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DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (Intelligence & Security) DoD Polygraph & Adjudication Process Study Mr. Thomas Ferguson PDUSD(I) December 28, 2011 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELDACTIVITY ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD PUT &TEXT HERE (Intelligence Security) Study Objectives • Assess Polygraph (PG) Programs’ compliance with policy - DoDD 5210.48 & DoDI 5210.91 • Review & assess the processes used by the nine PG Programs concerning applicant, periodic, & random screening for security, human resources & adjudication • Ascertain if PG exam results are being used in compliance with DoD policies • Assess if there is a consistent methodology in the handling of examinees who do not complete screening PG exams • Recommend PG & Security Policy COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELDACTIVITY ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD PUT &TEXT HERE (Intelligence Security) Scope & Methodology • Scope: 01 May 10 to 30 Apr 11 • Study Team composition & backgrounds • Site visits to all nine PG programs • Site visits to all eleven Clearance Adjudication Facilities (CAFs) • Review of Components’ PG & Adjudication files • 64 interviews/24 organizations visited COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELDACTIVITY ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD PUT &TEXT HERE (Intelligence Security) Background • 43,434 polygraph exams conducted - 40,872 Personnel Security Screenings (94.1%) - 1,537 Criminal Investigative Exams (3.54%) - 840 CI Investigations/Ops/Assets (1.93%) - 185 PSI/Adjudication (0.43%) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELDACTIVITY ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD PUT &TEXT HERE (Intelligence Security) Macro View • All nine polygraph programs are in policy compliance, with two exceptions: DIA & NRO conducted limited Extended Scope Screening (ESS) without authority • All 11 CAFs are in compliance with policies/restrictions regarding use of polygraph results • Interviews/files reviews at CAFs & Components determined no instances of adverse actions taken against those who either refused to take or failed to successfully complete a polygraph examination • Eight Observations with Eight Recommendations for Security & Four Recommendations for CI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELDACTIVITY ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD PUT &TEXT HERE (Intelligence Security) Observation 1 Issue: What to do with examinees who do not complete a polygraph with out admissions but have access to classified Observation : • 94% of Counterintelligence Scope Polygraph (CSP) examinees resulted in No Significant Response (NSR) & are returned to access • Remaining small number of examinees with Significant Responses (SR) or No Opinions (NO) with no admissions are in most cases returned to work with access • These are the most difficult cases to resolve without admissions or derogatory information found during investigation Recommendation: (OPR: CI & Security Directorates) • Collaborate to form a course of action to address examinees with access & unresolved polygraphs with no admissions & no other derogatory information COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELDACTIVITY ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD PUT &TEXT HERE (Intelligence Security) Observation 2 Issue: Polygraph Compliance With Policy Observations: • All DoD polygraph programs were in compliance with DoD policy with two exceptions - DIA & NRO ran a small number of ESS examinations in support of internal programs & NSA support respectively - Neither DIA nor NRO had USD(I) authority to run ESS examinations Recommendation: (OPR: CI Directorate) • Advise DIA & NRO polygraph programs to stop conducting ESS testing until such authority is approved by their respective Directors & after staffing for USD(I) approval COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELDACTIVITY ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD PUT &TEXT HERE (Intelligence Security) Observation 3 Issue: Fourth Estate identified as without polygraph support Observation: • Department of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) CAF, Washington Headquarters Service (WHS) CAF, Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) CAF, & the Defense Industrial Security Clearance office (DISCO) CAF did not have dedicated polygraph support Recommendation: (OPR: CI Directorate) • Coordinate with appropriate polygraph program to provide polygraph support IAW DoDI 5240.10 - DOHA will be supported by AFOSI polygraph office - WHS will be supported by NCIS polygraph office - DISCO will be supported by AFOSI polygraph office - JCS will be supported by NCIS/DIA polygraph offices COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELDACTIVITY ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD PUT &TEXT HERE (Intelligence Security) Observation 4 Issue: Polygraph process & capabilities training for Adjudicators Observation: • Polygraph-related training is not provided in the DoD Personnel Security Adjudicator Course • NRO & NSA polygraph & adjudicative programs have excellent in-house training programs Recommendations: (OPR: Security Directorate) • Coordinate the development of a polygraph training module for adjudicators • Coordinate the training of polygraphers on how polygraphderived information is best presented to & used by adjudicators COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELDACTIVITY ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD PUT &TEXT HERE (Intelligence Security) Observation 5 Issue: Polygraph & Security policy in the use of polygraph results can be better synchronized Observation: • Polygraph policy provides sufficient authority & guidance to execute the program • Personnel Security policy does not parallel guidance found in polygraph policy concerning the use of unfavorable, unresolved, or refusals to complete polygraph examinations. Recommendation: (OPR: Security Directorate) • Assure parallel guidance is contained in DoDD 5200.2 &/or DoD 5200.2M as is in DoDI 5210.91 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELDACTIVITY ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD PUT &TEXT HERE (Intelligence Security) Observation 6 Issue: Effective use of ESS by NSA Observation: • NSA is the only DoD Component authorized to use ESS questions - Falsification of security questionnaires & forms - Involvement in serious criminal conduct - Illegal drug involvement • NSA acquires a 20.7% admission rate compared to 12% rate for other polygraph screening programs • NSA attributes this result to the use of ESS • Top reason for access denials has resulted from admissions to undetected crimes • PERSEREC research shows that 38% of examinees omit reportable offenses on their SF-86s Recommendation: (OPR: CI Directorate) • Consider the augmentation of PSS testing with ESS questions with DIA & NGA polygraph programs for initial access by applicants & contractors COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELDACTIVITY ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD PUT &TEXT HERE (Intelligence Security) Observation 7 Issue: To improve the use of polygraph results as an adjudicative tool Observation: • FY10, OUSD(I) Security Directorate funded a program administered by PERSEREC that focused on assessing the quality & efficiencies of CAFs • This program is known as the “Review of Adjudication Documentation, Accuracy and Rationale (RADAR)” Recommendations: (OPR: Security Directorate) • Fund the PERSEREC executed program RADAR • Set standards refining the proper use of polygraph results, feedback to the Polygraph Programs from adjudication, & a process providing evaluation & analysis of the use of polygraph results across the adjudication community COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELDACTIVITY ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD PUT &TEXT HERE (Intelligence Security) Observation 8 Issue: Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) Observation: • JPAS & Scattered Castles are the first entry points for results of PSS polygraph examinations • Unanimous opinion of the 11 CAFs is that the polygraph section of JPAS was lacking data of potential benefit to an adjudicator • Specifically information regarding unresolved polygraphs. Recommendations: (OPR: Security Directorate) • Sponsor a requirements review working group of polygraph & security personnel • Identify polygraph data submission requirements, any JPAS/DISS system changes to meet those requirements, & submit the new requirements for validation COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELDACTIVITY ACTIVITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD PUT &TEXT HERE (Intelligence Security) Summary • Polygraph program is compliant with DoD policy • Adjudication process is compliant with the use of polygraph results • No adverse employment actions taken solely based on polygraph results • Develop a methodology to consistently handle SR/NO polygraph • • • • • • • results with employees with access Integrate polygraph results & adjudicative processes into Insider Threat methodologies Polygraph Programs identified to assist Fourth Estate organizations Improve Polygraph & Security policy synchronization Cross training awareness for both polygraphers & adjudicators. NSA & the effective use of ESS Improve JPAS usefulness for both polygraph & CAFs Develop RADAR for polygraph & adjudication evaluation & fund COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Back to front exit DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (Intelligence & Security) Questions? COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE