Case Study: Somalia

Bianca Chan Ji Hyun Rhim Matilda Ronning Chenyu Yao

Outline

• • • • • • • Historical background Action taken by the international community Tipping points and important decisions Failures of the international community Nicholas Wheeler’s Theory of Human Intervention and Somalia Somalia today Conclusion

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

About Somalia( لاموصلا )

• • • • • Location: Horn of Africa Capital: Mogadishu Population:700 thousand Resources: poor in profitable natural resources, poorly developed economic infrastructure after independence Clan system

History

Late nineteenth century: the British and Italians established British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland 1941 :Northern Somalia remain a protectorate, while southern Somalia became a trusteeship 1960 : the union of the two regions into the independent Somali Republic under a civilian government

History 2

1969 : Mohamed Siad Barre seized power in 1969 and established the Somali Democratic Republic, and ruled Somalia in a brutal and discriminatory way 1991: Somalia Civil War; Barre's government collapsed Since1991 : No central and internationall y recognized government exists

• • • • •

Siad Barre and Somalia Civil War

Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC)-Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) renamed the country the Somali Democratic Republic Brutal communist, totalitarian rule 1986: attacked clan-based dissident groups opposed to his rule -> used special forces, the "Red Berets“ Eventually ousted by combined northern and southern clan based forces, all of whom were backed and armed by Ethiopia.

Those against Siad Barre

• • • • • • • • Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) United Somali Congress (USC) Somali National Movement (SNM) Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) together with non-violent political oppositions: Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA) Somali Manifesto Group (SMG)

After Siad Barre

•

President Ali Mahdi Muhammad

selected by the manifesto group as an interim state president • • • •

Opposition

United Somali Congress military leader General Mohamed Farrah Aidid Somali National Movement leader Abdirahman Ahmed Ali Tuur Somali Patriotic Movement leader Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess refused to recognize Mahdi as president

Propaganda leaflet depicting a white dove of peace being crushed by a fist labeled "USC/SNA" ("United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance").

UN situation

• • Growing criticism of the UN role Too preoccupied with the Iraq crisis and the developing war in the former Yugoslavia to busy itself with civil war

American situation

• • • • Ceased to have any strategic significance at the end of the cold war Too preoccupied with the situation in Iraq, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the collapse of the former Yugoslavia to give much attention to the plight of Somalis Bush vs. Clinton American people were sympathetic towards the suffering Somalis vs. After soldiers faced fire from armed clans and 19 soldiers were killed in 1993 in the Battle of Mogadishu

ACTION TAKEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Action taken by the international community

• • November 1991 - March 1992: UN’s humanitarian agencies withdrew from Somalia out of fear for the security of UN personnel UN Security Council authorized sending of 50 unarmed observers to monitor ceasefire as well as 500 peacekeepers to assist with delivery of humanitarian aid

Action taken by the international community

• 1992 US’s first course of action to help Somalia crisis: airlifts food to Somalia

Operation Provide Relief

• • • • • April 1992-March 1993 • Led by United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) The Air Force C-130s delivered 48,000 tons of food and medical supplies in six months to international humanitarian organizations in Somalia 50 UN military observers to make sure food wasn’t stolen UN oversaw ceasefire • Unsuccessful 100,000 lives were saved as a result of outside assistance, about 10,000 after the United States join

Operation Restore Hope

• • • • • December 1992 - May 1993 • Led by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) • To make environment safe to deliver assistance UNITAF was followed by the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) • Raid in Mogadishu to make area safe for aid • Military supervised aid process Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia • Addis Ababa Agreement Worst of starvation over by March 1993 Humanitarian success!!

Operation Continue Hope

• • • • March 1993-March 1995 • Led by UNOSOM II An estimated quarter of a million lives were saved Revived the Somali police: some 8,000 were deployed in 82 district stations By March 1995, there were 46 district courts, 11 regional courts and 11 appeals courts

TIPPING POINTS AND IMPORTANT DECISIONS

Important decisions

• • • Resolution 733: enabled the council to authorize an arms embargo under chapter 7 of the charter Resolution 733, 746: led to the creation of UNOSOM I to provide humanitarian relief and help restore order in Somalia after the dissolution of its central government Resolution 794: unanimously passed on December 3, 1992 to form UNITAF, to ensure distribution of humanitarian aid and establishment of Somalia.

