The AWG-KP: QELROs
 This work is to be presented to COP/MOP 8 with a view
for it to adopt these QELROs as amendments to Annex
B of the Protocol.
 The final QELROs will be determined once all the
outstanding issues regarding the second commitment
period have been resolved.
 Participation of Annex I parties will, therefore, depend
to a great extent on the rules adopted and the
broader political context of negotiations.
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II. The AWG-KP: Length of the SCP
 In Durban, the COP/MOP decided that the second
commitment period “shall begin on 1 January 2013” and
“end either on 31 December 2017 or 31 December 2020,
to be decided by the AWG-KP 17.”
 Parties need to agree on the length before adopting the
second commitment period.
 A five-year long commitment period to avoid locking-in
the level of ambition and facilitate the updating of
mitigation commitments on the basis of the fifth
IPCC assessment report
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II. The AWG-KP: Continuity
 To ensure legal continuity, QELROs or commitments from
industrialized countries presented in a second commitment
period have to be legally-binding as of 1 January 2013.
 Adopting an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol could give
these commitments the required legal force.
 If negotiations in Doha conclude in the adoption of
amendments to the Kyoto Protocol Annex B, it will require
ratification by parties through their – usually lengthydomestic processes.
 A gap will arise as amendments to the Kyoto Protocol
itself or its Annexes require time to enter into force
following acceptance.
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II. The AWG-KP: Continuity
Proposals:
– Ratify amendments in an expedited manner
– Provisional application
– to “decide that parties to the Kyoto Protocol will apply
their commitments and other responsibilities under the
amendments to the Protocol.”
– to welcome declaration/s in an appendix, which
reiterate parties’ commitment to the Kyoto Protocol to
ensure that there is no legal gap between
commitment periods.
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II. The AWG-KP: Continuity
Flexible mechanisms:
 Parties will have to define who can operate the flexible
mechanisms, taking into account both Annex I parties not
signing up to a second commitment period and non Kyoto
Protocol parties.
 If it is agreed to grant eligibility to these Parties, then they
will need to define for which mechanisms, since when and
the conditions that would apply.
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II. The AWG-KP: Continuity
Carry over of AAUs:
 The carry-over of AAUs refers to a situation where a
country, having reduced its emissions beyond its target
during the first commitment period, can then carry-over or
bank these surplus emission units, and sell or use them
domestically to meet future mitigation commitments.
Currently the Protocol places no limitations.
 If no restrictions are placed on the carry over of surplus
AAUs, this could lead to no emission reductions compared
to business-as-usual emission projections by 2020, unless
the parties’ targets are significantly raised to compensate
for the excess in supply of AAUs.
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III. The AWG-LCA: Context
The Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative
Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) is a subsidiary
body under the Convention established by Decision
1/CP.13 (the Bali Action Plan) to conduct a
comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and
sustained implementation of the Convention through
long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond
2012.
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III. The AWG-LCA
Relevant decisions:
In Durban, CP.17 adopted Decision 1/CMP.17 and
agreed to “extend the Ad Hoc Working Group on Longterm Cooperative Action under the Convention for one
year in order for it to continue its work and reach the
agreed outcome pursuant to decision 1/CP.13”, at which
it “shall be terminated”.
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III. The AWG-LCA
Relevant decisions:
 The COP in this Decision mandated further work to be
taken to Doha on specific issues, including:
 shared vision;
 developed country mitigation;
 developing country mitigation;
 REDD+;
 sectoral approaches;
 various approaches, including markets; and,
 Review
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III. The AWG-LCA
Playing field and what is at stake:
 How to terminate its work and distribute pending matters.
 In principle, relevant issues not solved in Doha can be
forwarded to the permanent Subsidiary Bodies or the COP.
 However, views diverge on the extent to which work
pursuant to the Bali Action Plan has been accomplished and
on which, where and how key issues under the AWG-LCA
should continue to be addressed
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III. The AWG-LCA
Playing field and what is at stake:
Developed countries consider that most issues have
already been forwarded to the permanent subsidiary
bodies or other relevant institutions created for that
purpose, such as the Technology Executive Committee,
the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Committee and
the Durban Forum on Capacity Building.
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III. The AWG-LCA
Playing field and what is at stake:
Many developing countries support the continuation of
the work of the AWG- LCA until a successful outcome is
reached on all elements of the BAP, including issues,
such as means of implementation and finance for the
2013-2020 period, that need to be adequately addressed.
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IV. The ADP
Context:
Adopted last year in Durban under Decision 1/CP.17 as
one of the key elements of the Durban package.
Has held two meetings so far: ADP 1-part 1, in Bonn in
May 2012, and ADP 1-part 2, in Bangkok in late August
– September 2012.
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IV. The ADP
Context:
Sets up two work streams:
1.matters related to paragraphs 2-6 of Decision 1/CP.17,
referring to a “post-2020” period that will be
covered by the
new “protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed
outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to
all parties.” (post-2020 regime); and
2.those related to paragraphs 7-8, referring to enhancing
mitigation ambition during the pre-2020 timeframe.
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IV. The ADP
Relevant issues:
 How principles should guide the work of the ADP?
– divergence of views among developing countries as to
whether the common but differentiated responsibilities and
the equity principles, as currently interpreted and made
operational, should continue to apply.
 What “applicable to all” implies?
– argument that “universality of application” should not
become “uniformity of application” and that universal
participation must take into account the variety of national
circumstances.
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IV. The ADP
Relevant issues:
 Whether focus should be retained on mitigation or
equally consider the other Bali pillars?
– while most developed and some developing countries
support focusing on mitigation, particularly on raising the
level of ambition for the pre-2020 era, many developing
countries believe all elements, in particular adaptation,
finance, capacity building and technology, should be
central to its mandate.
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