Negotiations

• • •

Addis Ababa Agreement

Some difficult negotiations in Somalia between UN Special Envoy, Aidid, and Ali Mahdi The principles of a ceasefire were agreed Overly optimistic as Mogadishu collapsed into a state of general lawlessness • • •

Mohamed Sahnoun

Sahnoun did a lot to see the clan system and secured the support of the clan elders Strengthened his bargaining leverage with the warlords But the secretary general pushed a more forcible way to solve the problem quickly

The Bush Administration and ‘Operation Restore Hope’

• Telegram from US Ambassador in Kenya + Bill Clinton’s criticism towards Bush for his foreign – policy failures over Somalia and Bosnia + Bush’s personal reaction to the stories of the suffering of the Somalis • Sustained media coverage on Somalia • Support from US public

FAILURES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Failures of International Society

• • United States: The intervention was too late • • • Worst part of the famine already over Biggest threat was diseases, not starvation More lives could have been saved Too much force put into finding Aidid • • Many civilians killed in the search No previous warning given before the raid against Abdi house (which was thought to been Aidid’s command and control center) – The Somalias killed was estimated to 10.000 by US intelligence, while Adid says it was 13.000

• Resulted in a distrust of US and UN, and a growing support of Adid

• •

Was the use of military force really necessary?

Sahnoun’s approach to solve the situation – Make the clan-leaders cooperate and weaken the power of the warlords – Some argue that the attempt was stopped at the time when it had just started to show results The promise of disarmament, March 27 – Even though 14 warlords signed the agreement of a disarmament within 90 days, it actually never took place – Instead they were told that they could keep their heavy weapons if they moved them into UN monitored containment areas or Mogadishu.

– The disarmament didn’t happen mainly because it would have taken too much time and US wasn’t ready to comit and stay in Somalia for the time period needed.

Operation Gothic Serpent

aka. “Black Hawk Down,” Battle of Mogadishu • • • • October 3-4, 1993 Part of Operation Continue Hope 18 U.S. soldiers were killed (1 more killed two days later in a separate incident) The United States continued operations until March 25, 1994, when U.S. forces withdrew and was replaced by forces from India, Pakistan, Malaysia and Egypt

• •

The early withdrawal by US and UN

US withdrawal

• Operational Gothic Serpent • Withdrew in early 1994 • • Eager to hand over everything to UN Did not stay long enough to be able to help in creating institutions such as idenpendent police and judicary

UN withdrawal

• Tried to rebuild Somalia and restore legitimate authority – but failed • Finally withdrew from Somalia by February 1995

Somalia Today

• • • The situation in Somalia is still unstable No central government have had control over the whole country since 1991 Considered a failed state

Problems

• • • • • • No central government Civil war Informal economy Religious extremists Drought Piracy

• • • •

The Government

Transitional Federal Government • • Internationally recognized Only have control over parts of the capital and some territories int the center of Somalia • Have reestablished National Insistutions – Militairy of Somalia etc.

The north-west part of Somalia, Somaliland • • Self-declared but unrecognized state Relatively stable The north-east part, Puntland • • Declared an autonomous state in 1998 and its leaders Considering themselves to be independent Al-Shabaab • Controls most part of the South

The Islamic Courts Union (ICU)

• • • • Controlled most part of southern Somalia until the end of 2006, and also the capital Mogadishu Lost their territory in December 2006 After this loss some of the hardline Islamists from ICU formed other militant groups, such as Al-Shabaab By January 2009 a reconciliation and deal was done between the TFG and Djibouti contingent from former ICU • Resulted in expansion of parliament • And the former leader of ICU, Sheik Sharif Ahmed, became President of TFG in an election in 2009 – still president today

Al-Shabaab

• Islamic militant organization • Controls large parts of southern Somalia • Using force and terrorist tactics in order to gain control • In February 2008 they were added to US’s list of foreign terrorist organizations

Economy

• • According to the CIA and the Central Bank of Somalia: – Somalia have a quite healthy informal economy based on mainly livestock – remittance/money transfer companies – telecommunications GDP per capita: $600 (2010)

GDP

GDP in current U.S. dollars. Only until 1990.

GDP

US: $114.119 trillion, Japan: $5.069 trillion

GDP Growth Rate

Percentage change of real GDP compared to previous year.

Industry

It comprises value added in mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, water, and gas. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources.

Drought in Somalia

• • • • • Data from 2006 Around 1.5 million people in Somalia are in acute state of food crisis Water storage areas have dried up Crop production is estimated to be the lowest in over a decade Big problems with cattle deaths Displacement of around 400, 000 people – Everyday up to 2000 Somalia refugees are migrating into Ethiopia

NICHOLAS WHEELER’S THEORY OF HUMAN INTERVENTION AND SOMALIA

Solidarism

• • • • States should satisfy certain basic requirements of decency before they qualify for the protection which the principle of non intervention provides (28) committed to upholding minimum standards of common humanity (38) State leaders have a responsibility to protect the security and well being of their citizens (49) State leaders override their primary responsibility not to place their citizens in danger (51)

Solidarist Theory of Legitimate Humanitarian Intervention

Four Minimum Requirements/ Threshold Criteria

• • • • Supreme humanitarian emergency Necessity/ Last Resort Proportionality Positive Humanitarian Outcome

Four Additional Criteria

• • • • Humanitarian Motives Humanitarian Justifications Legality Selectivity

Supreme Humanitarian Emergency

• • • “A supreme emergency exists when the danger is so imminent, the character of the threat so horrifying, and when there is no other option available to assure the survival of a particular moral community than violating the rule against targeting civilians.” (50) Crimes against humanity-genocide, mass murder, state breakdown , and ethnic cleansing Michael Bazyler-“Intervening nation or nations need not wait for the killings to start if there is clear evidence of an impending massacre” (34)

Somalia (1991-1992)

• • • • • • •

Ongoing civil war:

More than 20,000 people killed in battle (Sept. 1991 Dec. 1991)

Outside of battle:

Starvation; over 3 million suffering Massive death; 500,000 dead Displacement; 1.5 million displaced 80% of food aid stolen

Humanitarian Motives and Justification

• • “Governments that justify intervention in humanitarian terms establish a normative benchmark against which we can judge their subsequent actions.” (39) – Actions following claims are more important than the claims themselves Mona Fixdal & Dan Smith- humanitarian intervention is “just if it produces a surplus of good over harm-taking all affected parties into consideration. (36)

Somalia (1992-1993)

• • •

Motives

Somalia operation perceived as relatively risk- free and short term Bush wanted to deflect attention from his inaction over Bosnia Media and pressure from US public • • •

Justifications

Declared Supreme Humanitarian Emergency Somalia didn’t have any resources that was wanted politically Major operations in Somalia

Legality

• “Promotion of human rights is as important a purpose in the Charter as is the control of international conflict.” (Teson, 42)

Somalia (1992-1993)

• • • • After collapse of the Siad Barre government in 1991-> anarchy “the unique character of the present situation in Somalia and mindful of its deteriorating, complex, and extraordinary nature, requiring an immediate and exceptional response.” (186) “not a case of intervention against the will of the government, but of intervention when there is a lack of government.” (186) No government, no problems with legality

Selectivity

• • “Considerations of prudence do not determine the moral agenda, but they do condition its treatment.” (48) There were elements of self-interest involved, but it was largely out of humanitarian interest.

Somalia

• • • • No country had an agenda that would undermine the humanitarian purposes of intervention No resources No political imposition Too much media coverage and public sympathy to allow another agenda

Proportionality

• • Nigel Rodley- “Gravity and extent of the violations be on a level commensurate with the reasonably calculable loss of life, destruction of property [and] expenditure of resources.” (35) Are civilian losses avoided as much as possible?

Casualties

• • •

United Nations

UNOSOM I: 8 deaths out of 54 military observers and 893 military personnel UNITAF: 46 deaths (43 US forces), 156 wounded (153 US) out of 37,000 personnel UNOSOM II: 147 deaths (143 military personnel, 3 international civilian staff and 1 local staff) out of 28,000 personnel, including 22,000 troops and 8,000 logistic and civilian staff • • • •

Somalis

September 1991: over 20,000 killed or injured by the end of the year 1991-1992: 300,000 deaths, 1.5 million people starving UNOSOM I: 500,000 deaths

UNOSOM II:

Attack on Aidid safehouse-60 civilian deaths, 4 journalists dead Battle of Mogadishu-number unknown (estimations range from several hundreds to over a thousand killed), 3,000-4,000 wounded, estimated 200 civilian deaths

Expenditure

• • UNOSOM I: $42,931,700 net, 48,000 tons of food and medical supplies UNITAF/ UNOSOM II: $1,643,485,500 net

Positive Humanitarian Outcome

• • • • • • •

RESCUE Success of intervention in ending the supreme humanitarian emergency (37)

Fairly successful Operation Provide Relief Operation Restore Hope Millions saved from starvation Revival of police and courts Partial revival of infrastructure • • • • •

PROTECT/RESTORATION How far humanitarian addresses the underlying political causes that produced human right abuses (37)

Failed to address the root of the problems in Somalia Failed to disarm or capture Aidid Made no progress in restructuring the government Could not end civil war

Nicholas Wheeler’s Conclusions (52)

• • • There is a responsibility to protect Justifications, legality, and selectivity have progressively better humanitarian qualifications BUT, all three don’t have to be met.

Governments should be prepared to risk and lose soldiers’ lives for primarily humanitarian reasons

CONCLUSION

Solidarist Theory of Legitimate Humanitarian Intervention

• • • •

Four Minimum Requirements/ Threshold Criteria

Supreme humanitarian emergency • • Necessity/ Last Resort Proportionality Positive Humanitarian Outcome • •

Four Additional Criteria

Humanitarian Motives Humanitarian Justifications Legality Selectivity

Significance of Somalia

• • The case study of Somalia was significant because it was the turning point of humanitarian intervention, validating the responsibility to protect as a customary law – Customary law. “If over a period of time, states begin to act in a certain way and come to regard that behavior as being required by law, a norm of customary international law has developed.” (44) Also demonstrated what is needed in a humanitarian intervention – Cultural sensitivity – – Commitment Time – Balance

Links

• • • CNN Coverage 2010: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hHTKyAEl 6b8 Black Hawk Down Trailer: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tnV6wM vd9s Drought in Somalia: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8mK_myt Pc28